Debating Termination: Rhetoric and Responses to U.S. American Indian Policy, 1947-1970 by HUMALAJOKI, REETTA,ELINA
Durham E-Theses
Debating Termination: Rhetoric and Responses to U.S.
American Indian Policy, 1947-1970
HUMALAJOKI, REETTA,ELINA
How to cite:
HUMALAJOKI, REETTA,ELINA (2016) Debating Termination: Rhetoric and Responses to U.S.
American Indian Policy, 1947-1970, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses
Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11493/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP




Debating Termination: Rhetoric and Responses to 
U.S. American Indian Policy, 1947-1970 
 
 





Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 










Debating Termination: Rhetoric and Responses to U.S. American 
Indian Policy, 1947-1970 
Reetta Elina Humalajoki 
 
This thesis examines discussions surrounding U.S. American Indian policy from 1947 to 
1970, a period in which Congress aimed to “terminate” the federal trust status of Native 
individuals and groups. Federal rhetoric promised that Termination would lead to 
“equality” for Native Americans, allowing them to become “full citizens” and gain 
“freedom” from government paternalism. In practice terminated tribes, like the Klamath, 
lost both Bureau of Indian Affairs health and educational services and protections on their 
land holdings, and were consequently subjected to land tax. These changes led to a loss of 
lands, as well as increasing rates of unemployment, alcoholism and ill-health among 
members of terminated tribes. This thesis argues that public and tribal acceptance of 
Termination was secured by the vague nature of policy rhetoric, obscuring the gravity of 
federal aims, as well as the persistence of assimilationist social evolutionary ideology in the 
U.S. throughout the twentieth century. 
Scholarship agrees that Termination was destructive, but generally presents the policy 
as short-lived, beginning in 1953 and running out of political steam by 1958. However, it 
was not actually repudiated until 1970. Drawing on discussions in the national press and 
the councils of both terminated tribes (Klamath) and groups that retained their trust status 
(Navajo, Mississippi Choctaw, Five Tribes), this thesis argues that eventual Termination 
remained the aim of federal Indian policy until President Nixon’s 1970 Special Message on 
Indian Affairs. It also demonstrates that the rhetoric of “freedom” and “citizenship” was 
interpreted in multiple ways, playing both to the mainstream belief in the inevitability of 
Indian assimilation, and tribal governments’ hopes to gain further self-determination. This 
thesis thus highlights the power and significance of language, demonstrating that 
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Introduction: “What is it to withdraw?” 
 
“You brought up the question about withdrawing, but on the other hand the 
United States Government wants to terminate the Indian. If you terminate the 
Indians, then what is it to withdraw? Now, you talk about the Indians, a lot of 
these people don’t understand. […] I declare myself that the Indians are not 
ready today and never will be ready. I want you to understand.”1 
- Unnamed Klamath Tribal Member, 
Klamath General Council 
 
In January 1958, the General Council of the Klamath tribe met with Louis Sigler, a 
representative of the Department of the Interior, to discuss the enactment of Public 
Law 587, the Klamath Termination Act, which sought to remove the federal trust 
status of the tribe. Federal trust status, for both the Klamath and other federally 
recognised tribes, was born both out of treaties signed between 1776 and 1871 and 
national legislation, marking a historic relationship between the federal government 
and tribal nations.2 Trust status prevented the sale of tribal lands, exempted tribal 
members from paying land tax, guaranteed aid for the management of tribally 
owned goods and resources, and provided an array of services to tribal members, 
like education and health care. After the Second World War, federal Indian policy 
                                                          
1
 Klamath General Council (hereafter KGC) (25 January 1958), Major Council Meetings of American 
Indian Tribes, Part Two, Section II, 1957-1970 (hereafter MCMAIT 2/II), Reel X. 
2
 Thomas Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969 




turned toward eradicating this status through a policy commonly referred to as 
“Termination”, and the Klamath tribe was one of the first selected for this process.  
Despite the bill to remove their trust status having been passed four years 
earlier, Klamath tribal members’ discussions within this 1958 meeting demonstrate 
a clear confusion over what ‘termination’ meant, what the impact on tribal 
members would be, and how it related to the idea of ‘withdrawal’ – another term in 
common use. Both words conveniently elided the question of agency, as neither 
provided an indication of whether the government or Indians themselves were 
ending trust status. Indeed, a whole rhetoric formed around Termination which 
spoke of granting American Indians “equality”, but did not make clear exactly how 
this was to be achieved. Instead, Termination was enshrouded in the language of 
liberation – “freeing” Natives from supervision and unnecessary federal 
paternalism.  This rhetoric is exemplified by a 1957 essay titled ‘Termination of 
Federal Supervision: The Removal of Restrictions over Indian Property and Person’ 
by Senator Arthur Watkins (R-Utah), a main proponent of Termination:  
“Secluded reservation life is a deterrent to the Indian, keeping him apart 
in ways far beyond the purely geographic. […] Firm and constant 
consideration for those of Indian ancestry should lead us all to work 
diligently and carefully for the full realization of their national citizenship 
with all other Americans.”3 
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Watkins’ essay highlights four central themes of Termination rhetoric that will be 
discussed in this thesis: the limiting condition of “Indianness”; the need to be 
“American”; the rights and responsibilities of “full citizenship”; and “freedom” from 
reservations.  
Despite this rhetoric, in practice Termination not only failed to achieve its stated 
aim of securing Native “equality”, but it impoverished tribes and eliminated the 
economic advancements made during the early twentieth century. Standing Rock 
Sioux legal scholar, activist and former National Congress of American Indians 
president Vine Deloria Jr. aptly labelled Termination a “disastrous policy”.4 Over 
13,263 tribal members lost their legal status as Indians, and 1,365,800 acres of land 
was removed from federal trust status.5 Indeed, nearly all of the 109 tribes and 
bands that were legally terminated consequently faced high levels of 
unemployment, poverty, racial discrimination, alcoholism and psychological 
trauma.6 Considering this disjuncture between public presentations of Termination 
policy and the reality of its impact on tribes, it is surprising that the rhetoric 
surrounding Termination has to date attracted scant scholarly attention. This thesis 
will address the question of how the language of Termination was interpreted on a 
national and local level, to examine why Termination came to be accepted as official 
federal policy and carried out for nearly two decades. The rhetoric of Termination 
could operate within varied ideological frameworks and be interpreted quite 
differently, yet meaningfully, by either mainstream Americans or members of 
                                                          
4
 Vine Deloria Jr., Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto (New York, 1969), p. 54. 
5
 Raymond Butler, ‘The Bureau of Indian Affairs: Activities since 1945’, Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 436 (1978), p. 53. 
6
 Roberta Ulrich, American Indian Nations from Termination to Restoration, 1953-2006 (Lincoln, 
2010), pp. xiv–xv; Charles Wilkinson, The People Are Dancing Again: the history of the Siletz tribe of 




legally recognised Native American tribes.7 A reassessment of Termination is thus 
required, specifically one which recognises that the power of the policy was rooted 
in language. 
 
Termination legislation and policy development 
 
Before moving on to investigate the debates which surrounded Termination, the 
legislation and development of the policy throughout the 1950s and 1960s requires 
explication. Efforts to remove special Indian status began in the early 1940s, with 
scholarship pointing to World War II and reaction against the Indian New Deal as initiating a 
shift in Congressional opinion.8  Positive 1940s media depictions of Native soldiers indicate 
that public attitudes became more supportive toward the integration of indigenous peoples 
as a result of American Indian participation in the national war effort.9 Historiography also 
shows that Indians who had served overseas or been employed in wartime industries in 
urban areas became disillusioned with the poor living conditions of reservations on their 
return post-war.10 
Simultaneously, federal reaction against New Deal Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) 
Commissioner John Collier and his 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) led to a movement 
against reservation-centric Indian policy.11 In the 1940s the IRA, which organised tribal 
governments and consolidated communal landholdings, was criticised for being 
                                                          
7
 In this thesis, “mainstream Americans” denotes the largely Christian, middle-class, Euro-Americans 
majority population during this period. 
8
 Donald Fixico, Termination and Relocation: federal Indian policy, 1945-1960 (Albuquerque, 1986); 
Kenneth Philp, Termination Revisited: American Indians on the Trail to Self-Determination, 1933-
1953 (Lincoln, 1999). 
9
 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, p. 20. 
10
 Ibid., pp. 6-8. 
11




“socialistic”, and Congress repeatedly attempted to repeal it.12 This anti-New Deal 
sentiment came to a height post-war, fuelled by tensions with the Soviet Union. In the 
context of the early Cold War, congressional representatives presented reservations as 
“socialistic environments” and “concentration camps”, claiming communal landownership 
and tribal identity were inherently “un-American”.13 Congressional – and popular – opinion 
had evidently turned both against reservations and the “big government” services 
associated with the BIA. This occurred despite the increasing presence of Native activism on 
a national level, spearheaded by the 1944 establishment of the National Congress of 
American Indians (NCAI).14 
Late 1940s developments in Indian policy marked the beginnings of the Termination era. 
The 1946 Indian Claims Commission Act, though not explicitly affecting tribes’ legal status, 
was aimed at preparing for the removal of federal trusteeship by allowing tribes to settle 
historic legal grievances with the U.S. government.15 As the case of the mixed-blood Utes 
shows, Claims Commission awards were often followed by withdrawal legislation: after an 
$18 million victory, intra-tribal conflicts and outside pressure from Senators for Ute 
Termination led to the eventual withdrawal of tribal trust status from virtually all mixed-
blood members of the Uintah Ute band.16 The Claims Commission, thus, contributed to the 
erosion of tribes’ federal trust status. 
Senate concurrently planned for federal withdrawal behind the scenes. In 1947, Acting 
BIA Commissioner William Zimmerman, under instruction by the Senate Civil Service 
Committee, compiled a list of tribes categorised according to their ‘readiness’ for the 
                                                          
12
 Ibid., p. 6. 
13
 Paul Rosier, ‘“They Are Ancestral Homelands”: Race, Place, and Politics in Cold War Native 
America, 1945-1961’, Journal of American History 92.4 (2006), p. 1301. 
14
 Philp, Termination Revisited, pp. 14–5. 
15
 Ibid., p. 16. 
16




removal of trust status.17  Zimmerman divided tribes into three groups: the ‘predominantly 
acculturated’ who were supposedly ready for immediate withdrawal, the ‘semi-
acculturated’ who needed another ten to twenty-five years, and the ‘predominantly Indian’ 
who would require at least twenty-five years before Termination.18 Zimmerman, apparently 
reluctant to participate in such plans, established a set of four criteria for ranking tribal 
levels of “acculturation”: the degree to which a tribe was assimilated with surrounding non-
Native communities; their economic position; the willingness of the group to relinquish 
federal aid; and the agreement and ability of the state to take over responsibility from the 
federal government.19  
This “infamous Zimmerman plan” became the template by which the Termination of 
specific tribes was justified, with many ‘predominantly acculturated’ tribes losing their trust 
status in the 1950s and 1960s.20 Withdrawal plans were also drawn up for some tribes on 
the ‘semi-acculturated’ and ‘predominantly Indian’ lists, including the Wyandotte and the 
Oklahoma Choctaw respectively, indicating that Zimmerman’s criteria was not strictly 
followed. Nevertheless, the list marked the first concrete plans for the systematic 
withdrawal of tribal trust status, and for this reason 1947 has been selected as the starting 
point for this study. 
President Harry S. Truman further supported the shift toward removing federal trust 
status by appointing Dillon Myer as Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1950. Myer had no 
background in Indian affairs; rather he was an experienced federal assimilationist, having 
run Japanese internment as head of the War Relocation Authority throughout WWII.21 
Myer’s three years as Commissioner were steeped in controversy, with both Native and 
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 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, pp. 29–38. 
18
 Philp, Termination Revisited, pp. 70–1. 
19
 Edward Charles Valandra, Not Without Our Consent: Lakota Resistance to Termination, 1950-59 
(Chicago, 2006), pp. 30–1. 
20
 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, p. 33; For an extensive analysis of Zimmerman's List, see: Philp, 
Termination Revisited, pp. 71–5. 
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non-Native Indian rights activists opposing his nomination from the start. Scholarship has 
shown that Myer spoke publicly of the need to “free” the Indians and put an end to the 
history of federal paternalism under the Bureau, but his actions strongly contradicted this 
rhetoric. Most notably, he issued a circular to BIA Area Office directors stipulating that all 
tribal contracts with attorneys should be approved by himself – including cases where 
tribes hired lawyers to seek redress from the BIA.22 This action was met with public outrage, 
eventually leading President Dwight Eisenhower to replace Myer with Glenn Emmons in 
early 1953. 
It is important to note that while the language of ‘freedom’ surrounding Termination 
was usually vague, the policy itself was clearly understood by its supporters. Mid-twentieth 
century Indian policy was formulated behind-the-scenes by a number of key federal figures. 
Critical roles were played by – among others – Senator Watkins and Congressman E.Y. Berry 
(R-South Dakota), who headed the Senate and House Subcommittees on Indian Affairs, 
respectively.23 These subcommittees were the most significant driving forces of 
Termination, and represented the members of Congress whose constituencies were most 
affected by Indian policy – 76 out of 83 members of these two subcommittees represented 
states with a substantial Native land base.24 Those federal figures who supported fast-
paced removal of the federal trust status of all tribes, and the closure of the BIA, will be 
referred to throughout this thesis as ‘Terminationists’ due to their unified Indian policy 
aims. 
  As this thesis will discuss, various terms – such as “termination”, “withdrawal”, 
“independence”, and even “handling one’s own business” – circulated around the policy, 
but in essence these all were used by federal officials to denote the removal of federal trust 
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 Ibid., p. 67. 
23
 Valandra, Not Without Our Consent, pp. 40–1. 
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status from tribes on a case-by-case basis. This aim to withdraw tribal trust status was set 
out in House Concurrent Resolution 108, passed in August 1953:  
“Whereas it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the 
Indians within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same 
laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable 
to other citizens of the United States, to end their status as wards of the 
United States, and to grant them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining 
to American citizenship […].”25 
This statement accurately reflects the aims held by federal proponents of Termination – to 
eradicate the trust status which set Native Americans apart from the mainstream 
population. Critically, the resolution also indicates Congressional reasoning behind the 
policy, by presenting legal tribal status as “wardship”. Moreover, in referring to “privileges 
and responsibilities”, the resolution implied that the Native population had not lived up to 
the requirements of U.S. citizenship, as well as having been denied its benefits. 
HCR 108 was little discussed in Congress; supporters of Termination coupled the 
resolution with a variety of minor bills, concealing its scope and serious consequences for 
Indian affairs, and it was passed without much debate.26 The implications of HCR 108 were 
undeniably serious and had the potential to affect dozens of tribes, specifically listing those 
whose federal trust status should immediately be removed: “The Flathead Tribe of 
Montana, the Klamath Tribe of Oregon, the Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin, the 
Potowatamie Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska, and those members of the Chippewa Tribe 
who are on the Turtle Mountain Reservation, North Dakota.”27 However, it was not a law, 
but rather “only” a resolution, a statement of the federal government’s intent in relation to 
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 House Concurrent Resolution 108 (1 August 1953) in Francis Paul Prucha (ed.), Documents of 
United States Indian Policy (Lincoln, 2000), p. 234. 
26
 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, p. 94. 
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Indian policy.28 The nature of the resolution as not legally binding perhaps contributed to 
the lack of congressional discussion on the matter, thereby allowing it easier passage. 
HCR 108 was not the only national Indian policy legislation passed by Congress that 
month; Public Law 280 followed two weeks later. While this law did not explicitly refer to 
Termination, PL 280 substantially eroded the federal-tribal relationship of several tribes by 
transferring their civil and criminal jurisdiction to the state in which each reservation was 
situated.29 Before PL 280, jurisdiction was shared by tribes and the federal government. The 
latter authority applied over a wide-range of offences committed by an Indian against a 
non-Indian or vice versa, specific major offences committed by Indians against each other, 
and designated crimes that focused on federal trust responsibility, like liquor use, hunting 
and fishing.30 PL 280, as such, marked the first instance in which states gained authority 
over tribal civil and criminal jurisdiction, and it was immediately imposed on tribes within 
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin. A few tribes, like the Menominee 
in Wisconsin and Red Lake Ojibwa in Minnesota, strongly lobbied against the bill and gained 
exclusion from it.31  
Most critically, the law included a provision by which any state could extend its civil and 
criminal jurisdiction over reservation lands without tribal consent, clearly demonstrating a 
top-down dictation of policy. Thus, while PL 280 did not end the federal trust status of 
tribes, it significantly limited this without their consultation, paving the way for future 
withdrawal of other services, in addition to funds for tribal police and courts. Despite HCR 
108 speaking of “freedom”, in practice it was quickly followed by coercive legislation. 
Furthermore, though when signing PL 280 President Eisenhower advised Congress to add a 
                                                          
28
 Charles Wilkinson and Eric Biggs, ‘The Evolution of Termination Policy’, American Indian Law 
Review 5.1 (1977), p. 150. 
29
 Public Law 280 (15 August 1953), in Francis Paul Prucha (ed.), Documents of United States Indian 
Policy (Lincoln, 2000), pp. 234-5. 
30
 Duane Champagne and Carole Goldberg, Captured Justice: Native nations and Public Law 280 
(Durham, 2012), pp. 5–7. 
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tribal consent clause into the law, this was not achieved until the 1968 Indian Civil Rights 
Act. In fact, PL 280 has never been repealed and still has an effect on law enforcement and 
criminal jurisdiction for almost a quarter of reservation-based Indians, as well as all Alaska 
Natives.32 
HCR 108 and PL 280 had a clear national significance, expressing the intent to remove 
the federal trust status of all tribes at some point. Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s 
these aims were supported by laws Terminating individual tribes. Each case had its own 
specific conditions and arrangements, but they were all usually based on the same draft 
Termination Act drawn up by the BIA.33 As such, though there was variation in exactly how 
the elimination of federal trust status would be implemented, it always meant tribal 
members were no longer eligible for services provided by the BIA, and tribal lands were no 
longer held in trust.  
The Termination of the Klamath Tribes is illustrative of the problems caused by the 
“withdrawal acts” passed by Congress. The 1954 Klamath Termination Act not only 
removed federal trust status over the tribe, but gave members the choice to either ‘remain’ 
or ‘withdraw’ from their tribe after federal trust status was removed. This highlights an 
alternative use of the phrase ‘withdrawal’ in the 1950s and 1960s, meaning the withdrawal 
of individual members from a tribal collective that no longer had trust status. The Act 
provided for the appointment of three Management Specialists by the Secretary of the 
Interior, charged with calculating the value of tribal assets. It is telling that these figures 
were termed ‘Management Specialists’ – it reflects their role as strictly confined to planning 
the management of tribal affairs, and also indicates that apparently no tribal members 
were deemed able to manage this process, despite the Klamaths’ supposed readiness for 
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 Ibid., pp. 12-4. 
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 Patrick Haynal, ‘The Influence of Sacred Rock Cairns and Prayer Seats on Modern Klamath and 





Termination. The tribe’s finances needed to be valued in order to determine each 
member’s share: the Act mandated an election to be held in 1958, where former tribal 
members would choose whether to maintain their assets communally as a tribe, or 
withdraw their individual portion thereof in the form of cash.34  
To the surprise of the federal government, the appointed Management Specialists, after 
surveying the Klamath tribe’s situation, unanimously opposed the 1958 date for 
withdrawal, citing tribal members’ lack of both education and experience in managing their 
own affairs. They eventually gained Congressional approval to extend the final Termination 
deadline to December 1961 by arguing that decades of federal paternalism had ill-prepared 
the tribe for supposed “freedom”. They failed, however, to halt the process altogether. In 
1958, 78% of tribal members voted to “withdraw from the tribe and have his interest in 
tribal property converted into money and paid to him”, attracted by a $43,000 payment, 
and unsure of what exactly the alternative was – this had not been clearly outlined in the 
act, which only made vague references to appointing a new ‘trustee’ for those who wished 
to remain a community.35  
Through Termination in 1961, Klamath tribal members lost their status as “Indian” and 
became “full American citizens”. Yet they struggled to find jobs, manage swiftly diminishing 
finances, and gain services in Euro-American communities unwilling to accept them as 
equals. Fernando Herrera, a tribal member who received his withdrawal money in 1965 in 
his late teens, describes the sudden cash influx, alcoholism and confusion as destructive: 
“The parties we used to have, at one party my cousin, he stabbed a guy and he killed him. 
[…] Then I had another cousin that was mixed up in another killing. And this was all during 
Termination. […] The scars are still there, people are still remembering what happened 
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 Patrick Haynal, ‘Termination and Tribal Survival: The Klamath Tribes of Oregon’, Oregon Historical 
Quarterly 101.3 (2000), pp. 280–1. 
35
 Public Law 587 (13 August 1954), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-68/pdf/STATUTE-68-




during Termination, people my age.”36 Herrera’s personal history demonstrates the violent 
chaos that was a direct consequence of the Klamath Termination process. 
Furthermore, Termination only eradicated federal trust status – those members 
choosing to remain with the tribal collective were placed under the trusteeship of the U.S. 
National Bank of Portland. Many withdrawing members were no more ‘free’ than those 
who had chosen to remain; 48.9% of both withdrawing and remaining tribal members were 
deemed “incompetent” under the Termination Act, including all minors, and placed under 
the bank’s guardianship, forced to appeal to loan officer Ray Lung’s approval for purchases 
as simple as children’s school clothes. 37 Furthermore, as a result of the loss of education 
and health services, alongside increasing rates of alcoholism and unemployment, the 
median age of death dropped among former tribal members from forty-six years in 1961, to 
just thirty-nine and a half by 1971, in comparison to Oregon’s overall figure of 72.1.38 
Through Termination, most of the former reservation lands were purchased by the 
government and turned into Winema National Forest, meaning Klamath tribal members 
lost ownership over their traditional homelands.39 Moreover, these disastrous effects of 
Termination have extended well into the twenty-first century. Despite regaining federal 
trust status in 1986, reservation lands have never been returned to the Tribes, Klamath 
County remains the second most economically depressed county in the state of Oregon and 
poverty rates are still high.40 
The terms ‘termination’ and ‘withdrawal’ could thus denote two parts of the process – 
the removal of federal trust status from a whole tribe, or an individual’s withdrawal from a 
tribal collective after trust status had been revoked. Throughout this thesis, ‘Termination’ 
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will be used to refer to the federal process of removing trust status from federally 
recognised tribes, seeing as this is both the term commonly used to denote the policy 
today, and the term widely used in Congressional and BIA circles at the time. By the time 
HCR 108 and tribal Termination bills were passed in Congress, the policy had taken a very 
clear shape. While this thesis will explore the multiple interpretations of the policy by 
various interest groups, including members of the press, tribal councils and mainstream 
public, what Termination was in practice can be defined in this manner.  
Though the Termination of each tribe was carried out in varying ways, they all faced 
serious problems as a result of losing their trust status. Despite HCR 108 and tribal 
termination bills not usually specifically mandating the division of tribal lands, 3,307,217 
acres of land was removed from trust status by the government, between 1948 and 1957, 
with serious ramifications.41 For instance, though the Menominee Tribe in Wisconsin 
retained a communal structure by agreeing to register as a corporation, not allowing 
individual members to withdraw, leaders of Menominee Enterprises Inc. had little choice 
but to sell land to non-Indians to help pay for services within the newly created Menominee 
County.42 Similarly, the Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Confederated Tribes, who were 
terminated despite lacking substantial resources for self-sufficiency, saw a stretch of their 
homelands in the Oregon Dunes turned into a national recreation area in 1972, no longer 
protected by federal trust.43 This loss of land and resources significantly contributed to the 
further impoverishment of tribal members, who often remained on former reservation 
lands, far from mainstream workplaces, as well as health and educational facilities that 
were no longer offered by the BIA. 
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The federal drive for the termination of trust status over tribes was supported by a sister 
policy of relocation. Begun in the late 1940s but amplified by Myer in the 1950s, relocation 
was a federally-funded BIA programme to aid tribal members in leaving reservations and 
tribal lands for urban areas, for employment and job training.44 Between 1952 and 1957 
seventeen thousand Native Americans received relocation services, but after this both 
funding and popularity declined. Relocation was an obvious attempt to assimilate the 
Native population by removing them from their tribes, with individuals often purposely 
placed as far away from their reservations as possible in major cities like Chicago, Los 
Angeles and Cleveland.45 However, jobs provided through the programme were almost 
exclusively unskilled and low-level, and often seasonal. Consequently, relocatees struggled 
to achieve better living standards than they had experienced on reservations, and return 
rates were high. Discrimination and culture shock also added to the marginalisation of 
Native people in urban spaces, with Indian slums quickly developing in areas of poor quality 
housing. Furthermore, Native people often resisted assimilation in city environments, 
instead organising culturally, socially and politically engaged communities. 46 This, alongside 
the continued urban migration of American Indians after relocation funding ceased, 
contributed to a growing pan-tribal movement that became vocal on a national level in the 
1960s. Relocation efforts largely functioned separately from Termination and had quite 
different results. For these reasons, though the policies had similar aims, this thesis will 
focus solely on Termination and will bring in relocation only where discussions surrounding 
the two overlapped. 
In the late 1950s, various political figures began to speak out against the fast-paced 
withdrawal of trust status and problems of relocation. Secretary of the Interior Fred Seaton, 
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for instance, discouraged the withdrawal of trust status without tribal consent in a 1958 
radio speech.47 With the election of John F. Kennedy as President, and the transition to a 
Democrat government, emphasis in Indian affairs shifted further away from Termination. 
BIA Commissioner Philleo Nash (1961-1966) emphasised bringing Native Americans under 
the umbrella of programmes for the development of impoverished areas; under President 
Lyndon Johnson’s Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), considerable funding became 
available to tribes for reservation development.48 The influence of major Termination 
supporters in Senate also decreased in the period, with Watkins leaving office in 1959.  
Scholarship, as a result, generally presents Termination as having ended in the early 1960s, 
with historian Donald Fixico even stating that “termination came to a halt” under Nash.49 
Indeed, some significant legislation was passed in the late 1960s, most notably the 1968 
Indian Civil Rights Act which added a tribal consent clause to PL 280. This portion of the Act 
was universally applauded, but Native activists were concerned by its simultaneous 
assertion of the U.S. constitution over tribal governments, seeing this as limiting tribal 
sovereignty.50 Furthermore, the withdrawal process was not stopped or reversed in this 
period for any tribes. The last Termination bill to take effect was passed in 1962 and 
enacted in 1966, removing the trust status of the Northern Ponca Tribe of Nebraska.51 The 
Oklahoma Choctaw Termination law was repealed just one day before it was meant to take 
effect in August 1970.52 This is in part due to the efforts of a few determined 
Terminationists, who retained their positions on the Senate Indian Affairs Subcommittee, 
including Senator Clinton Anderson (D-New Mexico).53   Though President Johnson released 
a message on Indian Affairs in 1968, titled “The Forgotten Indian”, it was not until 1970, 
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with Nixon’s Special Message on Indian Affairs, that a major federal figure publicly 
denounced Termination outright – not just Termination without consent.54 Only with tribal 
restorations, beginning with the Menominee in 1973 and extending to the Klamath in 1986, 
was there a genuine recognition of, and attempt to rectify, the human disasters caused by 
Termination. 
 
“An ethnohistorical approach to politics” 
 
In 2002, historian Daniel M. Cobb declared that American Indian policy history was on 
the “decline”, citing the need for an “ethnohistorical approach to politics”.55 Rather than 
suggesting Native American history return to the one-way study of “what non-Indians have 
done to Native peoples”, Cobb encouraged the employment of ethnohistorical methods to 
enliven policy studies, re-examining the roles that Native peoples played in political 
interactions.56 This has occurred to a limited extent – for instance, Cobb himself has 
illustrated how Native activists employed Cold War rhetoric to justify their aims of tribal 
sovereignty in the 1960s, drawing on oral histories and the records of Indian activist 
organisations.57  
His 2002 criticisms nevertheless remain valid in relation to Termination scholarship, 
where two separate trends have emerged: legislative histories and tribal case studies. This 
study will bridge the historiographical gap between these by drawing focus to the language 
of Termination. To date no extensive research has been conducted regarding the 
development of rhetoric surrounding Termination from the late 1940s plans for withdrawal 
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up until the 1970 Nixon Message. Debates surrounding Termination, and the language 
employed in discussing Indian affairs by federal officials, public commentators and 
members of specific tribes, must be investigated to gain a better understanding of why 
Termination prevailed in the 1950s, and the extent to which policy aims really changed in 
the 1960s.  
Termination historiography has tracked the development of Indian policy over two 
decades – as outlined above – with most early literature on the period focusing on 
legislative history. The seminal text on Termination is Donald Fixico’s Termination and 
Relocation (1986), documenting the development of withdrawal policy from the end of 
WWII through to the early 1960s. 58 Fixico’s book draws almost exclusively on federal and 
congressional records, providing little indication of the author’s own Native background as 
Shawnee, Sac & Fox, Muscogee Creek and Seminole. While attempting to demonstrate the 
psychological effects of Termination and relocation on Native peoples, Fixico largely relied 
on an uncritical reading of mainstream newspaper articles and interviews to represent 
Native voices, rather than utilising oral histories or tribal documents.59  
This neglect of Native viewpoints was criticised by Kenneth Philp in Termination 
Revisited (1999).60 Philp’s significant contribution is in demonstrating how Native responses 
to potential Termination plans developed and changed in the years before HCR 108 was 
passed, showing that the policy was initially supported by organisations like the NCAI.61 
Regardless of his criticisms of past historiography, Philp nevertheless draws similar 
conclusions to Fixico – both ascribe Termination’s failure to Native refusal to assimilate into 
Euro-American society.62 Both books also focus on the background of, and build-up to, 
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Termination, mainly addressing the questions of why Termination was adopted and how 
the legislation developed, but not considering how it was implemented or how it ended. 
Legislative histories of 1960s Indian affairs are similarly limited by a lack of consideration 
for local variations. George Pierre Castile’s To Show Heart: Native American Self-
Determination and Federal Indian Policy, 1960-1975 (1998) and Thomas Clarkin’s Federal 
Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969 (2001) shed light on 
the development of Indian policy in an understudied period, examining transitions from 
Termination to self-determination. 63  Castile claims that Termination ran out of “political 
steam” in the 1960s, presenting Native activism as relatively weak in the period, while 
Clarkin underlines continuities in federal officials aiming for eventual Termination, with 
Native activism mounting against restrictions to sovereignty.64 Both bring in Termination as 
a contrasting background to 1960s legislative developments, and argue that Native 
involvement in the OEO marked a clear departure from assimilationist federal policy.  
Research on Termination legislation has, thus, strictly divided the two decades of the 
1950s and 1960s, with virtually all scholarship focusing exclusively on one or the other. As a 
result, Termination emerges in historiography as a short, intense period between the Indian 
New Deal and self-determination legislation. Focusing only on the 1950s fails to address the 
question of why Termination was not officially repudiated until Nixon’s 1970 Special 
Message on Indian Affairs. Even historians of the 1960s, while accepting that Termination 
was still widely feared amongst tribes, emphasise change in federal administration and 
legislative ‘developments’, de-legitimising the real concerns of Native groups in the period 
as the federal trust status of tribes continued to be removed despite their opposition. 
Examining these decades together will allow for a more adequate consideration of 
                                                          
63
 George Pierre Castile, To Show Heart: Native American self-determination and federal Indian 
policy, 1960-1975 (Tucson, 1998); Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy. 
64




continuities throughout the period, rather than imposing an artificial end point to the policy 
despite tribal terminations continuing. 
Both 1950s and 1960s legislative histories therefore pay scant attention to regional or 
tribally-specific policy developments, limiting any sense of Native activism or involvement 
to the most vocal, pan-tribal actions. Maori scholar Linda Tuhiwai Smith has called for 
academic “decolonization”, criticising the discipline of history for maintaining colonialist 
structures by drawing on Western written sources, and neglecting Native systems of 
knowledge.65 Despite – or perhaps in response to – his largely federal-centric first book, 
Fixico has recently presented similar criticisms of historical scholarship. In Call for Change: 
The Medicine Way of American Indian History (2013) he re-assesses approaches to Native 
history, outlining the need for research to be conducted based on Indian views, in order to 
construct “cross-cultural bridges of mutual understanding”.66 These are valid criticisms for 
legislative histories of Termination, which tend to marginalise Native perspectives on 
Termination in their top-down focus on federal impact on indigenous lives.  
This decolonization theory, advocated by figures like Smith and Fixico, has led to the 
emergence of a second, predominantly interdisciplinary methodological approach in 
twenty-first century scholarship on Termination – tribal case studies. The most notable of 
these are Laurie Arnold’s (Lakes Band of the Colville Confederated Tribes) Bartering with 
the Bones of their dead: the Colville Confederated Tribes and Termination (2012), Charles 
Wilkinson’s The People Are Dancing Again: the history of the Siletz tribe of western Oregon 
(2010), David Beck’s Seeking Recognition: the Termination and Restoration of the Coos, 
Lower Umpqua, and Siuslaw Indians, 1855-1984 (2009) and Edward Charles Valandra’s 
(Sicangu Lakota) Not Without Our Consent: Lakota Resistance to Termination, 1950-59 
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(2006).67  Each documents a tribe’s struggle against Terminationist policies – whether a 
Termination Act or PL 280 – drawing on tribal knowledge and oral history in addition to 
written documents, bringing out the ways in which tribal members engaged with legislative 
change and policy-makers.  
Termination case studies have otherwise largely surfaced as journal articles, or sections 
of larger works on twentieth century tribal sovereignty, like anthropologist Valerie 
Lambert’s (Oklahoma Choctaw) Choctaw Nation (2007).68 In addition, former journalist 
Roberta Ulrich has attempted to bring a variety of case studies together in one volume, 
American Indian Nations from Termination to Restoration, 1953-2006 (2010), including the 
struggles of the Menominee, Alabama-Coushatta, Utah Paiute and Nebraska Ponca tribes, 
amongst others.69 This increased focus on Termination within specific tribal contexts has 
provided important insight into not only the local implementation of federal policy, but 
how various tribes engaged with, resisted and shaped its execution. These case studies 
provide a scholarly response to legislative histories that – perhaps inadvertently – have cast 
Natives as passive victims of U.S. paternalism.70 
Possible Native support for Termination has become a taboo subject, with most tribal 
case studies identifying support for it as restricted to specific individuals pursuing personal 
interests, notably Klamath tribal representative Wade Crawford and Oklahoma Choctaw 
Principal Chief Harry Belvin. Only Philp contends that there was some support for trust 
status withdrawal plans by activist organisations like the NCAI, making clear that this was 
tentative and quickly turned to protest after the passing of HCR 108.  To date, no broad 
examination of how Termination was communicated to tribes has been conducted, or how 
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members of varying tribes interpreted and navigated the policy. This thesis seeks to 
complicate the ‘victim narrative’ of tribes dealing with Termination and to explain why the 
policy gained a degree of support – both from the mainstream public and some Native 
individuals and groups – by examining the multiple ways in which the language surrounding 
it was interpreted and understood. 
 
Tribal councils: between the BIA and tribal members 
 
Examining policy discussions between local BIA Area Office staff and tribal members is 
critical for understanding how assimilationist programmes were executed on the ground. 
As Cathleen Cahill and Gabriella Treglia have shown, BIA Area Office employees, including 
reservation superintendents, had a tangible influence on the implementation of federal 
policy at the local level in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.71 Seeing as the 
BIA – in addition to tribal attorneys – was the main source of information on federal policy 
for tribes living on remote reservations, the extent to which local BIA staff influenced the 
development of Termination policy for different tribes requires investigation. The ways in 
which federal officials communicated policy to a variety of tribes, as well as the ways in 
which tribal members interpreted Termination, need to be explored in order to understand 
the development of withdrawal. Tribal responses also need to be examined, recognising 
both vocal resistance and the possibility of initial acceptance. 
The minutes of tribal council meetings, collected and archived by both the BIA and tribes 
themselves, provide an avenue for gauging both federal and tribal understandings and uses 
of Termination rhetoric. These hitherto neglected sources offer an insight into the conduct 
                                                          
71
 Cathleen Cahill, Federal Fathers & Mothers: a social history of the United States Indian Service, 
1869-1933 (Chapel Hill, 2011), p. 257; Gabriella Treglia, ‘The Consistency and Inconsistency of 
Cultural Oppression: American Indian Dance Bans, 1900-1933’, Western Historical Quarterly 44.3 




of Indian affairs at a local level, containing discussions between BIA staff and council 
representatives, as well as the voices of a variety of tribal members. It is important to note 
that tribal councils are heavily linked to the federal government; rather than reflecting 
traditional tribal governing systems, tribal councils today are largely federal creations, with 
many having been established under the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act or other BIA 
action, and based on a European parliamentary system.72 Though the exact structure and 
size of each tribal government varied, all were monitored by the BIA in the mid-twentieth 
century: each tribe’s superintendent attended every meeting of the council, including 
sessions of any executive committees, and council documents were stamped and filed at 
the BIA Headquarters in Washington, DC.73 
As a result, councils have been heavily criticised as unrepresentative “elite” institutions, 
particularly by pan-Indian activist organisations. In the early 1960s, tribal councils were 
ridiculed by Native youth at the annual Workshop on American Indian Affairs. Bruce Wilkie 
(Makah) summed up activist criticism of tribal councils in his final exam for the 1962 
workshop: “The Indian Council is, in reality, a figurehead body providing a buffer between 
the Indian people of the community and the colonial administration (the Indian Bureau).”74 
These views were shared by members of the 1970s activist group the American Indian 
Movement, who commonly referred to tribal council leaders as ‘apples’ and ‘Uncle 
Tomahawks’.75 These criticisms were justified in the respect that councils did not constitute 
indigenous forms of government and were essentially colonialist constructs.  
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Council meetings appear to have been largely conducted in English, in order for non-
Native bureau officials to communicate with tribes. In most cases Euro-American 
stenographers were employed to record these minutes, meaning any discussions or 
comments that occurred in a tribe’s own language were generally not included.76 A notable 
exception is the Navajo tribe, in which a council member was elected to interpret from 
English to Navajo and vice versa.77 In other cases, tribal members who did not speak English 
were unable to participate fully, as their contributions were not translated. However, the 
inability of BIA employees to speak the tribal language may in some situations have also 
been advantageous to tribal members, serving to exclude federal officials from partaking in 
a given discussion.  
The evidence of both English and tribal languages being used to varied extents in council 
meetings demonstrates that proceedings were not dictated solely by BIA employees. Even a 
preliminary examination of the minutes of various tribal councils shows that these meetings 
allowed tribal members space in which to voice their concerns. The general council 
meetings of most tribes in this period were open for all members to attend, not just 
community elites. While the use of the English language did undeniably disadvantage some, 
the very fact that these minutes mention Native languages being spoken is significant, 
demonstrating that a wide variety of tribal members actively participated in council 
discussions. While critics of tribal councils, like Wilkie, may have been correct in highlighting 
the limited control that these exercised, reading between the lines of these minutes 
provides a sense of wider debates within tribes and the diverse ways in which the language 
of Termination was adopted and challenged. As such, the minutes are an invaluable tool 
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not only for evaluating how federal Indian policy was communicated to tribes, but also how 
tribes negotiated and responded to it. 
An awareness of the colonialist nature of these sources is nevertheless needed in order 
effectively to interpret discussions surrounding Termination. As Fixico has suggested in Call 
for Change, the study of American Indian history requires a reassessment of Euro-American 
sources and recognition of the one-sided nature of – and bias inherent in – written 
documents.78 Such an ethnohistorical method involves consideration of an indigenous 
community’s specific historical and cultural context. For this reason, four tribal councils 
have been selected for close examination in this study: the Klamath Tribal Council; the Five 
“Civilized” Tribes Inter-Tribal Council; the Mississippi Band Choctaw Tribal Council; and the 
Navajo Tribal Council. The minutes of various meetings of these councils from the 1940s, 
1950s and 1960s are available in Major Council Meetings of American Indian Tribes, a 
microform collection drawn from BIA records. These tribes have been selected according to 
their categorisation in Zimmerman’s withdrawal plans, with the Klamath labelled as 
‘predominantly acculturated’, and the Mississippi Choctaw and Navajo as ‘predominantly 
Indian’.79 The “readiness” of the Five “Civilized” Tribes was contested among the BIA – 
according to Zimmerman’s list they were ‘predominantly Indian’, but they continued to be 
referred to as “civilized” throughout the period.  
The Klamath Tribes consist of three historically distinct groups brought together on a 
single reservation by the Treaty of 1864: the Klamath, Modoc and Yahooskin Paiute.80 
Today the tribes refer to themselves in the plural as the Klamath Tribes to reflect all three 
groups, but the singular term was used by both BIA officials and tribal members in the mid-
twentieth century, and will be employed throughout this thesis for that reason. The 
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Klamath General Council consisted of all adult members of the tribe, but only one hundred 
out of roughly a thousand and a half were required to be present at a meeting for quorum 
to be reached.81 In addition to the General Council, a ten member Executive Committee 
was established under the constitution accepted by the General Council in 1950, replacing 
the Business Committee established by the BIA in 1908 to aid in communicating 
programme matters to the full tribal membership.  The stated aim of the new Executive 
Committee was preparing the tribal government for full administration over the common 
estate, and they appear to have met on roughly a monthly basis.82  
In practice, however, the BIA practiced significantly more administrative power on the 
reservation than the Council, as reflected by the much larger size of the local Agency: the 
reservation Superintendent employed over one hundred staff members, compared to the 
General Council’s fifteen. It must be noted, however, that the Council was not purely a BIA 
imposition, having grown out of a combination of a tradition of collective tribal meetings 
held since at least the late 1800s and the needs of the BIA for a formal organ of tribal 
representation to communicate with.83 Indeed, the lack of control over their administration 
and resources was a constant source of frustration for tribal members throughout the first 
half of the twentieth century, as evidenced by the numerous proposals made by 
representatives to gain greater control over their own affairs.84 
As detailed above, the tribe was terminated in 1961 through the enactment of PL 587, 
the Klamath Termination Act. The Klamaths had long been considered a prime candidate 
for the removal of trust status, with former superintendent and tribal member Wade 
Crawford having lobbied Congress for a full liquidation bill from 1945 onwards.85 It was no 
surprise, then, that Zimmerman categorised the tribe as ‘predominantly acculturated’. The 
                                                          
81
 Stern, The Klamath Tribe, p. 245. 
82
 Ibid., pp. 236-8. 
83
 Ibid., p. 243. 
84
 Haynal, ‘Termination and Tribal Survival’, p. 272. 
85




belief that the Klamaths were largely assimilated is evident in a 1954 statement by Assistant 
Interior Secretary Orme Lewis:  
“Through intermarriage with non-Indians and cooperative work and 
association with their non-Indian neighbors… these people have been largely 
integrated into all phases of the economic and social life of the area. The 
standard of living of the Klamath Indians compares favourably with that of 
their non-Indian neighbors. Their dress is modern, and there remains little 
vestige of religious or their traditional Indian customs.”86 
The tribe’s “readiness” for withdrawal was, thus, based on apparent material equivalence 
with Euro-American society in the area, rather than clear information on economic ability, 
willingness of tribal members to give up their trust status, or the state’s capacity to take 
over services. While the tribe did have a relatively successful lumber industry, individual 
Klamath tribal members had little income: 37% of the tribal population lived solely off their 
$800 per capita payments.87 As stated earlier, the economic effects of Termination upon 
the Klamaths were disastrous.  
Furthermore, BIA staff appear to have based their evaluation of the tribe’s acculturation 
on a few individual pro-Termination members, like Crawford, who could afford to travel to 
Washington to campaign for withdrawal.88 However, the continued practice of traditional 
Klamath and Modoc religious and cultural rites to this day contradicts Assistant Secretary 
Lewis’ description of the Klamath. As anthropologist Patrick Haynal has noted, Klamath 
tribal members – including those who self-identify as Christians – generally believe in the 
significance of the spiritual connection between people and the natural environment, in 
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accordance with the Klamath origin story of their cultural hero Gmok’am’c creating their 
tribal homelands. Traditional religious practices, like the use of sacred rock cairns and 
prayer seats for individual spiritual quests, did not die out under early twentieth century 
assimilationist policies. Rather these beliefs are considered private and not suitable for 
discussion with outsiders, meaning BIA employees may not have been aware of the extent 
to which traditional cultural practices persisted.89 Reassessing discussions within Klamath 
tribal council meetings taking into account their cultural and historical background, while 
still acknowledging their frustrations with BIA administrative structures, will lead to a 
deeper understanding of their interpretations of Termination rhetoric.  
Unlike the Klamath, the Five “Civilized” Tribes do not reside on their traditional 
homelands. As a result of 1830s federal removal policies, the Cherokee, Choctaw, Creek, 
Chickasaw and Seminole tribes were forcibly and violently removed from their lands east of 
the Mississippi into present-day Oklahoma.90 Though the tribes re-established themselves 
as self-governing nations remarkably quickly, the trauma of removal lives on in their 
communal memory and informs their identities today.91 The questionable moniker of the 
“civilized” tribes is rooted in this post-removal period, as the tribes each established their 
own constitutions, governments and schooling systems by building on both Euro-American 
models and traditional patterns of communal land ownership.92 Many of these steps at 
building self-sustaining nations by combining the traditions of their tribes and Euro-
American methods were lost as a result of allotment policy and the 1906 Five Tribes Act, 
which significantly limited their sovereignty, for instance transferring power of electing 
tribal chairmen to the U.S. President. Historiography on the Five Tribes generally contends 
that tribal members favoured assimilation throughout the first half of the twentieth 
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century, with traditional cultural practices falling out of favour and tribal leaders becoming 
involved in pan-Indian organisations like the Society of American Indians.93 For the 
Choctaw, a Termination act was even passed, with Fixico attributing this to the tribe’s own 
willingness to “seize the initiative in abrogating their trust relationship.”94  
Anthropologist Valerie Lambert has complicated this view, demonstrating both how 
cultural practices were maintained on a local level amongst Choctaw communities, and that 
Choctaw Termination was profoundly guided by Principal Chief Harry Belvin and repealed 
due to strong tribal opposition before it could be executed in 1970.95 This study will 
consider the minutes of the Inter-Tribal Council, a forum consisting of five representatives 
of each tribe (including the chairmen nominated by the U.S. President) which normally held 
a day-long session four times a year, in January, April, July and October.96 These 
representatives were certainly elites largely instated by the federal government. Including 
the Inter-Tribal Council within this study of the language of Termination will allow for an 
examination of potential differences in how BIA employees presented Termination policy to 
“elite” members of tribes in comparison to those considered “predominantly Indian”. These 
minutes are especially useful for investigating the extent to which Termination was 
accepted by the supposedly “elite” acculturated members of tribes not officially deemed 
ready for wholesale withdrawal. 
Removal is equally a significant part of Mississippi Band Choctaw history and an 
influence on the tribe’s identity. As a result of Article 14 of the 1832 Treaty of Dancing 
Rabbit Creek, individual Choctaws were granted rights to land allotments in Mississippi, 
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which would lead to state citizenship if continuously occupied for five years.97 After 
struggling for over a century to both practice these rights and to be recognised as a tribe, 
Choctaw lands were reclassified as a reservation in 1944, to allow the local BIA area agency 
to set up an oil lease requested by the Shell Oil Company.98 A tribal council was also 
established at this time, to work as an advisory body to the BIA Muskogee Area Office in 
Oklahoma, which controlled the tribe’s few funds and administered programs.99 In terms of 
national Indian policy, the tribe was often forgotten – not even being specifically 
mentioned in Zimmerman’s List, but rather implicitly included under the general ‘Choctaw’ 
heading as over twenty-five years away from Termination.100 
The tribal council was initially small and limited in power, with its sixteen members 
meeting in the BIA agency kitchen. These representatives were popularly elected by adult 
tribal members, with one to three from each of the reservation’s seven districts, usually 
including already prominent community and religious leaders, as well as WWII veterans.101 
The council’s chairman, vice-chairman and secretary-treasurer were then elected by council 
members, rather than by the general Choctaw public. However, a shift away from 
paternalist BIA control occurred under the leadership of Phillip Martin, who entered tribal 
politics in 1957 and went on to be tribal chairman until 2007.102 Throughout the 1960s and 
1970s the tribal government expanded and took over control for their own administration 
with the help of OEO programmes, eventually developing a successful tribal economy and 
judicial system.103  
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The Navajo Nation, as it is known today, was straightforwardly classified as 
‘predominantly Indian’ in Zimmerman’s list, due to their undeniable poverty, poor health 
and lack of formal schooling. After the end of WWII, the Navajos had the highest rate of 
tuberculosis in the country, an infant mortality rate ten times the national average and 
classroom space for only 6,000 of the 24,000 children on the reservation.104 As a result of 
press outrage at the poor conditions on the reservation, Congress negotiated a 
development package for the tribe throughout the final years of the 1940s, passing the 
Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act in 1950.105 With the support of this act, further government 
aid, and a lucrative spell in the value of many of the tribe’s natural resources like coal and 
uranium, the tribe fared relatively well economically in the Termination period. 
These economic achievements were coupled with the tribe taking major steps toward 
sovereignty and greater self-government, as the tribal council consolidated its role as 
governing body and tripled its budget. Historian Peter Iverson has gone so far as to say that 
“[…] the termination movement helped inspire a Navajo nationalist movement.”106 
Historically the Diné – meaning “The People” – have been a unified group for generations 
before the establishment of the U.S. government, being united through a vast but well-
defined territory, common language and shared customs and beliefs.107 Diné culture is 
traditionally “matricentered”, with women holding a strong socio-economic position as the 
owners of livestock and heads of household.108 Before Spanish contact, the Diné were 
usually separated into local bands led by headman known as naataanii, but interaction with 
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Spanish and American militaries led to the formation of a more centralised tribal 
leadership.109  
The mid-twentieth century form of the tribal council, which was established by the BIA 
in the 1920s to sign off on oil leases, by no means reflects the traditional forms of Diné 
government. It expanded in the 1930s and by the 1950s, the Tribal Council consisted of 
seventy-four representatives, selected through elections hosted by local chapters, which 
had been drawn up by BIA staff based on pre-existing networks and local groups.110 These 
council representatives then elected the tribal chairman and vice-chairman, usually 
choosing men who had been educated at off-reservation boarding schools, like Jacob 
Morgan (1938-1942), Sam Ahkeah (1946-1954) and Paul Jones (1955-1963).111 Post-WWII, a 
significant portion of both tribal leaders and council representatives were also veterans. 
However, historian Carolyn Niethammer, biographer of councilwoman Annie Wauneka, has 
noted that the majority of council delegates “came from the lower economic levels of the 
community.”112 This assertion is supported by the fact that English-to-Navajo interpreters 
were used continuously out of necessity. Compared to the other tribal councils considered 
here, the Navajo representatives were probably the most varied in background. It is 
important to note, however, that naataanii continued to function separately from the 
council as local advisors, and traditional “singers” who conducted ceremonies like the 
Blessing Way also held a position of importance.113 
The tribal councils examined in this thesis, therefore, varied broadly in terms of their 
geographical location, historical context and composition, but each was an administrative 
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group composed of tribal members recognised by, and linked to, the BIA. Apart from the 
Five Tribes Inter-Tribal Council, the council representatives were popularly elected by tribal 
members in diverse ways, reflecting varied elements within each tribe. In the mid-
twentieth century, these councils, as such, constituted meeting grounds in which tribal 
members both interacted with BIA staff and with each other. Both English and a tribe’s own 
language were used to varying extents in each context, from the only occasional mention in 
Inter-tribal Council meetings, to much of Navajo meetings being conducted in Diné. This 
mirrors the varied socio-cultural influences at work within council meetings, which were 
both the main avenue for BIA officials to communicate policy and news to reservations, and 
for tribal members to voice their concerns. Council meetings presented spaces in which 
tribal, federal and more broadly Euro-American interests could most visibly intersect and 
interact. 
In this respect, the workings of tribal councils bear some resemblance to another 
federally administered space in which tribal members worked – boarding schools. As 
literary scholar Amelia Katanski has demonstrated, though boarding schools attempted to 
assimilate Native youth by imposing Euro-American values and the English language onto 
them, these students found ways of expressing their identities as both Indians and 
members of their tribe.114 Though boarding school students often wrote in English, they 
practiced a “linguistic subversion” in encoding the words taught by their Euro-American 
teachers with meanings and phrases relevant to their own experience – a process Katanski 
terms “writing ‘Indian’”.115 Tribal council members in meetings were also faced with English 
terms and language through their communications with federal officials and off-reservation 
Americans. This thesis will demonstrate that tribal council members displayed agency in 
interpreting and employing the language of Termination in their own ways and to their own 
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means in verbal communication as Klamath, Five Tribes, Mississippi Choctaw or Navajo 
tribal members, American citizens and American Indians – effectively speaking ‘Indian’. 
 
The national press: communicating the language of assimilation 
 
Tribal council debates can aid in understanding the varied ways in which Termination 
was implemented on a local level, but these discussions alone cannot sufficiently answer 
why the policy was not officially repudiated until 1970. Historians have noted that 
Termination rhetoric was vague in nature, but have paid little critical attention to the 
extent to and manner in which it was publicly discussed. Fixico simply notes that Myer 
offered “platitudes on Indian assimilation”, but offers no concrete examples.116 To examine 
the question of why the federal government continued to plan for the removal of federal 
trust status well into the 1960s, this thesis will look to national discussions surrounding 
Indian policy, as exhibited in the press. The hegemonic presumptions which underpinned 
mainstream beliefs about Native Americans – that are reflected in contemporary press 
reporting – can help explain why support for the removal of federal trust status was 
dominant in the mid-twentieth century. 
Before looking more closely at the role of the press in communicating policy, the 
historical background of assimilationist rhetoric must be noted. The idea that federal 
supervision is harmful and creates dependency had been prevalent within congressional 
circles since the late 1800s. This belief was heavily influenced by social evolutionary theory, 
which proposes that human societies evolve in a set pattern from “savagery” to 
“civilization”, as outlined by social theorist Lewis Henry Morgan in his 1877 book Ancient 
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Society.117 By this reasoning, Native tribes, with their communal land ownership systems, 
were on a lower rung of development, destined naturally to progress toward a Euro-
American societal model of democracy and capitalism. This principle is exemplified by the 
infamous statement by 1890s Indian rights reformist Merrill Gates: “Discontent with the 
tepee and the starving rations of the Indian camp in winter is needed to get the Indian out 
of the blanket and into trousers, - and trousers with a pocket in them, and with a pocket 
that aches to be filled with dollars!”118 The strong belief in the capitalist system’s 
transformative abilities and in the necessity of individual land ownership to foster full 
“maturity” in Indians, were major motivations behind passing the 1887 General Allotment 
Act (Dawes Act). The Act split up tribal lands into individual parcels and granted U.S. 
citizenship to those Indians who accepted their 160 acre allotment, freeing up “surplus” 
lands for white settlement.119  
“Liberation” from the reservation was, thus, already an established approach in Indian 
affairs by the turn of the twentieth century. This is evident in contemporary press 
editorials, which commonly promoted the elimination of the reservation system as 
“pernicious”, causing “increasing Indian pauperism”.120 The disastrous results of the 
assimilation era, including poverty and a wide-scale land loss among Native peoples, fuelled 
support for Collier’s reservation-centric plans for Indian affairs.121 However, the language of 
assimilation survived the 1930s Indian New Deal. While HCR 108 did not explicitly mention 
the issue of land ownership, elements of assimilation-era rhetoric can nevertheless be seen 
in the resolution, marking a re-emergence of social evolutionary ideology in claiming 
Natives needed to be ‘elevated’ to Euro-American standards. 
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The power structures which supported Termination cannot be fully understood by 
examining legislative action only, but also the attitudes and beliefs which informed these. 
Since the passing of the 1831 Supreme Court decision Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Native 
tribes have been considered “domestic dependent nations”, under the control and 
protection of the federal government, with limited sovereign powers.122 This decision was 
followed in 1832 by Worcester v. Georgia in which Chief Justice John Marshall affirmed the 
rights of the Cherokee Nation against impositions by the state of Georgia, and termed 
tribes “separate nations… having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by 
their own laws.” This ruling confirmed a limited sovereignty for tribes, laying the 
foundations for the modern conception of tribal-federal interactions as a government-to-
government relationship, which continues dependent on the federal government.123  
Tribal sovereignty, then, is established in the U.S. legal system, but is dependent on the 
federal government for its enactment, and in practice an ideal overlooked for most of the 
nineteenth and twentieth century until drawn on by Native rights activists in legal battles 
from the late 1960s onwards. Termination must be considered within this context of long-
standing paternalist control, and the assumptions about Native Americans inherent within 
this ideology. As anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff have highlighted, historical 
research needs to recognise power structures as “many-sided” and consider their 
implications in “culture, consciousness and representation”.124 This study’s focus on press 
rhetoric will bring to light the ways in which language constructs and communicates control 
over the indigenous population of the United States. The national news media, in 
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reproducing mainstream viewpoints for a mainstream audience, perpetuates the colonialist 
structures under which tribal communities live.  
The power of public opinion and attitude is in implicit consensus – a hegemonic system 
of beliefs so naturalised among a majority population that it is barely perceptible and 
therefore difficult to challenge.125 This examination will demonstrate that the ideas of 
assimilation and societal evolution, of Euro-American superiority over tribal nations, form a 
hegemony through which Native peoples are viewed as “less developed” and therefore not 
able to make their own decisions. In this respect, while contributing to the historiography 
of Termination, the implications here extend far beyond the mid-twentieth century. A study 
of language and the ways in which official federal rhetoric was publicly discussed – 
including how it was employed and interpreted, and the responses it received – will 
facilitate greater understanding of the ways in which national mainstream populations 
conceive of, and interact with, indigenous populations.  
A critical reading of how Indian affairs were discussed in the press, as well as how 
indigenous peoples were represented, can help to reconstruct public opinion from a 
specific time period. Sociologist Michael Schudson has described the press as a “composite, 
shared, ordered, and edited product”, suggesting that news does not simply report on 
events, but replicates the subconscious biases and beliefs of those who create it.126 
Reflecting capitalist concerns and cultural attributes, the press works as a mirror for public 
sentiment.127 Indeed, in the mid-twentieth century – if not still today – national newspapers 
were largely staffed by Euro-Americans; in 1995 ninety-five percent of journalists were 
white.128 Furthermore, national newspapers in the United States are an inherently 
commercial venture, owned by major press companies and heavily dependent on sales for 
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income – as such, press writing is by necessity aimed at an average consumer readership: 
middle-class and white.129 The anticipated audience for the national press has been, hence, 
strictly non-Native. As a result, press representations of Indian policy – whether in support 
of or in apparent opposition to it – reflect mainstream views of Termination which, 
presumably, could differ vastly from Native interpretations. 
The U.S. press is, however, not explicitly government-controlled and is often called a 
“free” press. Journalism historiography has shown that throughout the early twentieth 
century, the primary value of press reporting was objectivity, meaning newspapers claimed 
to present news in an unbiased and fair manner – and were believed to be doing so both by 
those working in the press and readers.130 The extent to which reporting on Indian affairs 
aligned with federal rhetoric, and whether opposing views came through in the press must, 
thus, be explored. A critical analysis of not only the content, but the structure and form of 
the press is required to uncover underlying attitudes about Native peoples. As a result, the 
news is a valuable source for gauging mainstream perceptions of and attitudes toward 
marginal populations, as news reporting reflected inherent societal power structures. What 
was accepted as “common sense” knowledge about Native people in the press can help 
answer questions of why Termination as a policy was adopted and persisted throughout the 
1950s and 1960s despite increasing opposition from Native communities. The ways in 
which Termination was presented, as well as protested, in the press, can help explain the 
extent to which attitudes to Native peoples developed in a period of supposed change in 
the government’s approach to the indigenous population. 
In 1947, the Commission on the Freedom of the Press, led by educational philosopher 
Robert Maynard Hutchins, released a report criticising the media for being unfair in its 
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representation of minorities, for focusing unduly on negatives whilst neglecting to cover 
their “common humanity”.131 Hutchins, as such, challenged the hegemonic representations 
of racial minorities, highlighting that these were based in stereotyping. Evidently negative 
bias in press reporting on race persisted, as is evidenced by the 1968 Report of the National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, which similarly criticised press coverage of African 
Americans for contributing to 1967 race riots, stating that it was the “responsibility of the 
news media to tell the story of race relations in America.”132 These reports demonstrate 
that while an understanding of the significance of power structures in press reporting on 
racial minorities was being awakened in the United States, both in academic and in federal 
circles, little tangible change toward fairer minority representation occurred. As such, 
during the Termination period, minorities’ access to the press was severely limited, 
restricting their ability to participate in public discussions of federal policy.  
In order to evaluate general mainstream perceptions and understandings of Indian 
policy, this thesis will examine national press reporting on Native Americans in the 
Termination era. In her broad study of Native imagery in the twentieth century press, 
Native Americans in the News, journalism historian Mary Weston argues that local 
newspapers were more sympathetic to tribal members’ concerns regarding Termination, 
whereas the national press either overlooked Indian affairs or presented stereotyped 
imagery.133 However, most of the American population did not live in areas close to 
reservations, meaning they depended on national press publications for information on 
Indian affairs.134 Furthermore, in order to understand mainstream reactions to federal 
Indian policy and perceptions of Native Americans, they must be situated within the 
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framework of an American national identity. For these reasons, local publications will not 
be considered here; instead the focus is on widely influential national news media, 
available across the country: the New York Times, Washington Post, Christian Science 
Monitor, and TIME magazine. 
The New York Times was founded in September 1851 by college student Henry 
Raymond, as a paper for the masses with a staunchly non-partisan position.135 While the 
Times has not fully succeeded in maintaining non-partisanship, with the paper strongly 
supporting Kennedy in the early 1960s presidential elections, throughout the twentieth 
century it was one of the most widely circulated broadsheet daily newspapers in the United 
States.136 It is not only a popular paper, but a well-respected one; it has won 114 Pulitzer 
Prizes, including fifteen between 1947 and 1970.137 As such, in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
paper was seen as presenting high quality, unbiased news reporting. Examining its 
representations of Indian affairs is, thus, critical to understanding mainstream perceptions 
of Native Americans. 
The Washington Post is another well-regarded national publication, gaining particular 
praise in the early 1970s for its exposure of the Watergate scandal.138 The paper has 
featured a strong emphasis on political reporting since its establishment in 1877. Though 
perhaps not as well-known as the Times in the mid-twentieth century, the Post 
nevertheless held an important position in the US press market during the period. Based in 
Washington D.C., it was well placed to cover federal government issues, including matters 
concerning the BIA. Like the Times, the Post aims for a non-partisan stance, but Phil 
Graham, editor from 1946 until his death in 1963, was a close friend of John F. Kennedy. 
                                                          
135
 Michael Emery, Edwin Emery and Nancy Roberts, The Press and America: An Interpretive History 
of the Mass Media (Needham Heights, 2000), p. 108. 
136
 Both before WWII and in 1997, the paper had some of the highest circulation numbers in the 
country, see: Ibid., p. 352, 545. 
137
 ’Pulitzer Prize Timeline’, http://www.nytco.com/pulitzer-prizes/ (viewed: 7.4.2015) 
138




Consequently, the editorial stance of the paper tended towards Democratic sympathy in 
the Termination era.139 
Unlike the Times and the Post, the Christian Science Monitor displayed a more 
conservative stance in this period, pledging support for Richard Nixon in 1960s presidential 
campaigns.140 While the Monitor was not as popular in the mid-twentieth century as the 
Times and the Post, suffering from decreasing circulation numbers from the 1960s onwards, 
it was nevertheless a respected paper, winning four Pulitzers, 1950-1969.141 Though the 
Monitor claims to be a secular publication, it is owned by Boston’s First Church of Christ, 
Scientist and was founded in 1908 under the motto “to injure no man, but to bless all 
mankind.”142 Since the Board of Directors of the Church appoints the editor, it is clear that 
the publication is influenced by Christian ideology and values, if not explicitly driving such 
an agenda. The Monitor has been selected for study here due to this distinctive 
background.  
Finally, TIME magazine is a weekly news magazine established in 1923, aiming to serve a 
market of “busy working men” by summarising day-by-day news into weekly digests.143 As a 
result, TIME has presented readers with a more narrative style, focusing on human interest 
pieces and, from the mid-1960s onwards, an increasing number of essays. Unlike the 
broadsheet papers here considered, TIME does not present itself as objective, instead 
blurring the boundaries between opinion, editorial and hard news. While in the mid-
twentieth century the publication was perhaps considered sensationalist rather than strictly 
respectable, it nevertheless gained high circulation numbers, reaching up to three million in 
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1962 for its domestic, Canadian and three overseas editions.144  Both in structure and style, 
TIME presented a departure from broadsheet newspapers. As the most circulated news 
magazine of the mid-twentieth century, it was influential in the wider arena of print media. 
TIME must, therefore, be included in this study as a useful point of comparison to more 
“traditional” broadsheet publications. 
Notably, all four of the publications here studied are based on the East Coast, TIME 
included. This selection reflects the dominance of East Coast publishers in the news media, 
with most major national newspapers being concentrated there throughout the twentieth 
century. According to 1997 circulation statistics, six of the top ten news publications had 
headquarters in East Coast states, including four in New York City alone.145 Furthermore, 
the main newswire services operate from East Coast offices, with the Associated Press (AP) 
and United Press International (UPI) based in New York City and Washington D.C., 
respectively. Though the geographical variation here is narrow, these papers are 
nevertheless most representative of the United States national press, ranging from liberal 
to conservative, daily broadsheet to weekly news magazine. The presentation of, as well as 
responses and reactions to, Indian affairs in these papers thus exemplify mainstream 




The issue of why such a disastrous policy was accepted for nearly two decades underlies 
all inquiry in this thesis. The following six chapters will demonstrate how language shapes 
U.S. American Indian policy – the ways in which it is presented, interpreted and responded 
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to. Federal rhetoric implicitly presented four elements as key to solving the “Indian 
problem” through assimilation: “Indian” dependency; joining American mainstream society; 
living up to “full” citizenship standards; and land ownership. Specific tribes and the federal 
government negotiated the vague concepts of “freedom”, “Americanness” and 
“independence” across their respective cultural boundaries; areas in which these 
perspectives both differed and overlapped must be considered in interpreting local 
discussions of federal policy. This language also shaped the ways in which the mainstream 
public viewed the indigenous population within their country – public acceptance of 
Termination thus depended on mainstream Americans’ belief in the ability of Native people 
to integrate with Euro-American society. These debates within the U.S. domestic and Native 
spheres coexisted with, and shaped, federal Indian policy to varying extents and must, 
therefore, be examined in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of why tribes 
were terminated. 
This thesis will start by examining Native and non-Native understandings of Termination 
legislation specifically. Chapter One: Communicating Legislation to Tribes, 1947-1954 
provides an account of how federal officials communicated about legislation with tribal 
council members in the years leading up to HCR 108 and tribal Termination acts. It also 
examines the varied responses of tribal council members to federal statements, indicating 
how withdrawal was interpreted by a variety of Native individuals and groups. This 
demonstrates that possible support for the eradication of federal trust status can be 
understood in light of the varied interpretations of what “Termination” would entail, as 
well as a willingness of tribes to appear cooperative in a volatile period of Indian policy. 
 Chapter Two: Press Presentations of Termination and Issues of Consent investigates 
the extent to which national press presentations of Termination policy differed from BIA 




reproduced the aims and ideology of assimilation. Most significantly, this chapter pays close 
attention to opposition to Termination, to show that it focused mostly on the pace at which 
trust status was to be withdrawn, rather than the idea of assimilation as an ultimate goal. 
Determining the range of voices who participated in discussions about Indian policy in the 
press – Native, mainstream, federal, etc. – will contribute to scholarship on limits to the 
supposed “freedom of the press”. This chapter examines the time immediately following 
the passing of HCR 108 and PL 280, and also tracks changes from the late 1940s to Nixon’s 
Special Message in 1970. 
The four remaining chapters adopt a thematic approach, examining specific debates 
related to Indian policy, to see how these influenced Termination and developed in the 
period. Chapter Three: ‘Looking Down on Indians’ – the Persistence of Discrimination and 
Control, investigates limitations to the belief in assimilation, demonstrating that racial 
discrimination was prevalent throughout the 1950s and 1960s, even affecting Native 
interactions with federal officials. Despite Termination rhetoric speaking of “freedom” and 
claiming the process was “voluntary”, the implementation of the policy was paternalistic 
and coercive. This chapter highlights the paradox in Indian affairs in the mid-twentieth 
century: that despite being pushed toward assimilation, Native Americans were 
consistently presented as racially and culturally inferior to the mainstream, raising the 
question of whether they would ever be able to fully join it.  
Chapter Four: Being “American” – Identification and Acceptance compares Native and 
mainstream perceptions of “Americanness” and what it means to be part of a national 
whole. Patriotic allegiance became critical in the McCarthyist atmosphere of the early Cold 
War; this chapter explores the effect anti-communist pressure had on Native self-
perception and identification. The main questions considered here involve cultural and 




constituted a barrier to being categorised as “American”. The chapter illustrates that the 
continuing interest in Native peoples and cultures did not preclude assimilation, but rather 
grew into a 1960s push to integrate stereotypical, perceived aspects of “Indianness” into 
the mainstream, thus transforming it into something “American”. 
Issues of legal status are explored in Chapter Five: Recognition of and Limitations to 
Native American Citizenship. All Native Americans were granted American citizenship 
status under the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act, but HCR 108 nevertheless described Natives 
as not yet “full American citizens”. This chapter examines how supporters of Termination 
deliberately distorted the factual legal status of American Indians, and how the press 
equally accepted the notion that Natives were not “fully” citizens. Finally, through 
comparing tribal councils’ discussions of citizenship to press representations of Native 
Americans as “wards”, the chapter will demonstrate that interpretations of what 
constituted “full” legal citizenship varied drastically. Increasingly into the 1960s, Natives 
spoke of themselves not only as U.S. citizens, but as citizens of their own tribal nations – 
sowing the seeds for an era of self-determination after Nixon’s Special Message. 
As chapters four and five establish, a key element generally accepted as inherent to both 
being culturally “American” and a legal citizen of the United States, is land ownership. The 
final chapter of this thesis, Chapter Six: The Rhetoric of Reservations, explores differing 
mainstream and Native interpretations of the significance of land to explicate tensions 
surrounding land ownership in Termination debates. This illustrates that “individual land 
ownership” was perceived by the mainstream public as being at odds with Native lifestyles, 
with reservations presented as encouraging dependency and idleness. Members of tribal 
councils, in contrast, had varied conceptions of what “individual land ownership” could 




Land was indeed an issue of much debate in the four tribal councils here considered, with 
varied “traditional” cultural influences and economic concerns not necessarily conflicting. 
Overall, the thesis argues that while federal rhetoric surrounding Indian policy may have 
shifted in the early 1960s toward a more gradual approach to Termination, through the 
economic development of reservations, the ultimate goal of assimilation remained inherent 
throughout the period. The unfixed, malleable nature of the language of assimilation means 
it could be altered to achieve varied aims and to gain support for questionable policies. 
However, the same rhetoric of “freedom” can equally be used as a tool by minorities at the 
margins of society, with tribal council members voicing alternate interpretations of rhetoric 
that had been cultivated by federal officials. Rather than emphasising change due to 
alterations in federal legislation, this thesis will draw out continuities in mainstream 
attitudes and perceptions underlying superficial developments.  
Outside of the circles of indigenous history scholarship, Termination is largely unknown. 
While Termination has long since been rejected as official federal policy, the ideologies 
which powered it have not died out. Forgetting the history of Termination, and ignoring the 
distorted rhetoric which garnered support for federal trust status withdrawal, leaves 
federally recognised Native tribes open to future threats. Attempts at terminating 
individuals or whole groups of tribes have resurfaced even in the twenty-first century. In 
2000, the Washington State Republican Party passed a resolution to terminate all tribal 
governments in the state, with a vote of 248 for and two against.146 Though the Bush 
administration distanced itself from any such claims and the resolution achieved no ground 
in practice, this support for eliminating tribal status is an alarming indication that 
Terminationist sentiment lives on. 
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In fact, the policy of assimilation through the removal of indigenous peoples’ special 
status has in recent years surged in popularity across the globe: Canadian Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper advocated changes to the legal status of First Nations, and Australian Prime 
Minister Tony Abbott equally promoted the “closure” of remote aboriginal communities.147  
Not only must we determine why 1950s and 1960s American Indian Termination in the 
United States was a failure, but how Natives and Euro-Americans interpreted the policy – 
and why the mainstream considered Indians “a problem” to be solved. Only then can a step 
be taken away from the idealisation of assimilation, and towards better cross-cultural 
understandings of the hopes and aspirations of specific indigenous populations for their 
futures, both as sovereign nations and as participants in broader society. 
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Chapter One: Communicating Legislation to Tribes, 1947-1954 
 
“It is important to note that in our… language the only translation for 
termination is to ‘wipe out’ or ‘kill off’. We have no… words for termination… 
Why is it so important that Indians be brought into the ‘mainstream of 
American life’?” 
- Earl Old Person, Blackfoot Tribal 
Chairman (1960) 1 
The term “Termination” has undeniably negative connotations, a matter recognised by 
Native American activists in the 1960s and 1970s, as demonstrated by the quote from 
former Blackfoot tribal chairman and NCAI president Earl Old Person. How could a policy 
carrying the multifarious negative connotations of a word like “termination” gain support, 
either in the public eye or amongst tribal councils? The key is in understanding the early 
rhetoric surrounding the policy. Though Termination is today the label most commonly 
attached to 1950s and 1960s federal Indian policy, until the passing of HCR 108 and PL 280 
the term was hardly used in public discussions of Indian affairs. In fact, the word 
“termination” is not even mentioned in HCR 108, the resolution which consolidated 
withdrawal of trust status as a federal aim.2 Rather HCR 108 stated that the aim of federal 
Indian policy was to “end their status as wards of the United States.”3  
Scholarship on Termination to-date, particularly Fixico and Philp’s key works on the 
legislative development of the policy, only briefly outlines Indian affairs rhetoric in the 
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years leading up to the 1953 shift in official Indian policy.4 This chapter will add to this 
existing historiography by assessing how potential legislation was presented to different 
tribes in the years preceding and following the passing of HCR 108 and PL 280. In particular, 
the extent to which legislative action on Indian affairs was communicated to tribal 
members both before and after the adoption of Termination legislation in Congress will be 
examined. Considering the Senate Subcommittee on Indian Affairs requested Assistant 
Commissioner Zimmerman draw up a list of tribes ready for the termination of their federal 
trust status as early as 1947, it is clear that this was already the set federal goal before HCR 
108 was passed. The extent to which this goal was communicated transparently to tribes 
considered to be at various stages of the federal withdrawal plan, will be determined. 
At least up to 1953, Termination was interpreted in multiple ways by varying tribal 
councils. The statements of BIA officials like Commissioner Dillon Myer, as well as Area 
Office staff of various locations, show that Termination was typically described in vague and 
inconclusive terms. This trend is clear in the BIA’s communications to varying tribes 
regarding government policy throughout the two decades of Termination. Officially, the BIA 
and its staff do not regulate Indian policy – rather their role is to make recommendations to 
Congress and implement whatever policy Congress adopts.5 In relating to tribes, Area Office 
staff are – at least theoretically – not in a position to bring out their personal opinions of 
Congressional Indian policy, but are rather compelled to follow through with given 
guidelines.  Legal scholars Charles Wilkinson and Eric Biggs have accused the BIA of 
corruption in the years immediately preceding the passing of HCR 108 in August 1953, 
already vehemently advocating the Termination of federal trust status of all tribes.6 
However, recent historiography on the assimilation era has underlined the importance of 
looking at local variations in the implementation of Indian policy. Historians Cathleen Cahill 
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and Gabriella Treglia demonstrate in their works how the influence of local BIA staff’s 
interpretations of Indian policy had a tangible effect on its implementation in various tribal 
contexts.7 Similar research has not so far been undertaken to uncover variation in how 
Termination legislation was communicated by Area Office staff. 
Furthermore, while historiography has acknowledged the significance of federal rhetoric 
in drawing support for and implementing Termination policy, the varied responses both 
between and within tribes to these actions have been insufficiently explored. Since federal 
Indian policy throughout the first half of the twentieth century was essentially top-down, 
largely determined by Congress rather than discussed and negotiated with tribes, it would 
be easy to simply categorise Native discussions of Termination as reactionary. However, 
this chapter will demonstrate that the ways in which tribes interpreted and understood the 
aims of federal policy had an impact on how Termination developed over time. In 
particular, council members of tribes not immediately selected for the removal of federal 
status, like the Navajo, Mississippi Choctaw and Five “Civilized” Tribes, held varied 
understandings of Termination because they did not have to deal with it directly. Indeed, 
federal rhetoric could be interpreted in a multitude of ways before the negative effects of 
Termination acts on tribes like the Klamath and Menominee became more widely known. 
This chapter will show that in the period immediately preceding and following the passing 
of HCR 108 and PL 280 in 1953, Termination was even seen by some tribal council 
representatives as a step toward eventual self-determination or a genuine tool for the 
“liberation” of the Native population. Only more rarely did tribal council members speak of 
it as an attack on Native communities and identities. 
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1.1. Early understandings of Termination in tribal councils, 1947-
1953 
 
While it is significant that the word “Termination” did not appear in 1953 Indian policy 
legislation, it is important to note that term was already in use among federal officials and 
BIA employees. A 1944 document by the BIA’s Portland Area Office Director, outlining a 
management programme for the Siletz tribe of Western Oregon, may contain the first 
instance in which the term was used in this context, stating the aim of “decreasing 
government assistance during the next ten years and final termination of such help at the 
end of that time.”8 Termination was also mentioned, for instance, in the appendices to a 
February 1952 Mississippi Choctaw tribal council session, titled “Enclosures to the Minutes 
of the Special Session of the Tribal Council of the Mississippi Band regarding the 
Establishment of the Bureau of Indian Affairs Division of Program”. The appendices 
included a memorandum addressed to “All Bureau Officials”, outlining details of how BIA 
employees were to implement Indian policy, signed by Commissioner Myer himself and 
dated 10 December 1951.9 This document unequivocally stated that the “ultimate 
objective” of the bureau was to “area by area and tribe by tribe, to bring about termination 
of Federal supervision over the Indians of continental United States and Alaska[…].”10 The 
word “termination” was, thus, already in use within internal BIA discussions of federal 
Indian policy in late 1951. The use of this term in a document meant for circulation among 
local BIA Area staff moreover indicates that Termination was already an accepted 
descriptor of official federal Indian policy, as this was a communication of aims agreed upon 
within the central BIA office. This, alongside the 1944 Portland Area Office document, 
demonstrates that the term originated amongst BIA employees and was commonly 
employed several years before any tribal Termination acts were passed. 
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Myer’s statement here also included details about how Termination would be carried 
out, with guidance given to staff to conduct “fact-finding surveys of the existing social and 
economic status of groups of Indians” and “to review and coordinate current Bureau 
programs to ensure that they conform to the ultimate objectives of the Bureau”.11  The 
memorandum outlined the establishment of the ‘Division of Program’, a new branch of the 
BIA to coordinate the altered aims of Indian affairs, and aid Area Offices in establishing new 
programmes to support this, stating as its function to “develop basic concepts and policies 
that are to guide programs aimed at improvement of the economic and social status of the 
Indians to the end that Federal supervision is no longer necessary.”12 This detailed 
description of federal Indian policy aims, coupled with an established plan for how they 
would be achieved through cooperation between the central BIA office, local agencies, and 
“full cooperation with the Indians”, demonstrates that Termination as a policy was already 
moving forward long before HCR 108 was passed. 
 Crucially, this document was addressed to “Bureau Staff”, not to tribal councils. It is 
unclear whether the memorandum was read by members of the tribe: it was not labelled as 
confidential, and the document itself stated that “Indian groups and individuals” should be 
kept “fully informed on Bureau actions affecting them”.13 The minutes of the Mississippi 
Band tribal council meeting with which these are included, however, show no indication of 
the memorandum having been discussed in the meeting. This indicates that local BIA 
employees in Mississippi did not openly refer to “termination” in communicating with the 
council. Furthermore, the minutes of the Klamath and Navajo tribal councils, as well as the 
Five “Civilized” Tribes Inter-Tribal Council, do not contain any reference to this document, 
indicating that it was not discussed with representatives of these tribes either. Myer’s 











memorandum, though stating in several places that tribes should be kept informed on 
policy procedures, was evidently not circulated to tribal members. 
This raises the question of how local BIA area employees discussed policy with members 
of tribes, and whether these discussions clearly stated the established aims of ending 
federal trust status and special services. Examining tribal council minutes from the late 
1940s onwards shows that BIA employees – both local area staff and central figures like 
Myer – did not communicate the aims and implications of federal policy as clearly as stated 
in that document, nor did they refer to “Termination” when actually speaking to tribes. 
Instead, vague terms were employed when speaking of federal policy: “freedom”, 
“equality”, “independence”. Discussions in 1949 and 1950 surrounding a long-awaited 
economic assistance bill for the Navajo and Hopi tribes provide an early example of such 
rhetoric. The Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act, finally passed by Congress and signed by 
President Truman in 1951, appropriated substantial funds to address long-standing health 
and educational problems among the two tribes. 14 In discussions within the Navajo Tribal 
Council it was often referred to as the “long range bill”, indicating it was seen as significant 
for the tribe’s future.15 However, New Mexico Representative Antonio Fernandez 
succeeded in adding an amendment to the bill to extend state civil and criminal jurisdiction 
over reservation lands in New Mexico, Arizona and Utah. The implications of this 
amendment were strikingly similar to those that PL 280 would later carry, eroding federal 
responsibilities over tribal lands. Most significantly, the amendment was accepted by the 
Navajo tribal council in a June 1949 meeting, though representatives later expressed 
objections to the initial vote.16 As a result of this, along with criticisms from non-Native 
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Indian rights activists, the Act was repealed by President Truman, who only signed the bill 
after the Fernandez Amendment was scrapped.17 
To understand why a policy so similar to PL 280, which was consistently opposed by the 
Navajo Tribal Council once passed in 1953, was accepted at this point, it is critical to look at 
how the Fernandez amendment was presented to the tribe by its main proponent – 
Fernandez himself. Though the minutes of the Navajo council meeting where the 
amendment was supposedly accepted are not available in the Major Council Meetings of 
American Indian Tribes microfilm collection, discussions at an emergency meeting in 
October 1949 are included.18 Fernandez, though not himself present, sent a telegram to be 
read at the meeting, which referred to extending state jurisdiction over the reservation as a 
civil rights issue: “I DO NOT WANT NAVAJOS TO LOSE RIGHT TO VOTE AND WILL FIGHT TO 
THE END FOR SAME PROVISION OR ANY OTHER REHABILITATION BILL PRESENTED WITH 
RESPECT TO NEW MEXICO. […] I SHALL NEVER GIVE UP FIGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
INDIANS ARE ENTITLED TO UNDER LAWS OF MY STATE.”19 Fernandez evidently prioritised 
what he saw as equal citizenship over the legal rights of tribes, implying Navajo tribal 
members were captives of a lawless reservation and not guaranteed state rights. 
Fernandez’s concerns regarding Navajo rights in New Mexico and Arizona were to an extent 
legitimate; tribal council discussions in the 1950s show dissatisfaction with inadequate 
provisions for tribal members to vote in state and federal elections.20 However, he did not 
consider the ways in which state jurisdiction would limit the much valued Navajo treaty 
rights, such as the guarantee that the reservation would be their exclusive domain.21 
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Fernandez continued to propagate such rhetoric on his visit to the reservation to 
consolidate support for the amendment less than two months later. In speaking to the 
tribal council, Fernandez compared the tribe’s situation to the civil rights struggle of New 
Mexico’s Hispanic population, stating:  
“My people were here when the Americans came. They made us immediately 
a part of the state. And we suffered. All people who work have to suffer. My 
people were poor. We had nothing. But we worked with the state. […] we 
should learn to know what the rules and laws of the state are and we should 
begin to obey them. If we obey those laws our neighbors in the state will think 
better of us and that is what we want. Then we can all be friends.”22  
This small segment of Fernandez’s speech to the Navajo council epitomises his general 
attitude in addressing the tribe. Rather than going into detail about the practical 
implications of the extension of state jurisdiction over the reservation – for instance, how 
the Navajo might manage the state criminal court system – Fernandez stuck to simple 
imagery and language, speaking in short sentences about “rules”, “laws” and “friendship.” 
By explicitly referring to his own Hispanic identity, Fernandez claimed greater 
understanding of the Navajo situation, whilst equating challenges faced by two distinct 
minority populations. 
The responses of Navajo tribal council representatives demonstrate that Fernandez’s 
vague language did not go unchallenged. At the October 1949 meeting in which 
Fernandez’s telegram was presented, elected council chairman Sam Ahkeah gave a long 
statement criticising the idea that state jurisdiction would protect the rights of tribal 
members. The Chairman, though enthusiastic about the $90,000,000 dollars the proposed 
                                                          
22





Navajo-Hopi bill would provide to the tribes, presented the Fernandez Amendment as 
ruining any positive effects:  
“There are more of our people uneducated over the reservation today who we 
feel will be hurt under this Fernandez Amendment. […] Congress is telling us 
that the Government would pay for the show with the $90,000,000 and invite 
the State as the audience and say dance the strip tease here. […] I believe the 
Government should educate us, make us lawyers, teachers, engineers and 
surveyors […] before presenting us to the State.”23 
In contrast to Fernandez’s characterisation of state jurisdiction as ensuring equality 
between minority and majority populations, Ahkeah presented the process as degrading, 
comparing pandering to the interests of the State over those of the tribe to a “strip tease”. 
In Ahkeah’s view, tribal members could only achieve the “equality” Fernandez spoke of 
through further education and economic development programmes, presenting the 
immediate imposition of state jurisdiction as mere federal abandonment. 
Tribal council Advisory Committee member and former Chairman Howard Gorman 
added that though the committee had initially accepted the Fernandez Amendment, their 
stance had been altered due to reactions during local meetings held in chapter houses, 
stating that “the people in our areas objected to us taking the very drastic arbitrary action 
on approving this Fernandez Amendment.”24 Members of the Advisory Committee, who 
could be considered “elites” of the tribe as they held most decision-making power in the 
council, evidently prioritised local reaction and brought up the concerns of the wider tribal 
membership. Gorman nevertheless did not object to the idea of state jurisdiction 
altogether, but rather – like Ahkeah – presented it as a move to be conducted in future, 
once the tribe was sufficiently prepared by the federal government:  
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“[…] the Government could go all out educating the Navajos and speed up 
educating the Navajos so that the time will come when we will emerge into 
what the Fernandez Amendment stands for. Letting the Navajos become 
assimilated to the white civilization and eventually become under the State.”25 
Both Gorman and Ahkeah, then, appeared to accept that the tribe would at some point 
come under State jurisdiction, but argued that the tribe was not yet ready for this. Instead 
further Government social and educational programmes were needed before tribal 
members could accept such a transfer. Rather than wholly opposing state jurisdiction in the 
future, these council representatives challenged Fernandez’s claims that equality would 
result from its immediate imposition. In this sense, Chairman Ahkeah and representative 
Gorman referred to the need for further federal involvement through its trust 
responsibilities as a method to secure “assimilation” through education and employment 
training. 
In contrast to Fernandez, who ignored the unique relationship of tribes to the 
government, Navajo tribal council representatives referred to federal responsibility intrinsic 
to the treaty relationship. However, discussions over jurisdictional issues in the Navajo 
Tribal Council do not appear to have had an effect on wider federal discussions of Indian 
policy in the early 1950s. Official federal rhetoric relied rather on ideas similar to those 
Fernandez used to justify his amendment – that the eradication of Native special status 
would lead to greater “freedom”. This use of language is best illustrated by the statements 
of BIA Commissioner Myer just before HCR 108 and PL 280 were passed. When appointed, 
Myer was criticised by both Native and non-Native Indian rights activists for his lack of 
experience in Indian affairs, a weakness historiographic scholarship has also underlined 
since the 1980s. Indeed, Myer’s closest dealings with Native American tribes had been in 







taking over sections of reservation lands for use as Japanese internment camps as the head 
of the War Relocation Authority during WWII.26 In administering Indian affairs Myer 
displayed a proclivity for autocratic control, as his attempt to control tribal attorney 
contracts demonstrates.27 The action proved to be a misstep for a bureau that promoted 
the end of the federal trust relationship, and abetted Myer’s forced resignation.28 
Comparing Myer’s interactions with different tribal councils, it is clear that he employed 
vague rhetoric in communicating with all tribes, regardless of what stage of the withdrawal 
plan – according to Zimmerman’s list – they were considered to be at. At the onset of his 
commissionership, Myer visited the Navajo Tribal Council to express his plans for the future 
of Indian affairs: “It is my belief that the time is coming – and that the time should come – 
when Indians as groups and individuals should be handling their business on an 
independent basis and that we should work step by step toward that goal.”29 In referring to 
Indian “groups and individuals”, Myer’s statement was open to multiple interpretations by 
council members, who could have seen this as either referring to greater self-determination 
for tribal groups or as advocating a move toward interest groups other than tribes. 
Furthermore, Myer did not refer to the removal of trust status or BIA services which 
Termination in practice entailed; instead he emphasised his wish not to “liquidate Indian 
reservations”, even stating: “The reservation lands belong to the Indians; the other 
resources belong to the Indians.”30 
Similar elements of Myer’s rhetoric were communicated to the Mississippi Band 
Choctaw. In an October 1951 council meeting, a member of the local BIA Area Office read 
out a quote of Myer, stating: “[…]the development of constructive programmes leading to 
Indians [sic] independence and a higher standard of living is the most important job that 
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lies ahead both for the Bureau of Indian Affairs and for Indian Tribal Organizations.”31 In 
speaking of “independence” with reference to new programmes, the BIA employee was 
evidently referring to ways of decreasing tribes’ dependence on federal support. This 
statement therefore attests to the homogeneity of Myer’s BIA rhetoric despite variations in 
tribal situations. Myer consistently referred to “independence” in communicating with the 
tribal councils of the Group III Navajo and Mississippi Band Choctaw, rather than addressing 
the problems of poverty and poor living standards faced by these tribes. In so doing, Myer 
implied that the “Indian problem” was a result of tribes being too dependent on the 
government, rather than inadequate BIA programming. In this respect, Myer echoed turn-
of-the-century BIA arguments, demonstrating the persistence of the belief that Native 
peoples and lifestyles were to blame for the state of Indian affairs.32 
Myer, in addressing Group III tribes, espoused Terminationist values, but veiled these in 
the rhetoric of ‘independence’, portraying this as a long-term goal. How, then, did he 
present his policy ideas to a tribe like the Klamath, which was considered ready for 
immediate removal of federal trust status? Klamath Tribal Council minutes retained by the 
BIA contain no record of Commissioner Myer visiting the reservation. Rather it seems that 
the Commissioner interacted with the Klamath primarily through elected Washington 
representatives of the tribe, like Boyd Jackson. Jackson, who later actively campaigned for 
the repeal of the Klamath Termination Act, reported on a summer 1950 General Council 
meeting with Myer, stating that the commissioner had “taken the position that he intends 
to extend to you the handling of your own business as fast as you can administer your 
ability to handle such parts of the business, if not all.”33  Even paraphrased by Jackson, 
Myer’s language comes across as consistent, whether addressing tribes considered 
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“predominantly Indian” or “predominantly acculturated”, using the same turn of phrase as 
with the Navajo: “handling business”.  
Jackson makes no mention of Myer discussing land or the liquidation of assets. While 
this may have just been an oversight by Jackson, it is entirely plausible that Myer simply did 
not mention land in communicating with the Klamaths. In 1950 Klamath policy discussions 
largely grappled with land issues, and planning for legislation to allow individual members 
to withdraw from the tribe and rescind their legal Indian status. The major question 
surrounding these plans was how these withdrawing members would be compensated for 
their share of assets, as will be discussed in Chapter Six. If Myer had made a statement 
against land liquidation it would have had tangible implications for the Klamath situation. In 
interacting with the Navajo the commissioner could safely make statements distancing 
himself from the concept of liquidation, so closely associated with memories of the 
assimilation era, without this contradicting any ongoing agreements or policies with the 
tribe. Furthermore, Myer was obviously aware of BIA categorisations of the tribes’ 
respective ‘readiness’ for Termination. When speaking to the Navajo and Mississippi 
Choctaw, Myer made no reference to the timing of his plans, whereas Klamath 
representatives were told they would be expected to takeover administration of their own 
affairs “as fast” as possible. However, this only demonstrates a very cursory knowledge of 
the Klamath situation, not giving the tribe’s Washington representatives any concrete 
indication of a timetable for Klamath Termination.  
That Myer did not visit the Klamath tribe seems odd, particularly considering that 
various potential bills removing the trust status of individuals or the entire tribe were 
discussed throughout the early 1950s. It is possible that minutes of a meeting Myer 
attended have been lost by the BIA or purposely not released in the public microfilm 





minutes; while historian Katherine Osburn states that Myer visited the tribal council in 
February 1952 to discuss the opportunities for self-sufficiency offered by Termination, the 
minutes of this meeting are not contained in the federal microfilm collection.34  
Retained minutes do show that Myer visited the Five “Civilized” Tribes Inter-Tribal 
Council in Oklahoma. The categorisation of the Five Tribes was complicated; according to 
Zimmerman’s list these tribes were more than ten years away from being ready for 
Termination, yet federal officials  generally considered them ‘advanced’ and well-
assimilated. Furthermore, at least one of the Five Tribes was deemed ready for Termination 
by Congress: in 1959 a law to later withdraw Oklahoma Choctaw trust status was passed.35 
When Myer visited the Inter-Tribal Council in 1950, plans for Choctaw Termination had not 
yet been formulated, let alone publicly discussed. Nevertheless, it is evident that elite 
members of the tribes, including the Inter-Tribal Council representatives, were considered 
heavily assimilated. 
Exceptionally, Myer spoke in far more detail to the Five “Civilized Tribes” than he did to 
the Navajo Tribal Council or even the Klamath Washington representatives. He referred not 
only in vague terms to “independence” for tribes, but stated explicitly that “there will be no 
Indian Service one day”.36 Myer gave this relatively candid and detailed speech knowing 
that the Inter-Tribal Council consisted largely of exceptionally well-educated and 
economically successful members of these tribes, who were often politically active not just 
within their tribes, but on a state-wide or even national level. For instance, Cherokee 
Principal Chief W.W. Keeler was also the executive vice president of Phillips Petroleum and 
served as an advisor on various federal committees, including President Lyndon Johnson’s 
1966 Task Force on American Indians.37 This difference between the Inter-Tribal Council 
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and other tribal councils was noted by Myer: “I am impressed by this group of leaders. It is 
quite different than most places I have visited. As I look around and see you as successful 
business men in your own right taking your time in trying to help us in the Indian problem, I 
am impressed.”38 
Despite these commendations of leadership, the administration of the Five Tribes was 
strictly controlled by the U.S. government, even in relatively unique ways. Tribal chairmen, 
for instance, were not elected by the tribal membership, but appointed by the US 
president.  In addition to Keeler, these leaders included Choctaw Tribal Principal Chief Harry 
Belvin, who drove the Termination process of his tribe.39 However, despite granting the 
Inter-Tribal Council a clearer indication of what policy would entail than he did for other 
tribes, Myer still dressed up his take on Indian policy in his characteristic rhetoric of 
“independence” and “freedom”. Though Myer did not use the phrase ‘handling business’ in 
this context, he did speak of ‘self-help’: “I feel very deeply that you do not help people by 
‘doing’ for them. The only thing we can do is to help people ‘help themselves’.”40 
An interview with Myer conducted in 1970, seventeen years after he was ousted as 
Commissioner, demonstrates that he genuinely believed that Termination was the solution 
to Indian affairs problems:  
“I think my record will bear out the fact that I believe very strongly that time is 
past due when many Indians should be released from all types of Federal 
supervision. While I have pointed out that many Indians do not wish this, I 
strongly feel that the trustreeship and other special forms of government 
services to the Indians are holding the Indians back politically, socially, and 
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economically. […] for the benefit of the Indians a strong hand will have to be 
taken both by the [Interior] Department and Congress.”41 
 Despite Termination having largely been discredited by 1970, Myer maintained his 
conviction in the need for federal withdrawal, a belief which his discussions with tribal 
councils in the early 1950s clearly reflected. Critically, Myer’s 1970 statement illustrates 
that he believed he knew what was best for Native Americans, as he stated that trusteeship 
should be ended even if “many Indians do not wish this”.  
Paradoxically, Myer’s Indian policy was fuelled by these coercive tendencies, despite his 
belief that he was eliminating a paternalist system. Furthermore, though clearly believing 
that federal withdrawal was the right step for tribes, Myer saw no need to keep them well-
informed on policy developments. His communications with BIA staff demonstrate that he 
had clearly established goals, as his use of the term “termination” in such communications 
shows. However, when speaking to tribes Myer largely employed vague rhetoric, omitting 
the practical implications withdrawal would have. Though Myer may have admitted to the 
Inter-Tribal Council that his goal was the shutdown of the BIA, it is significant that in 
speaking to all of these tribes there is no evidence of him referring to “termination”. This 
indicates a conscious attempt to use language with more positive connotations when 
speaking with tribes, obscuring the problems that the removal of federal trust status would 
result in. The rhetoric of assimilation was thus established well before any actual 
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1.2. Discussions surrounding HCR 108 and PL 280 
 
Until August 1953, when HCR 108 and PL 280 were both passed, Indian policy was in a 
state of transition. The Senate Subcommittee on Indian Affairs headed by Senator Arthur 
Watkins evidently had plans about what form Indian policy should take, influenced by 
Zimmerman’s testimony and a 1949 Hoover Commission Indian Task Force report which 
recommended integrating the Native population into the mainstream.42 The language in 
which federal officials spoke about Indian policy was, however, open to interpretation until 
congressional action was taken. Examining the language of HCR 108 and PL 280, as well as 
how these were presented to tribal councils, demonstrates how Terminationists in the BIA 
and Congress attempted to maintain the same vague rhetoric of ‘freedom’ to maintain 
support for Termination in the months immediately following the passage of the policy. 
“[I]t is declared to be the sense of Congress that, at the earliest possible time, 
all of the Indian tribes and the individual members thereof located within the 
States of California, Florida, New York, and Texas, and all of the following 
named Indian tribes and individual members thereof, should be freed from 
Federal supervision and control and from all disabilities and limitations 
specially applicable to Indians […]”.43 
As is evident in the above extract, HCR 108 encompassed the rhetoric of Indian policy that 
had developed in congressional and BIA circles from the mid-1940s onwards. The language 
of the resolution was evidently carefully selected by its proponents to avoid conflict – 
surely no one could object to ‘freedom’ and liberating Indians from ‘disabilities and 
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limitations’. Indeed, the resolution was rapidly passed in Congress, with minimal attention 
and virtually no debate.44  
Considering the homogenous nature of Congress from 1947-1953, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that an assimilationist Indian policy produced little dispute. Edward Charles 
Valandra’s description of the 1953 Congress as “white, male, Christian, heterosexual, racist 
and scared of communism” may seem extreme, but is to an extent justified as there were 
few women or non-white representatives: out of over five hundred members of Congress 
and Senate only four were non-white and twenty-four were women (all white).45 Perhaps 
more significantly, few congressmen had any interest – let alone experience – in Indian 
affairs, as the high turnover of members in Senate and House Indian Affairs subcommittees 
attests. With members frequently giving up their seats, the subcommittees were invariably 
staffed by newcomers who would deflect decision-making power to the chairman, giving 
experienced individuals like Senator Watkins and Congressman E.Y. Berry inordinate power 
in Indian affairs.46 
The resolution also resembled Myer’s vague rhetoric and tactics in speaking to tribal 
councils, referring to the process of withdrawal happening “at the earliest possible time”. It 
was not specified whether that was when tribes would be politically and economically 
ready for withdrawal, or when states would be ready to subsume Indian services. It was 
also unclear who would determine when that time had come: the BIA, Interior Department, 
Congress, states or tribal councils? Just as Myer provided representatives of the Klamath 
General Council no detailed information on when the termination of their trust status 
would be carried out, barring an ominous reference to a fast pace, HCR 108 equally did not 
establish a concrete timeline for its aims. 
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The language of PL 280 differed substantially from HCR 108, offering greater detail, 
which reflected its nature as a law rather than a resolution:  
“Each of the States listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over 
offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country listed 
[…] to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over offenses 
committed elsewhere in the State, and the criminal laws of such State shall 
have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have 
elsewhere within the State.”47  
PL 280 here set out to fulfil some of the aims outlined in HCR 108, to remove all “disabilities 
and limitations specially applicable to Indians”. That tribes retained civil and criminal 
jurisdiction over their lands, with federal jurisdiction only covering cases of the seven major 
crimes, was in PL 280 presented as a ‘limitation’ rather than an enactment of tribal 
sovereignty guaranteed by nineteenth century treaties.  
The provisions of PL 280 did not, however, completely do away with tribal jurisdiction, 
as specifically stated in the law: 
“Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter adopted by an Indian 
tribe, band, or community in the exercise of any authority which it may 
possess shall, if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the State, be 
given full force and effect in the determination of civil causes of action 
pursuant to this section.”48  
This statement provides for some continuation of independent tribal civil jurisdiction, but 
only as long as it did not conflict with state laws or interests. Furthermore, the Department 
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of the Interior has in practice often cut funding for tribal law enforcement and criminal 
justice from tribes covered by PL 280.49 
Similarly, PL 280 explicitly does not “authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation 
of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or Indian 
tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States […].”50 This provision, 
while deemed positive by historians like Philp, is limited by the overlap between tribes 
covered by PL 280 and put forward for Termination in HCR 108.51 Of the states immediately 
taking over the criminal and civil jurisdiction of tribal lands under PL 280, California, 
Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin all had tribes listed as ready for federal withdrawal in HCR 
108, meaning their treaty rights would soon come under question anyway. Indeed, 
members of several tribes later became engaged in Supreme Court cases to determine 
whether their treaty rights were terminated along with their trust status, resulting in long-
lasting legal battles.52 
Scholarship on PL 280 has focused mainly on its most significant and scandalous aspect – 
that any state could extend civil and criminal jurisdiction over tribal lands within its 
boundaries without the consent of the tribes in question.53 The law only required state 
approval: “the consent of the United States is hereby given to the people of any State to 
amend, where necessary their State constitution or existing statutes […] to remove any 
legal impediment to the assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the 
provisions of this Act.”54 The language of consent does then come through in the law, just 
not with respect to Native individuals or groups. This was also the most controversial aspect 
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of it at the time; President Eisenhower, though complimentary about the rest of PL 280, 
was consequently reluctant to sign the law.55 He advised Congress to amend the bill to 
require Native consent, but no change was made until the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act.56 
While HCR 108 thus encapsulated the ambiguous assimilationist rhetoric of Indian 
affairs, PL 280 gave the first concrete, legal evidence of what Termination policy would 
entail in practice, and to what lengths the federal government and BIA would go to achieve 
those aims. To what extent, then, were Congressional representatives and BIA officials 
transparent about these policies? Looking at tribal council minutes, it appears that the 
introduction of legislation by BIA officials to tribal councils did vary somewhat in focus. 
However, minimal guidance and information was given to any of the tribes, regardless of 
their place in federal Termination plans. The vague rhetoric of ‘freedom’ in withdrawal was 
maintained, but under new BIA Commissioner Glenn Emmons there was a shift in rhetoric 
toward presenting withdrawal as an eventual process. Discussions with tribal councils in 
this period consequently presented Termination as a far-off occurrence, despite official 
Congressional policy in HCR 108 putting the impetus on fast-paced withdrawal of trust 
status. 
For instance, the Mississippi Band Choctaw and Navajo tribes were both categorised as 
more than ten years away from readiness for Termination, according to Zimmerman’s list. 
There is little evidence in the available minutes of BIA employees discussing HCR 108 and PL 
280 with members of either tribe in 1953. The matter may have been raised at the 
Mississippi Choctaw council regular meeting in October 1953, but the documents from this 
meeting are poor quality and practically unreadable.57 At their July 1953 meeting however, 
the potential withdrawal programme was presented to the tribal council by BIA Muskogee 
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Area Office Tribal Relations Officer Marie Hayes. In speaking to the tribe, which was 
perceived as little assimilated with surrounding white society, Hayes described Termination 
as a gradual process: “Withdrawal doesn’t mean the Indian Service will be closed out 
immediately. So long as there is a service needed for needy people, it will be continued.”58 
Hayes’ presentation of the policy was likely influenced by an awareness of her audience – in 
addressing the Mississippi Choctaw she did not describe withdrawal as an urgent issue, 
implying that the BIA may never be shut down. Nor did she specify whether the “needy 
people” she was referring to would be provided services as tribes, or as individuals. Local 
BIA employees likely did not discuss specific Termination legislation in much detail with the 
tribe following the passage of HCR 108 and PL 280 because they did not see this as a timely 
concern. 
The Navajo tribe, though equally considered unready for federal withdrawal according 
to Zimmerman, had already faced the prospect of partial Termination through the 
Fernandez amendment’s extension of state criminal jurisdiction. The BIA’s stance on Indian 
policy was presented to the tribal council in an October 1953 meeting, where a report by 
Robert Young, Assistant to the Gallup Area Director, was read out to the tribe. The report 
described a speech by Commissioner Emmons at the meeting of the Indian Council Fire 
Organization of Chicago, during a dinner where Sam Ahkeah was presented an award for 
Indian leadership.59 According to the report, Emmons explicitly spoke of withdrawal in his 
speech, but did not mention HCR 108 or PL 280:  
“The Commissioner stressed the fact that the abolition of the Indian Bureau 
was not his chief objective. In fact, he stated that each Indian tribe has to be 
considered individually, and one cannot develop blanket plans that will fit all 
groups equally well. […] Some Tribes do not need Bureau help any more and 
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the Bureau can withdraw anytime without hurting them. However, many of 
the tribes, especially in the Southwest, will need the support, protection and 
aid of the Bureau for many years to come. The Bureau will not abandon tribes 
who still need help, and will withdraw only when the people involved are 
educated and able to compete on a par with other citizens.”60 
Emmons’ speech focused on slow-paced withdrawal of the bureau and its programmes, 
resembling Hayes’ descriptions of the process to the Mississippi Choctaw. It must be noted 
that Emmons’ speech here only appears as paraphrased by Assistant Area Director Young, a 
long-term BIA employee. An exceptional individual, Young had studied the Navajo language 
for several years, working also as an interpreter, and was a trusted liaison between the 
tribal council and the BIA.61 Young’s selection of these aspects of Emmons’ speech to 
communicate to the Navajo tribal council may of course reflect his own interpretation of 
federal legislation. Nevertheless, Emmons’ attempt to improve the public image of the BIA 
after the controversy surrounding Myer by opposing “wholesale” Termination is well-
documented by historians.62 As such, Emmons’ speech reflects the changing nature of 
Indian policy rhetoric under his commissionership, moving away from Myer’s push for fast-
paced withdrawal, to speaking of Termination as a gradual process.63 
HCR 108 and PL 280 were clearly not discussed in much detail with either of these Group 
III tribal councils. The minutes of the Five “Civilized” Tribes Inter-Tribal Council and the 
Klamath Tribal Council show that federal Termination legislation was discussed in greater 
detail in speaking to these groups, likely due to being considered mostly assimilated by 
federal employees. The Inter-Tribal Council continued to be kept well-informed on 
legislative developments, with a regular memo circulated to council members on legislation 
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pertaining to Indian affairs discussed in Congress. In September 1953 this memo outlined PL 
280, stating as its purpose: “To confer jurisdiction on the States of California, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin with respect to offenses committed on Indian 
reservations within such States.”64  
Though it is significant that PL 280 was brought to the attention of council members, the 
law was not highlighted as particularly important, just appearing as part of a list of more 
minor or tribally specific legislation with no special mention. Equally, concerns raised by the 
law, like the lack of provisions for Native consent, were not mentioned in this memo 
whatsoever. It did, however, single out HCR 108 as noteworthy:  
“With respect to H. Con. 108, you are advised that this resolution passed both 
houses and a report will be made by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to Congress 
by January 6, 1954. As you know, the provisions of this resolution are that 
certain tribes and individual members should be released from federal 
supervision.”65  
This reference to HCR 108 as a familiar resolution suggests that the Inter-Tribal Council was 
already well aware of the resolution. The memo, printed on the Muskogee Area Office 
Director’s stationary, does not comment on whether the removal of federal supervision 
was good or bad, but keeps a neutral tone.  
While it is not clear whether the document was written by the Area Director himself or 
one of his staff, it is addressed to specific groups: “Branch Chiefs and Field Personnel, 
Muskogee Area Office; Members of the Inter-Tribal Council of the Five Civilized Tribes; 
Members of the Executive Committee of the Cherokee Nation; Members of the Creek Tribal 
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Council; Members of the General Council of the Seminole Tribe.”66 Significantly, though the 
Mississippi Choctaw Tribal Council was administered by the same Area Office, they were 
not included in the list of bodies addressed. Thus, the BIA continued to keep the Five 
“Civilized” Tribes better informed on Indian policy than either the Mississippi Choctaw or 
the Navajo after HCR 108 was passed. While the Navajo Tribal Council had a tribal attorney 
to aid in communicating information to them, the Mississippi Choctaw were heavily 
dependent on the BIA for information, particularly in the 1950s. By 1964, the tribe had 
evidently joined the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) and received 
communications from them, but in the early 1950s tribal council members appear to have 
had very few sources of information on national Indian policy apart from the BIA.67 
Furthermore, Commissioner Emmons visited the Inter-Tribal council just over a month 
after HCR 108 was passed. In speaking to the Five Tribes, he continued to mould earlier 
Termination rhetoric, this time challenging the actual term ‘withdrawal’: “Incidentally, I 
don’t like the term ‘withdrawal’. As first Americans maybe the word adjustment or 
readjustment is better; the word withdrawal does not fully apply, because we are seeking 
the conclusion of a program not just ending it.”68 Emmons suggestion of changing the word 
of ‘withdrawal’ altogether indicates an understanding that the expression could invoke 
connotations of abandonment. As a term, ‘adjustment’ implies a less radical change than 
‘withdrawal’, giving the impression of slight alterations to improve a situation rather than 
the total overhaul that HCR 108 and PL 280 instigated. In addition, by emphasising that his 
aim was ‘concluding’ BIA services rather than ‘just ending’ them, the Commissioner 
indicated that trust status would not be withdrawn from unprepared tribes. Emmons’ 
language diverted attention from the complicated realities of Termination. 




 The council resolved to pay the NCAI fees in 1964, see: MBCTC (23 January 1964), MCMAIT 2/I, 
Reel I.   
68





While Emmons glossed over the practical implications of Indian policy legislation, local 
BIA employees in Oklahoma were more upfront with the Inter-tribal Council about the 
implications of HCR 108. W.O. Roberts, Area Director of the Muskogee BIA Office, warned 
the council of the problems HCR 108 might cause:  
“There are undoubtedly those who feel Indians should be released from 
Government supervision immediately. House Concurrent Resolution 108 
directs the Secretary to conduct examinations in certain areas to accomplish 
the release of Indians from Federal supervision. […] I would have no request to 
make of you in any such discussion other than to bear in mind the needs of 
those segments of our population which are in need. I think you […] know the 
situations well enough to make a very good representation of the basic needs 
of those elements in each of the Five Tribes who for various reasons are not 
yet able to take their place fully in the society about them.”69  
Roberts’ statement seems to diverge radically from the majority of BIA presentations of 
HCR 108. Rather than complying with the vague rhetoric of ‘freedom’ and ‘advancement’, 
the Area Director implied that the loss of supervision remained a significant risk for large 
portions of the Five Tribes. While Roberts’ reference to some being ‘not yet able’ to join 
surrounding societies indicates an acceptance of assimilation as a long-term goal, he 
nevertheless strongly warned Inter-Tribal Council representatives against the implications 
of HCR 108. This suggests that Roberts recognised council delegates were socio-economic 
“elites” of their tribes, better able to support themselves without federal services than the 
average Indian in Oklahoma.  
Roberts may have influenced – or been influenced by – the ways in which tribal council 
members themselves understood and interpreted federal legislation, seeing as he did not 
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unquestioningly support Congressional action. Significantly, in March 1954 – a few months 
after making these statements – Roberts left his position as Muskogee Office Area Director. 
Even at his final Inter-Tribal Council meeting, Roberts continued to encourage 
representatives to be critical of fast-paced Termination: he called for “the responsible 
citizenship of the Five Tribes” to “unite in a very definite request for the continuance of 
restrictions and secure extension of restrictions” to maintain trust status over Five Tribes 
lands.70 Roberts was soon replaced by Paul Fickinger, who supported Principal Chief Belvin’s 
plans to terminate the trust status of the Choctaw tribe, and spoke in favour of Native 
Americans taking “their place in the communities as a part of the total community just the 
same as anyone else does.”71 It is unclear whether Roberts left the position of his own 
accord or was removed by the central BIA office; whatever the case, his successor was 
significantly less critical of federal Indian policy legislation. 
Out of all the tribes here examined, only one was named in HCR 108 – the Klamath tribe 
of Oregon. The state of Oregon, where their reservation lands were situated, was also 
granted civil and criminal jurisdiction over the tribe under PL 280. Of the tribes here 
considered, the Klamath were by far the most affected by Termination legislation, which 
was regularly deliberated by the Klamath Executive Committee and General Council. The 
ways in which federal officials spoke of Termination legislation to the council must be 
assessed. The minutes of the tribal council show that the 1953 legislation was first brought 
up at a council meeting by a letter from the League of Nations Pan American Indians, a 
small pan-tribal activist group that had consistently advocated BIA reform since the 1940s 
and opposed Termination, rather than BIA employees.72 The organisation wrote to the 
tribal council in August 1953 warning of the risks posed to Native property interests and 
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treaty rights by BIA ‘bills and resolutions’.73 It is telling that a Native activist organisation 
managed to reach the Klamath Executive Committee to discuss HCR 108 and PL 280 before 
local BIA Area Office staff did. Not only does this demonstrate how keenly some Indian 
organisations tracked policy developments in Congress, but it also points to inadequacies 
and inefficiencies in the BIA Portland Area Office activities. 
Possibly as a result of this correspondence, the text of PL 280 and HCR 108 was included 
in the Executive Committee minutes in full, at the request of Boyd Jackson.74 At least some 
Klamath tribal members were, as such, fully aware of, and had access to, information on 
Termination legislation, though this was not necessarily circulated widely by the Portland 
Area Office. Instead it was up to members of the tribe like Jackson to record this 
information. While the text of HCR 108 was inserted into the minutes of the meeting, it 
does not appear to have been discussed at length, and there is no evidence that the tribal 
council was briefed on the significance of the bill. Nor did inclusion in the Executive 
Committee record mean wider circulation among the tribal membership; importantly, it 
remains unclear how accessible the minutes of these less than ten member meetings were 
to other Klamath individuals. 
The BIA, then, played little role in communicating HCR 108 and PL 280 to the tribe. 
Bureau employees did, nevertheless, discuss Termination with the council, but in raising 
federal policy issues, they focused their efforts specifically on the withdrawal of Klamath 
trust status. The BIA sent the Klamath tribe a draft version of a Termination act in 
September 1953, several months before the study of tribes ready for withdrawal mandated 
by HCR 108 was set to be completed.75 The minutes mention that the tribe’s 
Superintendent, E.J. Diehl, provided a “clarification” of the draft bill, but the Executive 
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Committee record does not include this. Whatever this ‘clarification’ may have entailed, it 
was only communicated to the Executive Committee, not the tribal council as a whole.  
The draft bill was only discussed with the wider tribal membership a few months later, 
at a December 1953 General Council meeting. This meeting was attended by C.S. Cohn, BIA 
Area Counsel, who was present “to go over the Termination Bill, giving legal advice as may 
be of an interpretative nature of apparent intent.”76 Before even stating the intention of 
this visit, Superintendent Diehl highlighted that Cohn’s time was limited, stating he was 
leaving on the “4:40 train”.  As this was not the first matter considered by the council that 
day, it is clear that the time provided for a BIA legal employee to answer tribal members’ 
critical questions on their draft termination bill was severely inadequate. Furthermore, 
Cohn’s discussion with the tribal members does not seem to be recorded in the council 
minutes, meaning members of the tribe not in attendance would not have been able to 
access that vital information. 
The degree to which Termination legislation was presented to tribes thus varied greatly 
depending on the tribe’s place in the withdrawal plan. The attention which federal officials 
gave to tribes and the nature in which Termination was presented also diverged. The Group 
III Mississippi Choctaw and Navajo tribes heard little mention of HCR 108 and PL 280 from 
federal employees, being instead told that the aim of transferring services away from the 
BIA was gradual and distant. The Five “Civilized” Tribes and Klamath on the other hand, 
gained far more information on Termination legislation. Yet though the Klamath were 
explicitly nominated for Termination by HCR 108, BIA employees did not thoroughly discuss 
the resolution with the tribe. Regardless, Commissioner Emmons failed to visit the tribe at 
this critical juncture, and BIA employees – including the superintendent – interacted 
primarily with the Executive Committee rather than the full General Council. HCR 108 and 
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PL 280 were only brought to the attention of any branch of the tribal council at the request 
of tribal members, or third-party activist organisations, not by BIA employees. While 
Muskogee Area Office Director Roberts was more wary of Termination policy, even he did 
not specify exactly what problems it could cause for tribes, and was soon replaced by an 
official more amenable to Congressional aims in Indian policy. Despite some variation 
brought about by local BIA staff, little detailed guidance on the possible effects of 
Termination legislation was offered to tribal councils, meaning most tribal members did not 
get up-to-date, accurate information about the withdrawal process and the significance of 
HCR 108 and PL 280. 
 
1.3. Tribal councils’ responses to, and interpretations of, legislation, 
1953-4 
 
Though containing the official guidelines for Termination policy, HCR 108 and PL 280 
were unevenly presented to tribal councils, with some tribes being granted more 
information than others. The ways in which tribal councils interpreted Termination policy, 
as established in HCR 108 and PL 280, remains to be explored. As most tribes received little 
explanation of the implications of Indian policy changes from federal employees, the 
varying ways in which they may have interpreted Indian policy in the period must be 
investigated. 
The Navajo, officially classed as ‘predominantly Indian’, did not explicitly discuss 
Termination policy on a regular basis. Examining the tribal council’s minutes in the years 
following the passing of HCR 108 and PL 280 does nevertheless indicate that the council 
was clearly aware of withdrawal-related bills before they were presented to Congress. In 
the week before HCR 108 was passed, the tribal council passed a resolution with an 





bill which would have allowed any American Indian declared ‘competent’ by the Interior 
Department to withdraw from their tribe.77 Council member Sam Gorman spoke out against 
the competency bill: “[…] I believe that we are all agreed on the fact that this is 
inappropriate as far as the Navajo tribe is concerned. We have not got to the point as yet 
where we can consider ourselves competent for withdrawal or for any limitations lifted as 
far as the Navajo Tribe is concerned.”78 
Though Gorman opposed allowing individual Natives to withdraw from their tribe, his 
statement did not altogether object to the concept of trust status removal. Rather, he 
specifically argued the bill was inappropriate for the Navajo tribe at the current time. 
Inherent in this argument is the assumption that the tribe would be ready at an indefinite 
point in the future – thereby implying an acceptance of the belief that the Navajo were low 
on a scale of societal development, not yet “competent” to manage their own affairs. This 
statement must be considered within the context of Indian policy developments in July 
1953, as Emmons had not yet widely visited tribes, nor had HCR 108 and PL 280 been 
passed. As such, at this point Termination could have posed a potential risk to the 
sovereignty of the Navajo tribe, particularly through the competency bill. 
A sense of threat is clear in the resolution passed to oppose the bill, stating:  
“[…] this Council respectfully request the Congress of the United States not to 
consider measures of this fundamental character affecting not only Tribal 
property rights but the lives of individual Tribal members, without adequate 
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notice to those tribes which will be affected and opportunity to be heard in 
opposition to or in support of such measures […].”79  
The resolution was written in the style of a Congressional document by the tribe’s attorney, 
Norman Littell, and thus reflects his interpretation of the tribe’s opposition to the 
competency bill. Most significantly, it does not specifically object to withdrawal, just to the 
lack of notice and consent allowed to tribes, acknowledging both the effects on 
communally-held tribal property and “individual Tribal members”. In this respect, the 
resolution epitomises the sentiment expressed by Sam Gorman – not opposing assimilation 
per se, just the manner and timing of federal plans. Publicly appearing to support eventual 
federal withdrawal may have been a conscious political manoeuvre adopted by tribes like 
the Navajo. Presenting themselves as working toward the ultimate goal of assimilation 
could create opportunities for a tribe to benefit from government programmes aimed at 
preparing for federal withdrawal, which would support the economic and educational 
development of the tribe.80  
Gorman thus turned the language of assimilation to the advantage of the Navajo, 
justifying the continuation of federal development programmes by claiming they would 
prepare tribal members for assimilation, building on an idea established by Chairman 
Ahkeah and Howard Gorman in challenging the Fernandez Amendment. This process 
resembles that identified by literary scholar Amelia Katanski as “learning to write ‘Indian’”, 
referring to Native boarding school students imbuing the English language with their own 
meanings, rather than simply absorbing it.81 Navajo tribal council members similarly spoke 
in terms of the tribe not being “ready” for Termination due to a lack of preparation, 
thereby challenging policies that threatened their trust status and demonstrating their 
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agency in dealing with coercive BIA policy. They could, as such, be described as “speaking 
‘Indian’”, or more specifically, “speaking ‘Navajo’” – turning the language of assimilation 
into a tool for improving the conditions of Navajo people without losing tribal status. 
Other tribes employed comparable tactics, responding to the prospect of Termination 
with an apparent acceptance of some sort of assimilation. The Five “Civilized” Tribes Inter-
Tribal Council displayed strikingly similar arguments against the whole-scale eradication, or 
even partial cutback, of services from their tribes. In October 1954, the Inter-Tribal Council 
approved a resolution explicitly responding to HCR 108.82 In the resolution, HCR 108 was 
presented as a generalised liquidation policy, and was strictly objected to on the grounds 
that: “[…] trust and service responsibilities have their origins in treaty relations and should 
not be terminated or abrogated without concurrence by the affected Indians or Indian 
tribes and the States in which they reside […].”83  
The resolution concedes that “it is and should be the mutual concern of the State, the 
Indian people and the Federal trustee that there be more progressive development toward 
the goal of full cultural assimilation and integration of the Indians into the community life 
about them […]”84 The Inter-Tribal Council did not oppose assimilation outright, but rather 
asserted the right of tribes to veto any decisions made by the federal government, and 
presented a list of provisions to be fulfilled before the trust relationship could be severed. 
This included integrating Native children into public schools, improving Indian health, 
promoting relocation by choice, and providing welfare services “to contribute to the 
betterment of the social and economic conditions of Indian communities.”85 The resolution 
was detailed, providing clear justifications for why the suggested provisions should be met 
before a tribe could be terminated. 
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These Navajo and Five Tribes resolutions were of course written at different times and in 
response to different pieces of withdrawal legislation. The Inter-Tribal Council specifically 
addressed HCR 108 a year after it had been passed in Congress, while the Navajo resolution 
objected to a bill still pending, meaning their situation was more urgent. It is therefore 
unsurprising that the Inter-Tribal Council resolution was a far more detailed and explicit 
statement against federal legislation than that passed by the Navajo Tribal Council the 
previous year. Five Tribes representatives had considerable time to reflect on Termination 
legislation and write a detailed response. Yet both resolutions still essentially objected to 
Termination due to timing, stating that legislation was forcing withdrawal too quickly and 
without proper consultation with tribes. The Inter-Tribal Council resolution was far longer 
and more detailed, but written in the same legal style and format as the Navajo resolution. 
The sentiment is also the same – presenting assimilation as a goal for the future, but 
criticising specific legislation. Like the Navajo, the Inter-Tribal Council emphasised the 
responsibilities of the government to tribes by presenting this as the key to some form of 
assimilation in the future, displaying agency through negotiating alternate interpretations 
of assimilationist language, rather than opposing Termination altogether. 
A critical difference is that while the Navajo resolution was written by the tribe’s 
attorney, the Inter-Tribal Council document was signed off by its President, Cherokee tribal 
member and Oklahoma judge N.B. Johnson. Significantly, Johnson had been President of 
the NCAI from its founding in 1944 until 1953.86 Johnson therefore had extensive 
experience in congressional lobbying; with well-educated representatives, the Inter-Tribal 
Council were not reliant on non-Native legal counsel to present their views directly to 
Congress. This difference in authorship partially explains why the Inter-Tribal Council 
resolution expressed a much stronger objection to Termination policy.  
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It may however seem surprising that a former NCAI president so clearly displayed 
support for ‘cultural assimilation’ as the ultimate goal of Indian policy. This aspect of the 
resolution seems to justify later Red Power criticism of the NCAI as ‘Uncle Tomahawks’, too 
reliant on and uncritical of the government.87  However, though signed by Johnson, the 
resolution was a product of amendments and suggestions made by a variety of council 
members. It thus reflects the wishes of a varied group of representatives, some of whom 
later supported Termination, like Choctaw Principal Chief Belvin. Moreover, though the 
resolution refers to ‘cultural assimilation’ as an eventual aim, this concept is not defined 
and the point-by-point recommendations for the improvement of Indian living standards do 
not refer to cultural programmes. With federal officials having so unequivocally praised the 
Inter-Tribal Council throughout the early 1950s, it is also likely that the Inter-Tribal Council 
did not want to impair this relationship: speaking of assimilation may have been a tactic to 
maintain the support of BIA officials and Congressional representatives.  
Considering HCR 108 and PL 280 carried a serious threat of potentially fast Termination, 
cooperation with government officials certainly seemed beneficial to the Navajo Tribal 
Council and the Five Tribes Inter-Tribal Council. The Klamath tribe, on the other hand, could 
not speak of assimilation as a far-off goal, as the tribe was faced with plans for the 
withdrawal of their trust status swiftly after HCR 108 was passed. A question much debated 
among historians is whether the Klamath tribe consented to Termination. An oft-quoted 
1956 Stanford University Research Institute questionnaire found that only 14 out of 100 
Klamath respondents believed that Termination had been requested by the tribe.88 Though 
this does not directly prove that the tribe opposed Termination, it indicates that tribal 
members did not see it as their choice. Scholarship furthermore concurs that the tribe was 
split into two factions: one opposing Termination, led by Boyd Jackson, and another 
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supporting it, led by Wade Crawford.89  To-date, scholars have characterised this division in 
opinion as stemming from a differing degree of acculturation with surrounding Euro-
American communities, with historian Heather Fryer describing Crawford as a “wealthy 
cattleman” who lived “completely in the mainstream”, and his supporters as mainly living 
off the reservation.90 
However, scholarship on the Klamath has not looked in detail at the development of 
tribal responses to Termination, instead focusing on the process of Termination rather than 
reactions to, and interpretations of, it. A draft bill for the withdrawal of Klamath trust status 
was initially introduced by the BIA to the tribe’s Executive Committee in September 1953, 
indicating that council members played little concrete role in formulating the plan but were 
allowed some time to review it before it was passed by Congress and signed into law in 
August 1954.91 Nevertheless, discussions conducted in General Council and Executive 
Committee meetings in 1953 and 1954 reveal that responses were not straightforwardly 
and consistently against Termination. Rather, tribal leaders attempted to negotiate 
alterations more suitable to the tribe in the Termination Act whilst not rejecting it outright. 
Anthropologist Patrick Haynal has tracked the confusing path of the draft bill among the 
tribal council, showing how in December 1953 the Executive Committee came up with an 
alternative “cooperative” plan to Termination, which would have established a tribal 
cooperative exempt from certain state taxes, allowing for the continuation of a tribal 
community despite the removal of federal trust status. 92 In January 1954 the General 
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Council rejected the cooperative plan, moving instead to accept the draft withdrawal bill 
sent by the BIA under the provision that the tribe could later make amendments to it.93  
According to a later statement by Executive Committee members Boyd Jackson and 
Jesse Lee Kirk before Congress, the rejection of the cooperative plan was an attempt by 
Klamath tribal members to castoff Termination entirely.94 Furthermore, Fixico has claimed 
that the acceptance of the BIA draft act resulted directly from blackmail by Senator 
Watkins, who allegedly threatened to deliberately withhold a $2.6 million judgement 
awarded by the Claims Commission if Termination was not accepted.95 It is difficult to 
assess the accuracy of these claims, seeing as the microfilm collection compiled from BIA 
records does not include the January 1954 council meetings. However, the tribal council’s 
attempts to shape withdrawal to better suit the needs and wishes of their community is 
evident throughout – even if there was little consensus as to what those amendments 
should be. For instance, the notes of a January 1954 Special Session of the Executive 
Committee meeting held after the General Council had accepted the draft Termination act 
mention that “The question of the word ‘termination’ was discussed by the members, 
Thereupon [sic] the Committee agreed to delete the word termination from the Agenda, 
and insert in its stead the words ‘Enabling Legislation’.”96 As these minutes are only a 
summary of the meeting rather than a full transcript, there is little explication of why the 
word “enabling” was favoured. Additionally, the text of a resolution to also change past 
references to Termination in Executive Committee meeting minutes to “enabling 
legislation” stated that “such term is a misnomer in effect of the real purpose of the bill 
under consideration […]”97  
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It is clear that the committee objected to the term ‘Termination’, instead preferring 
language which would emphasise the ability of the tribe as a community to take over the 
management of their own affairs, as the resolution stated, to enable “legislation for any 
program of management of the Tribes [sic] Affairs as the tribe may hereafter present with 
the tribes [sic] approval.”98 This statement, in its repeated references to the Klamath as a 
tribe indicates that Executive Committee members at this point in time favoured the 
continuation of a tribal collective, rather than liquidation of tribal assets between individual 
members. Furthermore, this attempt demonstrates the ability of Executive Committee 
members to exercise their agency in challenging the terminology of Termination, though 
they were ultimately unsuccessful in changing the wording of the Termination Act itself.  
In the July General Council meeting of that year tribal members continued to question 
the Termination Act, requesting details of its impact on the taxation of tribal lands, as well 
as their hunting and fishing rights, from new superintendent, W.W. Palmer. These 
conversations constitute clear evidence that tribal members still valued both their 
guaranteed treaty rights and their Klamath identity. For instance, tribal member Lawrence 
Witt made a strong statement for retaining hunting rights: “[…] I would like to have 
[Klamath Vice President] Lang make that a definite resolution we can pass so it will be a 
matter of record so that any Indian arrested hunting would have the full support of the 
Klamath Indians. (applause).”99 Though the tribe may have accepted the BIA’s draft 
Termination bill, this did not necessarily mean that they wished for liquidation, or the loss 
of their status and identity as “Klamath Indians”, as Witt put it. The support for Witt’s 
statement in the General Council proves that members of the tribe still identified 
themselves as ‘Klamath Indians’ and saw their treaty-guaranteed hunting and fishing rights 
as crucial, despite their withdrawal process moving forward. Such assertions of support for 









Klamath rights indicate that Haynal’s claim that tribal members were coerced into 
accepting PL 587 is correct, but also that tribal members were uncertain of the impact 
Termination would have on their lives.100 
The Klamath Termination Act, PL 587, was passed in August 1954.101 Unfortunately, like 
the January 1954 General Council meetings, the minutes of any council or committee 
meetings conducted from August to December 1954 are missing from the BIA’s collection. If 
discussions in the January 1954 meeting contained evidence of Watkins’ coercion, it would 
not be in the BIA’s interest to retain copies of these minutes. Similarly, if August 1954 
reactions to the passing of the Termination Act were emphatically negative, this would 
contradict the BIA’s attempts to present the tribe as supporting Termination. The reason 
for these minutes not being included is impossible to determine, but though the 
disorganisation of the BIA is well-known, it seems rather conspicuous that minutes of 
meetings held at the most critical junctures are not available in the BIA’s official collection. 
Similarly, Mississippi Choctaw tribal council minutes from the early 1950s are 
fragmented and partial at best, as is demonstrated by the omission of the minutes for their 
1952 meeting with Myer from the BIA collection. The minutes for only one meeting are 
available for the autumn of 1953, and even these are practically unreadable, meaning 
Mississippi Choctaw responses to the passing of HCR 108 and PL 280 are difficult to garner. 
Few meetings include full transcripts of discussions, instead consisting of summarised 
statements. Furthermore, while their identity remains unclear, it is apparent that the 
stenographer for these meetings was non-Choctaw, struggling to understand tribal 
members and displaying potential bias in the transcription of their meetings. For instance a 
February 1954 meeting transcript shows that while BIA officials’ comments were 
summarised with detail and some direct quotes, the content of speeches by Choctaw tribal 
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members was included only as far as the ability and willingness of the stenographer 
allowed. The minutes state that tribal member Woodrow Billie, in response to pro-
assimilation comments made by the local BIA Area Director, “made an impassioned defense 
of all Choctaw people seeming to plead for understanding of their situation.”102 The content 
of Billie’s speech and exactly what he was objecting to is not indicated, but he was evidently 
unhappy and emotional in his statement.  
Though we cannot get any direct evidence of responses to Termination in this period, 
the very nature of the Mississippi Choctaw minutes demonstrates that the tribe had 
virtually no control over their affairs in the early 1950s. As stenographers, likely hired by 
the BIA at this point, frequently left out comments made by tribal members, it is clear that 
Mississippi BIA Area Officials had little interest in Native opinions on Indian policy, both 
locally and nationally, at this point. The comments by tribal council members that are 
included show little mention or understanding of developments in Termination policy at 
that time – instead they focused on local matters perhaps more urgent for tribal members, 
which will be discussed in later chapters. 
Councils had varied responses to and ways of dealing with Termination legislation, not 
representing just socio-economic “tribal elites”. In the BIA-organised and administered 
arena of tribal councils, little direct and vocal objection to Termination policy is evident in 
the months immediately following the passing of HCR 108 and PL 280. Yet a closer 
examination that takes into account not just the direct statements of members, but the 
issues they wished to discuss, reveals more subtle forms of resistance. Both the Navajo 
Council and Five Tribes Inter-tribal Council expressed agreement with the general goal of 
“assimilation”, but questioned the timing and procedures adopted by the federal 
government. The Klamath, faced with immediate and direct withdrawal, attempted to 
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shape their Termination Act to include and acknowledge their concerns and needs. Though 
minutes are incomplete, particularly for the Klamath and Mississippi Choctaw, looking at 
what has been omitted can offer insight into, and evidence for, BIA negligence and even 
possible cases of the distortion of evidence and information. Comparing these four tribes, it 
is also significant that the minutes of the two tribal councils that repeatedly expressed 
support for “assimilation” have been well-maintained by the BIA. This has important 
implications for our understanding of how the BIA worked during the era of Termination, 




In examining the Indian affairs rhetoric in the build up to the legislative developments of 
1953, it is obvious that BIA officials purposely presented policy in simplified, broad terms. 
As Fernandez’s, Myer’s and Emmons’ statements at the meetings of tribal councils show, 
federal withdrawal was continuously associated with ‘independence’ and ‘freedom’ for 
tribes throughout the early 1950s – implying they would be allowed to determine their own 
affairs. Without a clear sense of what the process of Termination would involve, it is no 
wonder that a policy promoted in such positive, yet vague terms seemed potentially 
attractive to tribal councils. The real implications of the loss of civil and criminal jurisdiction 
to states, and loss of Indian bureau services, were either not considered or purposely 
obscured by federal employees. While some Area Office staff evidently did attempt to warn 
tribal councils of problems federal withdrawal might cause, overt criticism could lead to 
dismissal or reassignment, as Muskogee Area Director Roberts’ case attests. Despite 
individual examples like this, BIA rhetoric was remarkably homogenous across the nation, 





Tribal councils, particularly the Mississippi Choctaw, were largely dependent on the will 
of their local BIA Area Office to keep them informed on Indian policy, seeing as they had 
few contacts outside the reservation in the early 1950s. Most strikingly, interactions 
between councils and the BIA in this period highlight the government’s neglect of Klamath 
tribal members in preparing their Termination. BIA officials largely met with the ten-
member Executive Committee and only offered limited consultation time to the tribe’s 
General Council, despite the impending change in their federal status. These power 
dynamics played through in each of the tribal councils considered here, but were most 
pronounced and destructive in the Klamath case. Despite the rhetoric of ‘independence’ 
and ‘freedom’, tribal councils in this early period were offered little tangible control of, or 
input into, the direction federal Indian policy would take. The Klamath were encouraged to 
suggest amendments, but these had little impact on the Klamath Termination Act, as it was 
eventually passed. 
Nevertheless, an examination of the responses of tribal council members to legislation 
shows that the ultimate goal of ‘assimilation’ was rarely openly challenged in this early 
period. Notably a few Navajo tribal council representatives even explicitly promoted this as 
an aim. They justified their objections to terminating the trust status of their tribe on the 
grounds that they were not yet sufficiently ‘assimilated’ and thus did not fulfil Termination 
criteria. In discussing Indian policy, tribal council representatives of a variety of tribes did 
not publicly object to the idea of assimilation and becoming ‘full American citizens’. 
Chapters Four, Five and Six of this thesis will examine how these representatives 
interpreted and employed such concepts in order to gain a deeper understanding of why 
tentative approval was expressed. It is already evident, however, that Navajo, Five Tribes, 
Klamath and Mississippi Choctaw tribal members did not simply accept and absorb the 
rhetoric of Termination, but interpreted and employed it in various ways to support the 





Chapter Two: Press Presentations of Termination and Issues of 
Consent 
 
Despite not thoroughly discussing legislation with tribal councils, in speeches during his 
commissionership Dillon Myer maintained that reservations would not be broken up or 
people relocated by force.1 Senator Arthur Watkins similarly propagated the concept of 
Termination as voluntary in his writings and public speeches. In 1957 the journal Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, an influential publication which 
politicians often contributed to, published an essay by Watkins, which included a section 
subtitled “Voluntary Indian Actions Toward Federal Decontrol”.2 Watkins claimed various 
tribes, including the Confederated Tribe of the Colville (Washington) and the Peoria, 
Ottawa and Wyandotte Tribes (Oklahoma), had approached the government to instigate 
withdrawal. Furthermore, he quoted BIA Commissioner Glenn Emmons on “the value of 
voluntary Indian group action”: “A good program is one which results from the desires of 
and fits the needs of a particular group of Indians. In whole or in part the program should, if 
possible, be the work of the Indians themselves.”3 
Watkins thus portrayed Termination as voluntary, and tribes as playing a significant role 
in designing their own programmes for the removal of trust status. As the previous chapter 
has shown, Termination was nevertheless carried out without the final consent of tribes 
like the Klamath, and their suggestions for amending draft acts were typically ignored. 
Furthermore, scholarship has shown that the tribes Watkins listed as “volunteering” for 
Termination were bitterly divided on the issue, or misled by local BIA employees regarding 
what it would entail.4 The vague rhetoric of “freedom” and “consent” was employed by 
federal officials to mask the coercive elements of Termination. Several years after his 
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resignation, Myer continued to propagate the belief that withdrawal was necessary, despite 
admitting that it was often carried out against the wishes of Native individuals and groups.5 
As such, though Termination was presented as providing “freedom”, in practice consent 
was not required for carrying out federal withdrawal. 
In order to understand why Termination – despite its disastrous practical impact – was 
not officially repudiated until 1970, the extent to which the policy had public support and 
the ways in which Termination was discussed in the public domain must be examined. Was 
Native consent for withdrawal presented as a key aspect of the policy, and to what extent 
did the print media portray Termination as a voluntary process? This chapter will examine 
how withdrawal was presented in the press, focusing particularly on issues of consent, in 
order to examine the ways in which Termination was communicated to the public. For 
instance, the fact that PL 280 did not require Native consent for states to extend civil and 
criminal jurisdiction over reservation lands briefly became the subject of public controversy 
in 1953 and 1954, but failed to instigate rapid change in Indian policy. Termination 
continued to be covered in the press in the late 1950s and 1960s, but though problems 
with specific tribal cases were recognised, the core assumption that Native Americans 
should be assimilated into the mainstream was never seriously questioned throughout this 
period. 
Before examining the development of Indian policy rhetoric in the Termination era, it is 
important to note the disjuncture between “objective truth” and what communication 
studies scholar Thomas Farrell terms “social knowledge”.6 According to Farrell, “social 
knowledge” is information that is only dependent on its acceptance by a specific audience, 
regardless of external realities or “facts”.7 In the case of press representations of 
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indigenous peoples, this “social knowledge” is formed by a base of assumptions that is – 
consciously or not – deemed by journalists to be accepted by the audience they write for. 
Native opinion, consultation and voices – which would demonstrate the real and tangible 
influence Indian policy had on Native peoples – are not required for such a base of 
“knowledge” to form. Farrell states that such knowledge does not only work for broad or 
vague beliefs, but can also include specific details.8  
Considering the longevity of Myer’s conviction in the benefits of federal withdrawal, the 
persistent belief system on which this was based must be investigated. Indeed, Myer’s 
views were neither original nor uncommon in the United States – scholarship has shown 
that the belief that federal supervision was harmful and should be removed had been 
prevalent since the late 1880s.9 Press writing in the years following the passing of the 
General Allotment Act in 1887 particularly espoused this ideology, as demonstrated by an 
untitled July 1892 Times editorial, which supported the idea that “equal citizenship” could 
only be achieved through political participation and ending trust status:  
“The law distinctly provides that Indians who take their allotments in severalty 
shall become citizens, and there are also other ways in which citizenship may 
be acquired. The Sissetons have accepted this form of land holding, and so 
have tribes and individuals elsewhere. When, by conforming to State laws and 
to registration rules, the red men take their full share in elections, they will 
doubtless find some statesmen anxious to look after them and help them who 
have hitherto been but little concerned with poor Lo’s grievances. The day, in 
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fact, when Lo will take his place on the floors of Congress, representing white 
men as well as red, may not be very far distant.”10  
Though separated by over seventy years, Myer’s statement that “the time is past due 
when many Indians should be released from […] Federal supervision” shares a certain 
ideological base with this editorial comment – both see assimilation into Euro-American 
societal structures as not only a possibility, but a necessity for Native Americans.11 
Furthermore, like Myer in his speeches to tribes in the 1950s, the 1892 editorial presented 
Natives as consenting to assimilation, claiming allotment was “accepted” by tribes and 
individuals. Consent as a concept, thus, played some role in assimilationist ideology, both in 
the allotment era and in Myer’s time. This chapter will demonstrate that the belief in 
assimilation as desirable was a type of hegemonic, “social knowledge” which informed all 
mainstream responses to Termination and restricted Native participation in public debate 
surrounding the policy.  
 
2.1. Withdrawal in the press, 1947-1953 
 
In order to discuss effectively the issue of consent to Termination, it is necessary to 
chart the development of press writing on Indian policy in the years preceding the passing 
of HCR 108 and PL 280. Examining late 1940s and early 1950s discussions of Indian affairs in 
broadsheets and news magazines demonstrates parallels between how Termination was 
presented to the public and to tribal councils in the years preceding HCR 108. Press 
conversations on Indian affairs in this period, like Congressional rhetoric, cultivated 
factually dubious imagery and language to publicly frame Native Americans as ‘dependent 
wards’, needing ‘liberation’. For instance in a March 1953 newswire report the Washington 
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Post stated simply: “The House yesterday approved an investigation of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs to find out when the Indians can be freed of all Federal controls and what functions 
of the bureau can be abolished or transferred.”12  
This brief newswire report demonstrates the tendency of much of the news media – 
both in the mid-twentieth century and today – to rely on ‘authorities’ to communicate 
factually accurate information. ‘Authorities’, like the police, government officials or 
scholars, were almost exclusively Euro-American in the Termination period. Sociologist 
Teun A. van Dijk argues that white authorities are seen by both press staff and readers as 
“ethnically neutral” and, by extension, able to offer objective information on minority 
issues.13 Though van Dijk focuses primarily on Western Europe, his argument resonates 
with press reporting on Indian affairs in the early 1950s. In this period, objectivity was the 
ultimate ideal of U.S. news reporting, with American journalists generally attempting to be 
neutral and unbiased, eliminating evidence of personal opinions.14  
This idealisation of ‘objectivity’, in part, resulted in the prevalence of short newswire 
reports like the aforementioned Post piece. Newswires, sent straight from services like the 
Associated Press or United Press International, usually consisted of these brief one-
paragraph reports. As the Post example illustrates, these rarely contextualised the 
information they provided, and often merely regurgitated statements from ‘authorities’. In 
this case, the Post uncritically printed the House voice on Indian affairs, advancing the 
‘freedom’ rhetoric so typical during this period. The paragraph also mentions the abolition 
of ‘bureau functions’ – an additional detail on Indian policy that the BIA seldom 
communicated to tribes. This indicates that federal officials were more forthcoming with 
the general public on the nature of Indian policy than with tribal councils. 
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Newswire reports may have relied on officials’ comments to maintain brevity, but even 
longer articles prioritised federal authority voices. For instance, a July 1947 New York Times 
article by reporter Bess Furman, titled ‘Campaign Pushed to “Free” Indians’, outlined the 
influence of the Zimmerman plan on Indian policy.15 The article included long quotes from 
chairman of the Senate Public Lands Committee, Nebraska Senator Hugh Butler, who spoke 
of federal withdrawal in positive terms: “I am encouraged with the statement of William 
Zimmerman Jr. […] that ten tribes are ready now to be released from Federal 
supervision.”16 None of the tribes listed by Zimmerman as immediately ready for 
withdrawal resided within Butler’s home state, meaning the Senator had no direct regional 
motives in supporting their Termination. Butler’s statement, as committee chairman, rather 
reflected the broader contemporary federal approach to Indian policy. By referring to being 
“encouraged” by the Zimmerman plan, Butler communicated an enthusiasm for withdrawal 
similar to that of Congressman Antonio Fernandez and Commissioner Myer. The rhetoric 
adopted by these figures implied an understanding of the problems of Native populations 
and presented changes to the federal trust relationship as being key to resolving those 
issues. Furthermore Butler and Fernandez shared a self-proclaimed authority on Indian 
affairs, despite their lack of experience in this area.  
Moreover, the Times article reported exclusively on Butler’s statements without 
contextualising his comments in outside information, trusting in his authority alone. This 
focus on Butler may reflect the specific position of Bess Furman at the Times; previously a 
member of Eleanor Roosevelt’s press corps, she had been White House correspondent for 
the paper since 1943, meaning reporting on federal representatives was a core focus of her 
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job.17 In both the headline and body of the text, the term ‘freedom’ was only included in 
inverted commas, creating the impression that the paper did not necessarily support 
Butler’s stance. However, an uncritical adoption of the values propagated by Butler can be 
found elsewhere. Furman noted that “Senator Hugh Butler […] took charge today of a 
campaign to ‘free the Indians,’ acting for the ten tribes already officially pronounced ready 
to throw off wardship.”18 In referring to a “campaign”, she indicates that the efforts to alter 
federal status were both advanced and organised in Congress. Notably, the article states 
simply that Butler is “acting for” tribes, without questioning his right to do so or any 
involvement these tribes may have had in the process. By using the active verb “to throw 
off” in describing the withdrawal process, the text even supports the illusion that the tribes 
put forward for Termination supported the policy. Furthermore, the article uncritically 
accepted the contested conception of the federal-tribal relationship as one of “wardship”.  
Indeed, though there are significant similarities in how federal officials presented Indian 
affairs to tribes through tribal councils and to the public through the press, some critical 
differences in language and content can be found. As mentioned in the Post newswire 
above, more detail of the practical implications of changing federal Indian policy was 
communicated in the press than at tribal council meetings. While tribal council minutes 
show very little evidence of BIA officials discussing Zimmerman’s list, or the practical details 
of how a federal withdrawal policy would be carried out, the Times reported on both even 
before HCR 108 and PL 280 were passed. The ‘Campaign Pushed to “Free” Indians’ article 
contained detailed information of the three groups outlined by Zimmerman in his hearing 
with the Senate Public Lands committee, as well as the criteria used to categorise tribes.19  
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A March 1950 article by Furman included a point-by-point plan for the withdrawal of 
trust status, more than three years before HCR 108 was passed. 20 The article quoted a 1948 
“governmental commission”, listing the need for greater educational provisions to tribes, 
the “reduction of death and illness rates”, handover of services to state and local 
governments, the “transfer of tribal property to Indian-owned and controlled 
corporations”, and it explicitly stated as an aim the “full participation of Indian peoples in 
local and state civic life and ending of their tax-exempt status.”21 The article was evidently 
referring to the Hoover Commission report on Indian affairs, published in 1949.22 The Task 
Force appointed to compile the report included no Native representatives and evidently 
employed little Native consultation.23 Furthermore, there is no evidence to show that BIA 
or other federal officials communicated with tribal councils about the report. Though press 
reporting contained the same vague references to ‘independence’ and ‘freedom’ that 
federal officials espoused at tribal council meetings, reporters additionally publicised a 
wealth of detail on what the new direction in Indian policy would entail.  
The newspaper-reading public, as a result, was arguably kept better informed on 
developments in national Indian affairs than tribes were themselves. However, the position 
of this article in the Times must be noted. It was printed on page fifteen – not right at the 
beginning, but far from the end of the paper.24 Though the article was relatively long, it was 
hidden in the middle of the page, indistinguishable amongst the many articles surrounding 
it. Furthermore, it was situated next to a mass of announcements detailing the 
engagements of various New York socialites. Though other, more politically-toned pieces 
also appeared on this page, it is clear that Furman’s article and the details on Indian policy 
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it offered were not seen as ground-breaking or of significant interest to the average reader, 
despite carrying important implications for Native peoples. 
Measures like those cited in the 1950 Times article were catastrophic for terminated 
tribes. If the government was this transparent with the press on the tactics it intended to 
adopt with tribes, was there any public outcry over the policy? An examination of a wide 
range of newspaper reports on Indian affairs pre-1953 reveals that some objections to the 
policy did appear early on. These objections were driven almost exclusively by Euro-
American Indian rights activists like former BIA Commissioner John Collier and Association 
on American Indian Affairs (AAIA) president, Oliver La Farge. Both Collier and La Farge had 
been at various points involved in the AAIA, an Indian rights advocacy group established – 
and largely run – by non-Indians since 1922.25  Statements by both men appeared 
frequently in the press in the form of letters, comments, and interviews, with Collier having 
even been consulted as an expert on Indian affairs in the 1920s, before his 
commissionership.26 Rather than criticising federal withdrawal plans, the mounting press 
campaign against federal policy by non-Native Indian rights activists centred almost 
exclusively on Commissioner Myer as the main problem in Indian affairs.27  
Collier’s protests against both the policy of relocating Natives to urban areas and 
problems with Pueblo legal contracts, as publicised by the Times, largely focused on Myer’s 
background and employment history.28 In a 1950 letter to the Times editor, Collier 
emphatically criticised Myer’s appointment as Commissioner:  
“The new Commissioner, the two Assistant Commissioners, and the new Chief 
Counsel, represent a taking-over of Indian Service by the ruling personnel of 
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the late War Relocation Authority. That personnel made a deserved renown 
through ‘liquidating’ the War Relocation Authority at top speed. Will its 
orientation change? For it confronts a state of facts, law and principle 
generally different from that of the War Relocation Authority.”29  
As a letter to the editor, this statement was distanced from the paper’s own stance and 
Collier was not presented as an authority, like government officials. Furthermore, letters to 
the editor were printed on page ninety-eight of the broadsheet – far from a prominent 
position. 
A 1951 Times article also described Collier as criticising Myer for restricting “the right of 
the Pyramid Lake Paiute Indians in Nevada to employ legal counsel”. Collier was even 
quoted as stating that Myer’s failure to approve the tribal attorney’s contract would 
“seriously endanger the Indians’ capacity to defend themselves against predatory rights”.30 
Collier evidently viewed a tribe’s legal rights as conflicting with those of other Americans, 
though it is not clear exactly whose rights he saw as “predatory”. While Collier was granted 
the press space to criticise Myer’s attempts to control legal contracts, this was strictly 
counterbalanced by federal officials’ comments. Myer, in turn, refused to respond to 
Collier, with the Times commenting that “he was not going to be drawn into any public 
controversy with his predecessor. He said that the bureau supports Indian rights wherever 
they really were involved.”31 In keeping with the guidelines of “balanced” reporting, 
however, the reporter took no stand as to whether Collier’s accusations were justified or 
not. Objections to Myer and withdrawal policy more generally did not come across strongly, 
but were depicted as just one side in a contested matter. 
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The Christian Science Monitor also published statements by both Collier and La Farge 
objecting to early 1950s federal Indian policy, but granted them more prominent space 
than the Times. For instance, a 1949 news report published on page twelve of the paper 
prominently featured protest to the Fernandez Amendment of the Navajo-Hopi 
Rehabilitation bill.32 The report quoted a press release by the AAIA, explicitly stating that 
the Association opposed amendments made to the bill, but supported the appropriations 
therein guaranteed. No support for the Fernandez amendment was mentioned in the 
article; criticisms were allowed to stand for themselves. Yet the article did not openly side 
with opposition to the Fernandez Amendment, instead framing the Association’s criticisms 
as claims: “One amendment would remove federal safeguards in transferring the Indians to 
state civil jurisdiction, according to the association.”33 This phrasing called into question the 
reliability of the AAIA and undercut, somewhat, the strength of their objection. 
Furthermore, the short report made no mention of the debate surrounding the 
Amendment in the Navajo Tribal Council, as outlined in the previous chapter. 
These early media criticisms of potential Termination policy were neither frequent nor 
strong, and were always presented by Euro-American activists and former officials, not 
Native Americans themselves. Further examination shows that these white activists and 
organisations rarely objected explicitly to federal withdrawal policy pre-1953, with 
potential support for assimilation appearing in their comments to the press. A 1950 report 
on an AAIA meeting even claimed the association supported potential withdrawal in the 
name of self-determination. Paraphrasing Felix Cohen, a non-Native Indian rights activist 
and lawyer, the article stated that “the Indian was still shackled by governmental controls, 
which have increased rather than diminished […] Unless the Indians are granted self-
determination and the authority to arrange their own affairs, he said, they will always 
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remain a costly public ward.”34 Critical of government control, this statement could be 
interpreted as supporting the removal of trust status, particularly as Cohen described the 
Native population as ‘wards’, a term typically used as a justification for withdrawal policy.  
However, historiography shows that Cohen – who had played a critical role in planning 
New Deal Indian policy programmes – was in fact an opponent of Termination, instead 
advocating increased tribal self-government without the removal of trust status.35 The 
Times article’s only clear indication that Cohen did not share Terminationists’ 
understandings of Indian policy was in the mention that he saw Indians as becoming less, 
rather than more, equipped to handle their affairs over time: “He predicted that in twenty-
five years the Indians would be even less able to compete in the white man’s world than 
their impoverished kinsmen today.”36 This contrasted with plans outlined in Zimmerman’s 
list, which indicated that virtually all tribes would be ready for Termination within twenty-
five years. Nevertheless, Cohen and the AAIA’s broad comments on the damage of 
paternalism are remarkably reminiscent of Terminationist rhetoric. Before the passing of 
HCR 108, then, calls for both the removal of trust status and increased tribal self-
government could appear practically indistinguishable in the press.  
Before any official legislation or congressional resolutions were formed, public 
discussions surrounding federal withdrawal were fairly optimistic. In 1950 and 1951, some 
press writing even compared developments in federal Indian policy to the Point Four 
programme. A Cold War effort to gain U.S. support and stifle the spread of communism 
abroad, the Point Four Program offered U.S. technical assistance and training to develop 
the economies of the world’s poorest nations.37 The Times ran an article in March 1950 
comparing the changes in Indian policy to this programme, stating: “The twelve-member 
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House subcommittee on Indian Affairs recently swung into a new phase of its technical 
assistance or Point Four approach to end wardship of the American Indian.”38 The article 
went on to describe “wardship” as the main problem among the Native population, and 
included quotes of subcommittee members promising to drive legislation to end that 
status. By bringing in the parallel of the “Point Four approach” in the context of 1950s Cold 
War America, the quotes in this article implied that Native Americans, like poor nations 
overseas, were oppressed, ‘restricted’ by their ‘Indianness’ and consequently more 
susceptible to Communist influences.  Moreover, the article demonstrated a belief in the 
liberating power of ‘equal’ and ‘shared’ citizenship, describing proposed legislation as 
“aimed to add to the independent status of the Indians” and “looking toward eventual 
removal of all restrictions on Indians and making them citizens in exactly the same sense 
that the rest of the people of this country are citizens.”39 
A 1951 article in the Monitor equally presented Point Four as a possible solution to 
Native American problems. Rather than quoting federal representatives, the article 
highlighted the opinion of “Mrs. Henry Roe Cloud”, a boarding-school educated member of 
the “Ojibway” tribe and chairman of Indian Affairs for the General Federation of Women’s 
Clubs. Elizabeth Bender Roe Cloud was the wife of Indian Office employee Henry Roe Cloud 
– a notable member of the Society of American Indians, an early pan-tribal Native rights 
association (1911-1923) – and was herself an activist on Native issues throughout her life.40 
The article states that Roe Cloud “has presented a ‘Point Four’ program to hasten Indian 
assimilation into the main population stream.”41 Though a Native voice was here offered, 
the emphasis was still on assimilation and thus appeared largely in line with Termination 
aims. Roe Cloud also called for “a training program for Indian leadership directed to the end 
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of self-support and self-government”; this indicates that rather than advocating the 
liquidation of reservation lands she may, in speaking of “assimilation” and “Point Four”, 
have been describing a programme for increased tribal decision-making and administrative 
control over their own programmes – like Felix Cohen in the 1950 Times article.  
Roe Cloud also appeared to accept the assimilationist idea that Native Americans were 
on a lower plane of development, stating in the Monitor: “[…]those who speak English 
move faster along the pattern of our American civilization.”42 However, the comment was 
followed by a description of the educational and professional achievements of her 
daughters, indicating that these were the qualities she most strongly associated with 
“American civilization”. According to her granddaughter, anthropologist Renya Ramirez, 
Roe Cloud opposed Termination throughout the 1950s, indicating that she supported 
neither the loss of legal status nor full cultural assimilation. Moreover, Roe Cloud was not 
the only politically active Native American to reference Point Four. Though the press seems 
to have largely ignored his efforts, NCAI leader D’Arcy McNickle advocated a Point Four 
programme for Indian reservations from 1951 onwards. As Daniel Cobb has shown, the use 
of this term inspired a generation of Native activists who campaigned for a American Indian 
Point Four programme throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s.43 
These articles, particularly the Times report, demonstrate that the idea of Point Four 
was used by both federal officials and Native activists, even in this early Termination 
period. The concept of a Native Point Four programme not clearly explained in either 
article. It is therefore unclear just how similar these plans for Indian policy were to Point 
Four; using it as an umbrella term obscures possible critical differences concerning what 
sort of Indian policy was being advocated – those aimed at the removal of federal status or 
those intending to enhance tribal sovereignty and self-government. While Cobb’s argument 









that Native activists harnessed the discourse of the international Cold War context to 
further their cause is important and valid, the multiple ways in which ‘Point Four’ could be 
understood in the context of Indian affairs complicates this interpretation. At least in this 
early period, the concept of ‘Point Four’ was also used in support of Termination. This raises 
serious implications for how the NCAI and Native activist efforts later that decade may have 
been interpreted by mainstream readers.  
Indeed, “self-determination” also carried multiple implications in this period – as Charles 
Wilkinson has highlighted, the term as it is understood today, though rooted in 1960s Office 
of Economic Opportunity (OEO) socio-economic reservation development programmes, 
only came into general use in the 1970s.44 However, the references to “self-determination” 
and “self-government” made by figures like Cohen and Roe Cloud in the early 1950s 
demonstrate that this language was already in some use in the early 1950s. Indeed, Cohen, 
in his influential 1942 Handbook of Federal Indian Law located tribal sovereignty in the legal 
history of federal-Indian relations:  
“Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, supported by a host of 
decisions hereinafter analysed, is the principle that those powers which are 
lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted 
by express acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty 
which has never been extinguished. Each Indian tribe begins its relationship 
with the Federal Government as a sovereign power, recognized as such in 
treaty and legislation.”45  
This statement highlights the difference between how Native rights activists like Cohen and 
Roe Cloud and Senate Subcommittee on Indian Affairs members viewed “self-
determination” and “independence”. While both sides advocated eradicating BIA control 
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over tribes’ affairs, the former saw this as rooted in the rights of tribes as sovereign bodies, 
whereas Terminationists prioritised individual independence.  
The concepts of tribal sovereignty and self-determination – the entitlement of tribes to 
govern themselves and administer their own affairs – are today commonly accepted in 
scholarship and among Native organisations as inherent rights of American Indian tribes. 
But the early 1950s press instead reflected and reproduced the hegemonic belief that 
federal trust status was “limiting” the ability of Natives to assimilate and join the 
mainstream. Though hints of divergent views appeared in the media, a short article or 
interview in a newspaper could not provide enough space to explicate the differences. In 
this sense the nature of news reporting – in relying on “authority” voices, encouraging 
brevity and attempting “objectivity” – obscured important nuances in interpretation. In this 
context, an end to trust status appeared consistently as an opportunity for Native American 
‘liberation’. 
 
2.2. Tribal withdrawals, HCR 108 and PL 280, 1953-1954 
 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s build-up to Termination legislation, federal officials 
evidently provided the press with significantly more explicit detail on Indian policy than was 
readily available to tribal councils. In the months following the passage of HCR 108 and PL 
280, it is clear that Termination legislation was again discussed more openly in the press 
than with tribes. However, Indian affairs were not a point of significant public interest in 
this era – articles specifically on national Indian policy were few and far between. 
Furthermore, out of the two pieces of broad Termination legislation, PL 280 received 
significantly more coverage than HCR 108, despite the latter being the basic guideline for all 





The lack of interest in U.S. Indian policy was epitomised by TIME’s complete oversight of 
Termination legislation; the magazine did not mention the concept of Termination – let 
alone HCR 108 and PL 280 – a single time in the 1950s. The only implicit reference to 
Termination in the first half of the decade appeared in a June 1954 article on recent 
activities of the President.46 The article humorously noted that a group of Indians watched 
the President sign “a bill benefiting the Menominee Indians of Wisconsin”.47 The bill in 
question must be the Menominee Termination Act, which was signed into law by 
Eisenhower in June 1954.48 However, the article demonstrated no further interest in the 
content of the bill, instead making light of the situation: “[The President] turned to three 
Menominees witnessing the ceremony and asked if it wasn’t on June 17, 1876, that ‘you 
fellows beat General Custer.’ […] The three Indians, nervously eyeing the President’s still-
poised pen, hurriedly denied all connection with the measure.”49  
The supposedly more serious and respectable Times also reported on the event. In an 
article on the President’s recent activities, Eisenhower was quoted as asking “What was the 
date in ’76 that you fellows licked Custer?”50 While the TIME article described the 
Menominee representatives as “nervous”, little mention was made of the Native people 
present in the Times piece. Instead it stated that Senator Watkins corrected the President 
on the matter, informing him that the Menominee resided in Wisconsin. These articles not 
only failed to provide detail on the content of the bill, but referred to Menominee 
Termination only as a joke. For a humorous touch, the TIME article depicted the 
Menominees as desperate for the President to sign this act into law. In reality, the extent to 
which Menominee tribal members supported the bill is questionable, with evidence 
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suggesting Watkins blackmailed the tribe into its acceptance by threatening to withhold per 
capita payments.51 TIME’s article thus failed to recognise the significance of the bill and 
radically simplified the contentious event. The Times article did little better, calling the 
Menominee Termination Act “a bill to give the Menominees control of their own assets in a 
few years”.52 
Both articles portrayed Indian affairs lightly, with the President generalising between 
distinct Native groups and ignorantly associating all Indians with the historical Western 
frontier. This in part reflects the condescending stance toward Eisenhower often adopted 
by the contemporary press, presenting him as lacking intelligent leadership qualities 
despite his military background.53 Nevertheless, “Ike” enjoyed widespread popularity 
throughout the 1950s, meaning such quips played into his endearing everyman persona, 
associating Native affairs with stereotypes familiar to the public, like Custer’s Last Stand. 
Using serious Native issues for humour, and favouring stereotyped imagery over reports on 
federal Indian policy, were both characteristics typical of TIME in the 1950s and throughout 
most of the 1960s. Though not a broadsheet, TIME was the most successful news magazine 
of the 1950s, with circulation numbers beating rival news magazines consistently every 
week.54 Its influence as a medium for communicating news to a broad audience of the 
mainstream public should not be underestimated. That similar articles appeared in the 
Times furthermore undercuts the serious nature of other reports on Indian affairs that were 
concurrently published in the paper.  
Not all press writing on Termination was this obtuse. Articles on Indian policy continued 
to be reproduced in the Post, Monitor, and the Times following the passage of legislation in 
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the mid-1950s. Surprisingly, HCR 108 was rarely mentioned, particularly in the months 
immediately after it was passed in August 1953. The first clear mention of HCR 108 in the 
Times came in January 1954, with an article titled ‘Congress to get Ten Indian Bills’, 
outlining the progress of ten tribally specific termination acts.55 HCR 108 was called “the 
first sweeping action in Federal Indian administration in the last twenty years” – an 
uncommon overt mention.56 The author maintained apparent neutrality by neither 
explicitly supporting nor rejecting the resolution.  
However, a bias against trust status was apparent in the article’s subheading: “Proposals 
by Administration Would End Federal Rule Over 66,000 Persons”. In referring to the federal 
government ‘ruling over’ people, the subheading suggests that trust status was oppressive, 
not quite conforming to the neutrality of the article’s main body. This disjuncture between 
the tone of the text and the subheading may indicate that the latter was selected by 
members of the editorial team rather than the author, meaning more nuanced information 
gathered by the reporter was not transferred into the headline and subtitles.57  
Furthermore, the author included extensive quotes in support of Termination from 
Commissioner Emmons, while Native reactions to the bill were largely reduced to one 
sentence: “Some tribes favour their legislation, some oppose bitterly, in some opinion is 
divided.”58 While a few tribal examples were cited, little to no explanation of why tribal 
members supported or opposed legislation was provided. For instance, the article simply 
stated that in Kansas “three or four tribes oppose legislation for fear of loss of land or loss 
of living standard by having to pay taxes”, but did not elaborate on how the payment of 
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taxes could lead to either of those things, potentially allowing readers to dismiss such 
claims as unsubstantiated.59 
Similarly, the Post only reported on HCR 108 several months after the resolution was 
passed. The closest actual mention of the bill was in a September 1954 letter to the editor 
by Oliver La Farge.60 The Post therefore not only failed to cover HCR 108 in a timely manner, 
but it only appeared a year later because a Euro-American Indian rights activist wrote in. 
The letter, objecting to the withdrawal of the Paiute Indians’ federal status, provided little 
explanation or contextualisation of HCR 108 or Termination in general. Instead, 
Termination of the Paiute was opposed purely on the grounds that HCR 108 had not listed 
the tribe as ready for withdrawal.61 Indian rights activists like Oliver La Farge, though critical 
of Termination, rarely overtly opposed the resolution that consolidated it as official federal 
Indian policy. In fact, La Farge here even expressed explicit support for eventual 
assimilation and the Menominee Termination Act:  
“We believe that this Nation’s duty is to advance all Indians to the point at 
which they will no longer need special rights, but can live on an equal basis 
with all other Americans without them. […] Thus, in the last session of 
Congress, we did not oppose termination for such tribes as the Menominees, 
who seem to be ready for it, who consented to it, and had a large voice in 
saying how it should be done.”62 
Indeed, across the four publications here discussed only one article was published 
between 1953 and 1954 that mentioned direct opposition to HCR 108. In May 1954 the 
Times printed an article – ’Indian Trust Bill Put Under Attack’ – reporting on conversations 













conducted at the AAIA’s annual meeting.63 Like the aforementioned Post letter, this centred 
on La Farge’s objections to Termination, describing his presidential speech as focusing on 
“the group’s opposition to a bill now in Congressional committees that would terminate the 
trust status of eleven tribes in the country.”64 Yet whilst in his Post letter four months later 
La Farge objected to the Termination of the Paiutes due to their not having been listed in 
HCR 108, here he was presented as more directly opposed to the aims outlined in HCR 108. 
The article, after stating that the Trust bill was requested in HCR 108, quoted La Farge as 
challenging the need to follow Congressional resolutions: “We cannot accept the doctrine 
that the Executive Branch must unquestionably do whatever Congress asks for, no matter 
how patently wrong.”65 
Interestingly, although the article described La Farge as criticising the Executive Branch, 
including BIA Commissioner Emmons, for following the resolution’s recommendations, he 
did not evidently call for a repudiation of HCR 108. Indeed, little explicit opposition to HCR 
108 appeared in the press. This may in part be due to the nature of concurrent resolutions 
in general; as La Farge implied in the Times article, these are not legally binding. As Indian 
law scholars Charles Wilkinson and Eric Biggs note: “Legally, a concurrent resolution is a 
general policy statement only and does not have even that limited effect on any future 
Congress. Thus, technically HCR 108 had no further validity after the Eighty-Third Congress 
adjourned in early 1955.”66 HCR 108 was therefore not a particularly powerful document in 
itself. However, while La Farge may have been right in questioning the extent to which 
federal officials had to agree with HCR 108, the article went on to quote Emmons as 
claiming he was under a “direct mandate” by Congress to draw up Termination acts for 
eleven tribes. HCR 108 was thus clearly significant in outlining congressional policy and 
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demonstrating the extent to which Congress believed in assimilation as the goal of Indian 
policy. 
So while the press may have overlooked HCR 108 because it was a resolution rather 
than an actual law, it is evident that the belief in assimilation was also hegemonic and thus 
unquestioned. Indeed, in the case of the article ‘Indian Trust Bill Put Under Attack’, La Farge 
appeared not wholly opposed to the ultimate goal of assimilation and, in fact, seems to 
have accepted the concept of tribes “progressing” toward “civilization”. The article 
paraphrased La Farge’s objection to this Termination bill, stating the eleven tribes selected 
for withdrawal “included both some of the most advanced as well as some of the most 
backward.”67 Though La Farge was here also quoted calling bills “ill-conceived” regardless of 
whether a tribe was “ready” or not, he did not openly challenge the idea that a tribe’s level 
of “advancement” could be measured against mainstream society. Furthermore, the 
location of the article in the paper demonstrates that Indian affairs – despite serious 
accusations of neglect and impending damage to tribes – were not seen as a matter of 
major public interest by the Times. The single-column article was printed on page thirty-five 
of the paper, with only a fairly small font-sized headline. That the jocular accounts of 
Eisenhower and the Menominees were printed on page fourteen just two months later, 
demonstrates the lack of gravitas with which the concept of federal trust status withdrawal 
was treated in the press. 
HCR 108 and specific tribal termination acts, then, were not a matter for serious press 
consideration in the early 1950s. PL 280, on the other hand, had far-reaching legal 
implications for all tribes and was also more widely reported on. In what ways was this law 
presented in the press? An examination of press reporting, particularly in 1953 and 1954, 
demonstrates that PL 280 was indeed brought out in news media far more often than other 
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Termination legislation. In fact, non-Native Indian rights activists mounted a substantial 
campaign opposing the lack of Native consent required by the law, particularly in 1953-
1954. Though TIME unsurprisingly failed to mention it, the Times, Post, and Monitor all 
printed multiple articles, letters and reports opposing the law, as early as August 1953. The 
campaign in the press was largely driven by letters and statements from Collier and La 
Farge, who both continued publicly to criticise aspects of Termination policy.68 In a change 
from reporting on Indian affairs in general, it appears that the editorial teams of these 
newspapers got on board with opposing PL 280, with each paper running editorials 
opposing the lack of consent.69 
Representative of this objection was an editorial comment published in the Post in 
November 1953, less than three months after the law was passed. The comment outlined 
Eisenhower’s objections to the lack of consent in PL 280, stating: “We hope that the 
President will not let Congress forget this chore, for a reckless use of the power given the 
States could set back the progress of Indian policy by many decades.”70 However, the 
editorial objected expressly to the lack of consent, not the law in itself, claiming that PL 280 
was originally only applicable to California, and trusting Commissioner Emmons’ opinion 
that such measures were appropriate in that state: “Because of the conditions noted by Mr. 
Emmons, it is a progressive step there.”71 The idea of extending state civil and criminal 
jurisdiction over Native lands was thus evidently accepted by the Post’s editor. This 
supported the editorial stance toward Indian policy already established in an August 1953 
Post comment titled ‘Whither the Indian?’, published a couple of weeks before PL 280 was 
passed. The editor expressed support for Termination, objecting only to its fast-paced 
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schedule: “We share the hope that the Indians will become increasingly self-reliant and 
thus outgrow the need for Government aid. But we do not think this can be accomplished 
in a year or even in four years.”72 
The Times also strongly objected to the lack of consent in PL 280 in a 12 August 1953 
editorial comment titled ‘In Fairness to the Indian’. Published immediately after PL 280 was 
passed, this comment went so far as to criticise the manner of its passage through 
Congress:  
“The basic objection to the bill is that it would give a blanket authorization to 
all states irrespective of the wishes of the Indians. The key to the whole issue is 
Indian consent. The measure in its present form was whipped through 
Congress so rapidly that practically no one interested in Indian affairs – least of 
all the Indians themselves – knew what was happening until it had already 
happened.”73  
Discussions in tribal council meetings indeed confirm that PL 280 was barely discussed 
before being passed. Yet whilst this article objected so strongly to PL 280 lacking Native 
consent, it did not place this within the wider context of Indian policy developments in 
1953, making no mention of HCR 108 or the implications of the combined Congressional 
measures. The problems with Termination policy only came out to a limited extent in the 
editorial, though neither did it express clear support for even gradual assimilation.  
Furthermore, the Times editorial only obliquely mentioned Native protest, simply 
stating: “There is every reason to believe that many Indian tribes would have protested the 
bill had they known about it.”74 The only unambiguous mention of Native opposition to PL 
280 in the paper during the 1950s appeared in a brief AP newswire report published on 9 
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July 1954.75 It is worth quoting the report in full, to demonstrate just how little information 
and context was provided: 
“Legislation to permit the states to take civil and criminal jurisdiction over 
Indians was opposed today by the National Congress of American Indians, 
unless provision [sic] were made to require consent of the Indians to the 
change. A joint Senate-House Interior subcommittee was told that the bill 
would subject Indians to state jurisdiction even if they did not want it. They are 
now under Federal jurisdiction.”76 
No explanation of the membership of the NCAI or its significance was provided, leaving it 
up to the reader to figure out whether the organisation was largely Native or non-Native. 
Furthermore, the article does not quote any NCAI members, even the organisation’s 
President, Joseph Garry (Coeur D’Alene). The report failed to include an active Native voice 
at all, even using the passive tense in stating that the subcommittee “was told” about 
problems. Native opposition was presented as an intangible entity, not granted the space 
to explain objections and viewpoints to Times readers. 
Indeed, the only paper to bring out Native objections to PL 280 consistently was the 
Christian Science Monitor. The Monitor – a paper founded on the principle of serving all of 
“mankind” – indeed drew exceptional attention to Native opposition to the lack of 
consent.77 For instance, the paper published a lengthy article titled ‘Indians Protest Transfer 
of Control to States’ on page eleven soon after PL 280’s passage.78 Though not an editorial, 
this article made clear the problems of PL 280, providing extensive context and even details 
of exceptions to the law – notably that the Menominee in Wisconsin and the Red Lake 
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Reservation in Oregon had been omitted specifically due to tribal protest.79 Yet whilst the 
headline prioritised Native opposition, the article itself extensively quoted attorney Felix 
Cohen, and described Native dissent only vaguely. It even ended with a line presenting La 
Farge and other non-Native rights activists as the mouthpiece for Indian country:  
“It is the opinion here in the Indian country and voiced by such leaders as 
Oliver La Farge, president of the Association on American Indian Affairs of New 
York, and L.T. Konopak, president of the New Mexico Association on Indian 
Affairs, and many other interested persons that the bill should not have been 
passed at this time.”80  
Despite the heavy detail on the issues of PL 280, the article explicitly prioritised non-Native 
“authority” voices over the opinions of the affected indigenous people themselves, just as 
press writing on potential withdrawal had earlier that decade. 
The Monitor continued to publish detailed and prominent articles opposing PL 280 into 
the mid-1950s, including a November 1954 article on an emergency meeting of the AAIA, 
titled ‘American Indians Launch Plea for Right to Greater Self-Determination’.81 Compared 
to reporting on similar events, for instance the aforementioned Times article ‘Indian Trust 
Bill Put Under Attack’, the Monitor allowed considerable space for the AAIA to voice 
opposition not just to PL 280, but to Indian policy in general. Printed on page eleven of the 
broadsheet with a prominent headline, the article not only included quotes from La Farge, 
but ran the statement of the AAIA board of directors in full. This included striking 
indictments of Termination, calling for the consent of tribes to any changes in the federal-
trust relationship: “[…] consent [for withdrawal] should not be obtained by pressure 
amounting to duress, such as was used last year, in the cases of Menominee and Klamath 
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[…].”82 Comparing this article to AAIA quotes in other papers, it is clear that the Monitor 
was more willing to run direct criticisms of the government. Furthermore, the article’s 
author did not undercut the AAIA statement with any federal response, seemingly in line 
with its egalitarian ethos.  
However, though the title actively mentioned American Indians as ‘launching’ a plea for 
self-determination, the article itself conspicuously lacks any Native input, only quoting the 
non-Native AAIA. This again leaves the reader with the false impression that the AAIA spoke 
for Native groups, reflecting the contemporary academic reliance on Euro-American 
anthropologists, like Edward Spicer, as cultural intermediaries to interpret and preserve 
Native lifestyles in scholarship.83 Moreover, though calling Native consent “a necessary 
element in fair dealing”, the article did not reject the withdrawal of federal trust status 
outright or call for increased Native involvement in planning and implementing Indian 
policy. Despite the headline mentioning self-government, the article itself stated: 
“Termination, if it is justified at all, should be orderly, planned, after agreement with the 
Indians, with other federal agencies concerned, with the states and local governmental 
units, with churches and other organizations which will assume new responsibilities for 
Indians locally.”84 While ‘agreement with the Indians’ was mentioned, tribal leaders were 
not included in the list of people the Monitor stated should be involved in planning Indian 
policy change.  
Similarly, where the statement specifically rejected PL 280, it justified this on the lack of 
support at the state level: “The federal government should not withdraw until it has formal 
assurances of state and local acceptance of responsibility. Wholesale surrender of federal 
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responsibility, as in Public Law 280, is unwise and unfair.”85 This AAIA statement then 
inadvertently revealed the paternalist slant of the organisation – as did the Monitor itself in 
running Euro-American authority opinion rather than actual Native reactions and 
responses. As the articles so far mentioned demonstrate, this was a significant issue in 
press writing in general. 
The PL 280 consent clause campaign in the press was therefore greatly limited. The law 
was largely discussed in a vacuum, rarely placed within the broader context of Termination 
policy. The campaign itself was a failure – PL 280 was only amended to include consent 
through the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act.86  Furthermore, these articles focused largely on 
the lack of Native consent required by PL 280, not the ideology that was the basis for the 
law. HCR 108 and its coexisting implications for tribal rights were never mentioned to 
contextualise the consent debate within a wider framework of Indian policy. No comment 
by Native Americans – whether speaking as pan-Indian activists or tribal representatives – 
was allowed to enter the media’s PL 280 debate. Despite objecting to the lack of consent, 
the 1950s press ironically failed to include Native voices in their own coverage, instead 
relying on the statements of Euro-American activists. The continued bias of press makers’ 
reporting on Termination is irrefutable. 
 
2.3. Termination in the press, 1955-1970 
 
Despite the press campaign against the lack of consent required by PL 280, Termination 
legislation was neither repealed nor significantly altered in the mid-1950s. Nor did tribal 
withdrawal acts disappear after 1954; a final act was passed in 1962, setting 1966 as the 









year for Nebraska Ponca Termination.87 Other tribal Terminations, however, would have 
taken place were it not for the solid opposition of tribes and activist organisations: the 
Oklahoma Choctaw, for instance, came very close to having their federal trust status 
withdrawn in 1970.88 Termination as a process thus continued well into the 1960s, but to 
what extent did the press cover matters of Indian policy after the end of the predominantly 
pro-Terminationist eighty-third Congress? In order to understand the extent to which 
Termination slowed, both the ways in which the policy was treated in the press and shifts in 
Indian policy rhetoric must be examined.  
As aforementioned, the passing of tribal Termination acts was barely addressed in the 
press, and sometimes treated without requisite gravity, as in the TIME and Times coverage 
of the Menominee case. An examination of contemporary print media shows that different 
papers varied significantly in their coverage of specific Termination cases, with TIME only 
mentioning Termination twice in the 1960s: first in an October 1969 review of Vine Deloria 
Jr’s Custer Died for your Sins, and again in a multi-page article on the occupation of Alcatraz 
in 1970.89 Neither text offered much detail on Indian policy legislation, though the former 
described problems caused by Menominee Termination: “In the eight years since 
termination, many [tribal members] have become dead weights on the state’s welfare 
programs. They have, in fact, cost Wisconsin nearly $2 million.”90 Rather than bringing out 
the rich detail in Deloria’s book on the devastating impact of Termination on the 
Menominee, the article only cited the strain on state finances. 
In her study of twentieth century press representations of Native Americans, scholar 
and former journalist Mary Ann Weston claims that the local press in areas close to Native 
                                                          
87
 Ulrich, American Indian Nations, p. 137. 
88
 Valerie Lambert, ‘Political Protest, Conflict and Tribal Nationalism: The Oklahoma Choctaws and 
the Termination Crisis of 1959-1970’, American Indian Quarterly 31.2 (2007), p. 300. 
89
 ‘Books: Only When I Laugh’, TIME, 10 October 1969, www.time.com/archive (viewed: 21.6.2013); 
‘The Angry American Indian: Starting Down the Protest Trail’, TIME, 9 February 1970, 
www.time.com/archive (viewed: 24.6.2013). 
90





reservations provided more frequent and better quality coverage of Termination, whilst the 
national press almost entirely ignored specific tribal cases.91 TIME ’s treatment of 
Termination in general seems to support this view, but an examination of the Boston-based 
Christian Science Monitor from the mid-1950s onwards contradicts Weston’s argument. The 
Monitor reported extensively on developments in Klamath Termination legislation and its 
implementation, printing at least five prominently placed, detailed reports on issues arising 
from it.92  This finding, along with Nicholas Peroff’s assertion that the Wisconsin Green Bay 
Press-Gazette vocally supported Menominee Termination in the 1950s, complicates 
Weston’s simplistic split between local and national press sympathies.93 
Many Monitor articles on Klamath affairs were written by Malcolm Bauer, the paper’s 
Oregon-based staff correspondent, reporting in 1957 and 1958 on plans for the sale of 
Klamath lands and timber to pay off members of the tribe electing to withdraw according 
to the provisions of the Klamath Termination Act. The focus in these articles was mainly 
economic; for instance, a 1957 piece, ‘Sale of Klamath Land Held Oregon Disaster’, focused 
on how much withdrawing members of the tribe might receive (“over $50,000”), and 
warned that wholesale timber cutting might cause a drop in these sums.94 The same 
concerns were reiterated by Bauer in a 30 April 1958 Monitor article titled ‘Oregon Indians 
Await Action on Timberlands’.95 Significantly, this long piece was printed on page five and 
spanned a significant portion of five columns, indicating that the Monitor editorial team 
considered the news important. The article covered the topic in detail, explaining the 
provisions set in the Termination Act for Klamaths to withdraw or remain with the tribe, as 
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well as the different options for paying off withdrawing members. The article clearly 
presented the inherent risk that timber prices would plummet, stating experts felt that “to 
dump the Klamath timber on the market before August 1960 would smash the Northwest 
timber market and reduce disastrously the financial return to the Indians.”96 Relying solely 
on the voice of Euro-American ‘experts’, this article exemplified the continued reliance of 
the press on authority voices and demonstrates that the phenomenon certainly did not end 
in the 1950s. 
Comparing this reporting to New York Times coverage of the case, it seems that the 
Monitor was indeed exceptional amongst national newspapers in its treatment of Klamath 
Termination. The Times ran an article on 29 April 1958 – one day before ’Oregon Indians 
Await Action on Timberlands’ was published – but this was printed on page twenty-three 
and was half the length of its Monitor equivalent.97 The Times offered scant detail on the 
economic implications of selling land and timber at competitive bids to private investors, 
only briefly mentioning at the end of the article that the amount withdrawing Klamath 
tribal members would gain depended on how the sale of land and timber was handled by 
the federal government: “should the Administration’s measure fail, the returns to the 
Indians would be between 40 and 83 per cent of the $57,000.”98 Bauer’s writing in the 
Monitor, then, was not only more prominently displayed, but included more detail on the 
economic limitations of the measure. 
However, though the headlines of both articles mention the Klamath – either by 
referring to ‘Klamaths’ or ‘Oregon Indians’ – tribal members are absent throughout. The 
Times article only referred to the Klamath tribe as a whole, stating that seventy-seven per 
cent had “voted to leave their valuable reservation and take cash for a share of the tribal 











assets”, whilst the Monitor barely mentioned tribal members. Neither included any Native 
comment, with the Monitor only citing Euro-American authorities, including a forester 
employed by the Klamath Management Specialists and the Chief of the United States Forest 
Service. Nor did the articles question the aims and intended outcomes of withdrawal – the 
focus of both papers was purely financial in this case.  
Furthermore, both the Monitor and Times articles leave the reader with the impression 
that Termination was a deliberate choice made by Klamaths, not conveying that the bill had 
been drawn up by the BIA with most tribal council suggestions having been rejected. The 
press thus perpetuated the inaccurate belief that Termination was voluntary. Klamath 
withdrawal articles in both papers consistently mentioned tribal members voting on the 
issue, without detailing the problems with this procedure – thus obscuring the confused 
nature of the election. As Klamath tribal council minutes demonstrate, it is highly 
questionable whether most Klamaths understood the meaning of terminating federal trust 
status or that by voting to “withdraw” they would no longer be economically linked to what 
was left of the tribe. Omitting Native responses to, and experiences of, the withdrawal 
process, hence seriously distorted the representation of these events and made them 
appear innocuous. The national press at no point directly opposed Termination, and even in 
discussing problems focused purely on economic issues that could be inflicted on Indians 
and – more importantly – the state. In this respect, though both the Monitor and Times 
covered specific tribal terminations more frequently than TIME in the 1960s, the nature of 
this reporting did not differ significantly. 
The omission of Native voices continued throughout the period. This led to gross 
oversimplifications of complex tribal contexts, and outright factual inaccuracies. Reporting 





both the Times and Monitor ran articles in 1964 reporting on its results.99 The Times article, 
titled ‘Oregon’s Indians Exchange Roles’, compared the Klamath to the still federally-
recognised Warm Springs tribe.100 The journalist here radically simplified the Klamath case, 
using the phrase "the mighty have fallen” to foreground the problems caused by 
Termination. Whilst the tone was perhaps overdramatised, the article did present tentative 
criticisms of the process to remove trust status. In describing poverty resulting from 
Termination, the article stated “there are advantages sometimes to the reservation 
system.”101 However, the author did not explain why the tribe had been terminated; there 
was no mention of HCR 108 or the Klamath Termination Act. Instead, the article maintained 
that Termination was unequivocally the tribe’s choice, citing withdrawal payments as a 
motivating factor and stating that “the Klamaths came forward in a rush to declare for 
termination when the opportunity arrived.”102 No Native comment was included in the 
relatively brief article, which quickly moved on to discuss the financial situation of the 
Warm Springs tribe. 
The Monitor in turn ran a fairly extensive article titled ‘Guidance Needed: Freedom 
“Strands” Oregon Indians’, written by Kimmis Hendrick, the head of the Western Bureau of 
the paper. This was printed on page three, two months after the above Times article, and 
detailed the problems caused by Termination for former tribal members. In contrast to the 
Times piece, this article attempted to contextualise Klamath problems, including several 
quotes from Klamath Executive Committee member Elnathan Davis. Hendrick clearly 
communicated Davis’ opinion on Termination: “’We are worse off,’ declares Elnathan Davis 
[…] ‘We now pay taxes. And we don’t get consulted on the management of our own 
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property.’”103 The article furthermore placed Klamath withdrawal within the context of 
Indian policy legislation, specifically mentioning HCR 108 and the development of PL 587, 
the Klamath Termination Act.  
Additionally, while the article focused on poverty and economic problems caused by 
Termination, the inclusion of Davis’ quotes brought in a limited awareness of the broader 
cultural and psychological issues inflicted. Davis describes feeling removed from his cultural 
traditions, stating that he could not “speak the languages” or “dance”, but hoped for the 
continued existence of Klamath identity:  
“Mr. Davis wishes some means could be found to start another reservation. It 
would be established in perpetuity. Only those Indians who accepted this 
condition would be admitted. It would be fully committed to the ancient Indian 
ideal that the reason for living is not to make money but to work out the 
deeper purposes of life.”104 
This is a considerably romanticised and static representation of Native beliefs and values. 
The implications of such portrayals of Native cultures will be discussed in Chapter Three, 
but it is critical at this point to note that this mention of cultural concerns and inclusion of a 
Native voice was exceptional for reporting on Indian affairs. 
However, while the article presented Termination as a serious problem and even 
explained the legislation behind it, the underlying implication remained that the Klamath 
tribe had chosen this fate for themselves. In addition to Davis, Hendrick paraphrased a staff 
writer for the Klamath Falls Herald and News, the local paper of the Euro-American 
community surrounding the reservation, who seems to have believed that Termination was 
a choice: “Mrs. King agrees that she sees no profit in termination. The Klamath majority 
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approved it, she believes, because it is Indian political philosophy to ‘go with the winners’ – 
and Klamath advocates of termination were financially successful people who were very 
persuasive.”105 Though Hendrick specified that this was only Mrs. King’s belief, the article 
contained no sense of the staunch and yet futile opposition of Klamath tribal members to 
Termination that was expressed in tribal council meetings in the run up to 1961, as will be 
explored in Chapter Six.  
Hendrick’s later writing in the Monitor, moreover, indicates that he himself believed 
Termination was voluntary. For instance, his August 1968 front-page article mistakenly 
stated that the Menominee and Klamath tribes had asked for their Termination, and he 
conflated the two separate processes:  
“Very soon after Congress adopted this policy, two major tribes asked to be 
terminated. These were the Menominees in Wisconsin and the Klamaths in 
Oregon. Their members voted to end their tribal status. They wanted – and got 
– their timber-rich lands to be sold and money divided among them 
equally.”106  
Both the above article and ‘Freedom “Strands” Oregon Indians’ were part of a series of 
reports on Indian affairs written by Hendrick. In 1964 he penned a ten-part series of 
articles, while in 1968 twelve appeared; clearly Hendrick was considered an expert on 
American Indians. Yet though his articles throughout the 1960s criticised Termination 
practices, he did not question the motives of congressional Termination advocates or the 
goal of eventual federal withdrawal. 
In this respect Hendrick’s writing reflected continuing trends in press reporting on Indian 
affairs. Though the detail and frequency of his reports on Native Americans was unique for 









a national broadsheet, his acceptance that the federal trust relationship would have to 
eventually be severed was consistent with national news reporting throughout the period, 
even into the late 1960s. This is demonstrated most obviously in two articles and an 
editorial published in the Post in April 1966, in response to the naming of Robert Bennett 
(Oneida) as BIA Commissioner.107 The two articles almost exclusively contained Senate and 
Congressional criticisms of the BIA, including quotes explicitly blaming the Bureau for not 
following through with Termination: “In effect, the 16 Senators on the Committee called on 
the Bureau to admit its failure to upgrade the reservations and start working toward 
‘termination’ – the end of Federal supervision.”108 Not only did this demonstrate a 
continued belief in the need for Termination, this statement implied that the BIA had not 
yet begun removing federal trust status from tribes. No mention of the serious problems 
already inflicted on the multiple tribes that had been terminated by 1966 was made in any 
of this Post writing.  
While these articles did make clear that the opinions they presented were those of 
federal officials – not the paper itself – they both displayed a strong bias for Euro-American 
authority voices. The quoted article, ‘Senators Tell Bureau to Untie the Indians’ did not 
once include BIA responses to Senate Interior Committee criticisms of Indian policy. The 
other article, ‘New Deal for Indians is Expected of Bennett’, did to some extent focus on 
Bennett’s nomination as Commissioner, pointing out that he was the “first Indian to head 
the Bureau since U.S. Grant’s Administration”.109 However, this report quoted the criticisms 
of Senators like Frank Church (D-Idaho) and Clinton Anderson (D-New Mexico) at some 
length, while Bennett’s responses were allowed little space and were described in an 
unsatisfied tone: “Caught unprepared for the barrage of complaints that followed, Bennett 
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could offer only generalized replies and a promise to try to stamp out ‘the destructive 
effects of paternalism.’”110  
Moreover, in an editorial comment that same month, the Post displayed a clear 
affiliation with the Senate’s faith in Termination. Titled ‘Unsettled Indian Affairs’, the 
editorial made no mention of continuing Termination legislation like PL 280 and tribal 
withdrawal acts: “Termination, a goal laid down by Congress, is a frightening word to the 
Indian. Yet eventually Federal wardship should cease and the reservations should become 
integrated into their respective states.”111 Like Myer in his 1970 interview, the editorial 
showed no awareness of the reasons why Indians might be ‘frightened’ by Termination, and 
paternalistically asserted that withdrawal must take place despite Native wishes, ignoring 
the real harm already caused to so many tribes.112 
A few years before the articles on Bennett’s nomination, the Post presented relatively 
different views of Termination. Reporting on a press conference held by Secretary of the 
Interior Stewart Udall, the Post described Termination as effectively over: “Udall 
abandoned the controversial Indian policies of the Eisenhower Administration that sought 
to terminate Federal responsibilities for Indians as rapidly as possible.”113 Claiming Udall 
had “abandoned” these policies left readers with the impression that no more tribal 
terminations were going to take place; while few Termination Acts were passed during 
Udall’s time as Secretary of the Interior, this was nevertheless an inaccurate claim as many 
were implemented in this period. 
A 1962 Times article, ‘Anti-Indian Bias is Laid to States’, similarly indicated that 
Termination was on the wane, but presented this in a slightly more accurate way. Referring 
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to Senator Sam Ervin’s (D-North Carolina) speech to the NCAI criticising PL 280, the article 
stated:  
“The law was passed at a time when termination of Federal responsibility for 
Indian affairs was the expressed policy of Congress and the Eisenhower 
Administration. The present Administration does not favour termination unless 
individual tribes ask to be shifted to state jurisdiction and are found ready, 
educationally and otherwise, to fend for themselves.”114 
While a greater awareness of Indian policy legislation was shown in this Times article, it is 
questionable whether the Administration it wrote about really did not “favour 
Termination”. While historians like George Pierre Castile and Thomas Clarkin have shown 
that Udall indeed advocated a change in Indian affairs, the Post and Times articles’ 
assumptions that Termination was effectively over were simply inaccurate.115 These press 
statements may then demonstrate a lack of general awareness of what Termination meant 
and the implications it bore for tribes, but what the policy involved at this point was well-
established in federal circles. Though Udall focused on creating economic development 
programs to benefit tribes, these were to contribute to the eventual goal of the removal of 
federal trust status – and tribal termination bills continued to be passed and enacted while 
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From 1947 to 1969, press writing never challenged the assumption that Native 
Americans needed greater ‘freedom’ from federal ties espoused by government officials. 
All protests and objections were instead aimed at specific aspects of federal withdrawal 
policy: the lack of a consent clause in PL 280; the figure of Myer; problems with tribal legal 
contracts. Furthermore, though the policy was criticised after tribal terminations had taken 
place, it was still characterised as voluntary, a choice made by tribes. A clear paradox thus 
remained inherent in press writing on Indian policy throughout the period – despite 
criticising the lack of consent in PL 280, Native people were allowed little space to comment 
on policy, even when it directly affected themselves.  
Instead the press relied on white authority figures and non-Native activists to provide 
information on Indian affairs, distorting the real impact of Termination on Native 
individuals and groups. Newspapers typically only interviewed and quoted Native 
individuals who appeared to support assimilation and were educated in the Euro-American 
system, like Elizabeth Bender Roe Cloud. Even where Monitor reporter Hendrick quoted 
Klamath tribal member Elnathan Davis, non-Native ‘expert’ voices were also brought in to 
reiterate the idea that the tribe had made a bad decision, not the federal government. This 
demonstrates that federal rhetoric was effective in convincing the mainstream public that 
tribes had consented to Termination, though historical scholarship and tribal council 
minutes show that this was not the case. 
The language of assimilation, speaking of ‘freedom’ and ‘independence’, evidently 
successfully appealed to the belief systems of mainstream press readers. The appeal of 





knowledge”, based on the presumed shared values and interests of the mainstream.117 That 
“social knowledge” was the belief that Native Americans were on a lower plane of 
development, and would need to be assimilated to gain the status of the mainstream 
population. Mark Cronlund Anderson and Carmen Robertson have demonstrated that the 
press in Canada perpetuated similar beliefs about First Nations throughout the twentieth 
century, reinforcing established attitudes toward the indigenous population.118 In similar 
ways, national U.S. press writing continued to reinforce negative ideas about Native people 
as passive, silent and marginal. Though the press was provided with, and printed more 
detail on, the exact nature and methods of Termination than was brought to the attention 
of tribal councils, this was not appreciably contextualised in the print media by relating it to 
Native experiences. In this respect, despite including more accurate logistical particulars on 
Termination, press presentations were strictly limited in the information they provided, as 
they did not recognise the viewpoints of those most affected – American Indians 
themselves. 
Myer’s 1970 quote that federal supervision was “holding back” Indians and needed to 
be eradicated even if it went against Native wishes, is indicative of the strength of the 
“social knowledge” surrounding Native Americans in the United States. While “freedom” 
and “consent” were consistently presented as key components of Termination policy, their 
role was largely symbolic – the lack of consent might cause public outcry, but at no point 
did it result in widespread opposition to the ultimate goal of assimilating the indigenous 
population. The press continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s to both sustain and 
reflect this hegemonic belief in assimilation, with all news written from within this context. 
Though the literary flourishes of turn-of-the-century newspaper editorials may have been 
abandoned in favour of “objective” reporting, the press still generally promoted the ideas 
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presented in the New York Times in 1892: that the “red man” in “conforming to State laws” 
would be elevated to the status of mainstream Euro-Americans.119 Taking into account the 
limited Native participation in public discussions of Indian policy, it is evident that this was 
to be achieved whether Natives wanted it or not.
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Chapter Three: “Looking down on Indians” – the Persistence of 
Discrimination and Control 
 
This chapter will explore how attitudes and understandings of Native American peoples 
and cultures developed throughout the Termination period and how these contributed to 
the formation of Indian policy. Termination historiography has entirely neglected the 
subject of cultural policy; while there is much scholarship on Indian arts, the majority of this 
focuses on 1920s and New Deal era trends, but such work usually ends with references to 
WWII-era funding cuts, providing little sense of what followed in the 1950s and 1960s.1 
Native cultures are not mentioned in either HCR 108 or PL 280; both focused solely on legal 
status and government supervision, rather than explicitly commenting on Indian lifestyles. 
That Termination legislation included no reference to Native cultures and lifestyles fostered 
the sense that there were no cultures to consider. While this lack of federal attention may 
reflect relative inactivity in Indian cultural programmes, the Indian Arts and Crafts Board 
was not shut down in the Termination period, remaining active to the present day. 
Terminationists did, however, comment on Native cultures when publicly justifying the 
policy. In his 1957 essay Senator Watkins explicitly described how eradicating trust status 
would affect tribal cultures:  
“Now, doing away with the restrictive federal supervision over Indians, as such, 
does not affect the retention of those cultural and racial qualities which people 
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of Indian descent would wish to retain; many of us are proud of our ancestral 
heritage, but that does not nor should it alter our status as American citizens.”2 
On the surface, this statement seems to indicate that tribal members could continue 
to practice their cultures despite altered federal status, if they should so wish – 
becoming, perhaps, “Indian Americans” in the same sense that there were “Italian 
American” or “Polish American” groups. The implication stood that Native cultures 
could only be maintained as an “ancestral heritage” as long as they did not affect 
Indian status as “American citizens”, indicating that being “Indian” was a lesser, 
secondary concern. 
Moreover, Watkins’ tactics in carrying out the Termination of a variety of tribes 
calls into question his claims to treat Natives as “American citizens”. Historiography 
has suggested that he employed coercive methods to force tribes to accept the 
removal of their trust status, for instance withholding per capita and Claims 
Commission payments from the Menominee and Klamath, and threatening to 
remove the federal recognition of the whole Uintah and Ouray reservation if mixed-
blood members of the tribe were not withdrawn.3 These tactics essentially amounted 
to blackmail and threats, rather than the freedom of choice and cultural retention 
Watkins applauded in his 1957 essay. 
This incongruity between Watkins’ rhetoric and his approach in practice can in part be 
explained by examining what the Senator understood “culture” to be. In referring to 
“ancestral heritage”, he presents tribal cultures as unchanging remnants of a pre-colonial 
era with no legal impact, rather than the active and developing communities tribes 
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continued to constitute in the mid-twentieth century. Framing Native identity in this way 
delegitimised cultural aspects that may have developed after European contact. 
Terminationist understandings of Indian identities therefore differed greatly from what 
today is considered to constitute “cultural identity” or “ethnicity.” Jean and John Comaroff 
most aptly describe ethnicity as a “labile repertoire of signs by means of which relations are 
constructed and communicated”.4 This definition allows for the change and negotiation of 
cultural identity as something created and constructed by its participants, while still 
moulded by particular historical circumstances. It must be acknowledged, nevertheless, 
that to Watkins and his compatriots, “ancestral heritage” was a static label that could be 
simply and objectively assigned. 
Watkins, in referring to “cultural and racial qualities”, highlighted a question inherent in 
federal assimilationist efforts throughout the twentieth century: could Indians be 
“civilized”?  The question of whether the Native population was capable of assimilating into 
American society was a hotly debated topic at the turn of the century. The 1887 General 
Allotment Act, which guaranteed U.S. citizenship to any Indians that accepted a 160 acre 
individual allotment, seemed to indicate that Congress viewed Natives as able to join the 
mainstream through a change of lifestyle toward individual land ownership.5 However, the 
Burke Act, passed less than twenty years later, delayed the granting of citizenship until the 
twenty-five year trust period had passed, thus indicating that faith in assimilation had 
wavered.6  
As this chapter will show, such tension persisted into the mid-twentieth century, as 
demonstrated by press representations of Native Americans in the Termination era.  Two 
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conflicting – yet, at times, overlapping – beliefs were prevalent: 1) that Natives were 
inherently racially different and “inferior” and 2) that tribal societies were “primitive” or 
“immature”, on a lower stage of development toward “civilization”. Critically both 
conceived of “Indianness” as an obstacle to American citizenship, but a belief in racial 
difference implied that full assimilation was impossible. Furthermore, whether Indian 
“inferiority” was presented as a racial or cultural attribute, it formed an insidious, 
hegemonic belief in American society, influencing both Terminationists and their 
supporters – including many Native Americans. This chapter will demonstrate how these 
underlying attitudes were manifest both in the press and in federal-tribal interactions, as 
well as showing that tribal council members engaged with and harnessed assumptions of 
their own inferiority for their socio-political advantage.  
 
3.1. Racism and Native humanity in the press 
 
Examining press representations of Native peoples between 1947 and 1970 
demonstrates that negative stereotypes and outright racist depictions of indigenous 
peoples were prevalent throughout. This is particularly evident in the homogenous ways in 
which Native individuals were described in news stories. Print media representations of 
Native individuals both in the early years of Termination policy and after the shift away 
from “fast-paced” withdrawal consistently brought in references to Native physiological 
and temperamental differences to Euro-Americans. The physical appearance of Native 





colour or facial characteristics, describing Native individuals and/or groups as “usually 
placid”, “hatchet-faced”, “dark-skinned, pock-marked” and having a “craggy profile”.7  
Most typically, TIME applied such superfluous racialized descriptions to humorous or 
anecdotal stories, in some cases resulting in blatant racism and representations of Natives 
as ultimately ‘subhuman’. For instance, a November 1968 article on state elections 
displayed the distasteful humour of Senator Richard Greene, a Republican candidate for 
Washington State Lands Commissioner: “Then he issued his grand manifesto, including a 
plank on Indian fishing rights. Each fisherman’s limit is four Indians – ‘Any Indian under 5 ft. 
1 in. must be thrown back.”8 The timing of this dehumanising joke in 1968 is particularly 
significant; it coincided with the continuing National Indian Youth Council fish-in campaign 
in Washington to support tribal treaty rights.9 The Senator, thus, had evident political 
motivations in lampooning Indian fishing rights through this racist joke. 
While there is a tendency to write off news magazines like TIME as sensationalist 
publications in comparison to broadsheet newspapers, the imagery of Natives as physically 
different was also present in the New York Times, Christian Science Monitor and 
Washington Post throughout the period, though perhaps less explicitly. 10 Regardless of 
their general stances on Termination, all three newspapers drew attention to the physical 
differences of Native individuals they wrote about, distancing these figures from the 
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presumed Euro-American reader. A front page December 1955 Post AP newswire article 
presented the remarkable event of two Klamath men rescuing thirty-three people from a 
flooded river.11 While the article quoted a rescued Euro-American couple on their 
experience, the Klamath men were described as “two brawny Indian brothers”, only 
mentioning their names toward the end of the short piece and not including any comment 
from them. These Native men appear as silent, somewhat mysterious characters, 
consistently referred to as “Indians”, distancing them from the fellow Klamath Falls 
residents they had saved. Furthermore, it was printed on the front page of the Post, 
whereas Indian policy news was usually relegated to much later sections of the paper. This 
demonstrates that the editorial team expected readers to be more interested in one-off, 
attention-grabbing events involving Native people rather than discussions of long-standing 
issues. 
Even the Monitor, the paper most consistently sympathetic to Native opposition to fast-
paced Termination, prioritised Native physical difference in writing about Indian affairs. For 
instance, a September 1953 article eloquently expressed Standing Rock Sioux tribal 
members’ opposition to Termination legislation, but nevertheless described the Natives it 
quoted in heavily stereotyped ways: “David Blackhoop is a quiet man. He never raises his 
voice. In his immobile face is all the dignity of the Sioux chiefs who were his forebears.”12 
Mary Ann Weston claims that images of the “noble savage” had largely disappeared in 
favour of the “good” assimilated Indian by the 1950s, but this Monitor article contradicts 
such findings.13 The paper did include descriptions of Native Americans interacting with 
mainstream society, but these were undercut by representations of “stoic” or “noble” 
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Native individuals, strongly linked to a historic past through their physical features.14 While 
David Blackhoop was presented as an adult, he was nevertheless depicted as “alien” in 
some respects, his “immobile face” devoid of emotions the Euro-American readers could 
relate to. In this sense, the article demonstrates a Cold War phenomenon identified by 
Philip Deloria, of a “doubled consciousness of middle-class white Americans”, balancing 
notions of racial difference and human sameness.15  
The continued use of racially-loaded labels for indigenous individuals and groups 
moreover contributed to the representation of Native Americans as physiologically inferior, 
highlighting this unresolved tension in representations of indigenous peoples as both 
human, but still a distant “Other”. While BIA officials largely referred to tribal members as 
“Indians” or referred to their own tribes, questionable racial categorisations were deployed 
by the press. Today generally recognised as a racial slur, the term “redskin” or “red man” 
appeared with relative frequency in 1950s and 1960s press. While scholarship traces the 
term back to nineteenth century images of Native savagery and scalping, in the mid-
twentieth century it was apparently not universally seen as a racist term.16 The 1969 edition 
of the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language described the term as 
“informal”. However, in 1961 Webster’s English Dictionary called it “offensive” indicating 
that some debate over the propriety of the word did exist.17  
In the press the term was not usually used in an explicitly racist or derogatory manner, 
but rather as a label synonymous with the word “Indian”. TIME, in particular, often 
employed the term “red” to identify Native individuals or groups. Articles on historic 
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indigenous populations, in the context of archaeological findings or books and films about 
Indian wars, commonly referred to Native peoples as “primitive red men”.18 However, 
references to Natives as “red” were not restricted to past contexts, but also appeared in 
descriptions of contemporary Native individuals and groups. For instance, a June 1960 
article on theme parks referred to a prominent Cherokee businessman as “the ranking 
redskin in New York.”19 Here, the choice of phrase appears stylistically motivated, 
consciously alliterating “ranking” and “redskin” – which also featured as the subheading for 
the section. Such verbal ploys serve to catch the attention of the reader, and in this case, to 
entertain.20 The use of the phrase “redskin”, moreover, emphasised the sense of ‘exoticism’ 
surrounding the unusual figure of an indigenous businessman, racially distancing him from 
the reader. The emphasis on the Cherokee businessman’s race played on the prevalent 
stereotype that Natives were incompatible with the capitalist system and incapable of 
handling finances.21 This article exemplified the style of TIME, aiming for a more casual, 
easy-to-read tone than the broadsheet newspapers of the period, which consequently 
communicated overt racial prejudice. 
Racially insensitive labels appeared in broadsheet newspapers as well, though perhaps 
less frequently. The phrase “red man” was employed both by the Times and Monitor. The 
Times most strikingly included the term in the headline for a humorously-intended 1950 
article on Mexican Seri Indians seeing women in bikinis, titled ‘Red Men Get Even Redder 
When Peaking at Bathing Girls.’22 The term appeared over a decade later in the Monitor 
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article ‘The Nonvanishing Redman’.23 The article criticised the “pace” of federal Termination 
efforts, and strove to counteract the stereotype of the ‘vanishing Indian’ by quoting 
statistics of Native population growth. Nevertheless, the use of the term “redman” created 
a distancing effect, evoking nineteenth century language of the “noble savage”. No Native 
voice was present in the short commentary, and the article ends with the wish that “the 
numbers of [Indians] regarded as wards of the government will decline instead of 
increase.”24 The tone of these articles differed, with the Times employing the term “red 
man” to create a fish-out-of-water image of Mexican Natives on an American beach, and 
the Monitor invoking the long-standing stereotype of the “vanishing Indian” to critique 
federal policy. Nevertheless, the term “red man” worked to dehumanise and delegitimise 
Native peoples in both cases, emphasising the racial and biological difference of the Indian 
“Other”. 
The phrase “red man” was, therefore, frequently employed in the broadsheet press, 
whereas “redskin” was largely restricted to TIME. Strikingly, the only time that the term 
“redskin” appeared in a headline of a broadsheet newspaper was in a late December 1969 
essay in the Times Sunday magazine, entitled ‘The War Between the Redskins and the 
Feds’.25 The lengthy article was written by former NCAI chairman, legal scholar and activist 
Vine Deloria Jr., presenting a rare example of Native journalism and commentary in the 
mid-twentieth century. The several page essay strongly opposed Termination and 
specifically criticised Senator Watkins, stating that “The argument of ‘freeing’ the Indian 
was as phony as could be.”26 It included significant detail on the effects of Termination on 
tribes like the Menominee, Klamath, Alabama-Coushatta and Catawbas, as well as 
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describing government discrimination against tribes in comparison to their Euro-American 
neighbours. Illustrative of Deloria’s distinctive writing style, the essay sarcastically referred 
to Secretary of the Interior Hickel’s statements that the federal government was 
“overprotective” of Native rights:  
“With these remarks to his credit, it is a wonder that Hickel was the recipient 
of only sporadic boos and catcalls when he attempted to address the [NCAI] 
convention. No one even speculated on the possibility of a canine ancestor in 
Hickel’s immediate family tree. ‘Terminationist’ is a much dirtier word in the 
Indian vocabulary.”27 
Considering the article presented such staunch opposition to Termination and 
highlighted Native political activism, it seems surprising that the essay title included the 
derogatory term “redskin”. Within the context of Deloria’s text, the title worked to subvert 
the stereotypical war-like Plains Indian image and to catch the attention of Euro-American 
readers, drawing their awareness to continuing political struggles. However, the word does 
not appear anywhere else in the essay, which refers to Natives strictly as “Indians” or by 
their tribal affiliations. It is thus possible that the headline may have been selected by Times 
editorial staff or another journalist, as is common practice in press offices.28 Out of context, 
this reference to “redskins” in a paper largely aimed at a non-Native readership could in 
fact work to reinforce hegemonic, stereotyped understandings of American Indians, by 
framing the essay in a manner which set readers up to expect aggressive or even “savage” 
Native imagery, despite Deloria’s ultimate aim.  
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Furthermore, the essay appeared in the Sunday magazine of the Times, alongside other 
commentary essays, lifestyle spreads and recipes – not so-called “hard news”. It was clearly 
positioned as a perspective piece, detailing the author’s background both as a scholar, 
“Standing Rock Sioux” tribal member and former director of the NCAI. In contrast, the 
references to “redskins”, “red men” and physiological descriptions of Native individuals as 
barely human, “stoic” figures were regularly included in event-oriented news pieces, 
presented as fact not opinion. This essay, therefore, was a departure from typical Times 
reporting, rather than indicating a significant shift in mainstream conceptions of Native 
peoples. 
Deloria’s essay is nevertheless indicative of a late 1960s development in the U.S. press – 
the growing inclusion of Native voices. Native individuals were increasingly interviewed and 
presented in news pieces from the late 1950s onwards, something which rarely occurred in 
the years before Termination legislation was passed. Indeed, these voices were often 
included in opposition to federal policy, as in the January 1955 Times article ‘California Plan 
Disturbs Indians’.29 The article was remarkably sympathetic to California Indian bands, 
including extensive quotes from tribal leaders, like Pit River tribal member and president of 
the California Indian Congress, Erin Forrest. Forrest was quoted at length challenging public 
representations of Natives on matters of Termination:  
“’We have been misrepresented from one extreme to another,’ Mr. Forrest 
said. […] The fact is that some reservations want it and some don’t. Those who 
want termination have every right to want it. But many people have spoken 
who were not officially delegated by the reservations to speak for them.”30 
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This article is exceptional in that it allowed Native voices to stand alone, not attempting 
supposed neutrality by balancing them with opposing federal views. It demonstrates that 
the press was capable of relatively fair representations of Native peoples where tribal 
individuals and groups were allowed to speak for themselves.31 
Articles displaying Native individuals and voices continued to appear in the Times 
throughout the 1960s. The October 1968 Times article ‘Cherokee Chief is Phillips Man of 
Action’ even focused solely on the figure of Cherokee Principal Chief W.W. Keeler.32 The 
article strongly contrasts to TIME’s 1960 description of a Cherokee businessman as a 
“ranking redskin”, presenting a respectful image of Keeler as both a successful CEO of 
Phillips Petroleum Company and dedicated Cherokee leader. Indeed, the quotes of Keeler 
included in the piece made clear his determination to maintain his Cherokee identity: “The 
Cherokee people can rise again to the level of their former literary and cultural 
excellence.”33 Keeler’s quotes furthermore presented his Indian identity as a business 
advantage: “Many American business men overseas think they know all the answers even 
before they know what the problem is. I am an Indian, and I know the white man does not 
have all the answers and that some of the answers he think [sic] he knows are wrong.”34 
Keeler’s quotes thus showed that Native assimilation into the capitalist mainstream was 
possible, whilst still retaining pride in Indian identity.  
Significantly, this article was published toward the end of the Termination period, seven 
months after President Johnson released his March 1968 Special Message to Congress on 
the Problems of the American Indian, which called for federal policy “with new emphasis on 
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Indian self-help and with respect for Indian culture.”35 While the message did not outright 
oppose Termination, it signified a shift in Indian affairs toward speaking of “self-
determination” rather than Termination, largely as a result of campaigns by Native rights 
organisations like the NCAI. This representation of Keeler thus reflects the period in which it 
was published, showing that the changing political climate and increased Native voice in the 
press did have some effect on the representation of American Indians, challenging 
established stereotypes of Native cultures as incongruous with the capitalist economy. 
However, the article not only praised Keeler’s business acumen, but drew attention to 
his appearance, noting his ability to physically blend in with the mainstream: “The Cherokee 
chief looks every bit the businessman in his gray suit. His straight black hair, hazel eyes and 
rough-hewn visage affirm his heritage to those who already know of it.”36 Keeler here 
appears as not only socially, but physically assimilated – his “Indian heritage” was only 
visible to those already aware of it. The article, which included a large photograph of Keeler 
posing in his office, also foregrounded the idea that he appeared Euro-American by 
presenting his Native heritage as surprising; the first four paragraphs describe Keeler as a 
businessman and philanthropist, with only the fifth stating “He is an Indian himself.” 
Significantly, Keeler’s ability to physically pass as Euro-American was presented in a positive 
light, as evidence of his successful integration with the mainstream; only his own quotes 
brought out his Cherokee identity.  
Moreover, while the article mentions that Keeler’s grandmother spoke Cherokee and 
mother spoke English, it does not specify that his parentage was in fact mixed – the 
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Oklahoma Historical Society claims that Keeler was only one-sixteenth Cherokee.37 While 
Keeler certainly identified himself as an Indian, his heritage was in this context an 
advantage in terms of assimilation, allowing him to conceal his Native identity if necessary.  
The article, while not explicitly  commenting on Keeler’s biological make-up, hints at a 
continued, underlying form of racial discrimination in which Natives with some Euro-
American heritage were – perhaps subconsciously – deemed most acceptable. Indeed, the 
Times presented Keeler as an exceptional individual, rather than a typical mid-twentieth 
century Native person; this article appeared in the “Personality” section of the newspaper, 
reserved for people of particular interest and achievement. 
This fairly positive representation of Keeler was exceptional in presenting a Native 
person as playing an active role in the business world. Contemporary reporting on Indian 
labour instead presented Natives as only suitable to inhabit marginal roles in mainstream 
industry, as the 1969 Times article ‘Oklahoma Indians Try Electronics’ demonstrates. The 
short piece displays cautious optimism that electronics companies setting up supply lines in 
Oklahoma might aid in increasing Creek employment in the area: “The Indians, who are 
known for their manual dexterity, are expected to be well suited for the work, which will 
involve weaving cables for Western Electric and making printed wiring boards for General 
Electric.”38 These potential Native employees are presented as biologically suited to manual 
labour, reflecting a long-standing Euro-American belief that Indians were capable only of 
menial work. Under early twentieth century assimilation-era programmes, Indian Service 
boarding schools sought to train Native Americans specifically for manual work.39 Similarly, 
while Termination’s sister policy of relocation was promoted in the 1950s as an opportunity 
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for Natives to obtain employment and equal living standards to the Euro-American 
mainstream, in practice jobs secured were often physical, monotonous and temporary.40 
The article ‘Oklahoma Indians Try Electronics’ thus attests to this persistent belief in Native 
racial inferiority, presenting Indians as only able to inhabit marginal spaces within 
mainstream society. 
Indeed, reporting in the Times throughout 1969 still contained underlying assumptions 
of Native racial difference to Euro-Americans, focusing on “dark” or “brown” skin, physical 
abilities or “violent” nature.41 For instance, an article detailing the risk of drought at 
Pyramid Lake in Nevada described unemployed Paiute tribal member Warren Tobey as 
having a “leathery face, as dark and worn as his brown boots”.42 Though Tobey was quoted 
about the significance of the lake for both his tribe and other inhabitants of the state, this 
strongly racialized depiction distances him from Times readers.  Tobey was furthermore 
interviewed in his “ancient station wagon, dispensing fishing permits and reminiscing”, 
creating an image of him as incongruous with the modern world. Not only were the 
Pyramid Lake Paiute described as limited by their legal Indian status and life on the 
reservation in “tumbledown shacks”, their desperation was implicitly linked to their 
inherent “Indianness” through such dehumanising descriptions.  
That such strongly racialized depictions coexisted with articles containing Native 
perspectives demonstrates the limitations to late 1960s developments in press reporting on 
Indian affairs. Native issues and peoples continued to be marginalised by the twentieth 
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century press, reflecting a persistent problem for minorities – that the mass media was 
strictly controlled by Euro-Americans for Euro-American audiences and interest groups. 
Though the 1970s saw modest increases in the employment of non-white press staff, even 
in 1995 95% of all newspaper journalists were white.43 In the mid-twentieth century, then, 
racial minorities had little control over their press representations, even where they 
managed to gain media attention. While articles by activists like Vine Deloria Jr. did mark a 
change in bringing Native voices directly to mainstream readers, this occurred on too 
narrow a scale significantly to influence the broader, persistent – though perhaps 
increasingly concealed – racial discrimination of Natives in the press. Most crucially, this 
racial stereotyping of Native Americans in the Termination period existed in evident tension 
with the federal aim of making Native Americans “equal”, “full American citizens”. 
 
3.2. Responses of tribal councils to racism 
 
As representations of Native Americans in the press throughout the 1950s and 1960s 
demonstrate, the Indian population was consistently presented as racially or culturally 
“Other”, and inferior in mainstream news. To what extent, then, did local BIA employees 
working with tribes in various locations across the United States subscribe to these views? 
Termination was grounded within the belief that indigenous people could be assimilated; in 
order to understand limitations to the local implementations of the policy, the attitudes of 
BIA Area Office staff, as well as the ways in which tribal councils reacted and responded to 
racial discrimination, must be evaluated. 
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Mississippi Choctaw tribal members particularly struggled with issues of acceptance 
within Euro-American society, caught between an assimilationist federal policy and the 
racial discrimination of the Jim Crow South.44 In interacting with federal officials, Choctaw 
council representative Woodrow Billie made repeated requests for BIA staff and 
surrounding white communities to recognise tribal members as human.45 In December 
1952, after BIA officials’ comments in the minutes of previous council meetings had been 
read out, Billie stated: “All our employees are white people, but they are always looking 
down on Choctaws and measuring the Choctaws. The White people need to be more 
educated – educated enough to know that the Choctaws are human. We need to be more 
free.”46 Unlike Termination rhetoric, which situated tribes as needing “freedom” from the 
“disabilities and limitations” of Indian status, Billie’s statement was an indictment of BIA 
control over Mississippi Choctaw affairs. That same month Billie, as chair of the tribe’s 
Natural Resources Committee, had seen the council’s suggestions for the development of 
Choctaw timber rejected by BIA agents in favour of a programme drafted with no tribal 
input.47 Not only did Billie claim that the Choctaws lacked a say in their own affairs, but that 
their treatment by BIA staff lacked recognition of even their most basic humanity. This 
evident lack of respect from local BIA officials, expressed just months before Termination 
legislation was passed, clearly contradicts federal claims that the final assimilation process 
would be quick, to be completed within a generation. 
Indeed, the BIA held considerable control over the Mississippi Choctaw tribal council, as 
is reflected in the composition of the council’s minutes and files. While the minutes 
retained by the BIA contain various reports on Choctaw issues by local area office 
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employees, and stenographers usually quoted the statements of federal officials in full, the 
voices of tribal members themselves were often downplayed in the 1950s. Billie’s 
statement represents a rare instance of a direct quote of a tribal member; usually council 
representatives were paraphrased, or even merely noted to have spoken with no clear 
sense of what they were talking about. This was particularly an issue when tribal council 
members spoke in their own language, as without translators Euro-American stenographers 
could only state “Then he talked in Choctaw.”48 Speaking in Choctaw provided important 
opportunities for tribal members to speak to one another without being understood by BIA 
employees, allowing them to air grievances and discuss issues without federal input. 
Nevertheless, the very structure of these council minutes, in providing no indication of 
what such conversation entailed projects a strictly Euro-American viewpoint of Choctaws 
even within the context of their own tribal council.  
Furthermore, reports written by BIA employees about Choctaw tribal members provide 
evidence supporting Billie’s statement that Euro-American officials did not view them as 
entirely “human”. In these reports, BIA staff often commented on the “competence” of 
tribal members in an attempt to determine how successfully policies could be 
implemented. This is exemplified by a report in November 1952, in which BIA Tribal 
Relations Officer Marie Hayes evaluated tribal members, stating they “appeared to be alert 
and interested in the educational program and their own economic improvement.”49 Again, 
Hayes gave only her own observations of tribal council representatives as evidence of their 
potential support for BIA policies. However, her description carried not just a sense of the 
American values she herself supported, but also a hint of underlying racial prejudice. The 
need to specifically state that tribal members “appeared to be alert” indicates that BIA 
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employees did not always consider tribal members capable of understanding and focusing 
on matters concerning their own affairs.  
The political climate in Mississippi in the mid-twentieth century evidently put the 
Choctaw inhabitants of that state in a precarious position. This was recognised by other 
tribes, particularly the Oklahoma Choctaw, who raised the issue of racial discrimination 
against their ancestral relatives in Mississippi during several Inter-Tribal Council meetings. 
At an early 1952 Inter-Tribal Council meeting BIA Area Director W.O. Roberts referred to 
the Mississippi Band Choctaws as “generally retarded” and that Mississippi staff would 
need “tolerance and respect for racial differences”, reflecting the perception that the Band 
were on a lower plane of societal development, as well as racially “Other”.50 The minutes, 
though only paraphrased, indicate that Five Tribes members strongly objected to these 
categorisations, raising several questions “concerning adequacy of staff at Mississippi”. The 
minutes also mention that Cherokee representative “C.C. Victory emphasized point of Mr. 
Roberts of sending trained personnel to Mississippi and not to make ‘snap judgements’.”51 
While Victory’s full comments are not included, it appears he was concerned about 
Mississippi Choctaw tribal members being unfairly treated. 
Three years later the Inter-Tribal Council passed a resolution to support the Mississippi 
Choctaw and encourage BIA staff to continue working for the improvement of their 
facilities and education.52 It must be noted that the Mississippi Choctaw and Five Tribes 
were covered by the same Muskogee Area Office in eastern Oklahoma, meaning it was not 
in the best interest of the Inter-Tribal Council to publicly criticise its staff. Though the BIA 
was here commended, the brief discussion that followed indicates that there were some 
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problems with BIA employees. For instance, Choctaw representative Walter Veech stated 
that the former Area Director had “discouraged him very much” on the matter of the Inter-
Tribal Council getting involved in aiding the Mississippi Choctaw.53 While it is unclear why 
he had been discouraged, this provides an indication that working relations with local BIA 
staff were fraught.  
In 1960 the issue was raised again when Oklahoma Choctaw representative Jack 
Davidson instigated a lengthy discussion of racial discrimination in Mississippi. In his 
speech, Davidson said he did not wish to criticise the Area Office in Muskogee, but rather 
highlight problems experienced by Indians interacting with mainstream communities in 
Mississippi. Citing a Choctaw Southern Baptist minister whose daughter was refused 
admission to a Philadelphia public school due to her race, Davidson stated:  
“I am bringing the issue up as an American Indian and to say that the American 
Indians should rise up and fight. […] It made my heart bleed… and tears came 
to my eyes… to think such things exist. We have great headsmen among our 
people, but we sit back. The papers don’t print those things for us to read 
[…].”54 
Davidson evidently felt strongly about racial discrimination, calling for American Indian 
unity across state boundaries in dealing with such issues and decrying the lack of public 
awareness over the discrimination of Native peoples. While Davidson had a personal 
connection to the Mississippi Choctaw, stating his grandfather had been born in Mississippi 
– specifically in Philadelphia, near the Choctaw reservation – he presented this as an 
“American Indian” rather than a “Choctaw” issue. 









In response, Muskogee Area Director Paul Fickinger described the Mississippi situation 
as having been exaggerated, and claimed the BIA was working consistently to improve 
conditions. As a solution to problems, Fickinger suggested that Choctaws could leave 
Mississippi:  
“So long as I am the Area Director here, and unless directed to the contrary by 
my superiors, I intend to follow our present program of assisting any of the 
members of the Choctaw Indians of Mississippi who wish to do so to locate in 
areas where economic opportunities are more adequate and the social climate 
more favorable.”55 
Fickinger set ensuring equality and the elimination of racial discrimination as his goal, 
but did not see this as conflicting with the suggestion of moving Mississippi Choctaws 
off their tribal lands. In fact, his approach of encouraging Choctaw relocation rather 
than addressing problems in these areas was in itself a form of inadvertent 
discrimination against the rights of the Mississippi Choctaw to remain in the state, as 
guaranteed by Article Fourteen of the 1830 Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek.56 
Fickinger’s stance thus reflected the general climate of Termination policy, which 
worked to eradicate, rather than affirm, treaty rights. 
Furthermore, though Muskogee Area Office officials referred to the Mississippi Choctaw 
as far worse off than the Five Tribes, minutes show that BIA employees also referred to 
members of the Inter-Tribal Council in racially-loaded terms. On two separate occasions, 
Fickinger’s predecessor, Roberts, referred to Five Tribes members as “good stock”.57 In both 
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of these early 1950s meetings he used the phrase to describe Native Americans as equally 
capable as mainstream Americans: “Indians are good stock and are potentially capable of 
doing anything anyone else can.”58 Roberts, an experienced BIA employee, had served as 
superintendent on various reservations since the early 1900s and adapted his approach 
through shifts in federal Indian policy from assimilation to New Deal programmes.59 The 
above quote demonstrates that he viewed Natives in a generally positive light having 
worked with tribes for several decades. His choice of words is nevertheless significant; the 
commonly used phrase “good stock” originated as a reference to the hereditary quality of 
farm animals rather than human beings, reflecting a mid-twentieth century preoccupation 
with and belief in separate racial categories.  
Taking into account Roberts’ previous statements about the Mississippi Choctaw’s 
“racial differences” and background as an assimilation-era superintendent, it seems likely 
that he subconsciously viewed the Native population as biologically different. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, Roberts was vocally critical of Termination policy in Inter-Tribal 
Council meetings; his racialized statements on Native peoples indicate that he nevertheless 
did not view them as fully equal to mainstream Americans. Furthermore, Roberts’ 1953 
statement also implied that Native Americans were not yet commonly displaying their 
abilities, as he specifically stated they were “potentially capable of doing anything anyone 
else can” – a potential evidently not yet realised. 
Klamath tribal members, like the Five Tribes, were considered more advanced and 
assimilated than most Native Americans, as evidenced by their specific inclusion in HCR 108 
and the ‘predominantly acculturated’ category of Zimmerman’s list.60 However, they 
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encountered some serious problems in the years leading up to the passing of PL 587, faced 
with BIA staff far less sympathetic than Roberts, and were allowed little real control over 
the Termination process. Minutes of several meetings from 1949 and 1950 show that tribal 
members struggled to work with their Superintendent, Raymond Bitney and his staff, 
appealing to the BIA to have him removed.61 The problems included staff members’ 
unwillingness to cooperate, but mainly involved disrespect and discrimination. Though 
racism was not an explicit complaint of the council, a resolution passed by the tribe in 
August 1949 stated Bitney’s Chief Clerk, George Smith, had even come into violent conflict 
with tribal members: “He assumes a completely arrogant attitude and has thereby 
encountered several physical combats with the individual Indians.”62 
While relations with local BIA staff did evidently improve later in the 1950s as new 
employees were introduced, even those with more positive working relations with the 
Klamath tribe appear to have believed in an ultimate racial difference between Indians and 
Euro-Americans. For instance, in a June 1955 speech to the Klamath Executive Committee, 
Superintendent W.W. Palmer recognised that racial discrimination could be a problem once 
withdrawal was completed and tribal members lived amongst mainstream society:  
“There will be some incidents of race discrimination, and some will feel they 
cannot meet the world with its new environment, because of race, reticence 
and general fear. No race has a prouder heritage or more reason to be self-
confident. It is commonly said that self confidence in one’s ability is at least 
half of the battle in life.”63 
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Local BIA officials were thus aware that racism would cause problems, but posited 
that these were superficial and could be overcome. Palmer’s recommendation of 
how to deal with this was unrealistic, placing responsibility with individual tribal 
members to counteract difficulties, rather than presenting it as a wider issue for the 
community to address. Moreover, Palmer himself referred to Klamaths as part of a 
distinct “race” – rather than referring to their Klamath, Modoc and Yahooskin 
identities. Fickinger and Palmer, then, shared the view that “Indians” were a distinct 
racial group, though evidently believing they could participate in mainstream society 
as equals if they chose to do so. 
Palmer’s view, of course, demonstrates an improvement in relations between tribal 
members and BIA officials in the period; the Klamath tribe did not report brawls with BIA 
staff later in the 1950s. Similarly Mississippi Choctaw-BIA relations became less inflamed in 
the 1960s, with the tribal council gaining more control over the administration of their own 
affairs. A ten year gap appears in the BIA records, ending in 1954 and only picking up in 
1964. Following this gap, the 1960s minutes are fuller, including lengthy examples of tribal 
representatives’ speeches and resolutions drafted and voted on by the council, indicating 
that Native voices were no longer marginalised in these meetings. This change can largely 
be attributed to the efforts of Choctaw council members, Phillip Martin in particular. 
Drawing on 1960s War on Poverty programmes, Martin succeeded in starting a Choctaw 
Community Action Program in 1962, developing a fiscal system for the tribe and hiring 
financial support staff.64  
The 1960s establishment of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and move of 
federal policy away from fast-paced Termination, though still aiming for eventual 
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assimilation, was in this case put to good use by a tribe and resulted in greater tribal control 
over the decision-making and administration of their programmes. However, while OEO 
programs were helpful, this surge in Mississippi Choctaw Band socio-political activity should 
be attributed mainly to council members themselves, rather than federal efforts. That the 
Mississippi Choctaw tribal council managed successfully to navigate federal funding 
programs of the 1960s was largely the result of committed tribal members and thus does 
not necessarily mean that prejudice toward Native peoples had been eradicated. 
Discussions at a 1964 council meeting highlighted the need to continue interactions with 
local Euro-American communities through sports events, the annual Tribal Fair, and 
performances of a student singing group to “promote better understanding and 
appreciation”.65 Though these efforts were noted as having already brought some success, 
the tribal council and local BIA area employees agreed that more work was needed in 
challenging local prejudice. 
Regardless of how “ready” for Termination the BIA regarded a tribe, each dealt with 
discriminatory behaviour and the lack of institutional support for maintaining and 
revitalising their cultures and communities – at least until the 1960s shift of federal rhetoric 
toward economic development. Nevertheless, representatives of each of these tribal 
councils made statements promoting the value of their communities and traditions. 
However, little direct opposition to the categorisation of Native cultures as “inferior” 
appears in the available minutes of the four councils here considered, with some tribal 
members referring to their own communities as having “ancient traditions” or even as 
being in some way “primitive”. For instance, at a 1960 tribal council meeting Navajo 
representative Roger Davis commented on the tribe’s progress in relation to their Claims 
Commission case against the government: “[…] we, the Navajo people, the least educated 
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and almost primitive, who have gone extensively further than any other tribe in the United 
States. I think that the Navajo Tribe should be commended on the progress it has made.”66   
Significantly, Davis referred to the tribe as “almost primitive”, and linked this to levels of 
education – rather than any cultural attributes of the tribe. In contrast the press often 
categorised Native inferiority as a racial or inherent cultural quality, rather than as a 
structural problem stemming from educational needs. Each of the councils considered here 
clearly presented pride in their tribal communities, whether demonstrated by explicit 
speeches in favour of maintaining their cultures, resolutions passed by the councils, or 
discussions of the effects of modernisation on traditional practices.  Moreover, the 
continued use and prioritisation of tribal languages in meetings attests to tribal councils 
actively keeping their cultures alive: the Navajo Tribal Council employed both English-to-
Navajo and Navajo-to-English interpreters throughout the period, and as the Mississippi 
Choctaw gained more autonomous control over their tribal council in the 1960s, 
interpreters were more frequently used, both allowing tribal members to better 
understand legislation and resolutions discussed, and encouraging them to communicate in 
their own languages and still be understood by Euro-American stenographers and BIA 
employees.67 
The Klamath language also consistently appeared in the tribe’s General Council 
meetings, and as the final Termination date grew closer, Klamath cultural values and the 
rights of Klamath, Modoc and Yahooskin people to retain their distinct identities were 
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vocally defended.68 This trend is exemplified by Executive Committee member Dibbon 
Cook’s speech at an October 1955 council meeting, in which he spoke out against the 
factionalisation of the tribe between supporters and opponents of withdrawal: “Let us have 
a common objective, unite, preserve and maintain what we have left, fulfil our 
responsibilities and safeguard our priceless heritage, which is our only salvation, for 
ourselves and our people.”69   What exactly Cook saw as constituting Klamath “heritage” 
was not specified, but his stance in favour of ending intra-tribal conflict clearly supported 
maintaining the tribal community. This impression of Cook as valuing Klamath tribal identity 
is affirmed by his anti-Termination remarks later in the decade, including a November 1957  
speech: “We are being forced out to sink or swim […] for a paltry sum of Yankee dollars. […] 
Some has [sic] said this is not termination, which is true, but rather liquidation, and to some 
extent extermination.”70 Cook, thus, evidently saw Termination as threatening to both 
“liquidate” the  tribal land base and resources, and to “exterminate” Klamath identity. 
Despite its nature as a consortium of five Oklahoma tribes, the Inter-Tribal Council also 
clearly supported the continued vitality of specific tribal cultures. At a March 1954 meeting 
the council adopted a new Constitution and Bylaws. The resolution accepting these 
recognised Native status as American, but blatantly contradicted total cultural assimilation:  
“[…] in order to secure to ourselves and our descendants the rights and 
benefits to which we are entitled under the laws of the United States of 
America, and the State of Oklahoma; to enlighten the public toward a better 
understanding of the Indian race; to preserve Indian cultural values; [….] to 
secure and to preserve rights under Indian treaties with the United States; and 
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otherwise to promote the common welfare of the American Indians – do 
establish this organization and adopt the following Constitution and Bylaws.”71 
This statement highlights the dual aims of the Inter-Tribal council as protecting both the 
treaty rights and cultures of distinct tribes and of Natives as a broader interest group, here 
termed the “Indian race”. While the council presented Native Americans as a distinct race, 
it did not depict general interests as precluding the specific needs of different tribes 
involved in the Inter-Tribal Council. This positioning reflects the Inter-Tribal Council’s strong 
ties to the pan-tribal NCAI, as described in Chapter One. From its inception, the NCAI had 
expressed its mission as preserving Indian cultural values and upholding treaties.72 Based on 
this 1954 resolution, the accepted council view aligned with the NCAI’s conception of the 
“Indian race”, in contrast to press depictions of “Indians” as a racially or culturally inferior 
homogenous group.  
It is also significant that this statement did not refer to Native cultures as remnants of 
the past or “ancient” traditions, referring instead to “Indian cultural values” as part of the 
present. While the statement did not explicitly call tribes “modern” or reject the continued 
characterisation of Indians as “primitive”, it did mention the need for an improved public 
understanding of Indians. That this was released just over six months after the passing of 
HCR 108 and PL 280 indicates that the Inter-Tribal Council located Native cultures in the 
present, contradicting the federal rhetoric of assimilation as inevitable. Thus, while tribes 
dealt with problems of racial discrimination particularly during the early years of 
Termination, their responses demonstrate an adeptness at identifying, opposing and 
navigating these issues. Each tribe, regardless of BIA categorisations, vocally expressed the 
will to remain a community and maintain their cultures – not just as a past “heritage” as 
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presented by Watkins, but as a living and active part of their identity in the present and the 
future.  
 
3.3. The infantilization of Native peoples 
 
While it is clear that tribal council representatives challenged the discrimination of their 
communities, it is worth further examining the ways in which tribal cultures and peoples 
were presented as “inferior”. In addition to the press presenting tribes as racially different, 
Native Americans were also perceived as akin to “children” and Native cultures and 
lifestyles as “primitive”. Critically, unlike the more simplistic categorisation of American 
Indians as “racial others” discussed above, the infantilization of Native peoples and 
discussions of their cultures as “primitive” inherently rested on the belief that indigenous 
peoples could eventually become “civilized”. While this was a long-standing belief, with 
Congress financing education to meet this aim from 1819 onwards, in the Termination 
period it took on special significance as a justification for eradicating federal trust status.73 
Reporting on a 1957 NCAI conference, TIME ran an article titled ‘Indians: Ruffled 
Feathers’, which exemplified the persistent belief that Native Americans were ‘primitive’ 
and ‘immature’.74 The article relied on stereotypical “Indian” imagery in framing the 
reported meeting, which was attended by representatives from a variety of tribes and BIA 
Commissioner Emmons. The article’s author evidently supported Termination, describing 
the bureau as having “succeeded” in making three tribes “independent”. Emmons’ speech 
encouraging Natives to “pull themselves up by their own bootstraps” was also commended, 
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but the American Indian members of the NCAI were described as ungrateful: “[…] 
predictably, Emmons’ words of encouragement fell on ruffled feathers.”75 The journalist 
here sided with Emmons, delegitimising Native concerns by associating them with 
generalised imagery of “Indianness”. Framing their dissatisfaction in this way depicted 
Native leaders and representatives as stubbornly hanging on to meaningless, generic 
symbols of their “primitive” cultures. 
Furthermore, the article quoted an unnamed “top Indian Affairs Official” as comparing 
Native Americans to uncooperative teenagers: “’The Indians are going to have to face the 
fact that they will soon be 21. We are doing our damndest to give them the best possible 
preparation. But a lot of them don’t want to face the fact, and they resent it.’”76 The article 
concluded on this point, creating the impression that TIME agreed Natives were somehow 
themselves to blame for their situation. The article provided no legal or historical context 
on federal trust status, stating simply that they were “held back by a desire to preserve 
their tribal identity and traditions”.77 As this example demonstrates, public rhetoric in the 
Termination period presented Natives as wilfully occupying a “lesser” space of 
development, even if not always categorising them as biologically inferior. 
Though ‘Indians: Ruffled Feathers’ included some comment from Native representatives 
at the conference, this was framed so as to justify accusations of Indian stubbornness. The 
only Native American named in the article was NCAI President Joseph Garry (Coeur 
d’Alene), who was quoted as disputing the belief that reservations were “prisons”:  
“Snorted Coeur d’Alene Tribesman Joseph Garry, who is president of the 
National Congress of American Indians and a Democratic member of the Idaho 











House of Representatives: ‘As for the bureau giving us ‘freedom,’ we are free 
from all taxes, including tax from income on Indian land, and we are free to 
hunt and fish. What other freedoms could we have?’”78 
While Garry’s statement challenged Terminationist rhetoric, the reference to him as a 
“Tribesman” first and active political advocate second, delegitimised his views and 
associated him with a perceived “tribal” past, rather than contemporary American society. 
Seeing as the NCAI president was fully aware that Natives were by no means “free from all 
taxes”, moreover raises the question of whether Garry’s statement may have even been 
distorted by the TIME journalist. In any case, within the context of the article, Garry’s 
statement was used to justify federal policies, presenting his words as evidence of Native 
“special” status and advantage over Euro-Americans. Indeed, in describing Native 
objections to Termination the article stated that “the reasons are as complex – and 
sometimes as absurd – as the Indians themselves”, demonstrating a clear bias against 
Native perspectives.79 
Stereotyped “Indian” imagery and the trope of Natives as “immature” persisted 
regardless of 1960s shifts in political climate. Despite Nixon promoting a platform of Native 
“self-determination” during the 1968 presidential election, his first Secretary of the Interior, 
Walter Hickel, publicly cultivated the rhetoric of “childhood” and dependency when 
speaking about Indian issues.80 An August 1969 Monitor article entitled ‘U.S. Indians see 
threat to land in Hickel remark’, reported on developments in Nixon’s selection of BIA 
Commissioner and demands from Native communities for an American Indian appointee:  
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“American Indians are sending up smoke signals of distress because the Nixon 
administration has not yet appointed a commissioner of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs. Now they are adding some extra puffs because Secretary of the Interior 
Walter J. Hickel has just said that Indians need to ‘cut the cord’. The context of 
Mr. Hickel’s remarks indicated that he meant Indians are too dependent on the 
reservation system.”81 
Unlike TIME, this Monitor article was evidently critical of Hickel’s remarks, later calling 
them a “reversal” of developments in Indian policy since the Eisenhower administration. It 
nevertheless demonstrates the persistence of imagery that infantilized Native Americans in 
public discussion. It is of course significant that the Monitor’s usual Indian affairs expert 
Kimmis Hendrick, the author of this article, questioned Hickel’s statement. However, the 
support for the NCAI and other Native rights organisations presented here was undercut by 
the stereotypic reference to “smoke signals” in the opening line. Though NCAI president 
John Belindo was quoted extensively in the second half of the article, the homogenised 
image of “Indianness” in the opening paragraphs downplayed the serious nature of Native 
grievances. Hendrick, therefore, both criticised Hickel’s representation of Natives as being 
on a lower plane of development, and himself perpetuated imagery rooted in similar views. 
This apparent paradox in Hendrick’s writing attests to the hegemonic nature of the belief in 
Native “inferiority”, as it evidently influenced the way in which he wrote about Indians. 
The belief in Native inferiority was hence pervasive in press depictions of Natives and 
discussions of Indian policy in the mid-twentieth century press. Looking at the local level, 
though overt racial discrimination may have been largely eradicated by the 1960s, 
paternalistic language permeated the interactions of federal officials and tribal councils 
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throughout the period. After the removal of the extremely unpopular Klamath 
Superintendent Bitney in 1950, Erastus Diehl was appointed to the position. In his first 
meeting, he spoke at length of mutual support:  
“There is nothing I would rather do than sit in with you on that when you want 
me, never when you don’t want me. I would like to help you all I can in your 
program, help you through these growing pains. That’s what we can rightly call 
it. Not only here but all over the Indian Service we are having growing pains.”82 
In this speech Diehl presented himself as available for consultation at the tribe’s 
discretion, aiming accurately to represent their opinion. Indeed, Diehl was 
exceptionally well-liked by the tribal council; despite his removal shortly after the 
passing of PL 587 in 1954, tribal council members unsuccessfully requested his 
instatement as a Management Specialist for the tribe.83 This cooperative relationship 
does not, however, diminish the problematic paternalistic implications of Diehl’s 
speech here. By speaking of “growing pains” Diehl invoked an image of tribal 
members as adolescents, still in the process of reaching full ‘maturity’. He therefore 
located Natives “all over the Indian Service” on a lower plane of development toward 
“civilization”, and characterised this as a painful struggle. In this sense, Diehl’s well-
meaning statement revealed attitudes similar to those presented by Monitor 
journalist Hendrick. 
Similarly, a decade later BIA Commissioner Emmons spoke of himself in paternal terms 
when addressing the Navajo Tribal Council, recalling nineteenth century rhetoric of BIA 
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staff as “federal fathers and mothers” exemplifying “civilized” life to tribal members.84 After 
a long speech documenting developments in economic and educational programmes for 
the Navajo, Emmons stated: “I hope I haven’t bored you too much, but I am trying to speak 
as a father who has lots of love and affection for his family, and for his children, not as if I 
were someone who was an outsider, and we didn’t have mutual faith in each other.”85 
Though Emmons’ simile constructs an image of intimacy and care, his adoption of a 
paternal role speaks volumes about the Commissioner’s perception of the tribe. 
Furthermore, Emmons stated this at the end of a speech opposing potential per capita 
payments of Navajo claims winnings, telling the council they would later “hang their heads 
in shame” if they chose to distribute assets.86 This strong language demonstrates Emmons’ 
tendency toward forceful guidance of the tribe, using scare tactics to influence the council’s 
decision-making. Nevertheless, Emmons undoubtedly had a close relationship with the 
Navajo; the tribe vocally supported the appointment of the Gallup-native as 
Commissioner.87 However, like Diehl, Emmons held an inherently paternalistic stance, 
viewing Natives as unequal to mainstream Americans.  
Moreover, Emmons preceded this statement with several references to Termination 
policy and the problems other tribes had experienced with withdrawal and managing their 
money. For instance, the Commissioner described the Menominee situation, claiming the 
former tribe was struggling because it had distributed tribal money on a per capita basis 
against BIA advice:  “They were warned, ‘Don’t take that Money. Save that for a reserve, 
because someday you will need it.’ But, they didn’t listen. They went ahead and spent that 
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money and if they had that money today, they could do so many useful things with it.”88 
Emmons was here likely referring to the 1953 distribution of $9.5 million dollars of 
Menominee Claims Commission winnings in per capita payments. If that is indeed the case, 
Emmons grossly misrepresented the situation – in reality, the Menominee tribe had set out 
the use of these funds in a reservation development programme, but were forced to swap 
to a per capita payment plan due to the government’s refusal to accept a proposal that did 
not include plans for the withdrawal of trust status.89 Despite this element of paternalistic 
coercion in the Menominee case, Emmons here blamed the tribe for the problems it faced 
in Termination.  This exhibits not only a distortion of facts in presenting withdrawal to the 
Navajo, but also a belief that Native Americans – even those tribes already put forward for 
Termination – were not capable of making their own decisions. 
Indeed, the attitude demonstrated by national and local BIA officials during their 
interactions with tribal councils unequivocally illustrates the persistence of paternalist 
ideology throughout the Termination era. In addition to the problems of paternalism 
expressed in complaints by tribal council members about local BIA staff, as in the Klamath 
and Mississippi Choctaw cases, important decisions were consistently made for tribes with 
little regard for their consent. When the Klamath General Council suggested that former 
superintendent Diehl be named Management Specialist, Assistant BIA Commissioner 
Barton Greenwood told them in no uncertain terms that the tribe would have no final say 
over Termination-related issues: “As I said before, I am sure the Secretary wants 
instructions from you. However, […] he could proceed even without your consent.”90  
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Similarly, the US President retained and exercised the power to appoint the principal 
leaders of each of the Five “Civilized” Tribes until 1970.91  In explaining the Termination 
programme to the Inter-Tribal Council in 1954, the Acting Area Director stated: “It is 
important to remember that consultation does not always mean consent; that it is 
impossible to get 100% consent to any move that is made.”92 The Mississippi Choctaw were 
also consistently told that the government could force decisions through if the council did 
not make them efficiently, particularly with regard to lease agreements.93 Though the 
specifics varied for each tribe, the BIA nevertheless retained paternalist control over tribal 
affairs throughout the period – regardless of whether a tribe was considered 
“predominantly acculturated” like the Klamath, or “predominantly Indian” like the 
Mississippi Choctaw. 
BIA officials’ paternalist attitudes toward Native peoples and cultures, then, were 
manifested in the ways in which they interacted with tribes, even when specifically 
preparing them for Termination. Though the main focus of Indian policy shifted in the 
1960s from immediate removal of trust status to the economic development of 
reservations, these attitudes were not eradicated. George Pierre Castile claims that 
Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall genuinely opposed Termination, and that his 
proposed Omnibus Bill, if passed, would have ended the problematic paternalist “Indian 
trusteeship shackles”.94 Others provide more critical views of Udall – as Daniel Cobb points 
out, Udall had already fully drafted the bill before any consultations with American Indians 
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were held.95 His actions, then, in supposedly opposing paternalism, were just as controlling 
as those of the Termination advocates before him. 
Udall’s manner when speaking of Indians furthermore reveals that his views of Native 
cultures contained elements curiously similar to those posed by Watkins in 1957. In a July 
1969 interview, just after the end of his tenure as Secretary, Udall spoke in apparent favour 
of cultural pluralism:  
“You know, the thrust always had been well, give them a good education and 
get them into the mainstream, and assimilation was essentially the policy. I 
came to the conclusion that we had overlooked what the Indian, with his own 
history and his own culture, what he could add as an extra element, extra 
dimension to our society and that the Indianness of the Indian, his own history, 
his own background, that this was important, that if he wanted to continue to 
intermarry and to maintain his own communities, that he ought to have that 
option. […] The Indian who wanted to cling to his values and his culture and his 
art, that we ought to be big enough as a country to allow this kind of 
diversity.”96 
Though claimed to champion diversity, his phrasing indicates that he, like Watkins, viewed 
Native cultures as remnants of the past. It is significant that Udall here described 
maintaining Native identity as “cling[ing] to his values and his cultures”. Though Udall may 
not have intended this, his statement suggests a subconscious view of Indian inferiority – of 
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Native cultures not naturally coexisting with American society, but as traditions which 
stubborn individuals refused to relinquish.  
Udall, moreover, stated the country was “big enough” to “allow” diversity – a sentiment 
outwardly positive, but containing the inherent assumption that cultural plurality was 
something permitted, and thus controlled by the United States. In this respect, though Udall 
undoubtedly spoke more positively of cultural diversity than Watkins, their views 
converged in both presenting Indian culture as permissible as long as there was space in 
American society. Udall evidently viewed indigenous people through a similar value 
framework as most non-Natives, whether supportive of or objecting to the rights of tribal 
communities and cultures. Despite thinking he was enhancing Native rights, the Secretary 
of the Interior saw himself as the expert, not needing to consult with tribes in forming his 
policies. In this respect, Udall followed Commissioner John Collier’s 1920s example of 
drafting legislation like the Indian Reorganization Act (1934) without Native cooperation.97 
Udall’s approach, as such, demonstrates the dangers of persistent subconscious prejudice 
toward Native Americans – the strength of popular belief that tribes were “less developed” 
obscured paternalist actions, as federal officials evidently thought they knew what was best 
and did not consistently consult with tribes on Indian policy matters. 
The belief in Native inferiority was, then, in the mid-twentieth century evidently so 
deeply embedded within mainstream, hegemonic perceptions of society and “civilization” 
that even those non-Natives claiming to support indigenous rights and self-determination 
were – perhaps unwittingly – influenced by it. What remains to be investigated is what 
effect this imagery of “primitive” inferiority had on Native self-perception. With American 
Indians progressively moving to urban areas in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of 
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relocation, travelling between reservation spaces and cities, tribal communities became 
increasingly aware of mainstream conceptions of “Indianness” in the media. Not to 
mention that these stereotypes and impressions had already abundantly influenced the BIA 
employees they worked with for decades. An increase in tribal council discussions 
surrounding Native media representation attests to this growing awareness. Donald Fixico 
argues that Euro-American understandings of “Indianness” heavily impacted upon not only 
the self-perception, but the mental health of Native peoples: “Indian people have been so 
saturated with negative stereotypes and savage imagery that they began to feel unworthy 
and insecure; they began to doubt themselves, their culture, and their identity.”98 
All four of the tribal councils here examined, regardless of how “primitive” BIA 
employees saw them as, expressed an unequivocal awareness of and concern for their 
public image. All four tribal councils sent out press releases or letters to specific local and 
national newspapers concerning their affairs at some point in the period.99 In a November 
1960 Navajo Tribal Council meeting, Chairman Paul Jones spoke of his encounter with a 
journalist at a meeting of male Southwest history and culture enthusiasts, known as the 
Dons Club of Phoenix:  
“Present in the audience was the newspaperman who recently wrote a series 
of completely distorted articles relative to the Navajos and our Reservation. I 
took the opportunity to tell my listeners that this writer has insulted our 
intelligence and it was my belief that the stories were a disgrace to the largest 
newspaper in the State. At this juncture the applause was very loud indeed, 
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which proves to me that public opinion despite the many untruths printed 
about us, is firmly on our side.”100 
Jones, who had moved back to the reservation in 1933 after attending college in New 
Jersey and serving in WWI, reacted strongly against press depictions of his tribe.101 Though 
he did not elaborate on how the tribe and reservation had been represented, it appears 
that he was most offended by indications of Native inferiority. It would seem that Jones had 
not internalised a belief in the “primitive” nature of his tribe and was clearly concerned 
with the Navajo public image. 
Similarly, in a 1961 Inter-Tribal Council meeting, BIA Area Director Fickinger read out a 
letter from Creek Principal Chief Turner Bear to TIME.102 The letter objected specifically to a 
1960 TIME article which described the supposed adoption of Eleanor Roosevelt through the 
“traditional caparisons of his tribe by Chief Wah-Nee-Ota of the Creeks”.103 The brief 
reference to the event was framed in heavily stereotyped terms, claiming Roosevelt was 
adopted as an expression of gratitude for her help in repatriating a “sacred beaded 
thunderbird” from the Smithsonian Institution, stating that “on the day the thunderbird 
came back to its rightful owners, so did much rain, big thunder.”104 Not only did the 
language of this article delegitimise twentieth century Native efforts to regain sacred items 
from museums and archives, the event appears to have had no actual connection to the 
Creek Tribe. As the Inter-Tribal minutes detail, Principal Chief Bear wrote to TIME:  
“to set the record straight as to who is really the principal officer of the Creek 
Tribe and pointing out that this person is an imposter in assuming a title not 
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his own. Mr. Bear further stressed the need for factual information concerning 
Indians of America… to create a better understanding and appreciation of the 
Indian people.”105 
The article mentioned that the “ceremony” had taken place in Beverly Hills, California; 
indeed, according to a 1959 LA Times article, Wah-Nee-Ota was a musician and actor also 
known by the name of William McGuire.106 Though it is unclear whether he was a Creek 
tribal member or not, Wah-Nee-Ota’s presentation of himself as a “Creek Chief” was part of 
an act rather than a recognised tribal position. 
Evidently, tribal councils did keep track of how they were represented in the press, and 
made efforts to oppose imagery that they found offensive or unrepresentative. However, 
this does not mean that tribal council members were wholly immune to the influence of 
Euro-American perceptions of them. Looking specifically at the example of ‘childhood’ 
imagery, it is apparent that tribal representatives at varying points in time adopted similar 
language in speaking of themselves in council meetings. This language was adopted most 
clearly in discussions surrounding the Fernandez Amendment to the Navajo-Hopi 
rehabilitation bill in 1949. Speaking out against the extension of state criminal jurisdiction 
over the reservation, Vice-Chairman Zhealy Tso stated:  
“We are just like a child, able to toddle around with stumbling before getting 
anywhere. […] [B]efore we are able to stand on our feet, while still as children, 
not steady on our feet, many things are added to this bill that we feel we are 
unable to take for the good benefit of our Navajo people.”107 
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Tso spoke in terms similar to BIA officials, who so often evoked childhood imagery when 
addressing tribal councils. Taken out of context, this speech could even be interpreted as 
evidence that Tso himself believed in Native inferiority, as he spoke specifically of Navajo 
tribal inability to support themselves. 
It must, however, be taken into account that Tso spoke at a tribal council meeting, to an 
audience of both Navajo tribal members, BIA employees and the tribal attorney, Norman 
Littell. Tso followed this childhood imagery with an expression of hope that the government 
would continue to “lead us with the tremendous help from this long-range program”, 
stating that “the Navajo is not yet ready” for the state control Fernandez was pushing them 
toward.108 He also expressed the need to make Congress aware of this. Essentially, Tso 
played upon Euro-American rhetoric of Natives as children to gain federal support, as well 
as the support of his peers, displaying agency in his dealings with the BIA. Just as council 
member Sam Gorman spoke of the tribe as “not as yet” ready for withdrawal in 1953, Tso 
effectively harnessed the language of supporters of assimilation, embedding it with his own 
meaning, to secure the continuation of federal trusteeship and economic development 
programmes for the tribe.109  
Drawing again on Katanski’s phrase of “writing ‘Indian’”, Tso could be described as 
“speaking ‘Navajo’”, turning the rhetoric of Native infantilization to the purpose of Navajo 
socio-economic support. Furthermore, Tso began his speech by expressing pride in Navajo 
resilience, demonstrating that he did not deem the tribe inherently inferior:  
“The Navajo mind has been made out singly, for a definite purpose, and on 
that purpose the Navajo has strived to exist and has existed to the point where 









the Navajo is the biggest tribe of Indians in the United States. In following their 
own mind, the dictates of their thoughts, they have gotten to be a big tribe.”110 
Tso’s use of language is, in some respect, unique; few other representatives of tribes so 
adeptly and successfully turned Euro-American stereotypes to their own advantage. The 
success of this opposition to the extension of state jurisdiction was aided by its timing and 
the official categorisation of the Navajo as ‘predominantly Indian’ in Zimmerman’s List. 
Moreover, Tso was evidently aware of just how serious a threat the Fernandez Amendment 
and attempts at Termination were.  
However, Navajo tribal members also used childhood imagery in the 1960s, when the 
most immediate threat of Termination had passed. Rather than referring vaguely to a time 
when the tribe might be ‘ready’ for withdrawal, tribal members employed the image of 
childhood to object to BIA paternalism. Speaking of the Revolving Credit Program, which 
was meant to include provisions for training Navajos to take over the administration of 
tribal programs, longstanding council representative and former Vice-Chairman Howard 
Gorman expressed frustration: “When are the Navajos going to wear long pants and handle 
their own Revolving Credit Program? It looks as though we have been wearing knee pants 
long enough on this deal.”111  In referring to “knee pants”, Gorman depicted the tribe as 
immature, symbolically reduced to wearing children’s clothing. Through this image, he 
opposed the inefficiency of BIA bureaucracy, not allowing the tribe control over their own 
affairs: “What I mean is: we have been appropriating money for Government personnel […]. 
They are just taking our money, and they haven’t trained anybody to take their places.”112 
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Klamath Ida Crawford, wife of pro-Termination advocate Wade Crawford, expressed 
similar sentiments in a June 1960 meeting, two years after voting to withdraw from the 
tribe. During discussions of the complicated Termination process and how withdrawing 
tribal members would get their share of assets, Crawford criticised the suggestion that 
government loans should be paid out to tribal members until sufficient cash could be 
procured – loans that would accrue interest.113  Crawford highlighted inequality in this 
practice, stating:  
“What method are they going to use so that we can get some interest on the 
money owing to the Klamath Indians. Why isn’t there some talk of interest? 
Why is it all loans, loans, loans? They are talking to you like you are children. 
[…] You pay taxes, you have all the responsibility – you are citizens, that’s what 
you are.”114 
Like Gorman, Crawford used the image of Natives as children to highlight federal 
paternalism and criticise government action. However, while Gorman’s speech was aimed 
at furthering tribal control of reservation development programmes, Crawford presented 
paternalism as a problem resulting from Indian status, stating later that “Nobody else has 
to sell their timber on sustained yield – no one but the Klamath Indians.”115 
In her speech, Crawford indeed emphasised Klamath sameness to the mainstream – 
referring to them as not just citizens, but as taxpayers. Moreover, though Crawford had 
been an enrolled tribal member, she was born and had lived off the reservation for 
significant periods.116 It is thus unsurprising that she distanced herself from the tribe, 
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referring to Klamath tribal members as “you” rather than “we”. This differentiation 
underscores the impression that she bought into the belief that Indians or tribal 
communities were somehow inferior – or at least, treated unfairly. She maintained, 
however, that “equality” through assimilation was possible. The case of Ida Crawford, her 
husband, and supporters of Termination like them, perhaps provide evidence of the trend 
Fixico has identified, of Native peoples coming to believe their cultures and societies were 
unworthy. These attitudes had a grave effect on the self-perception of some Native people, 
leading to support for withdrawal and the downplaying, if not wholesale eradication, of 
tribal cultures. Not all tribal representatives, however, reacted in this way, with others 
navigating and manipulating language used about them to further the position of their 
communities as tribes. Nevertheless, despite changes in federal administration, the 
infantilizing language about Native peoples remained prevalent throughout the period, 




The Euro-American view of Native Americans as inferior and racially ‘Other’ was neither 
created by Terminationists, nor eradicated by shifts in federal policy in the 1960s. Rather 
the 1950s and 1960s press representations of Native peoples demonstrate the endurance 
of this ideology. Attitudes originating in the colonial era continued to impact on the lived 
experiences of Native peoples, both in dealing with federal officials and the mainstream 
public. Though by the 1960s the most obvious racist language was largely eradicated and 
press and federal officials avoided blatant discriminatory treatment, the underlying 





Communication and journalism scholar Christopher Campbell argues that journalists 
who consciously rejected racism nevertheless “advanced attitudes that fostered racial 
discrimination and prejudice”, and that this practice continues to the modern day.117 
Though Campbell’s work focuses primarily on representations of African Americans, his 
argument is equally valid concerning Native Americans. Explicitly racist comments were 
rare in the mid-twentieth century press, largely only appearing in the more sensationalist 
publications like TIME, yet Indians were consistently portrayed as not only physically 
different, but inferior. That the press propagated these attitudes had very tangible 
implications for the lived experience of Native peoples. Though the most overt racial 
discrimination had largely subsided by the late 1950s, BIA employees working with tribal 
councils displayed strong preconceptions of, and attitudes toward, Native peoples. 
Furthermore, the indigenous population lacked control over both their relations with the 
federal government and how they were represented to the mainstream public. The 
persistent proliferation of the belief that tribal communities were less “civilized” than 
American society served to justify the continued paternalism of the government, allowing 
Euro-American officials to believe they knew what was best, without Native consultation. 
Termination rhetoric, in speaking of “freedom” and claiming that trust status restricted 
Indians, glossed over the ways in which discrimination and prejudice continued to limit 
Native autonomy. In reality continuing federal coercion and widespread discrimination – 
not “Indianness” – precluded Native equality with the non-Native mainstream. The talk of 
“freedom” did not result in greater opportunities for self-determination amongst tribes, as 
paternalism persisted both on a local and federal level. Native cultures and communities 
survived only due to the commitment and determination of tribal members to resist 
paternalism, and to turn the language of tribal ‘advancement’ to their own advantage in the 
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economic development of their communities. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, 1960s OEO 
programmes and the efforts of Secretary of the Interior Udall, though indicating apparent 
change, were still aimed at the eventual termination of trust status. However, instead of 
preparing tribes for ultimate Termination, Mississippi Choctaw and Navajo tribal members 
succeeded in using funds from such programmes to strengthen and revitalise their 
communities, against the odds. While this achievement was considerable, tribal voices 
were continuously marginalised throughout the 1950s and 1960s press. Change in media 
representation required more militant attempts at attention by Native activists, as Red 
Power protests in the late 1960s and 1970s, like the Occupation of Alcatraz, came to 
show.118 
Discrimination and paternalism, thus, continued to impact upon Native experiences 
throughout the Termination period, but often in hidden and covert ways. Termination 
rhetoric, furthermore, placed the onus on tribes to maintain their cultures, obscuring the 
impact that federal withdrawal had on these. The inherent, hegemonic belief in Native 
“inferiority” outlined in this chapter, and tribal councils’ varied methods of rejecting it, 
must be acknowledged as playing a part in the implementation of federal policy on a local 
level. 
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Chapter Four: Being “American” – Identification and Acceptance 
 
As the previous three chapters have shown, Termination legislation was predicated on 
the belief that Native Americans had failed to “assume their full responsibilities as 
American citizens”, a view which ignored continuing institutional discrimination.  This 
chapter will explore whether Natives conceived of themselves as ‘American’ and were 
accepted as such by the mainstream public, as well as examining differing understandings 
of what it meant to be ‘American’. Despite the enduring fascination with “Indianness”, 
historiography has conclusively demonstrated that white supporters of Termination 
commonly believed the lifestyles of the Native population – which were seen as 
homogenous – were similar to Soviet communism. Indeed, an anti-socialist trend of 
conflating “Red Indians” with “Red Communists” had gained ground in U.S. public debate 
since the late 1800s, fuelled by news of attempted communist revolutions in Europe.1 
This view was propagated, for instance, by Republican Congressman E.Y. Berry, who had 
grown up in close proximity to reservations in South Dakota and saw himself as an expert 
on Indian affairs.2 A critical characteristic of his beliefs was that the communitarian New 
Deal, under John Collier’s “socialistic” leadership, had led the Native population away from 
American citizenship, and toward Communism. He expressed these beliefs in a 1950s 
speech: “Talk about fighting Communism? No, they are bringing it right to America and 
Communizing the Indian just as thoroughly as if they were citizens of Russia.”3 The 
elements that Berry saw as contributing to this “communization” were the support of 
communal land ownership and on-reservation education, as well as the legal recognition of 
tribal marriages and divorces according to the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act. In Berry’s 
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view, Native traditions and land ownership not only diverged from “American” individualist 
values, but were central elements of citizenship in the Soviet Union.  
This demonization of the New Deal as a “divergence” in the otherwise productive 
progression of Indian policy toward assimilation was widely accepted in Congressional 
circles following WWII.4 The BIA, the administrative powers of which had been bolstered by 
Indian New Deal policies, was furthermore lambasted for maintaining a supposed 
‘socialistic welfare system’ that contradicted the American values of ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’ 
and ‘individualism’.5 Congressional Indian policy in the early Termination period, in focusing 
on criticisms of the New Deal, thus ignored both the critical provisions guaranteed by 
nineteenth century treaties and the 1924 Citizenship Act. New Deal criticisms allowed 
Terminationists like Berry and Watkins to draw attention away from the real legal status of 
Indians as citizens, by making it clear that Native populations could not be currently 
perceived as “American”. 
For the purposes of this chapter, ‘Americanness’ will be considered as a matter of both 
nationality and identity. In this respect, the concept is related to – but not synonymous 
with – citizenship, which will be considered in more depth in the next chapter. A national 
identity is dependent on the cohesive self-perception of a country’s population and in this 
sense is essentially imagined, the product of a working hegemony.6 Unlike an ideology, 
national identity is hegemonic in that it is commonly accepted without being explicitly 
defined or communicated – mainstream Americans know what it is to be American without 
having to explain it to one another or themselves. Such a phenomenon is most succinctly 
defined by Jean and John Comaroff: “Hegemony […] exists in reciprocal interdependence 
with ideology: it is that part of a dominant worldview which has been naturalized and, 
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having hidden itself in orthodoxy, no more appears as ideology at all.”7 It is difficult to pin 
down the exact nature of ‘Americanness’, as it is not usually openly discussed and disputed, 
but rather generally accepted by the mainstream population encompassed within it.   
As Merle Curti documented in his 1951 book, the idea of ‘Americanism’ grew from the 
seventeenth century onwards, becoming inextricably linked to individualism in the 1870s.8 
Curti also sees ‘American’ thought as reliant on European tradition, with U.S. intellectual 
development being influenced by, and responding to, those trends.9 His book as such 
reproduced the Eurocentrism inherent in ‘Americanness’, not presenting Native peoples or 
other ethnic minorities as playing any active role in shaping the national identity. The 
Growth of American Thought particularly reflects the prevailing ideas about ‘Americanness’ 
at its time of publication – the early Cold War period. Scholarship has shown that at this 
time, the notion of ‘Americanness’ became largely defensive, defined in opposition to 
perceived values of communism.10 At this point, the belief in ‘American exceptionalism’ – 
that the United States as a ‘protector of the free world’, standing apart due to its unique 
origins and geography – was particularly strong.11 In contrast to Soviet totalitarian control, 
Americans came to hold a heightened belief in the U.S. as the ‘land of the free’, and the 
need to defend the ideal of democracy was broadcast in the press.12 The core values of 
‘Americanness’ at this point in time can thus be identified as ‘freedom’, ‘individualism’ and 
‘democracy’. 
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Nevertheless, Philip Deloria has shown in his influential book, Playing Indian, that 
“Indianness” also played a critical role in defining American national identity, with the 
performance of perceived Native traits helping to distinguish Americans from Europeans 
since the Boston Tea Party in 1773.13 Historian Robert Berkhofer has argued that the 
popularity of “Indians” has fluctuated throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
but imagery surrounding them has never disappeared completely.14 Indeed, while federal 
Indian policy rarely made front page news in the mid-twentieth century, Native imagery 
maintained a consistent position of public interest.  Scholarship on Indian representations 
recognises a resurgence of Native imagery both in World War II reports on Indian courage 
and war-time accomplishments, and in the propagation of Native imagery in anti-war 
protest during the 1960s and 1970s countercultural movement.15 While Indian policy may 
have resulted in a few front page stories in the Christian Science Monitor, as Chapter Two 
has shown, most of the national press marginalised topics pertaining to Native policy. 
Looking at the New York Times alone, in the year 1956 – when the Termination processes of 
the Klamath and Menominee were well underway – only five articles explicitly referring to 
Termination policy appeared, while at least nineteen were published on various aspects of 
Native art and artisanship alone.16 How can this continued interest in the image of the 
Indian and of Native cultures be reconciled with coexisting federal aims of Termination?  
                                                          
13
 Deloria, Playing Indian, p. 2. 
14
 Berkhofer, White Man’s Indian, p. xii. 
15
 Deloria, Playing Indian, p. 129, 158. 
16
 Articles on Termination: ’Indian Consent’, NYT, 12 January 1956, p. 26; Lawrence Davies, ‘Indians 
Divided on Being ‘Freed’’, NYT, 8 April 1956, p. 48; ‘Quakers Propose Help for Indians’, NYT, 4 June 
1956, p. 31; ‘G.O.P. Delays Sale of Indian Ground’, NYT, 19 September 1956’, p. 39; Seth King, ‘Lo! 
The Rich Indian’, NYT, 2 December 1956, p. 55. Articles on Native arts: ‘Hopi Indian Opera Offered’, 
NYT, 30 January 1956, p. 23; ‘Easter in Arctic a Festive Affair’, NYT, 1 April 1956, p. 65; ‘Wooden 
Indians to Go on Block’, NYT, 7 April 1956, p. 21; ‘Gay Indians of Wood and Iron are Sold for Much 
Wampum at Auction Wigwam’, NYT, 12 April 1956, p. 33; Faith Corrigan, ‘Young Navajos Spurning 
Rugs as a Way of Life’, NYT, 11 May 1956, p. 42; ‘Culture’, NYT, 17 June 1956, p. 220; Tania Long, 
‘The Eskimos Meet the Twentieth Century’, NYT, 17 June 1956, p. 203; ‘Indian, 17, is Niagara Queen’, 
NYT, 5 August 1956, p. 24; ‘About New York’, NYT, 13 August 1956, p. 41; ‘Portraits of 4 Indians’, 
NYT, 13 August 1956, p. 17; Pollyanna Hughes, ‘Indian Festival’, NYT, 17 August 1956, p. 112; 





This chapter will evaluate the extent to which these beliefs of Indians as not ‘American’ 
permeated mainstream public opinion and Native self-identification in the Termination era, 
and how they existed in tension with the late 1950s and 1960s fascination with 
“Indianness”. It will begin by examining the extent to which Native individuals saw 
themselves as ‘American’, demonstrating how they interpreted the supposedly ‘American’ 
values of ‘freedom’ and ‘individualism’. This chapter will then assess the extent to which 
the press presented the Native population as part of and contributing to mainstream 
society. Finally, the ways in which the majority public and representatives of tribal councils 
interpreted “Americanness” will be compared, to highlight the diversity in interpretation 
that vague Terminationist language sought to obscure. In order to understand mainstream 
and Native responses to Termination policy, the multiple ways in which ‘American’ identity 
could be perceived will be explored. 
 
4.1. “I am an American and I am proud of it” 
 
Historians Paul Rosier and Daniel Cobb have both conclusively demonstrated that Native 
activists in pan-tribal organisations actively engaged with the political discourse of the Cold 
War period to further their aims of tribal sovereignty and self-determination.17 Less studied 
is the extent  to which international political contexts had an impact on discussions of 
federal Indian policy within tribal councils. An awareness of Cold War tensions was certainly 
evident in the Five “Civilized” Tribes Inter-Tribal council meetings throughout the 
Termination period. Most typically, this was manifest in declarations of opposition to 
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communism and the prospect of Soviet involvement with Native peoples. For instance, in a 
March 1961 meeting Choctaw representative Jack Davidson unequivocally declared: “I am 
an American and I am proud of it and I don’t think American Indians need any 
communism… I’ll fight to the last drop of blood in my veins to protect the heritage which 
we have.”18  
While it is unclear whether Jack Davidson himself was a war veteran, his reference to 
violent combat on behalf of his heritage reflects the strong military participation of 
Oklahoma Choctaw in twentieth century U.S. wars; though lesser known than their Navajo 
equivalents, Choctaws served in both world wars as code talkers and several were awarded 
medals for their achievements.19 Scholarship on race relations in WWII has demonstrated 
that Natives participated in the war effort in substantial numbers across-the-board, and 
often with considerable patriotic enthusiasm, indicating a possible affinity of participating 
tribal members to a shared “American” identity.20 The involvement of Natives in the war 
had a particularly strong effect on tribal leadership and tribal councils; by 1946 over a third 
of all councils included at least one war veteran as a representative.21 Choctaw military 
service and Davidson’s statement alike reflect a willingness to defend American society – 
whatever that was understood to be – aggressively. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Davidson also nevertheless spoke of himself as an Indian and expressed concern about 
Mississippi Choctaw welfare due to their shared history. Evidently Davidson identified both 
as an American and an Indian. 
Davidson’s comment reflected a fear of communist influence over Indians similar to that 
expressed by Berry in his early 1950s speech. While Davidson did not accuse Natives 
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Americans of already being “Russian citizens”, he did see the spread of communist 
influence among tribal populations as a potential threat. Speaking of a “friend” who had 
visited the Soviet Union, Davidson stated:  
“… he met with men who were a channel of communism for the American 
Indian. […] people who are desirous of help sometimes will seek any form of 
aid that is offered to them… I would rather see the American Indian work by 
the sweat of his brow and the muscles of his back before he would accept 
communistic thinking.”22  
Davidson here expressed a typically mainstream American belief in the ability of all to 
succeed through individual effort – a rugged individualist mentality. 23 A critical difference 
between this statement and Berry’s is nevertheless evident. As a Choctaw tribal 
representative, Davidson recognised the struggles much of the Native population faced, 
which could lead them to ‘seek any form of aid’, even from enemies of the U.S. 
government, and indicates an awareness of the scandalous history of disastrous Native-
foreign cooperation in the past. Davidson was likely referring to the 1939 attacks on the 
American Indian Federation, a pan-tribal organisation critical of New Deal policies with a 
heavy following in Oklahoma, which fell into disrepute due to allegations of cooperation 
with pro-Nazi groups like the German-American Bund and Silver Shirts.24 
Davidson’s background as a representative of the Choctaw tribe in this era must also be 
taken into account. The Choctaw tribal leadership, under Principal Chief Harry Belvin, 
spearheaded the effort to terminate the trust status of the Oklahoma tribe beginning in 
1959, two years before this meeting was held.25 Indeed, Davidson’s statements in the Inter-
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Tribal council were backed by Belvin, who told the story of a young Indian man who tried to 
appeal to the Russian Consulate for financial assistance. Belvin, however, questioned the 
allegiance of Indians who were struggling:  
“… we can complain to our hearts content against our Government, and some 
of its policies, but we must never forget, first, last and always, that we are 
Americans… I have said this many times and I will say that again, if I don’t love 
my country, there are boats leaving every day for Russia and other parts of the 
world.”26  
Belvin’s adoption of Terminationist rhetoric and hyper-patriotic promotion of his 
“American” identity indicates that he and Davidson held different priorities. Belvin implied 
that being included in mainstream society was simply a matter of will and hard work, 
employing rhetoric similar to that propagated by, for instance, Muskogee Area Office 
employees in addressing problems of discrimination. In contrast, Native activist 
organisations like the NCAI and NIYC argued for further government development of 
reservations on the grounds that this would help curb any influence of Soviet communist 
propaganda.27 Belvin’s views instead reflect Terminationist ideas presented in HCR 108, 
that Natives – by choice – had not lived up to certain ‘responsibilities as American citizens’.  
These Choctaw representatives of the Inter-Tribal Council seem to have been well aware 
of Cold War tensions and made significant efforts to dissociate themselves from any 
accusations of Soviet influence.  An examination of Belvin’s statements and their affinity to 
Terminationist ideology sheds some light on the possible reasons why he pushed for the 
withdrawal of his tribe’s federal trust status. Belvin, born to a Euro-American mother and 
Choctaw/Cherokee attorney father, grew up on a 1,280-acre ranch, meaning he was 
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financially better off than most Five Tribes members.28 In this respect, Belvin, as a mixed-
race, economically self-sufficient man, reflected the relatively “elite” make-up of the Inter-
Tribal Council. Fervent anti-communism may furthermore be explained by the Inter-Tribal 
Council’s close links to the NCAI; former president N.B. Johnson remained a Cherokee 
representative on the Council in this period.29 As Rosier has effectively demonstrated, the 
NCAI worked hard to dissociate itself from international contacts which could be perceived 
as Communist, and cultivated links to hyper-patriotic groups.30 Though Belvin’s statements 
were perhaps closer in sentiment to Berry’s than the NCAI stance, the awareness of Cold 
War issues apparent in the Inter-Tribal Council was likely fostered by these links to activist 
organisations.  
Furthermore, the context in which these Choctaw representatives spoke of the threat of 
communism is significant – Davidson first brought up the subject after Earl Boyd Pierce 
(Cherokee) reported on an NCAI special advisory session on the upcoming American Indian 
Chicago Conference.31 Cobb’s detailed analysis of the run up to the conference shows that 
Inter-Tribal Council members held deep-seated suspicions about the event, worrying it 
might result in the establishment of an organisation in conflict with the NCAI. Cobb 
describes oil baron and Cherokee Principal Chief Keeler as – having conducted a business 
trip to the Soviet Union – becoming suspicious that Chicago Conference organiser Sol Tax 
had communist contacts.32 Ultimately, through participation in the Conference, Pierce 
managed to strong arm the inclusion of an “American Indian Pledge” as a preface to the 
Declaration of Indian Purpose there drafted, acting as an oath of Native loyalty to the 
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United States.33 Through the course of the conference, Pierce had also cautioned against 
strong anti-Termination statements, indicating that he may have sympathised with Belvin’s 
support of the policy, or at least did not want to contradict it publicly.  
Cobb rightly identifies strong conservative elements running through the Inter-Tribal 
Council, particularly in the activities of representatives like Keeler and Pierce. During the 
March 1961 Five Tribes meeting in which Davidson and Belvin spoke, the council voted to 
commend both these Cherokee councilmen for their work, implying that such pro-American 
views had support.34 The wording of these commendations, however, seems to contradict 
the notion that Five Tribes representatives saw themselves as primarily ‘American’. Both 
resolutions focused on the Native population as separate, praising Keeler and Pierce for 
“effort in behalf of the Indian people” and “service rendered to the Indians of this 
country.”35 Indeed, Council proposals continued throughout the Termination period to refer 
to the Native population as “Indians” rather than “Americans”. 
The influence of tribal ‘elites’ that were sympathetic to some of the assimilationist aims 
of Termination is thus clear in these Inter-Tribal Council sessions, but not all representatives 
subscribed to such views. Those Natives that supported government Termination policy 
were evidently more likely to refer to Indians as ‘American’. Comparing Belvin’s statement 
to speeches of Klamath tribal members in favour of PL 587 supports this impression. For 
instance, speaking at a November 1957 meeting, a Mrs Shelp stated: “[…] I am also a 
Klamath Indian, but an American first – and it seems to me that now the world situation is 
changed a great deal and the sooner that us Klamaths take our place in society the better 
for us […].”36 Shelp’s statement is remarkably similar to Belvin’s; both prioritised their 
identity as ‘American’ over their tribal affiliations. This self-identification as “American” 
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may explain why these two individuals were inclined to support federal withdrawal, as both 
apparently saw themselves as part of the mainstream rather than a tribal community.  
In Belvin’s case, the ease of associating with mainstream society could be attributed to 
his ‘mixed-blood’ heritage, but there is no evidence of Mrs Shelp’s background to draw any 
parallels here. Furthermore, attempting to interpret Native identity based on biological 
make-up substantiates a colonial legacy of Euro-Americans determining the “competence” 
of Native individuals based on ‘blood quantum’.37 Indeed, Maori anthropologist Linda 
Tuhiwai Smith has argued that blood quantum has been used as a method of asserting 
colonial power over indigenous peoples worldwide, allowing Native status to be defined 
from the outside.38 It is more useful to consider a characteristic Shelp and Belvin clearly 
shared – socio-economic status. In justifying her stance, Shelp stated: “Let me say this, that 
in the state of California where I reside, I am the guardian of the persons and estates of my 
children for a great many years. A few weeks ago I handed over to my son $10,000.00 
which I had invested for him.”39 Shelp, living off-reservation, had evidently already 
integrated successfully into mainstream American society and achieved financial stability, 
like Belvin.  
This likely influenced their perception of the policy of Termination, as Shelp particularly 
may have assumed that others, when forced by PL 587 to decide how to manage their own 
assets, would benefit economically. Both Shelp and Belvin serve as models of ‘acculturated’ 
Native individuals who identified themselves as ‘American’, just as Senator Watkins hoped. 
Unfortunately their shared assumption that the eradication of trust status would 
economically benefit Native Americans was unfounded; Termination led to further 
impoverishment in virtually all cases. Though members of the Klamath tribe who chose to 
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withdraw their share of assets during their Termination process were awarded $43,000 
each, this did not offer lasting security: by 1965 nearly forty percent had already used up 
these funds, and in 1989 thirty percent of all Klamaths were still earning less than $5,000 
annually.40 Furthermore, it is important to note that relative financial stability after 
Termination did not equate to losing Klamath identity. Though Charles Kimbol himself 
opted to withdraw from the tribe and used his $43,000 to buy a family home, he 
nevertheless became an influential tribal leader in the late 1960s and led the legal battle for 
the restoration of Klamath trust status.41 Kimbol did not view Termination as preventing 
tribal organisation, telling those who had opted to remain with the tribe that “it wasn’t 
meant for you not to organise and have a real council and stuff.”42 
Nevertheless, Shelp, Davidson and Belvin were all ‘elite’ and at least ‘semi-acculturated’ 
members of their respective tribes. Furthermore, their tribes – the Klamath and the 
Oklahoma Choctaw – were perceived by government employees as relatively ‘assimilated’, 
as Termination proposals for both tribes were accepted. How, then, did members of 
‘predominantly Indian’ tribes identify themselves? The extent to which, for instance, Navajo 
tribal members saw themselves as ‘American’ must be examined in order to assess whether 
identification with the mainstream was based on economic success or something else. The 
topic of ‘Americanness’ was discussed in Navajo Tribal Council meetings, usually when 
speaking of military involvement and the legacy of WWII, a matter of pride to the Diné both 
in the immediate post-war era and today.43  Navajo council meeting minutes demonstrate 
that participation in the war effort raised expectations for further inclusion in American 
society among many Navajos, not just tribal elites. For instance, in a meeting discussing the 
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Fernandez Amendment in 1949, council representative Maxwell Yazzie referred to the war 
in supporting the extension of state jurisdiction over the reservation:  
“The United States government has used us wards of the government as full-
fledged citizens of the United States during the war. They have used our young 
men as soldiers and left some over in foreign countries. The Fernandez 
Amendment says we will exercise full citizenship in our states and in the 
United States.”44 
Yazzie’s statement reflects Terminationist rhetoric to a fair extent, demonstrating that 
he did not see the Navajo population as enjoying “full-fledged citizenship” of the United 
States, presenting the Navajo as ‘wards’ that had only been ‘used as’ citizens in the war 
effort. On closer inspection, however, it appears that he believed that being a “U.S. citizen” 
and coming under state jurisdiction would better protect the tribe’s rights, particularly 
concerning education, as guaranteed by treaty: “It will answer a portion of the old Treaty 
with the United States Government with Navajo Indians on the education of the Navajos up 
to the standard of being capable citizens of the United States.”45 This indicates that in his 
view, the treaty-guaranteed rights of tribal members as Navajos were not incongruous with 
their rights as American citizens. Furthermore, in true patriotic fashion, he supported 
further involvement of tribal members in American military efforts, stating the U.S. 
government could be “privileged and proud of using our young men whenever the time 
comes they will need to be used.”46 
This dedication to U.S. military participation certainly contradicts Congressman Berry’s 
assumptions of Native Americans becoming “Russian citizens” as a result of the New Deal. 
Indeed, throughout the Termination era, the Navajo council strongly denied any 
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accusations of communist links, just like the supposedly more ‘acculturated’ Five Tribes. In 
a July 1950 meeting council representative Howard Gorman asked the tribe’s attorney 
Norman Littell to respond to radio and press accusations that he was a communist: “Several 
weeks ago we were surprised and amazed to hear that a certain man made some 
broadcasts and some charges against our attorney, Mr. Littell, in that he was affiliated with 
some Communist organizations”.47 Gorman did not make clear who had made these 
accusations, rather raising the topic to make a strong statement of Navajo patriotic support 
against communism: “[…] during the war we took a very definitive stand against any form 
of subversive activity, un-American activity, and we have fought for the freedom that we 
have.”48  
While Gorman did not explain how he defined “un-American activity”, it is obvious why 
tribal members would not have wanted to be associated with communism in the early 
1950s: being accused of socialist affiliations during the height of McCarthyism would have 
done the tribe no favours.49 Tribal members furthermore supported Berry’s condemnation 
of the New Deal, seeing as the Indian Reorganization Act and Collier’s policy of stock 
reduction were highly unpopular among the Navajo; most tribal council representatives at 
this point were from lower socio-economic levels of the community, and thus most heavily 
affected by stock reduction.50 
The Navajo Tribal Council continued, however, to express its official stance of American 
patriotism even after the “Red Scare” had lost its most fervent momentum. In an August 
1961 report to the council, Chairman Paul Jones commented vaguely on international 
affairs, asserting Navajo support for the U.S. on the world stage: 
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“These are perilous times for the free world. […] I am sure that this Council and 
Navajo people will join me in a pledge of patriotism to our President. If our 
nation should go on a complete war footing, it goes without saying that many 
of our Tribal plans will necessarily be changed or delayed.”51  
In this critical statement, Jones made clear that in his view, the Navajo tribe was certainly a 
part of the ‘free world’ that the U.S. represented.  Jones even provided some indication of 
his understanding of ‘patriotism’, which involved participating in any war effort and 
prioritising the needs of the United States over improvement programs for the tribe.  
A willingness to sacrifice the needs of the tribe is clear, but to what extent did Jones’ 
belief reflect wider tribal opinion? His background certainly differed from that of most 
tribal members. As mentioned in Chapter Three, Jones spent an extended period of time off 
the reservation in his youth, attending school in New Jersey, serving in the military, and 
working for the National Tea Company, before returning to the reservation and working as 
Navajo Chairman from 1955 to 1963.52 Similarly, Howard Gorman, a former tribal Chairman, 
was described by Peter Iverson as a member of the tribal council ‘Old Guard’ – referring to 
his involvement with the council since its inception by the BIA – and he evidently served as 
a representative for almost the entire Termination period, indicating some level of ‘elite’ 
status.53  
In contrast, though little background information about Maxwell Yazzie could be found, 
his 1940 U.S. census records indicate that he had not been formally educated and was a 
farmer by occupation.54 The tribal council records contain few comments by Yazzie, 
indicating he was not as heavily involved as Jones and Gorman were. Despite their 
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differences in background, all three evidently valued Navajo involvement in U.S. military 
efforts and saw the tribe as rightfully included in American society through this 
participation. Navajo tribal members apparently thus self-identified as American and valued 
their role in American civic life, having strongly campaigned to secure federal and state 
voting rights which New Mexico and Arizona had denied until 1948.55 This identification of 
the Navajo as ‘American’ permeated not just the so-called ‘elite’, but less formally educated 
elements of communities across the reservation, despite the tribe supposedly being 
‘predominantly Indian’. 
Comparing the Navajo to another ‘predominantly Indian’ tribe, however, reveals that 
these ties to a perceived ‘American’ identity fostered by WWII participation were likely 
quite exceptional. The war effort had also affected the lives of members of the Mississippi 
Band Choctaw, with over one hundred men serving in the military and Choctaw women 
covering farm work on the home front.56 In stark contrast to frequent mentions of 
patriotism and the war in the Navajo council, there is little record of the Mississippi Band 
Choctaw discussing war participation or mentioning ‘American’ allegiance in the minutes 
available in the Termination period. There is no evidence to support the notion that 
Choctaw tribal members expressed any affinity to ‘American’ identity, even in speaking to 
BIA or other government employees.  
As the statement of Mississippi Choctaw representative Woodrow Billie quoted in the 
previous chapter indicates, in the early 1950s tribal members expressed frustration at racial 
discrimination by BIA officials, implying they failed to even see tribal members as 
“human”.57 Billie’s statement was not apparently refuted in the council, with Chairman Joe 
Chitto only commenting that there was “a little ray of hope” in the upcoming change of 
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administration the following year, meaning the Mississippi Band would gain a new 
superintendent, hopefully “from out of the State”.58 These hopes were not contested, 
indicating that council representatives recognised that discrimination by BIA staff was a 
major problem. Representatives of the council, none of whom had in the early 1950s 
completed high school, had little contact with mainstream society.59 In the context of Jim 
Crow Mississippi, faced with racial discrimination not only from surrounding Euro-American 
communities, but the very BIA employees meant to facilitate their services, tribal members 
were excluded from a wider national identity.60 Dealing with racism, paternalism and 
poverty, there was indeed no reason for Mississippi Band tribal members to see themselves 
as ‘American’. Identification as ‘American’ hence varied both within and between tribal 
councils, but was not strictly tied to their supposed ‘acculturation’. Rather this was 
dependent on a wide range of circumstances, including the treatment of tribal members in 
their respective localities, the experience of individuals within mainstream society, and 
political motivations within the context of the early Cold War.  
 
4.2. The Press: Indians as “Americans” and American “Indianness” 
 
Many American Indians, then, publicly identified themselves as ‘American’, with the 
Mississippi Choctaw presenting an extreme exception. However, inclusion into the 
‘American’ national body is not only a matter of self-identification, but also acceptance – as 
the Mississippi Choctaw case demonstrates. To what extent did the mainstream, Euro-
American public view Natives as part of “American” society? As examined in Chapter Two, 
press reporting on Termination, whether supporting or opposing it, largely did not refute 
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the core assumption that assimilation of the indigenous population was the ultimate goal of 
Indian policy, but questions remained over whether the integration of Indians was possible. 
A broad consensus thus existed that Native people should become “American”, but the 
extent to which press writing presented them as able to become part of the nation must be 
established. 
Looking at early 1950s press reports on the formation and passage of Termination 
legislation, it is clear that few references were made to Native peoples as ‘American’, rather 
just calling them ‘Indians’. For example, a March 1950 New York Times article, ‘Deadlocks 
Beset Indian Freedom’, made no reference to ‘Americans’, describing developments in 
Indian Affairs as aiming “to get the Indians out of wardship”.61 This article is representative 
of a trend in 1950s official government rhetoric that emphasised the separation of Native 
populations from the mainstream by never referring to them as ‘Americans’ – even Watkins 
only presented Indians as becoming ‘American’ once tribes were terminated. Presenting 
indigenous people as marginal populations restricted specifically by their “Indianness” in 
this way justified Termination plans, as the removal of trust status was required for Native 
people to transform into ‘full Americans’. Interestingly, however, news articles like those 
mentioned in Chapter Two never described Termination as turning ‘Indians’ into 
‘Americans’, speaking only more broadly of citizenship and never propagating Watkins’ 
claims. Though issues of citizenship will be discussed in more depth in the following 
chapter, it is important to note here that pro-Termination reporting did not describe 
Natives as ‘American’ either at present or at any definite point in the future. 
Examining press representations of Native Americans more broadly shows that some 
press reporting nevertheless characterised “Americans” as people who were born, and – 
critically – whose ancestors originated from within, contemporary U.S. borders. This 
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definition was commonly employed by the 1950s and 1960s press – particularly the 
Christian Science Monitor – in writing critical of Termination legislation.62  In 1955 the 
Monitor ran a commentary on government Indian policy entitled ‘Justice for America’s First 
Settlers’, describing a Blackfoot man as being “more American than most citizens. He was 
one of the nation’s first settlers, an American Indian of the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana.”63  
In this instance, a Native person was categorised as American purely due to geographic and 
historical factors, even stating he is “more American” than the mainstream population due 
to his indigeneity. 
Despite considering Natives as inherently “American”, the commentary nevertheless 
concurrently presented the Blackfoot man as an exoticised “Other”, marginalising him as 
the previous chapter has shown was typical of the press. The unnamed man was described 
as wearing a “strange necklace of bears’ teeth”, speaking “in an unfamiliar tongue”, and 
communicating only through an interpreter.64 Furthermore, whilst in the second paragraph 
he was explicitly referred to as “American”, throughout the rest of the commentary 
“American Indians” and “Americans” were referred to as separate categories. This undercut 
the initial proposition of Indian “Americanness”, leaving the reader with the impression 
that simple geography did not, after all, determine nationality. This again highlights the 
phenomenon Philip Deloria referred to as a “doubled consciousness”, as identified in the 
previous chapter.65 The article’s author played with the notion of incorporating Indians into 
their conception of “Americanness”, but was unable entirely to accept it, instead implying 
that they were “different” but not “foreign”. These conflicting notions were not resolved, 
existing in evident tension with each other. 
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This categorisation of the Indian as both ‘American’ and not was, of course, purposeful – 
the aim of the comment piece was to criticise contemporary Indian policy, presenting the 
indigenous population as downtrodden and destitute. The article pointed to “many” 
American Indians having an average income of “less than $200 a year”, despite widespread 
prosperity reaching the rest of the country. Indian policy was portrayed as having failed the 
indigenous population; the writer accused the government of ignoring Natives in favour of 
aiding underdeveloped areas overseas – a clear jab at the Point Four programme. The 
article thus presented a contradictory image of “Americanness” for specific effect – the 
Indian was portrayed as having the right to the same standards of living as the mainstream 
population due to their historic primacy on the U.S. continent, but being impoverished by 
poor government policy. Here, the concept of being “American” was used as a justification 
for opposing Indian policy, by highlighting the inequality in living standards between the 
average Euro-American and American Indian. Significantly, though the article referred to 
NCAI opposition to Termination, the writer clearly stated: “Eventual termination of federal 
trusteeship is not opposed, but Indian leaders believe that the time has not yet come for 
that step.”66 
The same trope of Indians as the “first Americans” appeared also in the Times, featuring 
prominently in 1960s editorial comments on Indian policy.67 Just as with the Monitor, this 
writing opposed fast-paced Termination on the grounds of Indian primacy on the North 
American continent. As a July 1961 editorial proclaimed: “These are our neighbors. They 
were here before we were. They have rights that even the descendants of the Mayflower’s 
passenger list cannot contest.”68 This reference to “rights” reflected a 1960s development 
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in public discourse that sociologist Michael Schudson characterises as the concept of a 
“rights-based citizenship”.69 The influence of the developing rhetoric of the African 
American Civil Rights movement was here applied to Indian affairs, but was coupled with 
this notion of indigenous precedence. However, the Native population was still distanced 
from the mainstream population through the use of pronouns like “we” and “they” – 
implying that integration was incomplete. 
Nine years later to the month, the Times published a commentary on Nixon’s Special 
Message on Indian Affairs, beginning with two paragraphs of a vague history of European 
settlement in the Americas: “When Europeans first arrived on this continent and spread 
into its interior, they found a people whose ancestors had come from Asia 25,000 years 
earlier […].”70 The use of this imagery of Native Americans as an “ancient” people on the 
continent thus apparently endured throughout the 1950s and 1960s. However, unlike 
earlier Monitor applications of the concept, here Termination was seemingly rejected 
outright: “The policy adopted in 1953 of trying to ‘terminate’ the Indians was an error.”71 
Despite this apparent major difference, the commentary implies this was because “poverty-
stricken and culturally disorganized” Indians were not yet ready for Termination, terming 
the policy “premature”. This indicates that though the paper took a stronger stance against 
Termination after Nixon’s Special Message was issued, underlying support for eventual 
assimilation still persisted. 
As in Monitor writing, the blame was thus placed at the government’s door, terming 
federal Indian treatment as “neglect” and detailing financial responsibilities: “There should 
be no illusion, however, that the nation’s overdue debt to the First Americans can be 
discharged quickly or cheaply.”72 This highlights a common characteristic of all references 
                                                          
69
 Michael Schudson, The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life (New York, 1998), p. 255. 
70









to ‘First Americans’ in the press – blaming the government for Indian poverty. These 
writings, though justifiably portraying the federal government as actively excluding the 
Native population from American society, work to marginalise Native peoples in a pervasive 
victim narrative.  Native tribes and individuals were largely left out of the equation; though 
articles referred to the NCAI or included vague references to tribal leaders, Native 
perspectives were marginalised. One of the Monitor articles even ironically quoted a Native 
individual stating the Indian voice was “for the first time, really, […] being listened to”, but 
failed to identify her as anything other than “a tribal council chairman, a woman”. 73 
Omitting her name and tribal affiliation in this way denied her agency as both an individual 
and a representative of her tribe. 
Though these articles promoted Indian “rights” and criticised government plans for the 
termination of tribes, they simultaneously side-lined Native viewpoints. Tribal members, as 
the quote of Maxwell Yazzie above shows, did not necessarily find identifying as 
“American” incongruous with upholding the legal value of treaty rights. The present-day 
acceptance of federal-tribal interactions as a government-to-government relationship is 
based on the treaties signed between the federal government and tribes until the 1871 
Indian Appropriations Act was passed, demonstrating that the U.S. recognised tribes as 
sovereign governing bodies.74 Supreme Court decisions in cases filed by Native activists in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s affirmed these treaty provisions, leading to the current 
hegemonic view of modern tribes as sovereign.75 Legal scholar Charles Wilkinson has 
argued that this tribal sovereignty is not a modern construction, but deeply rooted in the 
colonial period and “long-dormant” in Indian affairs until the Termination period.76  
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Indeed, discussions of Indian precedence, like Congressional rhetoric, lacked mention of 
the legal implications of treaties between individual tribes and the government. In framing 
the debate in terms of “who got here first”, this writing sidestepped complex legal debates 
over the validity of treaties in favour of drawing support for Indian rights in terms easier for 
the mainstream public to relate to – that of making everyone “equal” Americans. This trend 
in press writing thus promoted assimilation by arguing that Natives should be brought in 
line with ‘Americanness’ because of their geographical right to be in the country. Such 
references constructed an image of the Native population as playing a critical role in the 
American past, but excluded from its present. Particularly in late 1950s and 1960s writings, 
the press presented government policy as moving further away from Termination and 
closer toward this goal of “equality”; as one article put it: “Here is a positive, precious 
indication that the American ideal of all-inclusive human dignity is at last beginning to 
encompass the first Americans.”77 The goal of assimilation into the “American” mainstream 
was thus supported, though Termination was seen as the wrong tool for the job. 
Despite opposing Termination, articles speaking of Indian precedence thus actually 
perpetuated Terminationist understandings of Native legal status; being born within the 
boundaries of the U.S. meant Native individuals had the potential to become “American”, 
but only if they conformed to certain ambiguous standards. Moreover, writing on Native 
issues often displayed only a vague awareness of federal legislation. This was particularly 
evident in a 1957 TIME article detailing the efforts of African American reporter Carl Rowan 
to document life on reservations. The article drew rough parallels between Rowan’s own 
experience as a minority with the situation of Natives, who were described as “the other 
‘American who is not quite an American’.”78 This statement neatly epitomised the 
underlying tone of all press writing on the idea of Indians as “American” – that, like African 
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Americans, the indigenous population was to some degree both included and excluded; 
perhaps geographically American, but too racially and culturally different to be really 
accepted in the mainstream.  
Interestingly, the article did in passing mention that the Native population legally had 
U.S. citizenship: “75,000 Indians (who got U.S. citizenship only 33 years ago)”.79 Evidently 
the article’s author viewed citizenship as separate from being fully “American”, as they 
portrayed Natives as citizens, but “not quite American”. Like the articles emphasising Indian 
precedence, this one was also critical of government efforts, but did not mention 
Termination. Instead relocation was depicted as a failure, with the government presented 
as encouraging Natives to leave the reservations, only for them to be met with 
discrimination in urban communities: “In many areas Indians are denied admission to 
hospitals, refused police protection, turned down when they apply for social-welfare aid.”80 
Unlike the Monitor and Times, this TIME article presented not only the government, but 
also “local whites” as excluding Indians from mainstream society. The article touched on 
experiences similar to those of the Mississippi Choctaw, pointing out that regardless of 
theoretical categorisations of Natives as ‘American’ or not, in practice discrimination by the 
white population excluded them from mainstream society.  
Weston has pointed out that though the press presents itself as a provider of objective 
facts, reporting on Native Americans  has continued throughout the twentieth century to 
perpetuate “well-worn Indian imagery”.81 Indeed, 1950s and 1960s press reports on Indian 
affairs persistently emphasised Native differences rather than their commonalities with the 
mainstream public. This distancing of Natives from American society is furthermore 
reflected in the persistent press preoccupation with “exotic” Indian cultures. This 











continuing fascination is exemplified by articles on Native ceremonies or powwows, which 
usually described Native dances as a historic performance, allowing audiences to view 
“exotic” or “primitive” displays. For instance, in 1957 the Times reported on Southwest 
Native dancers performing at a socialite ball, stating the visiting Indians were “trained in the 
ancient ritual of the dances of their tribes” and listed dances that would be included: “the 
dance of the warriors, a buffalo hunting dance and a healing ceremony”.82 Though the 
article mentioned that the dancers were Hopi, Apache, Navajo and Taos Pueblo, its 
references to these dances were vague and employed stereotypical labels.  
Characteristically, TIME employed even more crudely stereotyped imagery of 
“primitivism” in describing Native dancers. In 1965 the magazine printed an article on a 
Native performance at the White House arranged by President Johnson for the visit of 
President Maurice Yameogo of the Republic of Upper Volta (Burkina Faso): “There, decked 
out in everything from buffalo hides (with horns) to loincloths, were 35 Indians 
representing 14 American tribes, who whooped, chanted and clanged their way through 
five primitive dances […].”83 While TIME’s reporting on this event was, perhaps, more 
colourful than the earlier Times report, both presented Native dancers as nameless 
“others”, with an air of “exoticism”. Both thus perpetuated the stereotype of Native 
Americans as “ancient primitives”, incongruous with modern society. 
The widespread interest in Native performance demonstrated by the aforementioned 
articles stood in apparent contrast to the federal aims of Termination.  Fascination with the 
perceived markers of “Indianness” appears to indicate public support for the continued 
existence of Native cultures and tribal identities. In the late 1950s and 1960s this interest 
expanded into a veritable boom in popularity of Native arts, dances and fashions. Philip 
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Deloria has aptly documented the growth of hobbyism in the 1960s U.S., arguing that Euro-
Americans that dressed up as Indians fetishized reservations, dismissing urban Indians as 
“inauthentic”.84 The hobbyists, alongside the developing hippy and New Age movements, 
created an increased market for supposedly “authentic” Indian arts and crafts.85  
The increasing press focus on Native commodities, particularly arts and crafts purchase 
guides for tourists visiting reservations, supports Deloria’s findings. For instance, an April 
1963 Times article extensively quoted BIA Commissioner Philleo Nash on counterfeit Native 
jewellery and items.86 Though attempting to address the issue of “imitations of Indian crafts 
[…] mass-produced by machinery” in a serious manner, the article was coupled with a 
heavily stereotyped title: ‘On the Warpath Against Bogus Indian Art’.87 Despite the article 
itself describing the legal difficulties in eliminating counterfeit Native items from the 
market, the issues were framed within the usual language of perceived “Indianness”. 
Furthermore, little sense of the harm of this imitation market to Native communities and 
economies was given anywhere in the text. Though Nash briefly stated that counterfeit 
crafts denied Native artists “a much-needed source of income” and were a threat to “the 
standards of fine Indian craftsmanship and the very existence of true Indian handicrafts”, 
the main focus of the article was on harm to the consumer: “Moreover, the public is being 
cheated of dollars and cents and given a false idea of Indian arts and crafts.”88 In order to 
aid buyers, the article included a five point guide on identifying “authentic” goods, including 
purchasing only from reputable buyers, asking for the name and tribe of the artist, checking 
certifications or labels of authenticity and finally, consulting the Indian Arts and Crafts 
Board.  
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At no point did the article include commentary from a Native artist or tribal member, or 
suggest speaking to such a person. Authenticity, then, despite supposedly being rooted in 
tribal production, was not determined or defined by Native Americans. Indeed, the Indian 
Arts and Crafts Board employed no Native consultants or board members until 1942, and 
has been criticised by scholars for heavy-handed paternalism.89 The above article even 
claimed that some tribes cheated buyers: “Some Indians themselves are not above foisting-
off inferior products on a public anxious for Indian souvenirs.”90 Condemning Pueblo 
potters’ production of cheaper “low-grade” pottery “to meet a tourist demand for small 
curios”, this article did not present Native peoples as valid participants in a consumer 
economy. Buying guides like this homogenised Native arts and crafts, removing them from 
their indigenous cultural context and granting Euro-American elites control over their 
value.91 While recognising and encouraging a consumer interest in “Indian” artefacts, the 
article simultaneously marginalised Native people in favour of mainstream American 
buyers.  
Hence, this apparent interest in “Indian” products evidently did not extend to an 
interest in real Native experiences or histories. Starting in the late 1950s and continuing 
throughout the 1960s, the Times regularly and frequently printed articles commending 
mainstream Americans – particularly social elites – who integrated Native items into their 
homes and fashions.92 For instance, a 1967 article entitled ‘New Yorkers Dine on Legacies of 
the Indian, From Aztec to Zuni’ featured a prominent photograph of Mrs. Dockstader, the 
wife of the director of the Museum of the American Indian, wearing a “modified Pueblo” 
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dress and buttering “adobe bread” in a dining room decorated with Southwest Native 
textiles and a “Navajo wall hanging”.93 Framed by the wording of the title and including four 
recipes from the 1965 cookbook The Art of American Indian Cooking by Jean Anderson and 
Yeffe Kimball, the article demonstrated to readers how they could – quite literally – 
consume “Indianness” to affirm their elite socio-economic status. The article described the 
dinner parties held by Mrs Dockstader, “a trim, comely blonde”, as “one of the most 
unusual ‘occasional’ tables in Manhattan.” This line, coupled with the photograph and 
recipes, gave the impression that Native cultures were appealing due to their ‘exoticism’. 
The article appeared in the ‘Real Estate’ section of the paper, with a heavy focus on the 
ways in which Dockstader communicated her social standing through her domesticity. 
Dockstader was presented as an expert on Native cuisine, speaking of the typical diets of 
tribes across the continent: “There were the farming tribes such as those in New England, 
the Southwest and Southeast. […] Where they lived, corn and corn products such as meal 
and hominy were widely used. […] By contrast, the people who lived on the plains and 
plateaus were nomads.”94 Notably, she did not mention contemporary Native cuisine – 
rather, her use of the past tense presented American Indian cooking as a relic of the past, 
not as an active part of living communities. The article therefore distanced Native culinary 
culture from the mainstream, presenting it as not only ‘exotic’, but exclusively historical. 
However, the article also pointed out ways in which Native ingredients and cooking styles 
had influenced mainstream American fare: “The contribution of the Indian to the diet of the 
world has been extraordinary. […] the flavour of sage, which occurs so often in American 
stuffing for poultry, fish and meats, derives directly from early Indian cookery.”95 By 
emphasising this point, the article identified links between what were perceived to be 
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traditionally American and Native cultures, presenting these elements not as ‘exotic’, but as 
useful, having enriched the national diet. 
A dual tension can thus be identified in such articles, indicating that Native cultures 
were interesting due to their ‘exotic’ nature, but also presenting elements thereof as 
potentially contributing to an “American” national identity. This 1960s press phenomenon 
supports Jean and John Comaroff’s criticism of George Pierre Castile: Castile claimed that 
the colonial trade in ethnic objects extracted Native elements and refashioned them for a 
European audience, consolidating boundaries between the ‘savage’ and the ‘civilized’.96 The 
Comaroffs, rather, argue that consumer interest in the ethnic qualities of ‘Native’ products 
works to break down such simplistic distinctions.97 Indeed, though the 1960s interest in 
Native-inspired products grew from a fascination with ‘exotic’ or ‘primitive’ cultures, it was 
at its core integrationist, with consumers seeking ways in which to include “Indianness” into 
their mainstream lifestyles. Paradoxically, integrating aspects of Native culture into 
everyday American life would, however, transform them from ‘exotic’ to ordinary – a 
problem not recognised in press reporting on the matter. 
A 1968 Times article, ‘We’re Stealing from the Indians, Again’, reveals that the 
problematic nature of such adoption of “Indian” elements was, to an extent, addressed in 
the press. The title of the article is significant, referring humorously to the history of violent 
takeover of Native lands by the United States. The jocular tone persists in the text, 
describing stereotypically “Indian” summer fashions: “[…] fringed suede has invaded 
fashionable restaurants, and beach parties are awash with people whooping it up in beads, 
braids and buckskin.”98 It also included several large photographs of young Americans 
wearing feathers, headbands, fringed jackets, buckskin dresses and moccasins. While 
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presenting this as a global fashion trend, the article nevertheless identified its popularity as 
rooted in an American search for authenticity: “[…] Hong Kong is beading like mad, French 
ready-to-wear is cranking out fringed buckskin, Rome couture is pushing the Pocahantas 
[sic] look and American designers are gleefully embroidering on ‘their own’ heritage.”99 This 
article described a more widespread and popular movement than the elitist gatherings of 
Mrs Dockstader. Nevertheless, the non-Native trendsetters of both articles perceived 
Native cultures as both ‘exotic’ and strongly linked to what it was to be American.  
Unlike the 1967 article, however, ‘We’re Stealing from the Indians, Again’ was relatively 
critical of the “Indian” trend, stating there was “no very obvious relationship between the 
authentic antique Indian clothes on display and the fringed miniskirts and vests on sale”.100 
The article even sought Native comment on the matter, quoting artist Tom Two Arrows 
(though consistently terming his tribal affiliation “Onodaga” rather than Onondaga). Two 
Arrows was described via a pun as “pleased – with reservations” about the “Indian” fashion 
trend:  
“I don’t criticize because there are so many things to learn, but the average 
designer doesn’t know much about Indian heritage. […] Designers stick a little 
fringing here and a little fringing there. If they had knowledge of where the 
fringe should be placed, the amount and the fact that length represents great 
prestige and dignity in the tribe, then they would be doing a good job.”101 
Two Arrows evidently appreciated public interest in Native cultures, but wished non-Native 
designers were better informed. Indeed, this statement echoes, for instance, the Five 
Tribes Inter-Tribal Council’s calls for improving mainstream awareness of Native cultures.  











Unfortunately, this article did not prioritise Two Arrows’ criticisms, including them only 
at the very end of the text. This reflects the overall press trend of marginalising Native 
voices, even in discussions of their own cultures. Furthermore, such an inclusion of Native 
commentary on fashion trends was considerably rare, and the efforts of tribal councils to 
maintain their languages and cultures were largely ignored by the press. While Philip 
Deloria has claimed that the 1960s hobbyist movement’s search for authenticity in Native 
clothing and artefacts empowered real Indians to a limited degree, the creators of popular 
fashions and domestic commodities did not generally bother to consult the communities 
they emulated.102 This problem is equally prevalent today, as is demonstrated by the 
February 2015 controversy over a London-based fashion house allegedly copying the 
community-specific designs of Crow/Northern Cheyenne designer Bethany Yellowtail.103 
Deloria presents these mainstream adoptions of elements of “Indianness” as part of a 
pursuit of an American national identity, particularly at risk at times of uncertainty such as 
the Vietnam War, enduring Cold War, and Civil Rights struggles.104 However, while these 
insecurities may have cultivated an increased interest in “Indianness”, as the 1960s articles 
here examined show, the products marketed to the mainstream were those strictly seen as 
appropriate to an American lifestyle. Critically, as these items were being adopted by 
Americans into American homes, this trend did not contradict the continuing federal aim of 
Termination. Rather American youths and Mrs Dockstader alike, in adopting what they 
perceived as “Indian”, did not oppose federal withdrawal – and likely were not even aware 
of it. In essence, the idea of the American “melting pot” and supposed acceptance of 
cultural pluralism, instead of indicating support for tribal cultural revitalisation, marked an 
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American willingness to subsume specific Native traditions into a broader mainstream 
lifestyle, reducing culture to “heritage”.  
In this respect, the interest in Native commodities actually served Terminationist aims, 
both drawing attention to Native affairs and promoting a similar selective retention of 
elements of a “past heritage”. Considering these two trends together, that the Native 
population was considered outside of the general “American” mainstream, and that 
“Indian” products became popular among American consumers, reveals a concerning 
element of American perceptions of Native people – that some aspects of “Indian” cultures, 
when adopted by Euro-Americans, could be considered authentically American, but that 
living Native peoples themselves could play no part in shaping this national identity. 
 
4.3. Differing Understandings of ‘Americanness’  
 
In both tribal councils and in the press, Indians were not uniformly and unquestioningly 
categorised as ‘American’. While members of some tribes vocally expressed patriotic and 
pro-American views in light of Cold War political tensions, others struggled to be recognised 
even as human by surrounding Euro-Americans. Press reporting that was critical of 
Termination also failed to accept Native individuals and groups as fully ‘American’ on their 
own terms, instead integrating cultural aspects of “Indianness” deemed appropriate to 
mainstream society while delegitimising Native participation in this process. In order to gain 
a better understanding of why some Natives strongly identified as ‘American’ while the 
mainstream largely could not accept them as such, it is necessary to explore 
understandings of ‘Americanness’ within these two spheres. 
Scholarship on twentieth century Indian policy agrees that the Cold War produced a 





opposition to perceived Soviet ‘communalist’ living, ‘Americanness’ more than ever came 
to signify individualism.105 This intensified focus on the individual, as Philip Deloria has 
identified, existed in tension with the pervasive national belief that the United States was 
the ‘land of the free’ – freedom was defined only in terms of individuals, not 
communities.106 These tensions are evident in the manner in which government officials 
portrayed ‘Americanness’ to tribal councils in the Termination era. New Mexico District 
Judge Carl Hatch articulated this dual characteristic of ‘Americanness’ in a 1959 speech at 
the inauguration ceremony for new Navajo Tribal Council representatives:  
“It is only in countries where the people are free, where they are independent, 
where they are a part of the government itself that they are citizens, and that 
is the reason I like to use the word ‘citizen’. For here in America where we are 
all Americans, we are also free, independent individuals, and as it is a 
government of the people, by the people and for the people we are a part of 
the Government itself.”107 
Hatch’s definition of American nationality appeared to be remarkably inclusive, seemingly 
defined merely on the basis of residence in the country, yet he continuously emphasised 
the independence of individuals as an inherent aspect of this. Hatch furthermore praised 
the Navajo for emulating American democratic patterns in hosting their election for council 
officials, stating that the tribe was “acting in free elections as free, independent citizens of 
the United States of America.”108 
According to Hatch, becoming ‘American’ was essentially a simple process involving the 
freedom to participate in civic affairs. He furthermore emphasised that the purpose of 
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democratic processes was to promote individual interests. Klamath General Council 
proceedings in the few years leading up to HCR 108 shows that these conceptions of 
‘Americanness’ were embraced by certain factions within the tribe, causing tensions 
between those promoting ‘individual freedom’ and those working to maintain a tribal 
community. In 1950 Wade Crawford, the main Klamath proponent of Termination, objected 
to provisions in a draft tribal constitution for the Executive Committee to make emergency 
financial decisions without a meeting of the General Council. Crawford, drawing on the 
ideal of individual rights, claimed this move would lead to the loss of individual involvement 
in the government:  
“Why does Mr. Jackson or anybody else want to set up an executive 
committee to work under that kind of a government, when you never had 
chance to vote for it? And they tell you you are entitled to a voice in your 
affairs when you are denied it. And then tell you they are an American and to 
treat your fellow men right.”109 
The implication of Crawford’s statement is that the proposed Klamath Constitution was 
inherently ‘un-American’, limiting individual decision-making. In his view, compliance with 
American ideals and individual voting rights were paramount, and should be prioritised in 
tribal government dealings. Embedding his speech within a post-war context, Crawford 
then compared Klamath constitutional plans to contemporary dictatorships: 
“It’s a serious thing, I’ll tell you, its [sic] something our boys fought and died for 
in a foreign country. I’m not going to laugh it off and sit down and let this 
country fight and die for our right to vote for that’s exactly what Russia is doing 
and Germany is doing, and here we are practicing it on the reservation.”110 
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Crawford, like his fellow Klamath tribal member and Termination advocate Mrs Shelp, 
prioritised his identity as an ‘American’ over that as a Klamath Indian, criticising other 
Klamath leaders for supporting centralised forms of tribal government that he deemed 
incongruous with ‘American’ democracy. In this sense Crawford’s statements echoed the 
mainstream views of ‘Americanness’ propagated by Judge Hatch, and contrasted to the 
calls for preserving Klamath identity council representative Dibbon Cook expressed later 
that decade, as outlined in the previous chapter.  
Though Crawford drew on WWII imagery similar to that prevalent in Navajo Tribal 
Council discussions at the time, he employed these to challenge the legitimacy of the tribal 
government rather than just to express American patriotism. His statements, though 
reportedly met with applause, were criticised by the elected Council President Seldon Kirk, 
who noted that Crawford was himself on the Committee he so staunchly opposed. The 
council meeting furthermore appears to have been chaotic, with the stenographer noting 
that ‘everyone was talking’ and that Kirk had to ‘rap [his gavel] for order’.111 Clearly, 
Crawford’s views were contentious, though Kirk swiftly moved to discuss other issues, 
rather than inviting responses to Crawford’s claims. 
Some Native individuals, particularly those who later supported Termination, therefore 
subscribed to the predominant government view of inclusion in ‘American’ nationality as 
primarily hinging on ‘individual freedom’. Examining press presentations of Natives as 
‘American’, however, reveals that according to public discussions on the topic, more than 
just the right to vote was required for acceptance into the mainstream. Even “hard news” 
stories in broadsheets like the Post and Monitor often exhibited a sense of being ‘American’ 
as requiring a certain standard of living and lifestyle, incongruous with supposedly ‘squalid’ 
reservation life. Particularly in the late 1950s and 1960s, reports on relocation experiences 







and urban Indians presented Native Americans as capable of obtaining ‘modern lifestyles’. 
As a 1959 Monitor article by Indian affairs reporter Kimmis Hendrick detailed: “Of the 
450,000 Indians on tribal rolls, about 250,000 have become involved in the mainstream of 
American life […]. Some are pre-eminently successful in business or otherwise: 
characteristically all of them are modern Americans.”112  The article stated clearly that all 
Indians were “voting citizens”, but then claimed that only some were “modern Americans”. 
This implied that citizenship may have secured civic rights like electoral eligibility, but did 
not necessarily involve the adoption of an “American” lifestyle and cultural signifiers. 
The article nevertheless criticised Termination, stating Indians were “unprepared by 
education, experience, and aptitude to take on the responsibility” of their own 
administration.113  Yet in presenting financial success and urban living as necessary for 
inclusion in the American mainstream, journalists like Hendrick revealed an affinity with 
underlying Terminationist attitudes of Native Americans as not “full citizens”. Despite 
mounting press criticisms of the pace of Termination, the idea of being “American” 
continued to be used in similar ways in the 1960s, equating only “American” lifestyles with 
modernity. As a 1968 Post article quoted from President Johnson’s Message on Indian 
Affairs: “Indians should take part in modern American life ‘with a full share’ of economic 
opportunity and social justice.”114  Though this statement shows a development away from 
more simplistic Terminationist conceptions of severing trust status as the solution to all 
Native problems, it nevertheless shares in the belief that becoming a “modern American” 
should be the ultimate goal for all indigenous people and implied that this had not yet been 
achieved. 
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The press generally presented conforming to specific lifestyles and patterns as 
requirements for participating in “American” society – legal citizenship alone was 
insufficient. If Native Americans managed to conform to certain critical material aspects, 
could they then be accepted as fully American? A Monitor report on a 1959 Southwest 
Indian Youth Council meeting seems initially to indicate that this was possible: “Crew cuts, 
flattops, pixie bobs, permanents. Business suits, slacks, and cotton dresses. This was a 
meeting of Americans; but they were 250 boys, girls, men, and women from 54 different 
tribes of American Indians.”115 “Americanness” is thus here denoted by commodities and 
fashion trends, conforming to specific hairstyles or clothing. The article even contained two 
photographs of young Natives in Euro-American formal attire, including a headshot of the 
Southwest Indian Youth Council President Melvin Thom dressed in a suit and tie, smiling 
broadly.116 Another image showed five young Native men and women laughing together, 
the accompanying caption describing  them as “modern young Indians.”117 These images 
together starkly contradict the prevalent stereotype of Natives as “stoic” and 
“emotionless”.118 
However, the article also included images of young Natives dressed in tribal regalia and 
engaged in powwow dances. This presentation of a group of Native youth as both modern 
Americans and active members of their tribal communities was exceptional for press 
reporting in the Termination period. The balancing of the two within one article was 
achieved through extensively interviewing participants at the meeting, with journalist Betty 
Williams including long quotes of Native individuals, like Joe Louis Jimenez (Nambe Pueblo): 
“What is our culture? […] I speak the language. I can dance from here to Doomsday and 
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they can’t take that away from me!”119  Yet despite bringing out the voices of capable, 
motivated young Native activists, it is significant that Williams only referred to them as 
“American” when describing their clothing, otherwise referring to them as “Indians” or as 
members of specific tribes. While supposedly “Indian” fashions could be adopted by 
mainstream Americans, a young Native man could only be considered “American” if he 
conformed to specific modes of dress.  
Interestingly, there are significant parallels to be drawn between these conceptions of 
material ‘Americanness’ in the press and discussions of identity in some tribal council 
meetings. In May 1953, Navajo council representative Frank Bradley objected to criticisms 
of how council members dressed at meetings:  
“The Navajo people have lived for years and years and under conditions which 
shows that we have not all gone American. We do not pretend to be 
Americans yet regarding the American way of living. The conditions that we 
are living under does [sic] not require that yet.”120  
Bradley then highlighted poor sanitation conditions, with children carrying water for miles, 
as an explanation for why Euro-American dress standards should not be applied to the 
Navajo: “We have water for sanitation, yes, but it does not exist on the Reservation yet. 
The majority of the Navajos do not shave to start with so why should we criticize one 
another on that point? It is not reasonable. I do not see it. We have not gotten that far 
yet.”121  
At a superficial glance, Bradley’s speech could be interpreted as support for assimilation, 
implying that the Navajo should aim to comply with conventions like shaving at a later date. 
However, Bradley made it unequivocally clear that he found appearances a trivial matter: 
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“It is the knowledge that the person has up in his head that counts, so why say that we are 
going to change our people overnight and cause our people to dress like a white man or 
anything like that. It is the knowledge that these Navajos have that counts.”122 In referring 
to the need to ‘go American’, Bradley was emphasising improving living standards in terms 
of water, sanitation and transport – not the “suits, slacks and cotton dresses” referred to in 
the 1959 Monitor article. While ‘Americanness’ in both cases was defined in terms of 
commodities, it is clear that Bradley’s interpretation of which material goods signified 
‘Americanness’ was far more relevant to the concerns of the Navajo Tribal Council than 
mere matters of appearance.  
This contrast demonstrates that mainstream conceptions of Native ‘Americanness’ and 
indigenous views of what it was to be ‘American’ could diverge in significant ways. Whether 
defined geographically, economically or culturally, Natives were not granted space to 
participate in shaping the idea of what it was to “be American”. Mid-twentieth century 
press writing showed little awareness of this irony of federal officials claiming to support 
‘freedom’ while coercing legislation onto Native American communities. A 1952 Times 
article presented a rare exception, quoting attorney Felix Cohen’s statement that federal 
Indian policy and regulations under Commissioner Myer were "an unprecedented invasion 
of American principles.”123  
Similarly, in a 1950 letter to the Post, John Collier claimed that some government 
officials believed Indians “must be forced into an ‘assimilation’ program to dissolve their 
tribes and tribal organizations, to forfeit their rights as Indians, and to conform […] to the 
Congress’ preconceived notions of what kind of American citizens the Indians ought to 




 The article did not explicitly taking a stand either for or against Cohen. However, the article 
allowed Myer considerable space in countering the attorney’s claims and ended in a quote from a 
Republican congressman calling Cohen ‘unfit to represent Indians’. ‘U.S. Laws on Indian Called Un-





be.”124  Collier portrayed a willingness to accept and appreciate cultural pluralism within 
American society, along with the freedom of Native peoples to choose their own identity. 
However, only non-Native Indian rights activists like Collier and Cohen gained ground in the 
early 1950s press, both in opposing Termination and in challenging mainstream hegemonic 
conceptions of ‘Americanness’. Furthermore, it is important to note that Collier and his 
New Deal policies had been heavily criticised by some tribes for being paternalistic, for 
instance imposing much-hated livestock reduction on the Navajo despite widespread 
protest.125 Collier’s history of coercive tactics indicates that non-Native individuals like him 
were inappropriate advocates for Native rights.126 
Only in the wake of late 1960s and early 1970s Red Power activism did a Native 
challenge to mainstream conceptions of “Americanness” appear in the press. In a rare 
display of attention to Native affairs, TIME printed a several page spread on the Occupation 
of Alcatraz entitled ‘The Angry American Indian: Starting Down the Protest Trail’. The article 
concluded with a long quote by an unnamed “militant” Indian: 
“You will forgive me if I tell you that my people were Americans for thousands 
of years before your people were. The question is not how you can 
Americanize us but how we can Americanize you. The first thing we want to 
teach you is that, in the American way of life, each man has respect for his 
brother’s vision. Because each of us respected his brother’s dream, we enjoyed 
freedom here while your people were busy killing and enslaving one another 
across the water.”127 
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Scholarship has demonstrated that attracting media attention was a significant aim for 
young Native occupiers of Alcatraz.128 The above quote serves as evidence of the Red 
Power movement’s success in achieving this aim, but their inability to fully control their 
media image. While it is possible that the unnamed speaker here chose to speak in terms 
fitting with the “noble savage” image, performing the “Indianness” expected by journalists 
in order to secure coverage of his statement, the strange speech patterns here could also 
be the result of liberties taken by the TIME editorial team. Regardless of whether the 
romanticised nature of this quote was a product of the speaker’s performance or the 
journalists’ editing, the article propagated an ‘exoticised’ Native figure, drawing subtly on 
prevailing ‘noble savage’ imagery.  
As Smith and Warrior have shown, this increased attention to Native activism in the 
media had little lasting effect on old stereotypes, an argument supported by the imagery of 
this TIME article.129 Nonetheless, it presented a strong challenge to mainstream control 
over the term ‘American’.  While this was linked to Native precedence on the land, unlike 
earlier articles speaking of ‘First Americans’, an Indian interpretation was here offered. As 
such, the indigenous population was presented as not merely qualifying for 
“Americanness”, but defining it. In stating that Natives had been more “free” before 
colonial contact, this Native activist challenged the idea of “Americanness” as representing 




During the Termination era, press depictions of ‘Americanness’ largely centred on ideas 
of ‘freedom’ resembling official government rhetoric. Even reporting recognising Native 
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American precedence on the continent ultimately saw this as only opening up the 
opportunity for indigenous individuals to enter into the mainstream through assimilation. 
The press also exhibited a public willingness to adopt select, often invented, “Indian” 
traditions into mainstream fashions, in an effort to create a more legitimate, “American” 
identity. While apparently inclusive, this practice of adapting “Indian” fashions and crafts 
items into homes, was totally controlled by Euro-American consumers and social elites. 
Mainstream “Americans” could integrate stereotypic aspects of “Indian” cultures into their 
own lives to affirm their identity as “American”, but Native individuals expressing their own 
tribal cultures were consistently presented as distinctly “Other”. However, many Natives 
saw themselves as ‘American’ regardless – whether supporting Termination or not. The 
press generally suppressed Native voices and understandings of ‘Americanness’ that 
challenged mainstream beliefs about the nation. Only in the late 1960s, particularly as a 
result of increased militant activism, did some Native voices break into news media, 
challenging both Termination policy and definitions of ‘Americanness’. 
Native individuals and groups demonstrated a clear awareness of the importance of 
‘Americanness’ throughout the Termination period, as the Cold War atmosphere and New 
Deal backlash limited tolerance for cultural pluralism particularly among Congressional 
circles. Self-identification as ‘American’, as well as what it meant to be an ‘American’, 
nevertheless varied. Mississippi Choctaw tribal members, for instance, faced with long-
standing racism, had to fight for the recognition of their basic human rights of respect and 
fair treatment. This did not lend space for discussions over whether the tribal members 
should be considered ‘American’ or not. On the other hand, Navajo tribal members – 
though also largely living in subpar conditions – referred to their deep involvement in WWII 
to foreground their identification of ‘American’. For tribal members, identity was not simply 
tied to their legal citizenship status, nor their supposed levels of ‘acculturation’. Rather it 





Native communities and individuals felt included within society. The Navajo were clearly 
well-known as the largest tribe in the country, and gained further media attention in the 
late 1940s famines and blizzards. The Mississippi Choctaw, in contrast, were little known on 
a national scale. 
Interactions with mainstream society also fuelled the self-identification of pro-
Terminationist Native individuals, most of whom were financially successful and/or lived 
away from tribal lands. These individuals identified themselves as primarily American, and 
saw inclusion within mainstream society as the key to Native stability and development. 
This identification as ‘American’ certainly explains why individuals like Crawford and Belvin 
supported Termination, as they presented their Indian identity as secondary, resembling 
Senator Watkins’ claims that pride in being Native could be retained at the level of an 
“ancestral heritage”.130 Native supporters of Termination may also have seen the policy as a 
method of consolidating their political standing or economic position. Belvin, for instance, 
may have supported federal withdrawal mainly to secure his good relations with the federal 
government, as he reversed his position in the early 1970s. In the aftermath of the 
Termination controversy, Belvin supported tribal revitalisation and was even popularly re-
elected Choctaw Principal Chief in 1971.131 
However, as Navajo Frank Bradley’s comments show, becoming ‘American’ could also 
denote gaining higher standards of living, sanitation, education, and infrastructure. Native 
voices in the 1960s press furthermore challenged hegemonic views of ‘Americanness’, 
calling for the recognition of Native contributions to a national identity, whilst maintaining 
respect for the variety of their Indian traditions. The mainstream unfortunately failed to 
incorporate these meanings into the larger framework of what it was to be ‘American’. 
Underlining difference whilst maintaining the importance of development toward 
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conformity with wider society, there was no chance of genuine public acceptance of 





Chapter Five: Recognition of and Limitations to Native 
American Citizenship 
 
Early 1950s debates surrounding Termination legislation focused largely on the trust 
status of Native tribes and the pace at which this should be withdrawn. Throughout these 
discussions, both before and after official legislation was passed in 1953, the aim of federal 
policy was clear: to make American Indians “full citizens”. This chapter will examine how 
discussions surrounding the concepts of Native “citizenship” and their legal status evolved 
throughout the Termination period. As already established, the federal rhetoric of 
Termination was vague, leaving space for multiple interpretations of ‘being American’. The 
first paragraph of HCR 108 speaks volumes of the Congressional interpretation of Native 
legal status in 1953, seeing as it aimed to “end their status as wards of the United States, 
and to grant them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship.”1 
This implied that in the eyes of Congress, Native Americans were unequivocally still wards 
of the federal government, not on a footing of ‘equal’ citizenship with the rest of the 
country – and that this status was holding them back, precluding their “rights” as 
mainstream citizens.  
HCR 108 made no mention of the fact that all Native Americans were already U.S. 
citizens according to the 1924 Citizenship Act. The Act, though granting all Indians born 
within the United States citizenship status, specifically stated that it did not infringe on the 
tribal rights of Native individuals and groups. Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford Lytle have claimed 
that the act introduced a sort of dual citizenship, “which is not hindered in either respect: 
Indians are not to lose civil rights because of their status as members of a tribe, and 
members of a tribe are not to be denied their tribal rights because of their American 
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citizenship.”2 This reading of the Act allows for continued Indian identity alongside the 
acceptance of American citizenship – or even a dual citizenship of Native individuals, 
belonging both to the American nation and their sovereign tribal community. 
However, though Deloria and Lytle claim it provided “full citizenship”, the 1924 Act 
neither contained this wording nor defined exactly what citizenship entailed. Instead the 
Act focused primarily on issues of voter registration and electoral requirements, and made 
no mention of wardship in any shape or form, meaning the federal government retained its 
position of responsibility toward tribes as guaranteed by nineteenth century treaties.3 
Furthermore, in practice the Act did not secure equality for American Indians, as Arizona 
and New Mexico continued to legally restrict indigenous voting until 1948.4 Discriminatory 
laws also persisted throughout the first half of the twentieth century; for example, an 1802 
law banning Indian alcohol use and state regulations against interracial marriages in Oregon 
were only lifted in the early 1950s.5 While Deloria and Lytle’s assessment of the Citizenship 
Act holds in theory, in practice Native individuals were systematically denied some 
constitutional citizenship rights.  
The Citizenship Act, as such, established a sort of “differentiated citizenship” – to use 
Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman’s term – creating a space for American Indians that was 
different in nature to that enjoyed by the mainstream population.6 Both the Act and HCR 
108 remained ambiguous about what exactly “citizenship” meant. Citizenship is a much 
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contested and debated concept in political philosophy, but equally a term largely taken for 
granted in public discourse.7 Though the average person may have strong feelings about 
what citizenship means to them, it is not something often clearly defined in media 
commentary. Public policy expert William Galston claims that the core values of citizenship 
in liberal society include general, social, economic and political virtues, but he recognises 
that these depend on individual interpretation and the socio-cultural context of a 
community.8 What “citizenship” grants and what is required of “citizens” can be defined in 
multiple ways, and – like perceptions of what it meant to be “American” – these ideas have 
evolved throughout the twentieth century United States.  
The concept of specifically Native American citizenship is little discussed or understood 
in U.S. political discourse to this day, indicating that different types of citizenship are not 
generally conceived of or accepted as valid. For instance, while sociologist Michael 
Schudson’s The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life includes an extensive analysis 
of the implications of the Civil Rights movement on conceptions of American citizenship, it 
barely mentions Native Americans – let alone the Indian Citizenship Act.9 As the Act has 
been largely forgotten or omitted from the historiography of American civic life, in what 
ways was Native citizenship conceptualised in the Termination period? This chapter will 
show that a general consensus existed both within tribal councils, federal circles and the 
mainstream public that Native Americans were not equal citizens, but interpretations of 
why “full citizenship” had not been conferred varied to a great extent. 
HCR 108, in calling for Natives to have all the “rights” of American citizenship, did 
address real concerns about the social and legal position of the indigenous population, 
                                                          
7
 Kymlicka and Norman outline the developments of political theories of citizenship in the twentieth 
century, particularly pertaining to minority rights, see: Ibid., pp. 1-9. 
8
 Ibid., p. 11. 
9





shared by members of Congress, tribes and the wider public. Indisputably, the living 
standards of the average Native community were far below those of most Euro-
Americans.10 But in what ways did the understandings of citizenship differ between these 
majority and minority groups? This chapter will focus on three key points of discussion in 
relation to the “full citizenship” Termination called for: “wardship” in the press; tribal 
conceptions of limitations to “citizenship”; and growing discussions of “dual citizenship”. By 
examining these areas separately, we can see how tribal and mainstream understandings of 
“citizenship” differed, how the justifications for Termination were constructed, and how 
these all developed throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
5.1. “Citizen-wards” in the press 
 
Examining Termination era public discussions surrounding Indian affairs demonstrates 
that federal rhetoric of Indians as not “full citizens” was generally accepted. In part, this 
was due to a persistent belief that the Native population had never been granted legal 
citizenship, showing a lack of awareness of the 1924 Citizenship Act. It was not uncommon 
for reporters in the 1950s and 1960s to use the term “citizen” to differentiate mainstream 
Americans from “Indians”.11 For instance, a 1961 New York Times editorial on the Twenty-
Third Amendment’s extension of the right to vote in presidential elections to District of 
Columbia residents, grouped together “Indians on reservations” and “unnaturalised 
foreigners” as non-citizens who could not vote.12 This implication was false, because the 
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Citizenship Act had provided legal citizenship and all discriminatory state electoral laws 
against Natives had been eradicated by this point.13 While in practice some barriers to 
Native voting remained, as will be discussed later in this chapter, the Times journalist’s 
generalised comment reflected ignorance about Indian legal status. 
In some cases even writing explicitly on Indian Affairs failed to portray accurately their 
legal position, as demonstrated by a January 1951 letter to the editor of the Washington 
Post by a member of the AAIA. The letter opposed Myer’s proposition to require the 
Commissioner’s approval for all tribal legal contracts, asserting that such measure would 
restrict the “constitutional rights” of American Indians. However, the piece showed no 
awareness of the 1924 Citizenship Act, instead stating that: “The association maintains, for 
example, that the obsolete 1872 law on which the Commissioner bases his authority does 
not apply to Indians who are citizens, as virtually all American Indians now are […].”14 
Despite AAIA members being considered authorities on Indian affairs, little understanding 
of the real legal status of Native peoples was displayed here; all Native Americans were 
certainly legally citizens after 1924, not just “virtually all”. It seems unlikely that the writer 
was aware of the Citizenship Act, calling into question his grasp of Indian affairs despite 
being the AAIA Secretary. 
However, while such factually inaccurate depictions of Natives as non-citizens did 
appear in the press throughout the period, more commonly American Indians were 
presented as having a limited, lesser citizenship. For instance, in announcing the 
appointment of Emmons as BIA Commissioner in July 1953, TIME stated: “As commissioner, 
said Emmons, he will aim to ‘liquidate the trusteeship of the Indians as quickly as possible’, 
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and make them self-supporting citizens.”15 The implication is clear that trusteeship was 
incompatible with complete citizenship, making Indians dependents. Leaving no space for 
explanation as to how trusteeship would be liquidated, this comment moreover indicated 
that by cutting ties between the government and tribes and eliminating any special legal 
relationship between the two, Natives would somehow just become “free” and 
“independent”. The idea of citizenship’s transformative nature had already been 
established in the assimilation period particularly through the 1887 Dawes Act, which 
divided communally held tribal lands amongst individual families and conferred citizenship 
upon those who accepted their allotments.16 This theory had however already been 
repudiated at length in the 1928 Meriam Report, stating for instance that “citizenship and 
continued guardianship are not incompatible”.17 Emmons’ statements, as such, reveal a 
startling persistence of discredited assimilationist ideology. 
Indeed, throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, the press predominantly described 
Natives as ‘wards’ of the government, and trust status was presented as the main inhibitor 
of equal Native citizenship.18 Throughout the four news outlets here examined, only two 
articles were printed between the years of 1947 and 1970 challenging the incompatibility of 
citizenship and trusteeship. In June 1951, the Post printed a letter to the editor by John 
Collier, responding to the paper’s claims that Sac and Fox athlete Jim Thorpe was a “ward” 
and not a U.S. citizen. Specifically mentioning the Citizenship Act, the letter stated:  
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 “For, since 1924, all Indians born in the United States, who had not previously 
become naturalized by treaty or statute […] were made full citizens by an Act 
of Congress. […] Nor does wardship, as the reported statement of the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs implies, deprive Indians either of citizenship, or the rights 
incident thereto. Citizenship is a personal status whereas “wardship” (really a 
misnomer) refers to the fact that the United States has treaty obligations to 
render certain services to Indians with respect to the administration of Indians’ 
trust and restricted property. Wardship, as many court decisions have held, is 
not incompatible with citizenship.”19 
This letter is significant in that it detailed the legal realities of Native status in the United 
States, objecting to the idea  that the trust status – or “wardship” as it was more commonly 
referred to – precluded citizenship. 
Oliver La Farge depicted Native legal status similarly in an April 1950 essay he penned 
for the Sunday Magazine edition of the Times. After describing the 1924 Citizenship Act, La 
Farge challenged popular perceptions that wardship meant total dependence on the 
federal government:  
“This term [ward] as used in Indian law has a quite different meaning from its 
usual one. Indians have the vote, they are free to go and come, to buy and sell, 
and to engage in any enterprises they may choose – at least as far as their legal 
status is concerned. As wards, the property reserved to them by the United 
States in recognition of their status as aborigines is held in trust for them by 
the Federal Government and is exempt from taxation or alienation. […] 
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Wardship is thus more of an advantage than a handicap to the average 
Indian.”20 
Both La Farge and Collier, therefore, presented Native legal status in nuanced and accurate 
ways, challenging federal rhetoric and press depictions of wardship as limiting. While both 
writers more-or-less accepted the use of the term “wardship” in this context, they 
recognised the importance of special Native status and did not see this as precluding 
citizenship, even presenting it in a positive light as beneficial to American Indians.  
These two articles are virtually the only examples throughout the 1950s and 1960s press 
to present a legally accurate view of Native trust status and citizenship. La Farge and 
Collier’s reactions to general press writing highlights a prevalent belief among the 
mainstream public, and a central tenet of Terminationist thinking -  that there was only one 
possible type of citizenship. Modern political theorists, like Jacob Levy, recognise that 
indigenous “differentiated citizenship” can cause members of mainstream society to view 
themselves as disadvantaged in comparison to the special rights allowed a Native 
population.21 Terminationists like Emmons took this view to the extreme of casting Native 
special services as precluding U.S. citizenship.  
Nevertheless, instead of explicitly arguing that special services for the Native population 
disadvantaged Euro-Americans, federal officials – particularly in the years leading up to the 
passing of Termination legislation – presented wardship as inherently negative and 
incompatible with citizenship. Such reporting on Indian citizenship was most common in 
the lead up to the passage of HCR 108 and PL 280. Notably, in April 1953, the Times ran a 
short United Press International newswire consisting almost entirely of quotes from 
                                                          
20
 Oliver La Farge, ‘Not an Indian, But a White-Man Problem’, NYT, 30 April 1950, p. SM4. 
21
 Jacob Levy, ‘Three Modes of Incorporating Indigenous Law’, in W. Kymlicka and W. Norman (eds.), 





Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay. Titled ‘Indian Citizenship Urged’, the report 
described McKay’s speech on an NBC television program: “Douglas McKay, Secretary of the 
Interior, said today that he was ‘not in sympathy’ with present Federal policies on Indians’ 
affairs and called for full citizenship for all members of that race.”22 This statement suggests 
that McKay did not view Natives as “full” citizens, an impression supported by the subtitle, 
‘Secretary McKay Opposes Ward System of Government’. This title communicated the 
message that the trust status relationship between tribes and the federal government was 
inhibiting Native citizenship. Indeed, McKay was a staunch Terminationist; not only did he 
express the Interior Department’s support for HCR 108 before it was passed, but he actively 
advocated for the Termination of the Siletz and Grand Ronde tribes in Western Oregon, his 
home state.23 
Interestingly, according to the UPI newswire, McKay referred to “present Federal 
policies”, but did not specify what those were. It is likely he was referring to the Indian New 
Deal, which was rarely referenced in the press, though staunchly criticised in Congressional 
circles. Indeed, a 1943 Senate Subcommittee on Indian Affairs report explicitly blamed the 
New Deal for creating tribal communes of ‘perpetual wardship’.24 Though this report was 
completed ten years prior to McKay’s appointment as Secretary, the influence of such 
thinking on his perceptions of Indian affairs is undeniable. In the Times article McKay went 
on to clarify his views on wardship by stating: “Any time anybody lives as a ward of the 
Government, they are of no value.”25 Unfortunately, despite this blatantly negative 
statement, the newswire did not specify what McKay saw as limiting about ‘wardship’ 
status in practice. Rather, McKay appeared to be opposed to trust status out of principle, 
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implying that Indians were of no “value” to American society due to the nature of the 
federal-tribal relationship. As previous chapters have demonstrated, in practice federal 
paternalism did indeed cause major practical issues for tribes, with reservation 
superintendents and other BIA staff controlling their affairs. However, this article did not 
discuss any of these issues, rather focusing on the special legal arrangement between tribes 
and the government as the problem, preventing “equal” citizenship. 
Indeed, debates surrounding Indian “wardship” generally overlooked problems of 
paternalism. This is evident in a January 1947 article featured on the front page of the Post. 
Reporting on the Senate Civil Service Committee’s sessions on Indian Affairs, the article 
quoted committee chairman William Langer (R-North Dakota) at length: “As a start, Langer 
suggested wiping out the Office of Indian Affairs and treating its 236,000 Indian wards ‘like 
white people’.”26 This statement was an obvious indictment of the separate status of 
Natives in relation to the federal government. Later in the article Acting BIA Commissioner 
William Zimmerman’s statement that Indians were “now citizens” was paraphrased, 
mentioning that their “long-standing treaties” were still valid. However, this was only 
included on page two of the Post and clearly presented as Zimmerman’s personal view 
rather than a generally accepted definition.27 The article thus displayed a possible bias 
toward Lang by prioritising his statements and quoting him at length. Furthermore, Lang’s 
reasons for criticising wardship were brought to the fore, including his statement that the 
purpose of the hearings was “cutting down personnel [and] to recommend consolidation or 
even abolishment of departments if we feel it is necessary for efficiency and economy.”28 
This statement reveals a potential ulterior motive for Termination – cutting costs. 
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Trusteeship was thus presented as unjustifiable, maintaining special treatment of Indian 
“wards”, but also fostering economic inefficiency and wasting federal funds. 
As the growing literature of tribal Termination case studies has effectively 
demonstrated, 1950s and early 1960s removals of federal trust status not only 
impoverished tribes but failed to cut federal costs. For example, rather than reducing 
expenditure, the Interior Department and state of Wisconsin spent two million dollars per 
year in running Menominee County after Menominee Termination in 1961 – more than had 
been spent on the administration of the tribe under trust status.29 It is unclear how widely 
these problems were known in federal circles in the years immediately following the first 
Terminations, but such issues did not evidently alter the public rhetoric and debates 
surrounding Native citizenship in the 1960s press – news writing continued to refer to 
Natives as “second-class citizens”, “wards” or needing “full citizenship”.30 For instance, a 
December 1964 Post article titled ‘Indians May Get Push Toward Citizen Rank’ continued 
the trend of relying on federal authority figures for commentary on Indian affairs.31 The 
report covered Senate Judiciary subcommittee hearings on criminal jurisdiction issues on 
reservations, but focused largely on describing the efforts of Senator Lee Metcalf (D-
Montana) rather than the Native individuals who gave testimony: “Sen. Lee Metcalf […] 
who has been sponsoring Indian legislation for more than a decade, is considering several 
bills aimed at continuing the slow process of assimilating Indians in the general 
population.”32 As the headline mentioned Indians getting a “push toward citizen rank”, it 
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seems that the journalist here considered assimilation a requirement for achieving what he 
describes as “full citizenship”.  
The language of this 1964 article, thus, did not substantially differ from 1950s rhetoric 
about Indian citizenship. Natives continued to be presented as ‘lesser’ citizens, even 
implying that this was due to their unwillingness to assimilate by describing them as “long 
suspicious of white men and changes”.33 The only difference was in timing – while early 
1950s articles referred to abolishing the trust relationship ‘as quickly as possible’, here a 
“gradual transfer of functions from the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs […] to other 
agencies” was advocated.34 Rhetoric on Indian policy only largely diverged on issues of 
timing – not on the core idea of removing special services and trust status as the only 
method of ‘elevating’ Indians to ‘full citizenship’. 
 Significantly, while the press presented Senator Metcalf’s ideas in ways very similar to 
those of moderate Terminationists like Emmons, Metcalf in fact was an opponent of the 
fast-paced removal of tribal trust status. In the late 1950s, Metcalf campaigned against 
Termination in Senate, calling it an attempt to “dispose of the ‘Indian problem’ by sweeping 
it under the rug”.35 Not only did this article fail to pay attention to the Native speakers at 
the meeting reported on, it eliminated nuances in political approaches by focusing on 
vague areas of assimilationist rhetoric. Metcalf’s comments on improved hospital services, 
housing and industrial training are mentioned later in the article, but the references to 
assimilation and “full citizenship” are prioritised, placed in the opening paragraph. 
Similarly, even the few articles explicitly opposing Termination often referred to Natives 
as not “full citizens”. A 1961 Times article recounted criticisms for Termination expressed in 











a report commissioned by the Fund for the Republic, titled A Program for Indian Citizens. 
Diverging somewhat from early 1950s writing on Indian policy, this piece focused largely on 
the figure of W.W. Keeler, the only Indian appointed to the commission that conducted the 
four year study. Just like the 1968 Times profile article on Keeler mentioned in Chapter 
Three, this piece portrayed Keeler as an exceptional Native individual rather than the norm; 
he was described as “vice president of the Phillips Petroleum Company and a principal chief 
of the Cherokee Indians” as well as “a special consultant to the Secretary of the Interior on 
reorganizing the Bureau of Indian Affairs”.36 Notably, Keeler’s role as the oil company vice 
president was mentioned first, prioritised over his chairmanship of the Cherokee tribe – this 
implied some level of successful economic assimilation into the American mainstream. 
Nevertheless, Keeler was quoted as strongly opposing federal Termination policy, stating: 
“termination has been a retarding influence on the Indian people”.37 
However, in defining Termination, the article stated it was “a policy designed to remove 
the Indians as wards of the Federal Government […] instituted in 1953 by the Eisenhower 
Administration, which wanted to make Indians full citizens.”38 The idea of Natives as 
‘wards’, and thus not ‘full citizens’, was fully accepted here. Despite the strongly negative 
comments made about Termination policy, its central ideology was not questioned – 
rather, the problems with Termination were presented as practical ones: Termination had 
apparently been conducted in a “hasty manner” and caused the “abandonment by the 
Federal Government of educational, medical and road building and other services without 
first establishing other sources of support for such services.”39 According to this article, the 
1961 report did not actually object to the goals of Termination, just the methods employed 
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by the government. The Times article was accurate in this respect – though A Program for 
Indian Citizens in its title referred to Indians as ‘citizens’, the report itself did not object to 
assimilation or call for an end to Termination, rather pushing  for greater Indian 
participation in planning economic development in preparation for ending tribal trust 
status.40 The report, thus, mirrored the criticisms of federal policy presented in the 1928 
Meriam Report which, despite denying that “wardship” limited “citizenship”, upheld the 
federal goal of ultimate assimilation, declaring that “Eventually all Indians in the United 
States will be assimilated into our social, economic, and political life […].”41  
The lack of change in discussions of Native citizenship in the Termination period thus 
demonstrates the hegemony of the belief in assimilation, and unresolved tensions within 
Indian affairs. The same debates over Native citizenship and “wardship” that had been 
prominent at the turn-of-the-century resurfaced in the 1950s. This tenet of Terminationist 
ideology, that trust status was inherently a problem, did not require justification. The 
relationship between tribes and the federal government was undeniably problematic, but 
the fixation on “full citizenship” in public discussions obscured alternate solutions to 
paternalistic practices. Non-Native Indian rights activists like Collier and La Farge opposed 
the view that “wardship” was inherently damaging, but the idea of a “differentiated 
citizenship” did not catch on in public discussions over Indian affairs.  Native Americans 
themselves, furthermore, were largely absent in these discussions, or appeared as a 
voiceless, “suspicious” mass, resistant to the inevitable, transformative force of assimilation 
into the American mainstream.  
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5.2. Discussions of American citizenship at tribal council meetings 
 
As these press debates thus demonstrate, in mainstream public rhetoric the concept of 
Native citizenship was usually inextricable from discussions of “wardship”. But to what 
extent did those national Indian affairs debates reflect the concerns of Native individuals 
and groups? Interestingly, very little mention of “wards” or “wardship” was found in the 
minutes of the tribal councils here examined. The only clear discussion of such a 
relationship in the formative years of Termination policy occurred at a December 1949 
Klamath Business Committee and Tribal Special Member Committee meeting with Acting 
BIA Commissioner William Zimmerman. This question was raised due to the unique 
problems tribal members were experiencing with their superintendent, Raymond Bitney, as 
discussed in Chapter Three. In this meeting, tribal members complained to Zimmerman that 
Bitney disrespected them. Klamath Joe Ball even claimed that Bitney had declared himself 
his “legal guardian”.42  
Tribal members requested that Zimmerman comment on these accusations. In apparent 
contrast to Bitney, Zimmerman stated:  
“I have often argued actually the relationship between the Indians and the 
government is that of a trustee rather than a guardian. Mr. Bitney has no 
responsibility of the persons of the individual Indians as a guardian would have 
if appointed in a state court. Neither Mr. Bitney nor I have any power to seize 
an individual Indian and hold him under restraint, as a guardian would have 
power to do.”43 
                                                          
42
 Klamath Tribal Special Member Committee and Business Committee (8 and 12-13 December 







Zimmerman did not refer to Indians as wards. However, seeing as a guardian is the legal 
counterpart to a ward, Zimmerman did contest the definition of the federal-Native 
relationship as wardship. Rather, in speaking to Klamath leaders, he specifically referred to 
this dynamic as a “trust” relationship.  
However, Zimmerman did not present his own view as the unequivocal truth. Instead he 
stated that he had “often argued” for that interpretation, meaning he recognised that 
multiple understandings of Indian legal status coexisted. Despite the prevalence of the 
concept of “wardship” in discussions of Native citizenship in the press, that Zimmerman 
was questioned on this subject demonstrates that Klamath tribal council members did not 
necessarily see themselves as wards – or at least, did not view their reservation 
superintendent as their legal guardian. 
Speeches at the same meeting reveal that though they may not have labelled 
themselves “wards”, Klamath tribal members did not see themselves as “full” or “equal” 
citizens either. For instance, before the above exchange between Ball and Zimmerman, 
President Seldon Kirk spoke about the problem of inequality: “Now we are citizens the 
white men make quite a joke of it – the black white man ready to take up responsibility. […] 
When do we become citizens? When is that time coming? What else must we do?”44 Kirk 
referred to Indians as both citizens and not. This indicates that while he probably 
recognised that Natives were legally citizens, they were not fully equal to the mainstream 
public. He expressed this by comparing the Native situation to discrimination against 
African Americans, indicating a frustration with discrimination and the lack of Klamath 
control over their own affairs. In this respect, Kirk’s views seem similar to those exhibited in 
the mainstream press, indicating that legal citizenship was insufficient in guaranteeing 







Natives rights as citizens. However, Kirk’s statement both used the language of “citizenship” 
as limited and challenged the federal view that assimilation was required, by speaking of 
Indians as able to handle their own affairs:  “The Indian a long time ago had no education, 
knew nothing whatever of civilization, but he was taking care of himself, feeding himself. 
He was competent. […] How long do we have to go, how long are we going to be under the 
protection of the United States government.”45 In this sense, Kirk turned the language of 
limited citizenship to his own devices, criticising federal paternalism but also prioritising 
Native ability. 
Later at the same meeting, a draft bill which would have allowed individual members to 
withdraw from the tribe was discussed. These deliberations demonstrate that in the late 
1940s there was evidently a strong push from some tribal members to be allowed to leave 
the tribe. However, an agreement was never reached over the exact nature of the bill and 
in September 1953 focus instead turned to the BIA’s draft wholesale Termination Act.46 
Nevertheless, discussions over the possibility of individual withdrawal reveal some of the 
motivations tribal members had in supporting the erosion of trust status, and that the 
concept of “full citizenship” and differing interpretations of this played a key role. Klamath 
Executive Committee representative Dice Crane posed the question to the assembled 
members and tribal attorney: “All Indians are citizens of the United States, aren’t they?”47 
This raised a lengthy discussion about whether tribal members could be considered citizens. 
Termination advocate Wade Crawford responded that Indians were only citizens in a 
“political”, but not a “personal” right, indicating his wish that the bill refer to withdrawing 
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from the tribe as gaining “full citizenship”. The tribe’s attorney, Glenn Wilkinson, 
elaborated on Crawford’s point, though not entirely agreeing with him:  
“In a political sense you are all United States citizens now, at least in a political 
sense. If you put in here a full United States citizen, or something like that, it 
might leave the status of those who remain on the reservation somewhat 
uncertain because of the implication that by granting full United States 
citizenship to those who go our Congress may mean redemption of some from 
what citizenship you now have.”48  
It is obvious that neither these tribal members nor Wilkinson saw the Citizenship Act as 
guaranteeing “full” citizenship, as Deloria and Lytle have since argued.49 Rather Wilkinson’s 
statement outlines the problem with the vague wording of both the draft individual 
withdrawal bill and the Citizenship Act – neither clearly defined ‘citizenship’. He also 
indicated that a risk remained as federal officials could interpret the level of Native 
citizenship according to their own will; if withdrawing members were referred to as “full 
citizens” in a Congressional bill, remaining members could by proxy be considered lesser 
citizens and, for example, their electoral rights might be restricted. 1949 discussions include 
terminology strikingly similar to what federal rhetoric came to revolve around throughout 
the 1950s: “full citizenship” of Natives. However, in contrast to federal rhetoric, Klamath 
tribal members here indicated that bureau inefficiencies and paternalism limited Native 
citizenship, rather than the Native population failing to live up to requirements. 
Similarly, tribal council minutes reveal that reservation residents sometimes struggled to 
participate in elections, despite the 1924 Citizenship Act in theory guaranteeing voting 









rights. While the press often attributed these issues to “wardship” and Native legal status, 
tribal council minutes demonstrate that in practice this was due to discrimination and lack 
of support from outside institutions. A brief indication of such problems appeared in a 
February 1952 report by the BIA Tribal Relations Officer of the Mississippi Choctaw tribe, 
Marie Hayes. The report stated that seventy-four Mississippi Choctaws had “reenrolled to 
vote” and paid their poll tax.50 Though this was mentioned in the report as a positive thing, 
it is clear that with only seventy-four people registered to vote out of a population of at 
least 1,600, Mississippi Choctaws did not have proportionate representation on a state or 
federal electoral level.51 As poverty was the main problem facing tribal members in the 
early Termination period – and largely the reason the tribe was not put up for withdrawal – 
it is clear that the long-standing Mississippi poll tax restricted the ability of many tribal 
members to exercise their citizenship rights.52 
Electoral limitations were not just a problem of the Jim Crow South, as minutes of other 
tribal councils also provide evidence of discrimination in practising civic duties. Despite 
1948 action in New Mexico and Arizona to allow Natives to vote in state and federal 
elections, the issue of enfranchisement remained a priority for the Navajo Tribal Council in 
the early 1960s. Discussions at January 1960 and February 1961 meetings demonstrate that 
Navajo citizens still struggled to exercise their right to vote in state and national elections, 
and the tribal council worked with attorney Norman Littell to combat disenfranchisement.53 
In contrast to his early 1950s support for the Fernandez Amendment’s extension of state 
civil and criminal jurisdiction over tribal lands, in 1960 Littell strongly supported both the 
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Navajo right to vote as U.S. citizens, and their right to self-government. Backing a resolution 
he had written for the council to negotiate election rights with the state of Arizona, he 
stated: 
“[…] everyone of you can vote as you damn well please. That’s the freedom of 
American citizenship. […] [The resolution] is intended also […] to forestall the 
state in extending civil and criminal jurisdiction under Public Law 280. It is 
being talked about over in Arizona because they could, under that law, by 
passing a law in the Legislature, extend civil and criminal cases and enforce 
their own election laws if they had civil and criminal jurisdiction. I would like to 
keep this under your control.”54 
Littell’s change of heart with regard to state civil and criminal jurisdiction reflected a 
general change in attitude in the tribal council toward more open expressions of tribal 
sovereignty and Diné identity. Consolidated tribal powers did not, however, mark 
dissociation from U.S. citizenship. As these resolutions supporting tribal participation in 
state and federal elections demonstrate, Navajo tribal members were interested in 
exercising their civic duties, but were stymied by outside discrimination. In February 1961, 
while discussing a resolution commending steps taken by New Mexico to support Native 
voting rights, tribal council representative Jimmie King drew on his military history to 
emphasise his citizenship rights:  
“I believe that one of our dearly loved American heritages is the right to vote. 
For anyone to disenfranchise me, I would feel that that individual must do 
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away with the Unit Citation that was bestowed upon me. They would have to 
tear that off, along with the battle stars which were awarded me.”55 
The inability to vote was undeniably an important issue for Navajos – as King’s 
statement here shows, tribal members understood the implications of disenfranchisement 
and how it restricted their U.S citizenship. These notes and discussions in Mississippi 
Choctaw and Navajo council minutes demonstrate that the civic abilities of tribal members 
living in different parts of the country were severely limited due to state-level 
discrimination – not the action of tribal members themselves, as federal rhetoric implied.  
While electoral problems were real and significant for the Mississippi Choctaw and 
Navajo, these were not the only matters tribal members experienced as constraining their 
U.S. citizenship. The minutes of a 1952 Mississippi Choctaw tribal council meeting indicate 
that tribal members felt that surrounding Euro-American communities did not see Indians 
as “full citizens”. Though these minutes are abbreviated notes rather than a full transcript, 
it is evident that in discussing citizenship with BIA employees, like Tribal Relations Officer 
Hayes, tribal members expressed concern about citizenship: “Emmett York asked that Mrs. 
Hayes inform the Council as to what the outside contacts really expected of the Indians, 
and how they could aid in the speeding-up process of acceptance as full-fledged citizens in 
all communities.”56 Just as with the 1949 concerns of Klamath tribal members, this 
statement shows that York did not see himself as a “full” citizen, but clearly wished to 
achieve that status. York was only paraphrased, so the minutes contain little indication of 
how he interpreted citizenship, but it is significant that he asked this question after Hayes 
had spoken of the role of the Bureau as “assisting the Indians to secure services not 
otherwise provided for them at the present time – thus, the reason for Indian Service 
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schools, hospitals, welfare program, health program and the many other services rendered 
by the various branches.”57 The context of the question thus indicates that York may have 
associated “full citizenship” with securing the same services other citizens received. 
Significantly, it was clear that he wished to be a citizen, but saw tribal members as 
restricted by the attitudes of “outside contacts”, lacking “acceptance” by others. 
In contrast Hayes heavily indicated in the same meeting that the U.S. citizenship of 
Natives was restricted by their own reliance on the bureau, and that Indians should strive 
to integrate with local communities:  
“The basic policy of the Indian Service Bureau was restated by Mrs. Hayes; as: 
Assist in enabling the Indian people to take their place in the respective 
communities, politically, socially and economically. […] When the Indian 
peoples could take their place in the various communities on a par with other 
citizens, then there would be no longer a need for the Indian Service 
Bureau.”58 
Later in the meeting, Hayes clarified that the shutdown of the Indian Bureau was what the 
“Withdrawal Program” aimed for, even specifically referring to this as “termination”. While 
Katherine Osburn has demonstrated that Hayes did not entirely discourage the practice of 
Mississippi Choctaw culture and language, this quote reveals that she did not see Natives as 
equal citizens, because they had not “taken their place” in local communities – in Hayes’ 
view some level of assimilation was required.59 






 Evidence indicates that Hayes called the Mississippi Choctaw language "beautiful" and encouraged 
tribal members to use their "colorful Indian culture" to attract tourism. See: Osburn, Choctaw 





This interpretation was generally representative of BIA employees’ approach in the 
period. A Washington BIA official visiting the Five “Civilized” Tribes Inter-Tribal Council in 
1958 similarly stated:  
“Someday the Indian people will take their place in the communities as a part 
of the total community just the same as anyone else does. They cannot go on 
being ‘indigent Indians’ or a special class…[…] After all, the Indian is a citizen of 
both the State and the United States and he is a part of the community in 
which he lives.”60 
Indians were clearly addressed as citizens in this statement – not only federal citizens, but 
citizens of specific states also. However, assimilation was presented as a necessary feature 
of citizenship, with Native integration into local communities considered an inevitable 
development which would “someday” take place. The possibility of a different kind of 
citizenship was distinctly denied as resulting in a “special class”. 
In 1953, Commissioner Emmons himself gave a lengthy speech to the Navajo Tribal 
Council just three months after HCR 108 was passed, similarly disparaging Native “second-
class citizenship” and stating:  
“Like all other friends of the Indians, I was particularly pleased by the action 
taken by the Congress […] in wiping off the books or modifying a series of laws 
which have been for many years a form of discrimination against the Indian 
people. This action is the best proof you could possibly have that the 
overwhelming majority of Americans everywhere want their fellow citizens of 
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Indian extraction to have the same rights and privileges which they themselves 
enjoy.”61 
The discriminatory laws Emmons referred to were likely the ban on Indian alcohol purchase 
and use, as well as the laws restricting Native voting in Arizona and New Mexico, all of 
which had been repealed a few years before this meeting.62  However, Emmons evidently 
did not view the alcohol ban repeal as a sufficient change. Significantly, he spoke directly of 
the need for Natives to not only achieve equality with Euro-Americans, but for them to 
have the same “rights and privileges”. The idea that Natives could be citizens with slightly 
different rights – including trust status and BIA services – but remain equally valuable 
members of society, was presented as untenable by officials like Emmons. This supports 
Levy’s claim that “differentiated citizenship” can cause disunity among the majority 
members of a society. 
It is significant that the Commissioner did not refer to the Native population as “wards”, 
at least not during this address to the Navajo council, whereas press statements 
unquestioningly used the term. Emmons referred to tribal members only as “citizens” and 
“Indians”. Later in his speech, he even addressed the issue of maintaining Native cultures:  
“What we are trying to achieve essentially, as I see it, is a condition of parity or 
equality for the Indian people as compared with the rest of the population. 
This does not mean that we are expecting Indians to give up their own culture 
and be just like everyone else. But it does mean that we want to give the 
Indians the same opportunities for advancement – the same freedom and 
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responsibility in the management of their properties – as other American 
citizens.”63 
The implication stood that Native Americans could continue to see themselves as “Indians”, 
as long as they conformed to Euro-American models of “freedom”, which inherently 
involved “the management of their properties”. In this respect Emmons held that Native 
cultures could only be maintained as a ‘heritage’, reflecting the prevailing view of culture 
shared also by Watkins and Udall, as demonstrated in Chapter Three. 
In citing property management, Emmons highlighted an aspect of Termination that was 
barely publicly discussed: land ownership. The individual ownership of land has been a key 
characteristic of American identity and citizenship from the very founding of the United 
States. Only individual land owners had the right to vote in the colonies in which seminal 
U.S. leaders like George Washington and Thomas Jefferson grew up.64 The freedom to own 
property has since become ideologically embedded in American citizenship, as shown by 
Merle Curti’s frequent references to debates surrounding land ownership in The Growth of 
American Thought.65 Particularly in the post-WWII period, American conservative political 
ideology gained prominence, empowered by popular backlash to the supposedly 
“socialistic” institutions of the New Deal. In this atmosphere, liberal conceptions of 
democratic government became easily associated with Soviet communism.66 The 
significance of land ownership will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, but here 
it is important to note that federal discussions of Native citizenship in tribal councils 
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contained clear indications that property management and “full citizenship” were 
perceived as intertwined. 
To understand the implications of Terminationist rhetoric, the extent to which tribal 
council representatives internalised the federal belief that trust status precluded “full 
citizenship” must be examined. Tribal council members also brought up issues of ownership 
at meetings, but with a different focus. For instance at a January 1964 Mississippi Choctaw 
Tribal Council meeting, Chairman Phillip Martin broached the subject of property 
ownership in a long speech on the development of Adult Education programmes:  
“If employment is made available, many of us will have to learn about the use 
of money, unwise use of credit, and other things of misuse will hurt us. Many 
of our people have always had a landlord who controlled these things. Our 
people need to know much more about the privileges and responsibilities of 
citizenship.”67 
In referring to the “privileges and responsibilities of citizenship”, Martin echoed federal 
Termination rhetoric and the sort of language BIA employees propagated in speaking to the 
tribe throughout the 1950s, recognising that tribal members had little experience of 
financial management. However, though his statement recalled HCR 108, the context 
demonstrates that his meaning diverged significantly from that of BIA officials like Emmons 
and local employees like Hayes. Martin did not dispute the U.S. citizenship of Natives, or 
necessarily imply that they were lesser citizens, just that they were not sufficiently aware of 
what citizenship entailed. Adult education, rather than assimilation into mainstream 
communities, is what Martin presented as key to realising change toward Mississippi 
Choctaw equal citizenship. 
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In fact, Martin continued his speech by emphasising the importance of developing the 
tribal community:  
“We need improved facilities. We hope to purchase 80 acres of land near the 
Pearl River School and use part of it to develop a community center. […] We 
want to see this developed so that we can invite our neighbors to come and 
participate with us. We know they will if we have adequate facilities.”68 
Though, like Hayes, he spoke of communities, Martin emphasised the need to interact with 
rather than assimilate into local Euro-American communities. Far from giving up tribal 
holdings, the chairman spoke of increasing the communal land base for a community 
centre. In contrast to the Terminationist federal rhetoric, Martin did not see U.S. citizenship 
as precluding the continued existence and even revitalisation of the Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians. Indeed, in 1964 the council established the Choctaw Community Action 
Program and worked on development opportunities provided under the Economic 
Opportunity Act.69 
Significantly, Martin’s speech also indicated concern with the “facilities” available to 
tribal members, demonstrating an awareness of the disparity in living conditions between 
the Mississippi Choctaw and their “neighbors”. This highlights a major concern about living 
standards, which was shared by a variety of tribal councils throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
For instance, in 1963 Creek Principal Chief W.E. McIntosh reported on the affairs of his 
tribe: “In fields of health, including sanitation, education, welfare and employment, 
industrial development, Creek Tribe through tribal officials and Council is doing everything 









possible to hasten the day when the Creek Indians will be self-sustaining citizens.”70 
McIntosh presented his tribe as citizens, but as unequal to the mainstream as his tribe was 
not yet “self-sustaining” – this is in keeping with the general trend of tribal members 
identifying themselves as strongly “American”, but not necessarily as equal citizens. 
However, McIntosh went further to specify what he saw as limiting to Creek citizenship: 
education, sanitation, employment and so on. McIntosh thus employed citizenship rhetoric 
to highlight the substandard living conditions of Creek tribal members compared to the 
mainstream. Just as members of, for instance, the Navajo Tribal Council, related living 
standards to being “American”, the Creek and Mississippi Choctaw chairmen drew parallels 
between citizenship and the material conditions of tribal members. Council 
representatives, therefore, recognised a variety of factors as limiting “full” Native 
citizenship – but unlike federal officials and the press, they rarely presented Native inaction 
as one of them. 
However, official federal rhetoric in the 1960s did not reflect Martin’s and McIntosh’s 
emphasis on Native citizenship being limited by substandard living conditions. Nor did 
communications from BIA employees to tribes seem to change in emphasis despite 
increasing 1960s provisions for OEO reservation development programmes. This is clear in 
Superintendent Glenn Landbloom’s 1962 report to the Navajo Tribal Council on Secretary of 
the Interior Udall’s three goals for Indian policy: “(1) maximum Indian self-sufficiency; (2) 
full participation of Indians in American life; and (3) equal citizenship privileges and 
responsibility for Indians.”71 
Though Landbloom apparently had faith in Udall’s vision for Indian policy, stating that 
“considerable action has already resulted”, the language here exhibited did not significantly 
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diverge from the stated aims of Termination. HCR 108, too, referred to the “privileges and 
responsibilities” of citizenship and, like Udall, presented these as something Natives were 
lacking. Udall’s policy rhetoric was, of course, not as forceful as HCR 108 – the latter placed 
onus on Indians to “assume their full responsibilities”, whereas Udall emphasised “self-
sufficiency” without implying that Native Americans had shirked their duties.  
Udall’s aims, nevertheless, included “full participation of Indians in American life”, not 
mentioning tribal membership. In this sense, his views do not correlate with Mississippi 
Choctaw Chairman Martin’s ideas of Natives as U.S. citizens and developing tribal 
communities, though both refer to citizenship “privileges and responsibilities”. Instead 
Landbloom’s presentation of Udall’s policy carried assimilationist undertones, showing 
signs that Terminationist ideas of Natives as not yet “full” citizens persisted in discussions 
with tribal councils in the 1960s. Though tribal council members generally tended to 
present themselves as unequivocally American, there was not a similar insistence that 
Natives were “full” U.S. citizens. Rather, members of, for instance, the Klamath and 
Mississippi Choctaw tribes – at least publicly – employed the federal rhetoric of “lesser” 
citizenship, but imbedded these with their own interpretations and meanings.  
 
5.3. “Ancient sovereignty”: the 1960s shift toward self-determination 
 
Both discussions in tribal councils and public debates in the press surrounding Native 
citizenship presented it as limited, but for varied reasons: the press usually spoke of 
“wardship” to describe Natives as wilfully dependent, while members of different tribal 
councils expressed frustration at substandard living conditions, BIA paternalism, and 





gaining “full citizenship” was even a motivation for individual members wanting to 
withdraw from their tribe, but the wholesale removal of federal trust status was not 
generally advocated. These discussions contradict Deloria and Lytle’s argument that the 
1924 Citizenship Act ensured “full citizenship” for Natives, or even created a “dual” 
American and tribal citizenship.72 However, focusing on discussions of the U.S. citizenship of 
Native Americans is insufficient. Daniel Cobb has shown that Native activists in the 1960s 
increasingly publicly communicated their identity as not just American citizens, but also as 
Indians.73  Moreover, particularly later in the 1950s and throughout the 1960s, discussions 
of tribal members as citizens of Native nations increased in council meetings, 
demonstrating that many Indians did indeed see themselves as “dual citizens”. The 
contexts in which these claims of citizenship were made, as well as the ways in which the 
press depicted tribal governments, must be examined to understand the full impact of the 
rhetoric of citizenship on the development of Indian policy. 
That the leaders of the Five “Civilized” Tribes valued both their American citizenship and 
tribal membership is evident in a 1955 bill passed by the Inter-Tribal Council “[t]o extend 
the period of restrictions on lands belonging to Indians of the Five Civilized Tribes in 
Oklahoma, and for other purposes.”74 The bill was drafted in response to demands of the 
1906 Five “Civilized” Tribes Act, which divided reservation lands into allotments amongst 
individual members, but decreed that the land parcels of Indians the BIA deemed 
“incompetent” would remain under trust status.75 After various extensions, these 
restrictions were due to end in 1956. In order to maintain lands in Native ownership, the 
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Council requested these protections be finally extended until the death of allottees, unless 
a “certificate of competency” was applied for.  
While the Inter-Tribal Council’s 1955 bill made clear that any tribal member choosing to 
apply for a certificate of competency would “not be entitled to any of the services 
performed by the United States for Indians because of their status as Indians”, it did not 
present this as eradicating the tribal membership of such individuals: “Provided, that 
nothing in this Act shall affect that status of such persons as a citizen of the United States or 
the right, if any, of such person to share in the distribution of tribal asserts or to participate 
in tribal affairs.”76 This statement proves that whilst Five Tribes leaders accepted that some 
members wished to revoke trust status over their lands, allowing them to buy and sell their 
property and eradicate BIA control over their personal finances, this should not affect their 
tribal membership. While the allotment policy had been aimed at the full assimilation of 
Indians into mainstream American society and the 1906 Act had dismantled the existing 
tribal governments of the Five Tribes, fifty years later the Cherokee, Choctaw, Creek, 
Chickasaw and Seminole in Oklahoma maintained their will to survive as tribes. 
1960s minutes of Inter-Tribal Council meetings support this impression that council 
members held a dual identity – and not just on an abstract level, but as a part of their legal 
status. Such a stance was indisputably expressed by a visitor to the Five Tribes, Allen 
Quetone (Kiowa), a long-standing BIA employee who described himself as active in tribal 
affairs.77 Though the minutes mostly paraphrased Quetone, his attitude was clearly 
communicated:  
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“Mr. Quetone states ‘he believes Indians should retain their lands, and what 
rights we have’; he states he feels he is a citizen…. ‘yet I am an Indian, entitled 
to certain things.’ He further stated ‘there is a question of whether the services 
we get as Indians are basically a gift from the Federal Government.’ He states 
his tribe won a claim on the basis of treaties.”78 
Quetone here presented Natives as not only citizens, but as Indians. In doing so, he referred 
to trust status and services not as a ‘government dole’, but as the legal right of Natives, 
guaranteed by their treaties with the government.  
Though Quetone was a visitor to the Inter-Tribal Council, his statement was not 
contested in the council meeting – at least not openly. While no one appears to have 
commented on Quetone’s speech, it was followed by discussion of the NCAI and upcoming 
American Indian Chicago Conference.  These conversations exemplify the Inter-Tribal 
Council’s usual language in speaking of national Indian affairs, consistently calling 
themselves and other Natives “Indians”. Dennis Bushyhead, Cherokee representative to 
both the Inter-Tribal Council and the NCAI, read out and spoke in favour of resolutions from 
the latest NCAI meeting: “[…] actions, decisions, and policy declarations have been arrived 
at during the past decade without regard to the facts of Indian needs, conditions, and 
aspirations, thereby producing the unrealistic and destructive ‘termination policy’ […].”79 
Bushyhead’s support for the NCAI was repeated by Quetone, indicating the men agreed on 
prioritising “Indian needs”. 
Many Inter-Tribal Council members thus advocated the special rights of Indians as 
guaranteed by treaties, in accordance with the NCAI’s campaign for increasing tribal control 
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over their own programme administration without severing trust status, demonstrated by 
their slogan “Self-Determination – Not Termination”.80 As shown in Chapter Four, Five 
Tribes involvement in the June 1961 Chicago Conference was nevertheless highly 
controversial, and Cherokee chairman W.W. Keeler and representative Early Boyd Pierce 
pushed for the inclusion of an “American Indian Pledge” as a preface to the Declaration of 
Indian Purpose. In this January 1961 Inter-Tribal Council meeting, too, Keeler questioned 
the intentions of the Chicago Conference. The minutes describe Keeler as having “stated his 
reaction is he hates to see Indians taken in by Dr. Sol Tax; that the NCAI has been for the 
Indians… he said we have had a lot of speakers – Indian and non-Indian – but it was the 
Indians themselves who made up their minds.”81 Though Keeler disagreed with Bushyhead 
and Quetone on the worth of the Chicago Conference, all three clearly identified Native 
people as “Indians” with a special status in the nation. While Keeler’s opposition to Sol 
Tax’s involvement may have been motivated by the anthropologist’s socialist links and 
German-Jewish background – characteristics Keeler saw as incongruous with American 
principles – his opposition to non-Native control over Indian rights activism indicates that 
he nevertheless valued “Indianness”.82 
 In the case of the Five Tribes, BIA employees did not strongly push fast-paced 
Termination and federal officials usually supported the Council’s decisions, with Oklahoma 
Congressman Tom Steed, for instance, successfully backing the extension of trust status 
over allotted lands in the 1950s.83 Even Oklahoma Choctaw Termination attempts were 
largely led by Principal Chief Harry Belvin, rather than federal employees.84 In this sense, 
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the “Indian” or specific tribal identities of these groups were not directly legally challenged 
in the period. In contrast, the Klamath were faced with the Termination of their legal status 
as members of a federally recognised tribe. As this realisation became clear to tribal 
members, council debates increasingly highlighted the significance of not only the 
membership but the citizenship of Klamaths to their tribe. For instance, in a June 1958 
General Council meeting representative Elnathan Davis, vowed to ’work for the repeal’ of 
the Klamath Termination Act:  
“I have always been against P.L. 587 from its inception. […]If Congress did that 
to some other nation, there would be a war – no other nation would stand for 
it. I feel this severing of our relationship – Congress, the United States would 
never do that, never pass a law that United States citizens choose to elect a 
law or denounce their citizenship. They would never do that, so why do it to 
us, the Klamath tribe, or any other tribe?”85 
Davis explicitly opposed Termination here, and foregrounded not only Klamath identity, 
but their legal status. Comparing the tribe to a nation, he rejected federal interpretations of 
a uniform American citizenship, instead arguing that Klamath citizenship was equally legally 
valid. Davis’ stance in 1958 had strong support among the Klamath General Council, and the 
speakers after him referred to “the treaty of 1864” and “our sacred heritage” to emphasise 
the need to maintain the reservation in the future.86 Significantly, this sort of language of 
tribal citizenship only appeared in Klamath General Council meetings late in the 1950s, in 
this case after the vote for withdrawing or remaining in the tribal cooperative had been 
held. At this meeting newly elected tribal council representatives, like Davis, were 
introduced and some conversation was evidently held “in the indian [sic] language”, 
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indicating that the impending Termination date had led to a shift in the council’s 
atmosphere.87 As the deadline drew nearer for removing Klamath trust status, tribal 
members not only subverted key concepts of Termination rhetoric, like “citizenship”, but 
used these to challenge federal Indian policy. 
While these strong statements were clearly born out of Klamath resistance to 
Termination, tribes not immediately faced by the policy equally employed notions of tribal 
citizenship. In the late 1950s the Navajo Tribal Council, under the leadership of Chairman 
Paul Jones, moved toward consolidating the self-government of the tribe by expanding its 
judicial system and founding a tribal police force.88 The wish of the tribal council to take 
over the administration of their own programmes as a tribe while eradicating BIA 
paternalism is clear throughout 1960s discussions. For instance, long-term councilwoman 
Annie Wauneka spoke out against BIA incompetence in a 1961 meeting:  
“Why let the white men run over the Navajo and let them do as they please? 
That is my position. […] I am not saying that we are asking for termination of 
trusteeship of the Government over the Navajos; all I am asking is that we get 
adequate personnel, qualified to do the job for the Navajo people.”89 
Wauneka criticised paternalism, but clearly distinguished this from advocating 
Termination. Though she did not use the terminology of “self-determination” like the NCAI, 
her speech shows support for similar principles, calling for restrictions to BIA control whilst 
opposing Termination of the Navajo tribe. The Navajo Tribal Council did not join the NCAI 
due to the high membership fees the tribe would have had to pay, but they evidently kept 
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up-to-date with the organisation’s actions.90 The Council even included a full report of the 
1961 Chicago Conference in the minutes of the meeting at which Wauneka spoke.91 
Wauneka’s speech indicates that council representatives sympathised with NCAI concerns, 
despite the tribe remaining non-members. 
Regardless of frustration at federal paternalism, the tribal council expressed allegiance 
to both “the Navajo people” and the United States. The ceremonies inaugurating newly 
elected tribal officials in April 1963 featured both Navajo and American traditions, with the 
“Navajo Tribal Band” playing the (presumably U.S.) National Anthem, and Chee Anderson, 
“Master of Ceremonies-Interpreter” translating proceedings into Navajo.  Indeed, in taking 
up the position of Chairman, Raymond Nakai’s oath of office involved promising to uphold 
the Treaty of 1868 and the U.S. Constitution “in the manner which is in the best interest of 
my people.”92  Nakai’s inaugural speech, moreover, exemplified a trend in Navajo 
discussions in the 1960s, emphasising tribal sovereignty and self-determination alongside 
American citizenship: 
“The goal toward which I propose to lead the Navajo people is the goal of all 
true Americans […]. I shall never voluntarily surrender the ancient sovereignty 
of the Navajo people, (applause) or barter it away bit by bit, to private interests 
or other governments; but I will restrict the power of the Navajo government 
toward the Navajo people. (applause).”93 
Charles Wilkinson has claimed that the term “self-determination” only spread into 
general use in Indian affairs in the 1970s, but was used in Native circles already in the early 
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1960s.94 Nakai’s reference to sovereignty is one of the only incidents of this term appearing 
in the 1950s and 1960s council minutes of any of the tribes here considered. This may, 
however, be due to the restrictions on the minutes available, including meetings only up to 
1960 for the Klamath Tribal Council, and 1964 for the Navajo and the Inter-Tribal Councils. 
Nakai’s inaugural speech nonetheless reflects a shift in the language of Indian affairs at a 
transitional period, when Termination Acts were still being passed, but the fast-pace of the 
policy was simultaneously criticised.  In taking up his position as Chairman in 1963, Nakai 
did not shy away from speaking of the “Navajo government” and justifying its position 
based on the “ancient sovereignty” of the tribe, thus confirming that it was not just a 
collective of people, but had inherent rights of self-government. Compared to early 1950s 
tribal council members’ statements that the tribe was “not yet ready” for Termination, 
Nakai’s speech boldly communicated Navajo resistance and resilience in the face of 
paternalism, facilitated by the shift in federal Indian policy discussions.  
However, Nakai also expressed his willingness to “restrict the power of the Navajo 
government”, indicating that he did not view the council as an unproblematic 
representative organ of the Navajo people. Indeed, in his campaign for chairmanship, Nakai 
had pledged to introduce a Navajo constitution in accordance with the U.S. constitution, to 
limit the powers of the tribal government. Though the Nakai administration did draft a 
constitution that was accepted by the council in 1968, this was never sent for public 
ratification by the Navajo people.95 Instead, a Navajo Bill of Rights was passed in 1967 
protecting the rights of Navajo citizens to, for instance, due process; equal protection; 
freedom of religion, speech and press; and the right to trial by jury.96  Nakai’s speech in 
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1963, thus, exhibited concern with the implications of unlimited powers of tribal 
governments over their members.  
An examination of the press in the same period unequivocally demonstrates that 
newspapers shared this concern. In fact, a trend of presenting tribal governments as 
limiting the American citizenship of tribal members emerged in the 1960s, alongside the 
continuing rhetoric of “wardship”.  For instance, TIME ran an article in 1965 addressing the 
issue of Native citizenship. Entitled ‘Civil Rights: The Constitution & Mrs. Colliflower’, the 
article described a legal case between Madeline Colliflower and the Blackfoot tribe.97 
Colliflower was sentenced by the tribal court without trial for refusing to move her cattle 
off land that had been leased to someone else. Her case is well-documented in secondary 
literature, with Deloria and Lytle arguing that it was critical in leading up to the passage of 
the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act.98 The TIME article certainly recognised the questions of 
constitutional rights raised by the Colliflower case, criticising the Fort Belknap tribal council 
for not arranging a trial.99 Interestingly, the article referred to the Citizenship Act in 
justifying its criticisms of tribal courts, stating:  
“Congress in 1924 capped the conquest of the American Indian by granting 
U.S. citizenship to all Indians born from that year on. Until then, tribal Indians 
had been considered ‘wards of the Government.’ But the gesture by no means 
fully extended the U.S. Constitution to about 70% of the country’s Indians – 
the 380,000 tribal members who now live on 399 reservations and enclaves 
maintained by the Federal Government.”100 
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TIME, though bringing in the context of the Citizenship Act, did not portray Natives as 
having equal rights to mainstream citizens, highlighting concerns similar to those presented 
by Nakai at the Navajo Tribal Council. Furthermore, the article strongly criticised tribal 
courts, claiming that Indian judges had “little or no legal training” and that tribal members 
were “consistently denied writs of habeas corpus.”101 While protection of tribal members 
from potentially corrupt or autocratic tribal leaders is an important concern still hotly 
debated in Native circles, the TIME article showed little awareness of the legal rights of 
tribal nations and their courts.102 While the article did refer to the “Blackfoot nation”, its 
tone was critical of tribal sovereignty: “[…] the law still regards Indian tribes as quasi-
sovereign nations”.103 By including the word “still”, the writer implied that the sovereign 
status of tribes was not sustainable and would change. This impression was reinforced in 
the next paragraph, which stated that “fortunately, this situation is bound to improve” and 
hailed Colliflower’s case as certain to “sharply curb the power of tribal courts.”104 These 
critiques were typical of the news magazine; three years later a follow-up article on the 
Colliflower case in heavily stereotyped terms criticised tribal courts for abiding by “Indian 
customs and traditions of justice, which include such warlockery as divination – by 
observed hand trembling – of witches and thieves.”105 
The Times also reported on Colliflower in 1965, declaring in a headline that ‘Tribe Courts 
Lose Unchecked Power.’106 Unlike the TIME piece, this article did not carry a caricatured 
image of ‘primitive’ tribal courts, instead recounting in detail the development of the case 
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from the tribal court to the Circuit Court of Appeals. The Times described Colliflower’s 
victory against the Blackfoot court as presenting  “another milepost in Indian freedoms”, 
and quoted Circuit Judge Ben Duniway at length, stating that the courts “were created by 
the Federal Executive and imposed upon the Indian community, and to this day the Federal 
Government still maintains a partial control over them.”107 The article thus shared TIME’s 
interpretation of the solution to the situation: both presented state or federal involvement 
as desirable and tribal court systems as inherently problematic and harmful, even 
questioning their legitimacy to represent tribes. In this respect, the general press stance as 
exhibited by TIME and the Times differed in approach to Nakai; though both recognised 
potential problems in the legal status of tribal governments, the press advocated federal 
and state court involvement or even wholesale shut down of tribal courts, while Nakai 
viewed tribal constitutions as a solution. Nakai thus preferred taking Euro-American models 
into account in establishing Navajo administrative systems, rather than giving up tribal 
controls in favour of state jurisdiction. Indeed, the Navajo Nation has focused much effort 
on developing its tribal court system since its establishment in 1958, with the 1991 Navajo 
Nation Code of Judicial Conduct successfully integrating traditional Diné legal values and 
the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct.108 
These press articles presented Native Americans as ‘second-class’ citizens specifically 
due to tribal government frameworks, rather than ‘wardship’ or ‘dependency’ caused by 
trust status. In similar vein, the March 1969 TIME article ‘Civil Rights: Revolt on the 
Reservation’ criticised the Navajo tribe’s right to exclude non-Navajo U.S. citizens from the 
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reservation.109 Describing the now infamous case of Navajo tribal councilwoman Wauneka 
slapping the director of the OEO’s Navajo legal branch, Ted Mitchell, the article stated: 
“At a tribal advisory council meeting, 50-year-old Annie Wauneka, the council’s 
first squaw, rose to ask if the 1968 Civil Rights Act forbade the tribe to banish 
unwanted whites from the reservation. […] Then she smacked the Harvard Law 
School graduate several times across the face. The following day, two Navajo 
policemen, acting on council orders, packed Mitchell into his pickup truck and 
hustled him off the reservation.”110 
Unfortunately the minutes for this meeting are not available in the BIA’s Navajo Tribal 
Council records. Wauneka’s biographer, Carolyn Niethammer, has shown that the incident 
was uncharacteristic for the usually diplomatic councilwoman: on other occasions Wauneka 
showed support for Euro-Americans working in tribal administration, for instance 
advocating a pay rise for the director of the Navajo Tribal Utility Authority.111 The 
councilwoman was evidently adept at both working within a more direct Euro-American 
political framework and according to traditional Diné rules of courtesy, but these skills do 
not come across in the above description.112 Not only was Wauneka incorrectly termed the 
first woman on the council, but the derogatory term “squaw” was used to pit her against 
the “Harvard Law School graduate”, with tribal police also presented as aggressive and 
forceful in “packing” the urbane Mitchell off.113  
The article did highlight real issues regarding the legal implications for Native individuals 
existing as both tribal members and U.S. citizens: “Since 1924, when Congress decided that 
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American Indians are U.S. citizens, Navajos and other Indians have been both tribal citizens 
and Americans. Now their rights as members of each group had been thrust into 
conflict.”114 As Nakai’s 1963 speech demonstrated, Navajo tribal members recognised these 
issues, and secondary literature shows that many in fact disagreed with Wauneka on 
Mitchell, supporting his work on Navajo legal programmes.115 However, the article offered 
no indication of this nuanced Navajo response, instead framing its consideration of real 
legal conflicts by presenting the tribe in stereotyped terms of a ‘vanishing race’ through 
assimilation: “As the Navajos’ population expands, opportunities shrink. Young men go 
away. Elders lose esteem. Bypassed by white progress, the Navajos clutch the tatters of 
their treaty promises and watch the old ways die.”116  
The change in focus of these 1960s articles – highlighting constitutional matters rather 
than issues of “wardship” – is nevertheless evident. This can largely be attributed to the 
growing public attention to the African American Civil Rights movement in the 1960s. As 
Schudson has demonstrated, the 1960s marked a shift in American conceptions of 
citizenship, with focus moving away from the civic responsibilities of citizens, to their 
federally guaranteed rights.117 Schudson’s argument is supported by the changing rhetoric 
surrounding Native citizenship in the Termination era press.  The focus on specifically 
constitutional rights not reaching Indians despite their U.S. citizenship only emerged as a 
major concern in press reporting from the mid-1960s onwards. The rhetoric of “wardship” 
and discussions of the problematic nature of trust status, nevertheless, did not die out. In 
fact, these debates surrounding Native citizenship shared the implication that the Indian 
population would have to assimilate in order to gain “full citizenship”, giving up the trust 
                                                          
114
 ‘Revolt on the Reservation’, TIME. 
115
 Iverson, Diné, p. 238. 
116
 ‘Revolt on the Reservation’, TIME. 
117





status, treaty rights and government structures that denoted their position as sovereign 
entities alongside states and the federal government. While members of tribal councils 
were similarly aware of problems caused by their different legal status to the mainstream, 
they nevertheless prioritised their identities as citizens of the United States and tribal 
nations equally, finding protections to their rights in enhancing and developing tribal 




Termination rhetoric, in speaking of the need for “full citizenship”, found resonance 
both in mainstream popular beliefs and the understandings of members of various tribal 
councils about Native legal status. While Native Americans living on reservations often 
associated themselves with American national identity and presented themselves as 
unequivocally American, few council members presented the Indian population as “equal” 
citizens to the mainstream. Little understanding of Native legal status was presented in the 
press, with articles rarely mentioning the 1924 Citizenship Act, and some calling indigenous 
peoples “wards” regardless of their legal status. Termination relied on the vague terms of 
“full” or “first-class” citizenship and HCR 108 did not explain exactly  what these meant, 
meaning federal officials, BIA employees, members of the mainstream public, and – most 
importantly – members of federally recognised tribes were able to interpret the limits to 
Native citizenship as they saw best. 
The varied cultural contexts of tribal members, federal officials and the general public 
complicated discussion surrounding concepts like “citizenship” in the Termination era. The 





divergent ‘mainstream’ and ‘minority’ cultures and worldviews. Jean and John Comaroff 
have described history as being constructed through “consensus and contest”, and noted 
that this struggle is rarely equal between all parties involved.118 In the case of Termination, 
a general consensus existed between federal and mainstream public understandings – the 
1924 Citizenship Act was largely forgotten or seen as negated by continued “wardship”, and 
Natives were understood as inhabiting a marginal role in U.S. society. Though the exact 
details of what was limiting Native citizenship varied in public debate in the press, a 
prevalent implication was that Indians were holding themselves back by remaining on 
reservations, and that the federal government, in maintaining a differentiated citizenship 
status, was denying “full” citizenship to the Native population. 
Native interpretations, particularly when speaking to BIA officials, equally viewed tribal 
members as not on a par with mainstream citizens, but for very different reasons. 
Discrimination in local areas, state-level disenfranchisement, and lower living standards 
were all discussed as reasons Native Americans were not “full” citizens of the United States. 
However, these views rarely came into direct contest with public assumptions of Native 
legal status. Throughout the 1950s, discussions between tribal members and BIA 
employees were not transparent enough for differences in understandings of key 
Termination concepts to be explicitly debated. Furthermore, in cases where tribal members 
did recognise a divergence in interpretation, councils did not have the power to alter the 
course of federal Indian policy, meaning direct opposition may have been considered an 
ineffective way of dealing with the BIA. Instead, a close examination of how BIA employees 
and tribal members employed the same language reveals Native agency in embedding 
these concepts with meanings relevant to them. Supporting “full” citizenship, as such, could 
mean supporting development of Mississippi Choctaw community institutions and 
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resources, the ability of Navajo individuals to vote in state elections whilst maintaining the 
tribe’s civil and criminal jurisdiction, or improved living conditions for the Creek and other 
tribes in Oklahoma. 
Only in the Klamath case did tribal and federal understandings come directly head-to-
head, as the federal status of the tribe was removed. Elnathan Davis’ statements in the 
years leading up to this action demonstrate the extent to which Native understandings of 
“citizenship” could diverge from mainstream conceptions. He presented tribal membership 
as citizenship in a Native nation, an identity which was also vocally expressed in the Navajo 
Tribal Council in the 1960s. These late 1950s and early 1960s statements marked a gradual 
shift in the language employed by tribal council members, leading toward the burgeoning 
discussions of sovereignty in the 1970s self-determination era. However, at this point such 
expressions remained contained within the walls of tribal council buildings.  
The press, even in writings from Euro-American Indian rights activists like La Farge and 
Collier, could not in the Termination period conceive of tribal membership as a form of 
citizenship. Native voices, considered neither “reliable” nor “authoritative” by mainstream 
standards, were rarely allowed to enter the discussion of what “citizenship” was. Though 
the 1960s saw increasing attention drawn to the constitutional rights of Native Americans, 
“Indianness”, communal land ownership, and continued federal trust status were still seen 
as preventing U.S. citizenship. This persistent belief and the static nature of mainstream 
conceptions of “citizenship” were the main reasons that Termination continued to be 





Chapter Six: The Rhetoric of Reservations 
 
“So one of the biggest problems facing the Government is to assist the Indian 
in moving into the main stream [sic] of American life and breaking that pattern 
of isolation. Reservation life leads to a continuation of certain old ways of life 
and nowadays leads to a welfare type of state […].”1 
- Dillon Myer (1970) 
Mainstream Euro-American debates surrounding the nature of citizenship did not, at 
any point in the Termination period, recognise tribal membership as a form of citizenship. 
The popularity of Termination was, as such, supported by the way in which federal 
withdrawal rhetoric delegitimised tribal governments as legal institutions. But did 
Terminationists consciously decide to employ rhetoric for this purpose, or was this 
language a sign of ingrained attitudes toward Native peoples and spaces, of which 
Termination was just the latest result? This chapter explores this question by examining the 
differing ways in which reservations and other tribal lands were perceived by both Euro-
Americans and the indigenous inhabitants of these areas throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
to demonstrate the ways in which discussions of land aided in drawing apparent support 
for the Termination of trust status.  
Dillon Myer’s above statement, made seventeen years after his Commissionership, 
demonstrates his belief that reservations encourage dependence. This view was not 
exclusive to Myer, but rather reveals the persistence of turn-of-the-century conceptions of 
reservations as obstacles to assimilation. Even the 1928 Meriam Report, which criticised 
federal allotment policy for assuming that individual ownership “in itself” was a “civilizing 
factor”, maintained that Native lands should continue to be divided into individual parcels, 
                                                          
1





but with a renewed focus on education: “The primary duty is to educate the Indians in the 
use and management of their own property.”2  Similarly in 1948, the Hoover Commission 
Task Force Report criticised allotment policy for concealing a takeover of land by non-
Natives, but nevertheless declared that “assimilation must be the dominant goal of public 
policy.”3 These criticisms indicate that in the mid-twentieth century allotment policy was 
recognised as harmful, yet public discussions of reservations maintained that they were 
inherently problematic. Myer’s statement is thus symptomatic of the persistent belief that 
the Native population should not live differently to other Americans.  
Historian K. Tsianina Lomawaima has described late nineteenth century reformers’ faith 
in individual land ownership as a “’magical’ process of transformation”, with Indian Office 
officials believing that it would eradicate Indian “laziness”, whilst in practice transferring 
“surplus” Native lands to white prospectors and cattle owners.4 Secondary literature and 
tribal oral histories both show that Native Americans heavily resisted being forced onto 
individual allotments often too small to support families and of a poor quality.5 The 
enduring negative reputation of allotment amongst Native communities clearly stemmed 
from these issues, but officials in the early twentieth century claimed resistance was rather 
due to “the strength of ancient Indian custom of communal ownership.”6 The ways in which 
indigenous populations spoke about their lands during the Termination period therefore 
requires careful study to examine how they were viewed and the extent to which this 
differed from federal conceptions of reservations.  
In recent years, indigenous studies scholarship has turned toward not just identifying 
the colonizing aspects of academic scholarship and knowledge, but developing new 
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methods of research equipped to encompass aboriginal philosophies. For instance, legal 
scholar John Borrows (Anishinabe/Ojibway) argues that land is an inherent part of 
indigenous citizenship, not just due to the resources it offers, but to the way it connects 
people with their past, future and present. He terms Native perspectives on their cultures 
and relationships with their community a “landed citizenship”, to emphasise its connection 
with their tribal homelands.7 Though Borrows writes within the Canadian context, his views 
reflect a wider movement across indigenous scholarship, calling for the recognition and use 
of indigenous conceptions and worldviews in not only self-government, but also in 
interactions with non-Native institutions.8 This trend is most evident in Donald Fixico’s 
model of Native reality, the “Natural Democracy”, which he outlines in Call for Change.9 
Like Borrows, Fixico presents Native peoples as not simply using the land, but as interacting 
with and respecting the natural environment as equal to themselves.10 Furthermore, he 
posits that academic research should not focus just on “Indian-White relations” or even 
“interacting Indian-White relations”, but rather on Native “physical and metaphysical 
reality.”11 
Fixico’s critique of scholarship is particularly relevant in relation to Termination 
historiography; despite the policy’s focus on issues of land ownership, scholarship to date 
has not addressed the question of how Native perceptions of their lands may have 
influenced the development of Indian policy, an approach which may help explicate 
Natives’ varied understandings of and responses to federal trust withdrawal. It must be 
taken into account that tribal councils were products both of their specific cultural contexts 
and outside influences, not only through interactions with BIA officials but also through 
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time spent at off-reservation boarding schools, in military service, or just interacting with 
surrounding Euro-American society. As such, while it is important to accept the spiritual 
significance lands held – and continue to hold – for indigenous peoples and the role this 
played in their perceptions of self and surroundings, this relationship must not be 
romanticised. To categorise Native relations with the land as exclusively spiritual is 
reductive, obscuring the ways in which Native Americans have engaged with the U.S. 
capitalist economy and adapted it to their own purposes.12 
This chapter will begin with an examination of national press representations of 
reservations, to identify the mainstream beliefs about Indian lands and how these ideas 
developed throughout the mid-twentieth century. The pervasive imagery of reservations as 
‘impoverished’, ‘diseased’ and ‘degraded’ fostered support for the termination of trust 
status, as these spaces were widely considered harmful. The chapter will then examine 
Navajo and Klamath discussions of their tribal lands in the Termination period, to 
demonstrate that Native peoples valued their lands for multifaceted reasons, including 
cultural and economic motivations. While BIA-produced council minutes do not 
straightforwardly present Native viewpoints, a close reading of the debates therein 
contained can aid in understanding how tribal members conceived of their lands in the 
Termination period. Finally, discussions surrounding individual land ownership will be 
examined. This concept was taken for granted by the Euro-American mainstream, adopted 
by some Native pro-Terminationists, and harnessed by tribal members aiming to revitalise 
the cultures, identities and economies of their communities. Examining the diverse 
discussions surrounding reservations and land ownership will challenge prevailing simplistic 
divisions between Euro-American and Native views, demonstrating how tribal members 
drew on discussions of their land to gain support for economic development programmes 
and to resist unwanted federal policy. 
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6.1. ‘Barren reservations’: press representations of Native lands, 
1947-1970 
 
Terminationists evidently viewed reservations as obstacles to Indian progress, or even as 
‘socialistic environments’, equating communal land ownership with communism, like 
Congressman E.Y. Berry. An examination of 1950s and 1960s press representations of these 
reservation spaces will reveal how widespread these views were, helping to explain why 
Termination was accepted or opposed in public debate. It is also important to address how 
the structure of print news, presented as ‘fact’, aided in reproducing and maintaining 
negative conceptions of Native lands. As Mary Ann Weston points out, most national 
newspapers throughout the twentieth century were based far from reservations – and to a 
great extent still are today. According to Weston, journalists were usually unable to visit the 
reservations they reported on, and so the general public was dependent on writers with 
little to no contact with Native people for their information on Indian affairs.13  
Looking at national press reporting immediately before and in the early years of the 
Termination period, it is clear that representations of reservations remained homogenous 
throughout, characterised almost exclusively as places of “squalor”, “dirt” and 
“degradation”, from which tribal members supposedly could not escape.14 For instance, a 
1951 New York Times article labelled reservations as “far-flung”, with “appalling 
conditions”.15 The report described an American Museum of Natural History painting 
exhibition that was intended as a “documentary of the country’s all-but-forgotten men, 
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women and children”, and stated that the problems of Indians were “rooted in disease-
breeding living conditions, in poverty and in social discrimination.”16 
This article’s focus on the “plight” of a marginalised population was rooted in the 
muckracking tradition of Danish immigrant Jacob Riis’s late 1800s reporting on “squalor” in 
New York City slums.17 Riis’ 1890 book How the Other Half Lives presented exposés of 
“squalid” living conditions with the purpose of shocking readers into an awareness of the 
problems of poverty, and inspiring elite philanthropic involvement.18 In a similar vein, this 
article worked as an advertisement for the painting exhibit, aiming to “prod the conscience 
of the cognizant few and prove a sad revelation to the many.”19 Though the article did 
include some statistical information, mentioning that infant mortality rates were “four to 
seven times higher” amongst Indians than for the rest of the population, it contained no 
tribally-specific information whatsoever, instead presenting a generalised view of all 
reservations. The art exhibition included paintings of reservations by non-Native artists, 
ironically mirroring the relationship of press writing to tribal lands – presenting outside 
impressions, rather than accurate information.  
The use of generalised statistics to characterise the whole Native population, as 
displayed in this article, was the norm in press writing on Indian affairs in the early 1950s. 
This reflects a general bias in press reporting toward ‘facts, quotes and numbers’, which 
sociologist Carolyn Martindale has noted was prevalent in 1970s news coverage of African 
American protests.20 The focus on health information also reflects a general U.S. concern 
with health in the post-war period, with welfare rehabilitation programmes becoming a 
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focus of domestic policy under the Eisenhower administration.21 The above Times article 
gives little indication of the source of the statistical information, but the facts cited seem 
generally to be in line with the health conditions of tribes noted in secondary literature, for 
instance both the article and historian Alison Bernstein cite the Navajo infant mortality rate 
as seven times the national average.22 While the statistical information conveyed in the 
press was thus certainly valid and concerning, the media preoccupation with these aspects 
framed reservation life as the source of such problems.  
Furthermore, such “facts” were often intended for shock value and served to back up 
stereotyped, sensationalist imagery designed to attract attention and readers – a style 
which proved successful for the popular TIME magazine.23 This trend is exemplified by the 
1955 article ‘Medicine: Indian Health’. The article, littered with numbers and apparent 
facts, stated that “any Indian born on a reservation has a life expectancy of only 36 years 
against a neighboring white child’s 61” and that there were “56 scattered hospitals and 21 
health centers”.24 No clear source of this information was cited, but the precise numbers 
lent an appearance of authority. These statistics were brought in to support the move of 
the administration of Indian health services from the BIA to the Public Health Service that 
had been passed into law two years earlier in 1953.  TIME evidently supported any move 
away from special Indian services, despite government research in reality finding little 
improvement in Indian health after the PHS transfer.25 
The article went on to make crude, generalised statements on tribal lands:  
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“[…] some 350,000 of a total Indian population of 400,000, live on barren 
reservations in grinding poverty, existing from hand to mouth in crowded, 
filthy huts with animals and vermin. The scourges that the white man has been 
most successful in suppressing are especially deadly for the Indian, e.g. 
diphtheria, tuberculosis, dysentery.”26 
While it is certainly true that Native health services required urgent improvement in 
the early 1950s, TIME propagated a caricature of the situation. Not only did this 
description depict reservations as ‘primitive’ hot-beds of disease, it implied that 
Native individuals were biologically weak. While this article may seem extreme, such 
ideas had widespread and vocal support in early twentieth century government 
records. The Meriam Report, for instance, indicated that health standards needed to 
be improved to protect surrounding white communities, as otherwise reservations 
would become “centers for the development and spread of infectious and contagious 
diseases.”27 The dehumanising TIME article thus reflected the unresolved tension 
between the mainstream belief that physically inferior Native peoples should be 
isolated, and the fear that isolation fostered Indian dependency on federal services. 
The articles cited thus far demonstrate that perceptions of reservations had not changed 
much since the late 1800s, with the influence of settler colonial ideologies still evident. This 
despite the fact that federal policy had undergone drastic changes from assimilation to New 
Deal reservation development before Termination legislation was passed. The extent to 
which the gradual change in federal policy from withdrawal “as soon as possible” – as 
advocated by Myer – to Udall’s slower-paced assimilation through reservation development 
affected the ways in which the press portrayed Native lands must be evaluated. 
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Udall’s policies attracted significant press attention and presented a new focus on 
reservation development programs and the Office of Economic Opportunity.28 For instance, 
a 1966 Monitor article quoted Udall at length, urging states to aid in the administration of 
services for tribes, to promote “American Indian progress”.29 Like earlier 1950s articles, this 
one also utilised statistics to indicate what reservation life was like: “Reservation Indians 
have the highest unemployment rate, are the most impoverished minority, and have ‘the 
least habitable’ housing.”30 However, unlike in the above 1950s reporting, no sensationalist 
references to reservations as “destitute”, “vermin-ridden” or “barren” were included. 
Instead, Udall presented the reservation situation not as the natural state of tribal lands, 
but as the result of poor management on a federal and state level. The author even 
highlighted problems with Termination, stating that it “has never been repealed” and had 
become “highly controversial”.31  
However, the article did not provide any Native perspective or context on Indian affairs, 
with Udall himself determining the best solution would be increased economic 
development through “partnership” with states. Despite the article opposing Termination, 
then, it showcased Udall’s plans to transfer tribal administrative functions to the state – 
working in the same way as PL 280, a law aimed at preparing tribes for the removal of trust 
status. Though several tribes, like the Lakota, had resisted PL 280, Udall introduced similar 
measures.32 Both historians and Indian leaders have castigated Udall for not sufficiently 
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consulting Native groups in formulating his policies.33 Press reporting on Udall thus 
reflected his underlying paternalist stance and vision of the future of Indian affairs, working 
toward eventual economic assimilation. Indeed, Robert Burnette, NCAI Executive Director 
1960-1963, later heavily criticised Udall’s economic development efforts as maintaining 
assimilation, stating that the OEO “diverted the attention of the Indian people from their 
sacred lands” as they “ran over each other to get jobs at $2.50 an hour.”34 
It is important to acknowledge, nevertheless, that many tribes benefitted from OEO 
programmes, developing their economies and strengthening tribal administrative 
structures. The Navajo, for example, established their own Economic Opportunity Office.35 
However, reporting rarely presented these development programmes as consolidating 
tribal communities, but rather as facilitating the progression of tribes from ‘primitivity’ to 
‘civilization’. This sense of an inevitable pattern of human societal development was 
evident in a Monitor headline as late as 1968. Including a large map of contemporary 
federal Indian reservations across the United States, the short article was titled ‘From 
Forest, to reservation, to…?’36 This headline drew on stereotypical imagery of Natives as 
having lived in forests pre-European contact, in the wilderness without structured societies. 
Though the brief report was critical of Termination, stating that “some Indians wanted it; 
most Indians didn’t”, it nevertheless maintained that the federal trust relationship, 
including protections over Native lands, should be gradually given up: “Today the dominant 
tribal view is that the federal government should not relinquish its responsibility for Indians 
until it has certainly fulfilled its obligations to them to the letter.”37 The article thus 
presented Native Americans as complicit in the plans for ending trust status and eventual 
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assimilation, creating a sense that federal trust status was generally seen as undesirable 
and that reservation development was only acceptable as a step toward assimilation – a 
trend typical of press writing on Indian affairs in the 1960s.38 
Despite the sceptical or outright negative representations of reservations in the press, 
national reporting did not evidently condone the removal of entire tribes from their lands 
unless this was justified as beneficial to the Native people in question. This is clearly 
demonstrated by the controversy over the construction of Kinzua Dam in Pennsylvania, a 
congressionally approved project to end repeated flooding in Warren County. Completed in 
1965, the construction flooded nine thousand acres of the Seneca Allegany Reservation and 
displaced 130 families, despite the tribe’s lawyers presenting alternate plans for 
construction elsewhere.39 The controversy spanned the early 1960s and sparked prominent 
opposition in the national press, inspiring multiple pieces in the Times and Post.40 For 
instance, a 1962 Post editorial declared that “it is open to serious question whether the 
only way in which the Corps of Engineers can achieve [the end of flooding] is by dishonoring 
a treaty with the Seneca Indians signed in 1794 by George Washington […].”41 Significantly, 
in this case Kinzua Dam was justified by Congress as necessary to protect surrounding Euro-
American communities, making no attempt to claim it was beneficial to the Seneca. This is 
key to explaining the opposition of the press to the dam; while reservations were often 
presented as harmful to Native people, the national press did not accept the takeover of 
Native lands purely for mainstream gain. 
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In fact, as tribal and national Indian opposition to Termination mounted throughout the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, challenges to federal Indian land policy also surfaced through 
an increasing inclusion of Native voices in the press. Daniel Cobb has challenged the 
prevailing notion that the 1970s Red Power movement presented the first significant 
national Indian activist efforts. Instead Cobb traces the roots of pan-tribal protest to the 
early 1960s, asserting also that Native people have always been engaged in political 
activism.42 The increased press attention to Native protest at tribal land loss supports 
Cobb’s claims.43 For instance, a 1966 Post article, ‘Indians Hit Plan to End Reservations’, 
outlined National Indian Youth Council opposition to a Senate report it claimed was 
encouraging a return to Termination.44 The article described the NIYC as blaming the lack of 
improvement in Indian living standards on Termination, and presented Native students as 
performing more successfully in Indian schools, rather than state public-schools where “the 
dropout rate is notably higher”.45 While the reason for this better performance was not 
explained in this brief article, it quoted NIYC President Gerald Brown in stating that Indian 
affairs should be focused on “political, legal and economic security for our tribes, 
reservations and communities, without the constant threat of their destruction or 
extinguishment.”46 According to this view, the threat of Termination was causing 
stagnation, whereas Native communities and land bases were critical for Indian progress.  
A 1963 Post article equally brought out the significance of land for Native political 
activists. The piece outlined NCAI executive director Burnette’s contention that changes to 
inheritance regulations on individual allotments posed a threat to Native lands, allowing 
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their sale to both Natives and non-Natives.47 Furthermore, the article, titled ‘Indians’ Leader 
Calls Bill “Worst Landgrab”’, quoted Burnette on the significance of tribal lands: “Their land 
is all the Indians have. […] This bill is a big step toward taking it away from them.”48 While, 
as demonstrated in Chapter Two, Native voices were usually marginalised in discussions of 
Indian policy, these few Native comments on land issues display the beginnings of a limited 
inclusion of indigenous voices in the press. 
However, these calls of support for the retention of Native land bases coexisted with 
persistent heavily stereotyped views of reservations as “squalid” places or even “human 
zoos”.49 For instance, in some articles economic development was justified based on 
caricatured images, as in the 1967 Times article ‘Industry and the Indian’. The article 
displayed imagery analogous to 1950s representations of reservations: “The average 
reservation Indian, particularly in the Southwest, lives in a mud adobe hut, if he is 
fortunate, or in a derelict automobile if he is not. If the prairie and hills fail to yield wild 
game, the Indian often goes hungry.”50  
Similarly, a 1969 TIME article, ‘Indians: Squalor Amid Splendor’, depicted the Havasupai 
reservation in the Grand Canyon region in strongly stereotyped terms: “Against such 
natural splendor, the 370 members of the Havasupai tribe live, or exist, as one of the most 
impoverished groups in the U.S. The soaring cliffs of the canyon, once a shield against 
Apache warriors, have become walls of a prison.”51 This article typified TIME’s 
sensationalist writing on Indian affairs throughout the Termination period, demonstrating 
that intensely negative portrayals persisted in the press despite federal officials speaking of 
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slowing down the withdrawal process.52 Though the article recognised that the Havasupai 
had lived there for “ten centuries”, this historical context was not brought in to 
demonstrate the right of those people to be there or the significance of the lands to the 
tribe, as was the case in press writing opposing the Kinzua Dam controversy. Rather the 
article focused entirely on the difficulty of transporting goods to the area, and how tribal 
members refused to adapt to modern housing, terming the Havasupai “canyon dwellers, 
accustomed to huts made of rock, sheet metal or scrap wood”.53 This implication that the 
natural environment was not a suitable living place for humans further demonstrates the 
strength of social evolutionary thinking, suggesting that there was something ‘animalistic’ 
about the Havasupai tribe. 
The imagery of poverty, unemployment and ill-health permeated press writing on 
reservations throughout the Termination era. Though 1960s reservation development 
programmes through the OEO did herald an increased discussion of economic development 
potential in these regions, these coexisted with continued portrayals of reservations as 
‘degraded’ areas. Moreover, even reporting that supported reservation improvement was 
written exclusively through Euro-American value systems, judging the value of lands solely 
on economic terms, and usually overlooking the cultural and historic ties tribes retained 
with their communally-held lands. With reservation spaces so unequivocally presented as 
‘primitive’ loci of ‘squalor’, it is unsurprising that cuts to federal spending on them went 
largely unopposed. Only in cases like the Kinzua Dam controversy did significant opposition 
to the federal removal of Native people from their reservation occur. As such, the 
persistence of these representations demonstrates a hegemonic view that Natives would 
be better off without reservations, helping to explain support for Termination. 
                                                          
52
 See also: ‘National Service: Precept Corps’, TIME, 18 January 1963, www.time.com/archive 
(viewed: 18.6.2013). 
53






6.2. “A Place to Hang My Hat Up”: Navajo and Klamath tribal councils’ 
conceptions of reservation spaces 
 
In the interview quoted at the beginning of this chapter, former Commissioner Myer 
referred to reservations as areas that had been “set aside” for Indian use, indicating that 
after the Indian Wars the U.S. government had allowed tribes spaces in which to live.54 
While it is true that reservation boundaries were set out in nineteenth century treaties, it 
would be unfair to classify them as simply government impositions. Many tribes were 
forcibly moved – like the Five “Civilized” Tribes in the 1830s – but some reservations were 
situated on ancestral homelands. The Klamath reservation was established on a greatly 
diminished section of their lands, with the Modoc and Yahooskin tribes moved on to it 
under the provisions of the Treaty of 1864.55  Similarly, the Navajo reservation was 
established through their 1868 treaty, ending the tribe’s imprisonment at Bosque Redondo 
and allowing them to return to their traditional homelands.56  
Though violence and coercion was thus inherent in the making of both the Klamath and 
Navajo reservations, the historic connection of these tribes to those lands extends far 
beyond the establishment of the United States. In fact, the oral histories of both tribes 
locate them within those spaces: Diné knowledge centres on the creation of the tribal 
nation between the four sacred mountains which today still bound the Navajo Nation to 
the North, South, East and West; and the Klamath creation story tells of the cultural hero 
Gmok’am’c creating the Klamath, Modoc and Yahooskin in the vicinity of Klamath and other 
surrounding lakes.57 The influence of these specific histories and traditional beliefs on the 
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ways in which Navajo and Klamath tribal members spoke about their lands in the BIA-
monitored space of the tribal council must be assessed, in order to understand the local 
development of mid-twentieth century Indian policy.  
The growing number of Navajo Nation scholars ground their research within a Diné 
worldview, which has been passed down to them through a continuous tradition of oral 
history, language and location within their tribal homelands.58 Some characterise this new 
focus as a revitalisation of tribal identity; as Diné scholar Lloyd Lee has put it, “more than 
400 years of American colonization” has had an undeniable impact on Diné lifestyles and 
thinking, calling for citizens of the Navajo Nation today to work toward regaining and 
“decolonizing” ancestral lifestyles and knowledge.59 This work has led to an increasing 
scholarly focus on Diné philosophy and the foundational paradigm of Sa’ah Naagháí Bik’eh 
Hózhóón – meaning a person’s journey to health, happiness and prosperity.60 
In the Termination period, the Navajo were to a great extent still restricted by BIA 
paternalism, whilst negotiating steps toward greater tribal control of their assets, as 
previous chapters have shown. The tribal council did not reflect traditional Navajo 
leadership structures, but rather was a federal imposition based on Euro-American political 
structures.61 Nevertheless, many of the popularly elected delegates to the council 
represented the lower economic levels of the community, meaning council minutes 
encompass a diverse range of Navajo voices.62 These varied influences and beliefs 
particularly manifested in discussions of land and its appropriate uses in the tribal council. 
For instance, an October 1951 meeting focused on remaining grazing regulations and the 
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effects of New Deal stock reduction on the tribe and its wellbeing. Representative Tacchini 
Nez spoke in favour of following traditional lifeways and of the significance of the four 
mountains:  
“If the activities of the tribe were not interrupted seventeen years ago, they 
would be all right and I personally think the way my people think is that the 
eighteen land management districts set-up should be done away with and also 
the present existing grazing regulation and I think we should abide by our own 
laws, namely the four sacred mountains and we should live as we did centuries 
back and in that way, I think we could live peacefully…”63 
Nez evidently objected to 1930s stock reduction, a disastrous policy which saw BIA 
employees forcibly decreasing Navajo herd sizes, even shooting thousands of goats and 
sheep.64 Nez framed his criticisms within a specifically Navajo context, not only emphasising 
the significance of land for Navajo subsistence, but connecting the specific place of the 
reservation – between the four sacred mountains – to the governing structures of the tribe.  
Calling the four “sacred” mountains “laws” by which tribal members should abide thus 
shows that Nez indeed perceived being Navajo as a ‘landed citizenship’; tribal lands were 
not only significant as a home, but as informing the guidelines by which the Navajo should 
live in a political and social sense. Whether Nez was speaking literally or rhetorically, his 
speech presented a radical protest to BIA paternalism through a connection to Diné 
knowledge, according to which lessons from ancestors are considered important in dealing 
with the challenges of contemporary life.65 
Nez’s speech may seem extreme, but is unsurprising considering many 1950s council 
representatives had been involved in resisting or attempting to negotiate stock reduction 
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with BIA staff. Discussions of land in less inflammatory contexts were indeed more 
measured. In an October 1958 council meeting, for instance, the possibility of erecting a 
police radio mast on Navajo Mountain, a place central to Diné ontology, was debated.66 
Representative Dick Beyale, described by another council member as someone who knew 
“the ways of our Navajo Tribal traditions”, was invited to comment on the matter:  
“It is very true that we have this traditional Navajo Religion which we all 
respect, yes, we have these traditional stories and ancient history that we have 
about our air waves and other matters like that […], and it is very evident 
today as they were in those ancient days. So I see nothing wrong with today’s 
communication and with whatever communication was used back in those 
ancient days. […] It is merely another way of using what nature has provided. 
[…] It isn’t just for the people that are located in Navajo Mountain, but it is for 
the entire Navajo population.”67 
This statement shows that there was some debate surrounding the issue of whether the 
radio mast would be harmful according to traditional conceptions of land. Beyale’s 
response, however, demonstrates that Navajo knowledge was not necessarily considered 
incongruous with economic and technological developments of the land. Instead, he 
presented the police radio repeater as widely beneficial, not tarnishing the continuing 
significance of Navajo Mountain. 
At the same meeting, the tribal council passed a resolution commending Senator Clinton 
Anderson and Congressman Steward Udall “in appreciation of their outstanding service to 
the Navajo people in congress.”68 The services highlighted included successful support of a 
law securing the McCracken Mesa area for the tribe, a development Chairman Paul Jones 
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described as “a statesman like [sic] solution to a struggle over grazing rights between 
Navajo residents in San Juan County, Utah, and the powerful white ranchers seeking to 
exclude the Indians from their ancestral homes.”69 Council representative Ned Hatathli 
further expanded on the dispute and its origins, stating that “Navajos had lived for 
centuries” in McCracken Mesa and that “the Navajo Tribe is interested in acquiring land 
and not selling or relinquishing for any purpose because our Reservation is overpopulated 
and we need every square inch of land we can get.”70  
Both the historic ties of the Navajo to their land and its economic significance in 
improving living standards were evidently important for the tribe. Councilwoman Annie 
Wauneka supported the praise of Udall and Anderson, expressing this appreciation within 
the framework of “the traditional Navajo method”, requesting information on the officials’ 
backgrounds: “We Navajos have a way and have tradition as to how to recognize a friend 
and someone that we can support. That is done through what we know as the Clan 
System.”71 This reference to traditional Diné identification through their clan system 
supports the sense that tribal representatives appreciated the regaining of land as an 
affirmation of their tribal identity and community.72 
Interestingly, Senator Anderson, despite helping to guarantee this land for the tribe, was 
an avid Terminationist, even supporting a March 1961 report from the Comptroller General 
which recommended the termination of Indian tribes without their consent.73 He made no 
clear reference at this meeting to his motivations in supporting the bill, but his later speech 
revealed he viewed the value of reservation lands as mainly resource-based. Telling the 
tribe to “never let go” of their oil reserves, he stated: “you are not only the largest but you 
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are going to be the richest tribe America has ever known.”74 It is likely that Anderson 
viewed the Navajo as “predominantly Indian” and not yet ready for Termination, in 
accordance with Zimmerman’s list. Indeed, he had in a 1955 letter condemned attempts to 
remove tribal trust status without “a well thought out and planned program for the 
management of tribal assets following termination.”75 Anderson’s emphasis on material 
wealth in speaking to the council indicates that he saw securing the area as a step toward 
Navajo integration into the American capitalist economy, by gaining economic resources 
that would allow tribal members to become self-sufficient and thus facilitate eventual 
Termination. While Anderson’s vision of the land as a resource may have contrasted to the 
Navajo descriptions of “ancestral homes”, in this case these interests of Anderson and the 
Navajo tribe converged. 
The tribal council minutes thus contain underlying hints of Navajo knowledge, though 
the values detailed in present Diné scholarship are not explicitly mentioned. This may 
partially be down to translation work – as mentioned before, some of the discussions in 
meetings were held in Navajo, translated to Euro-American stenographers by tribal 
members. Due to these language barriers, some epistemological nuances may have gone 
unrecorded. These concepts have, however, been passed down through oral history, as 
demonstrated by the autobiography of Frank Mitchell, a traditional Navajo Singer who lived 
through most of the Termination period (1881-1967). In telling the story of his life, Mitchell 
included traditional Diné songs which spoke about Sa’ah Naagháí Bik’eh Hózhóón as “the 
main beam” of a “sacred house”.76 
Probably the most significant explanation for why Diné knowledge and its relation to the 
land were not explicitly discussed in council meetings is the presence of non-Navajo officials 
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at virtually every meeting. Organised by the BIA, council meetings may have been 
considered an inappropriate arena to discuss tribal knowledge in depth. Furthermore, while 
the council did gradually earn the respect of Navajo tribal members, they did not displace 
more traditional “medicine men”, local leaders known as naataanii and ceremonies like the 
Blessing Way and Protection Way.77 Tribal members, therefore, had other outlets through 
which to express and practice their traditional beliefs, outside meetings at which federal 
officials were present, and only mentioned traditional beliefs at times where Navajo lands 
were explicitly threatened. 
Indeed, many tribes – including the Navajo Nation – consider their traditional beliefs 
private – knowledge that is only to be shared with select community members.  For 
instance, Mohegan anthropologist Gladys Tantaquideon described tribal elders as 
considering their traditional knowledge as “personal property”, to be disclosed only to 
appropriate individuals at puberty as a spiritual gift.78 Furthermore, the private nature of 
Native belief systems may in part be due to the power structures inherent in American 
society, which delegitimised Native beliefs as “primitive”; Tantaquideon found that Euro-
American scholars in the 1920s and 1930s ridiculed Natives as “superstitious”, and that 
tribal members often refused to disclose information about their beliefs to anthropologists, 
even sometimes giving fictional accounts.79 Privacy is similarly an important aspect of the 
traditional belief systems of the present day Klamath Tribes. As noted by Patrick Haynal, 
personal spiritual matters, particularly pertaining to traditional sacred cultural places in the 
“Klamath/Modoc landscape”, are considered private matters and usually not publicly 
discussed by tribal members.80 Nevertheless, today Klamath tribal members speak openly 
                                                          
77
 Wilkins, Navajo Political Experience, pp. 68–79; Emerson, ‘Diné Culture, Decolonization, and the 
Politics of Hózhó’, p. 61. 
78
 Melissa Jayne Fawcett, Medicine Trail: The Life and Lessons of Gladys Tantaquideon (Tucson, 
2000), p. 84. 
79
 Ibid., pp. 69-71. 
80





about the socio-economic significance of their ancestral lands, and regaining those lost 
through Termination is today the Klamath Tribes’ top priority.81 In October 2015, tribal 
member Fernando Herrera described land as “everything” to the Klamath: “It was where 
our people lived all this time. This is our heritage, this is our roots, this is our livelihood. I 
mean this is where we hunted, we fished, everything was there. Our water. It comes from 
our land. It’s our culture.”82 
This recent statement strongly contrasts with the views of federal officials like Orme 
Lewis, who in 1954 claimed the Klamath were assimilated and that there remained “little 
vestige of religious or their traditional Indian customs”.83 Examining discussions 
surrounding land can help assess these claims, taking into account the nature of the tribal 
council as established and monitored by the BIA. Early 1950s minutes demonstrate that the 
Klamath council was dissatisfied with BIA control over their lands. President Seldon Kirk 
repeatedly declared his frustration with trust status and federal paternalism throughout the 
early 1950s.84 In a 1950 meeting, for instance, he spoke decrying the lack of tribal control 
over their lands and resources, criticising federal statements that Klamath timber would be 
cut on a sustained yield basis indefinitely: 
“Does that mean that the United States government intends to hold the 
reservation the rest of our lives, generation to generation, so on and so forth? 
[…] They say the Indians don’t know how to take care of themselves, - I don’t 
see why they can’t. […] let’s make some move through our delegates to initiate 
some legislation whereby the Indians will be recognized, will have some 
voice.”85 
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Significantly, while Kirk expressed the wish to eradicate federal control, he spoke of the 
Klamath tribe working together to control their resources, calling for the establishment of 
an executive committee to help decide on matters relating to the tribe. These concerns 
reflect Kirk’s varied background and education; descended from a long line of tribal leaders 
since the Treaty of 1864, records show Kirk attended boarding schools in Carlisle and 
Phoenix, and worked in the Klamath Agency as a police officer in the 1910s, as well as being 
a small ranch holder and carpenter.86 His belief in Klamath ability evidently stemmed from 
his own successes and experiences, but he maintained support for the tribe remaining a 
unified group. 
However, this frustration with the federal government dictating how tribal lands and 
resources were to be used contributed to support for the individual withdrawal bill 
discussed in the previous chapter. Wade Crawford, for instance, advocated allowing 
individuals wishing to withdraw from the tribe to take their share of tribal assets in land, 
rather than cash, justifying this based on the economic benefits of land for stockholders, 
claiming this would “be a good thing for the tribe and for the individual.”87 Tribal 
representatives Boyd Jackson, Dice Crane and Hiram Robbins objected strongly to this 
suggestion. Jackson, in particular, presented a differing economic model for facilitating the 
withdrawal of individual Klamaths, stating the tribe should pay withdrawing members in 
cash and then allow them to lease lands surrounding their individual allotments to generate 
important income for remaining tribal members for years to come. Jackson thus 
foregrounded economic concerns, but focused on those of the Klamath community: “We 
would still have the land, - we don’t have enough land to begin with. We want to realize all 
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we can from the land […].”88 At this point little dispute remained over whether individual 
members should be allowed to withdraw, but Crawford and Jackson already strongly 
disagreed on whether individual or communal interests should be prioritised in land use.   
Significantly, conversation on the issue was then continued in Klamath as tribal 
executive member James Johnson “talked in Klamath for several minutes, receiving 
applause” and “Byram Lotches talked in Klamath for some time, receiving applause.” Due to 
the nature of council minutes being English-only, more nuanced explanations of the 
significance of the land that may have been stated in Klamath are not here recorded. These 
Klamath language discussions are evidence of the agency practiced by tribal members, in 
hosting discussions in their own language when choosing to exclude outsiders from the 
conversation. A vote followed these discussions, rejecting the idea of paying off 
withdrawing members with land by an overwhelming vote of sixty-four to four, 
demonstrating that support for retaining lands in tribal ownership was strong within the 
council.89 Though the individual withdrawal bill was forgotten once Termination became 
official federal policy, these discussions are significant in determining the influence of issues 
of land and how it should be handled.90 
However, after PL 587 was passed, discussions surrounding land shifted significantly, as 
Termination became an imminent prospect. While Klamaths had different plans for the 
tribe’s economic future – either through development on an individual or communal level – 
pre-1953, frustration with BIA control over lands and assets was shared. Significantly there 
was no clear threat to the Klamath land base at this point, though their reservation had 
been diminished by turn-of-the-century allotment. While the tribe was mentioned in HCR 
108, the resolution made no reference to land. Federal plans for Klamath management 






 Jackson and Crawford also debated whether a Chiloquin timber mill should be under tribal 





after Termination became clearer once PL 587 was passed, presenting a convoluted 
framework for tribal members to remain with a collective under an alternate trust system, 
or withdraw with a share of cash, to be procured by selling off land and assets. At this point, 
discussions shifted away from just economic concerns to speaking more broadly of the 
reservation as “home”, “heritage” and “inheritance”. As it became increasingly evident to 
Klamath tribal members that federal plans would end up not only removing trust status, 
but potentially lead to a substantial loss of land, discussions of the reservation as “home” 
formed the basis for resistance to Termination.  
During a January 1955 General Council meeting, for instance, several members of the 
tribal Executive Committee expressed concern about losing the reservation through PL 587. 
At this early stage in the process, rather than opposing withdrawal outright, Jackson spoke 
out against hiring businessmen with potential vested interest in Klamath lands as 
Termination Management Specialists. He expressed a sense of powerlessness over the 
Termination process, stating: “We are up against a stone wall, so to speak, and this 
reservation represents our home, the last we have got, and we will hang on to it […]. ”91 The 
minutes state that as Jackson spoke, the council meeting became chaotic, to the point that 
“confusion through the room became so loud the President finally had to stop him.” 
However, Jackson refused to be silenced, again presenting his argument for protecting the 
reservation as the tribal home: 
“The whole thing is nobody knows where to begin it, nobody knows, not even 
those who passed the law. It’s a new chapter in life, the handling of Indian life. 
[…] I would like to have a place where I can hang my hat up and nobody can 
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throw it out, but if we don’t watch our p’s and q’s we won’t have. That’s what I 
am afraid of.”92 
Jackson’s stance was supported by fellow Klamath Executive Committee member 
Dorothy McAnulty. In a long speech opposing the wholesale withdrawal of tribal trust 
status, McAnulty stated: “[…] this as I understood it was our home permanently, paid for by 
the blood of our forefathers.”93 Both Jackson and McAnulty referred to the reservation as a 
home – McAnulty specifically used this term, and Jackson’s evoked the same meaning in 
referring to “a place where I can hang my hat”. Neither here referred to traditional Klamath 
or Modoc spiritual significance of the land, but they nevertheless prioritised the 
reservation’s significance as their home, not just as a resource to be effectively managed. 
While neither explicitly commented on ancestral connections to the land, McAnulty’s 
reference to “forefathers” hints at it. To this day, Klamath tribal members believe that their 
lands were provided for them by Gmok’am’c, who former Klamath culture and heritage 
director Gordon Bettles described as “the one that created the world as we know it” and “is 
said to have lived on the top of Mount Shasta”, visible from the former reservation.94 The 
sense of the cultural significance of the land is implicit in McAnulty’s speech, as she 
presented tribal members as having a perpetual relationship with those lands, due to their 
ancestral links to the area and sacrifices of their “forefathers” in maintaining them. 
Furthermore, both Jackson and McAnulty expressed pain in speaking of the loss of the 
reservation: Jackson stated he was “afraid” and McAnulty later in her speech argued that PL 
587 was “definitely against our desires”.95 As the final Termination date drew nearer, both 
the sense of confusion over what it would involve and the emotional connection to the 
traditional tribal homelands became ever clearer. In various 1957 and 1958 meetings 
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Jackson and President Kirk continued to make statements speaking of their “home” and 
“heritage”.96 The strongest indictment against Termination came, however, from an 
anonymous female member of the General Council. In an extended speech criticising the 
lack of information on withdrawal provided to tribal members, she stated: 
“[…]I love this place, as who doesn’t love their home. It is sad – it hurts in [sic] 
deep within me to have to give up what has been ours for so long. […] Free 
grazing, irrigation at the least that we, as Indians, had to pay. These were some 
of the things I know of – I know we enjoy, along with our hunting and other 
rights. So now we come to the place where we, the indian [sic] people, have to 
give up our home. […] And I approve of what Mr. Kirk said, this public law is a 
means of robbing us of what we have left.”97 
This tribal member associated the reservation with “home”, the subsistence it provided, 
and the treaty rights of the tribe. 
President Kirk’s statement which this “unnamed lady” referred to, detailed the tribe’s 
historical links to the land. The meeting minutes state that “Mr. Kirk quoted an Indian 
legend with regard to the setting of the boundaries in the treaty of 1864”.98 Unfortunately, 
this section of the speech was not included in full, with the stenographer noting that “noise 
in the hall […] and Mr Kirk’s throat ailment” prevented transcription.99 However, 
considering the rest of the speech was quoted at length and this section disregarded as just 
a “legend” indicates the stenographer may not have considered it necessary to attempt 
transcription. It is nevertheless evident that Kirk, and others, referenced Klamath oral 
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history at appropriate points in council discussions. Furthermore, the minutes contain Kirk’s 
statement on the value of his identity and its connection to land:  
“I am a Klamath Indian, part Modoc, and I claim that the Klamath and Modoc 
made an agreement with the United States to have the reservation here 
permanent – as long as the waters of the streams have flown, as long as the 
hills have stood, as long as the sun rises in the east. The United States robbed 
the Indian of the land […].”100 
Kirk clearly saw the 1864 Treaty as far more significant and valuable than Terminationist 
officials did. In addition, Kirk’s statement presented the land – and by extension the 
Klamath and Modoc tribes’ relationship with it – as eternal.  
Though detailed descriptions of tribal legends and beliefs are not provided in the 
minutes of the Klamath General and Executive Council meetings of the 1950s, statements 
like these indicate that tribal members nevertheless deeply connected their tribal identity 
to the natural environment of southern Oregon, a relationship which is maintained among 
the Klamath Tribes today. In October 2015 Bettles described natural landmarks and oral 
history as documenting the boundaries of the Klamath homelands: “[…] the legends that 
are listed in these mountain tops, these peaks show the minimum boundary of where our 
cultural world existed”.101 Charles Kimbol, former tribal chairman, stated that same month 
that according to Klamath oral history, the reservation borders ran from “peak to peak”, 
emphasising the natural markers that bound their lands.102 Both Bettles and Kimbol’s 
statements demonstrate that the oral history surrounding the treaty of 1864 that Kirk 
referred to in 1957 continues to be passed down among Klamath tribal members. This 
language of the reservation as part of the tribe’s homelands formed a basis for resistance 
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to PL 587, highlighting the historic rights of the tribe to their land as well as its significance 
for Klamath culture and identity. 
Both the Navajo and Klamath tribal councils, then, displayed strong support for retaining 
lands for their tribal communities, justifying this on economic, historic, and cultural 
grounds. That the spiritual significance of these lands was not usually publicly discussed in 
tribal council meetings does not mean that traditional beliefs were forgotten; rather it 
reflects the nature of Termination era tribal councils as mainly arenas in which to deal with 
administrative matters and to negotiate with the BIA, and indicates selective transcription 
by Euro-American stenographers. Even where the significance of lands and home were 
more clearly communicated, as in Klamath General Council meetings after the passing of PL 
587, these tribal understandings of land and their relationship to it had little impact on 
federal policy. This attests to the continued strong paternalism in the federal-tribal 
relationship; despite Termination rhetoric speaking of “freedom” in land ownership, this 
did not stretch to the freedom to continue to own their lands communally. 
 
6.3. Allotment legacies: individual vs. communal land ownership 
 
The mainstream public charged reservations with causing dependency and obstructing 
assimilation, while Klamath and Navajo tribal council members did not see reservations and 
industrial development as incongruous, viewing their lands as spiritually, historically and 
economically significant. It was thus generally accepted that reservations were problematic 
spaces, but the solutions offered diverged dramatically, even within tribal groups. These 
different visions of the future for tribes were largely based on what was perceived as the 





Such debates were rooted in turn-of-the-century assimilation policies, based on the 
belief that individual land ownership signified the highest level of ‘civilization’. Assimilation-
era policy rhetoric moreover explicitly focused on efficient land use, and the need for lands 
to be productively cultivated, based on the belief that Native Americans were idle. The 
main congressional proponent of assimilation policy, Senator Henry Dawes, explicitly 
articulated the belief that individual land ownership was necessary to secure productive 
Native land use in a 1902 report on the Cherokee tribe: “There is no selfishness, which is at 
the bottom of civilization. Till this people will consent to give up their lands, and divide 
them among their citizens so that each can own the land he cultivates, they will not make 
much more progress.”103 Framing Native land use as inefficient also justified the transfer of 
reservation lands to Euro-American ownership: the 1887 Dawes Act opened up 20,000,000 
acres of “surplus lands” for sale and allowed non-Native leases on allotted lands.104  As a 
result, tribal land ownership patterns were severely complicated; by the mid-twentieth 
century the land bases of many tribes included both individual allotments – some of which 
remained under trust status – and communal lands.105 Despite these serious complications 
caused by allotment, the belief in individual land ownership formed the basis for 
Terminationist criticisms of communal land holdings.106 
The persistence of this ideology is neatly epitomised by the comments of Thomas Hatch, 
head of the BIA Department of Extension and Credit, in his first meeting with the 
Mississippi Choctaw council in January 1951. In discussing the future of the tribe’s land 
management, Hatch described the Oklahoma Choctaw, whose lands had been parcelled by 
allotment, as better off than their Mississippi compatriots, concluding with the statement:  
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“The final answer […] is that when you people in the end will own a piece of 
land and operate it, that’s when you forget you belong to a tribe and become a 
citizen and become happy and fix your house when you want it fixed and not 
wait until somebody else fixes it.”107 
Hatch evidently believed in the transformative effect of land ownership, and its ability to 
make Indians become citizens. His speech implied that without individual ownership of 
lands, the Choctaws would remain ‘idle’ and ‘lazy’, not taking responsibility for their own 
lives. Lands held communally in trust by the government were, by proxy, presented as a 
major obstacle to ‘progress’. 
Interestingly, Hatch’s speech presents a rare example of individual land ownership being 
explicitly discussed in conjuncture with mid-twentieth century Indian policy. The 
transformative effect of individual land ownership did not play a central role in Termination 
rhetoric; as mentioned in Chapter One, Commissioner Myer even declared to the Navajo 
council that it was not his intention to “liquidate” tribal lands.108 Taking into account the 
fact that allotment was widely accepted as harmful by the mid-twentieth century, federal 
officials may have deliberately avoided speaking of the effects of trust status withdrawal on 
tribal lands. Indeed, in interacting with the press, federal officials made explicit statements 
distinguishing Termination from assimilation, both before and after tribal Termination Acts 
were first passed. In 1947, the Monitor released a report on Indian policy developments 
that described Congress as moving “carefully” to remove tribal trusteeship and stated that 
past mistakes would not be repeated. It also contained assurances from government 
officials that the “release of the lands would not result in the wholesale dispossession of 
Indians from their lands such as occurred in the decades from 1890 to 1920.”109  
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Similarly, in a December 1955 Monitor piece Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay 
responded to criticisms that Termination policy was aimed at the “dispersal of Indian 
communities” by rejecting associations to past policy:  
“Mr. McKay denied emphatically that the administration had any intention of 
letting Indian lands revert to white ownership. ‘Our principal point,’ he said, ‘is 
that the solution need not be sought and must not be sought, as it was in the 
past, by denying or frustrating the property rights of an Indian who has 
demonstrated his competence’ – including his right to sell his land.”110 
 McKay did not explicitly refer to the Dawes Act, but nevertheless evidently wanted to 
distance himself from the disastrous Native land loss that had resulted from allotment. 
Instead he prioritised individual rights of the Indians, implying that the problem with past 
policies was that they had maintained restrictions over land sales for a period of 25 
years.111 In this respect, it appears that McKay may have deemed the Dawes Act too 
limiting, while still acknowledging the serious Native land loss that had resulted from 
assimilationist policies.  
Furthermore, despite claiming in 1955 that the policies he supported as Interior 
Secretary would not lead to a white land-grab, McKay had already backed the 1954 Klamath 
Termination Act which unambiguously provided for the sale of Klamath reservation lands to 
pay off members of the tribe who chose to withdraw.112 His public statements, as such, did 
not match his policy-making in practice. In 1993 Bill Brainard, leader of the Terminated 
Confederated Tribes of Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians, epitomised the 
frustration of Oregon Natives with McKay’s Termination tactics, declaring: “I believe 
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Douglas McKay is one of the biggest damn liars out. And I think that they wanted the little 
bit of land that was left.”113 
Despite federal officials’ public attempts to differentiate Termination efforts from past 
policies, tribal council representatives of various tribes did not hesitate to bring up 
historical precedents of land loss in contesting BIA land management, particularly later in 
the 1950s.  This is evident in 1956 Inter-Tribal Council debates surrounding federal plans to 
sell land on behalf of the Five Tribes. Having survived forced removals in the 1830s, the 
Tribes re-established systems of self-government in present day Oklahoma on a communal 
land use basis, giving tribal members the right to occupy and cultivate lands, with title 
reverting back to the tribe when use ceased.114 These self-governing structures were 
systematically dismantled through early twentieth century allotment, with only small town 
sites retained as tribal trust lands.115 In 1956 Cherokee representative Hill Stansill referred 
to this fraught history in speaking against the sale of Five Tribes lands: “[…] where will they 
go – if you are going to do that – give them a place to go. […] before you know it, we will 
have another Trail of Tears, because the Indians do not have a bit of land, and the Indians 
ought to have a voice in it.”116 Moreover, the Inter-Tribal Council resolved to send tribal 
delegates to Washington to inquire about the issue, and to make sure that trust lands 
would not be transferred to state ownership or sold, even if profits were to be distributed 
among the Tribes, thus demonstrating that though most of the lands of the Five Tribes 
were already allotted, council members wished to retain the rest in communal holdings. 
Similarly, Boyd Jackson brought up issues caused by allotment at a Klamath tribal council 
meeting in 1959, reading out a report expressing fears that lands would be lost through 
Termination:  “That policy was the key to open the doors of the Klamath Reservation to the 
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public, who took over 100,000 acres of the best lands of the allottees. And here again […] 
history repeats through the loss of lands by the Indians.”117 This fear of land loss became a 
reality in 1969 when remaining tribal members voted to end the National Bank of Oregon’s 
trust over the tribe, in response to which the Bank sold off the remaining lands without 
warning and distributed the money amongst the remaining members.118 
However, not all Klamaths viewed individual land ownership through allotment as 
destructive. Considering Wade Crawford came from a family of wealthy cattlemen who had 
presumably personally benefitted from the allotment system, it is unsurprising that he 
consistently spoke disparagingly of both the reservation and communal land ownership in 
general.119 In a summer 1951 speech that spanned six uninterrupted pages of the tribal 
council minutes, Crawford derided federal control over tribal lands, objecting to the 
establishment of further tribal industries and lumber contracts.  Crawford accused the BIA 
of trying to “hold down a race of people that is striving for individual enterprise and the 
right to call your home your own, and your hat your own.”120  
Interestingly, while Crawford and Jackson strongly disagreed on Termination matters, 
both drew on the folksy American image of “one’s hat” as a marker of home to justify their 
stance; as demonstrated by Jackson’s 1955 speech quoted in the previous section. 
Crawford drew on this image to criticise communal ownership as causing federal 
dependency, stating further that tribes should “take their place with non-Indians”: “That’s 
the way this great country was built, private enterprise, initiative, ambition to look out for 
yourself. That’s the way it will be unless Russia moves into this country.”121 Crawford 
evidently subscribed to the prominent mainstream view of reservations as harmful and 
causing dependency, exacerbated by Cold War tensions, exhibiting not only frustration with 
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paternalism and the economic problems of the tribe, but viewing communal ownership as 
fundamentally incongruous with the American society he identified as a citizen of. 
Crawford’s outspoken nature and strong statements against federal paternalism were 
reportedly applauded by the Klamath audience, indicating he had some support among the 
Klamath General Council. Critically, these meetings in which he spoke about individual land 
ownership were held before the Klamath Termination Act was passed. After the 
Termination process had been set in motion, and more vocal expressions of the significance 
of the reservation were expressed in meetings, strong criticisms of Crawford also appeared. 
At a 1954 meeting, a report by Boyd Jackson and Jesse Kirk, elected Washington delegates 
of the tribe, was read out. It questioned Crawford’s right to represent the tribe, and quoted 
him addressing the Indian Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs: “I do believe our group, numbering some 300 members of the Reservation, who 
believe in our individual rights, and we want to live in Oregon under the laws of Oregon as 
citizens of Oregon and we do not want to be living under any other.”122 Crawford’s 
statement was offered as evidence of his not representing Klamath opinion. Indeed, a 
resolution was passed at the same meeting denying tribal funds for travel to Washington 
from anyone who was not “an official delegate of the tribe”. This was adopted with a small 
majority of forty-eight votes for to thirty-one votes against, indicating that some support 
for Crawford’s views persisted at this early stage of withdrawal. The main issue thus 
dividing the irreconcilable Klamath factions was whether individual or communal land 
ownership would most benefit tribal members. Both sides considered the reservation 
economically significant, but differed over whether tribal members would be aided more by 
splitting up assets or maintaining communal ownership and tribal identity.  
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Though Crawford characterised the BIA as paternalistic, many bureau officials shared his 
zeal for individual land ownership, as the above 1951 quote by Hatch demonstrates. Later 
that year Mississippi Choctaw tribal members were also told that individual land ownership 
was the only way they could come to make use of their lands, with a BIA employee stating: 
“If the tribe wants to use the land, it is up to you all to decide on individual holding of tribal 
lands.”123 Even when not addressing tribal members, BIA staff focused on the tribe’s 
readiness for individual land ownership, as evidenced by a remark by Tribal Relations 
Officer Marie Hayes in a 1952 report that “[t]he Indians appear to be interested in 
individual enterprises and owning their own land and homes.”124 Seeing as this report was 
only intended for BIA staff, and not tribal members, it demonstrates the aims and focus of 
officials in dealing with tribes in this period. The report also noted that Mississippi Choctaw 
children “sang well in English”, further indicating that assimilation into Euro-American 
society – both culturally and economically – was of considerable interest to regional BIA 
officials in the years preceding Termination.  
However, in March 1952 BIA employees in Mississippi appear to have reversed their 
stance on land ownership. In a Special Session of the tribal council, Hatch explicitly 
promoted land ownership as a community, stating:  
“You are to think at all times that this ‘land’ belongs to the Choctaw Indians. 
When you begin to see it that way, you will begin to things [sic] in connection 
with these regulations. In taking action as the Tribal Council, you are to 
prepare to respect all of the happenings to all people – you are to think in 
terms of the Tribe – not on an individual basis.”125 
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While this statement seems completely contrary to his previous stance on land ownership, 
it must be taken into account that he spoke of tribal land holdings whilst introducing the 
BIA’s newly proposed land management plan for the Mississippi Choctaw.126 This plan 
reflects the position of the Choctaw in Congressional Termination plans, which projected 
them as by no means ready for withdrawal of trust status in the near future.127 Indeed, 
tribal trust lands had only been reclassified as a reservation in 1944 to ease BIA 
administration of the tribe.128 In this respect, the BIA may have seen maintaining a tribal 
land base as necessary for the economic and educational development of the tribe, a way 
in which to facilitate eventual assimilation into the mainstream. In this sense, Hatch’s 
motivations were similar to Senator Anderson’s later support for Navajo land acquisition – 
developing tribal lands was seen as a necessary stage in progressing toward “civilization”. 
Indeed, though the BIA plan retained Mississippi Choctaw land holdings communally, it 
provided the reservation superintendent with significant control in administering leases to 
tribal members and evicting them, if rents were not paid.129 
This management plan aimed to simplify the complex state of affairs of Mississippi 
Choctaw property management. Many tribal members had held farms on loan systems 
from the government until these lands reverted to trust status in 1946 as a result of 
defaults on payments.130 The BIA had then assumed total control of Choctaw lands, 
requiring the tribal council to charge members fees for the use of homesteads. Tribal 
members, in turn, were often unable or unwilling to pay these leases – largely due to 
provisions in their 1864 Treaty which promised that heads of families would be granted fee 
simple allotments of at least 640 acres.131 This had been a compromise to allow tribal 
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members to remain in Mississippi, as according to the treaty anyone not accepting an 
allotment would be faced with removal from the area, but by the mid-twentieth century 
these promises remained largely unmet. In this respect, a form of individual land ownership 
was a Mississippi Choctaw treaty right, one which had not been fulfilled by the 1950s, as 
Choctaws were obligated to pay leases for the use of lands that they perceived as already 
belonging to themselves. As Katherine Osburn has shown, the payment of leases for the 
use of reservation lands was a continuous point of conflict within the tribal council.132 
These frustrations were exhibited in council meetings as calls for individual land 
ownership.  For instance, at a January 1953 tribal council meeting, Chairman Joe Chitto 
responded to discussion on the problems caused by Mississippi Choctaw sharecropping and 
land assignments by stating: “(We) want individual land ownership anyway we can get 
it!”133 Read out of context, this statement may appear to support federal efforts of 
Termination. However, Chitto spoke specifically of the need to avoid sharecropping – a 
system which kept many Choctaws living in severe poverty, with farming families only 
earning an average of 307 dollars per annum post-WWII.134 Moreover, Chitto had been 
involved with the tribal council since its inception in the New Deal era, and had consistently 
resisted what he felt to be unnecessary federal involvement in tribal community matters.135  
His background thus indicates that he may not have interpreted individual land ownership 
as leading to assimilation, but rather viewed it as a method of eradicating BIA paternalist 
management of the tribe. 
Discussions of individual land ownership were brought up again by Chitto and fellow 
Choctaw delegates on a visit with Area Director W.O. Roberts in the Muskogee Area Office 
in February 1954, a meeting held specifically to discuss the BIA management plan. In the 
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brief record retained of this meeting, Roberts promised to “explore means for making it 
possible to purchase land, if the full Council desired” at the delegates’ request, indicating 
that the council was indeed interested in land ownership.136 However, the minutes also 
note that delegates felt “the government had made promises to the Indians in earlier days 
and that these promises had not been kept and that there should be some reexamination 
of these promises and some effort made to keep them.”137 The brief report at no point 
quoted tribal representatives, but this reference demonstrates they were unhappy with BIA 
treatment and felt government “promises” had been broken. This is likely a reference to 
the unfulfilled land provisions of the 1864 treaty. 
In referring to “individual land ownership” the Mississippi Choctaw Tribal Council was 
thus challenging BIA control over their administration, and advocating the fulfilment of 
their treaty agreement with the government. This vision of property management was 
considerably different to – for instance – BIA employee Tom Hatch’s views that individual 
land ownership would lead to “forgetting” one’s Indian identity. Indeed, it appears that the 
council saw individual ownership as a method for the tribe to retain lands. This is evident in 
council representative Baxter York’s statement at a  December 1951 tribal council meeting, 
that he did not “object to individual holding of tribal lands”, as it would enable “the tribes 
[to] hold on to their land as long as possible.”138 Tribal members, then, did not necessarily 
see individual land ownership and the persistence of the tribal community as mutually 
exclusive. The tribe continued to prioritise the significance of the Choctaw language to 
contest federal impositions over the tribe, as tribal member J.C. Allen’s 1953 complaint that 
the tribe’s Constitution and By-Laws were written in “white men’s words” attests, after 
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which discussions were conducted in Choctaw.139 Furthermore, community clubs and 
Choctaw fairs were run throughout the period, showcasing how much they valued their 
identity as a tribe.140 
In the mid-1960s, once land management plans had been settled between the council 
and the BIA, the Mississippi Choctaw minutes show that discussions shifted away from 
conversations of individual ownership toward assertions of the need to gain lands for tribal 
ownership. As mentioned in Chapter Four, in January 1965, the tribal council unanimously 
adopted a resolution to purchase “700 acres of land adjacent to Tribal lands in the Pearl 
River Community”.141 The resolution stated unequivocally that “it is the desire of the Band 
to purchase additional land to be used for the benefit of the Band and its members.”142 
Moreover, the topic of purchasing additional lands specifically for the tribe as a whole came 
up frequently in council meetings in 1965 and 1966, supported by 1960s federal 
development programs.143 This evident interest in land and the consistent appeals to 
purchase lands communally support Osburn’s contention that farm lands were critical to 
Choctaw identity, with 1960s tribal council efforts focused on regaining lands the Band had 
lost throughout its history with the United States.144 Unlike Wade Crawford, these 
Mississippi Choctaw tribal members did not speak of individual land ownership to justify 
the liquidation of the tribe. Rather, their case complicates the predominant historical 
narrative that individual land ownership was synonymous with Termination and 
incongruous with retaining tribal communities, demonstrating how tribal members in fact 
attempted to gain property ownership to bolster their self-determination.  
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Considering individual land ownership patterns and the retention of tribal identity as not 
inherently conflicting also offers a fresh perspective on the near-miss case of Oklahoma 
Choctaw Termination. Choctaw Principal Chief Harry Belvin explained his support for the 
tribe’s Termination at a 1958 Inter-Tribal Council meeting, referring to the status of 
Choctaw lands as already consisting mainly of individual allotments, on which some federal 
restrictions operated. Belvin’s intention, as the 1958 meeting shows, was to sell off 
remaining communally-held tribal lands and divide the proceeds amongst members on an 
individual basis.145 As Oklahoma Choctaw ethnohistorian Valerie Lambert has 
demonstrated, Belvin saw the tribe as already terminated as a result of allotment policy 
and the disintegration of tribal governments as a result of the 1906 Five Tribes Act.146 
Indeed, Inter-Tribal Council meeting minutes record Belvin as stating that “actually the 
1906 Act in effect has been a ‘termination’ program for the Five Civilized Tribes…” and state 
he was “of the opinion the Choctaws would not lose a thing […] should H.R. 2722 be 
enacted.”147 This claim supports Lambert’s argument, showing that Belvin viewed 
Termination as simply a natural extension of allotment era-processes. Indeed, there is little 
doubt that Belvin supported Choctaw assimilation into the mainstream; as Principal Chief 
he had since 1948, for example, encouraged tribal members to speak only English and to 
attend white schools.148 
Oklahoma Choctaw Termination was little discussed at Inter-Tribal council meetings, 
with representatives of other tribes expressing concern that services might be lost, but 
determining ultimately that the Council was not to “inject itself into individual tribal 
affairs.”149 Discussions between Choctaw tribal members, moreover, were not recorded in 
the Inter-Tribal Council’s minutes. However, Lambert has argued, that in communicating 
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with tribal members, Belvin concealed the nature of the act, emphasising the economic 
importance of per capita payments from land sales for combatting the problems of 
unemployment and poverty.150 The Inter-Tribal Council minutes support this contention to 
an extent; though Belvin here spoke openly of Termination, he claimed the act would “not 
affect the services which the Bureau provides for needy groups, such as schools, hospitals, 
the welfare program, and the non-taxable status of individually owned Indian lands.”151 It is 
unclear how accurate these claims would have been in practice; after news spread through 
Choctaw youth and urban activist movements in 1969 that the act would terminate the 
tribe’s trust status, a campaign against it was mounted, resulting in its repeal in August 
1970.152 This unsuccessful end to Oklahoma Choctaw Termination demonstrates that 
though tribal members evidently did not protest the sale of communal lands to be 
distributed per capita, the loss of trust status and federal recognition was not widely 
supported. As in the Mississippi Choctaw case, individual land ownership was not seen as 
incongruous with retaining tribal identity and status.  
Furthermore, while Choctaw representatives appeared to support the sale of remaining 
tribal lands in Inter-Tribal council meetings, other Five Tribes leaders spoke in favour of 
retaining, and even regaining, lands for tribal ownership, despite not having formal 
reservations. For instance, discussions of Indian-owned lands having been erroneously put 
on state tax rolls came up consistently in meetings throughout the 1950s. In 1957 Area 
Director Paul Fickinger responded to what he called “rumours” that restrictions on Indian 
properties would be removed and tribal members be made to pay taxes on their lands, 
assuring all council representatives that county treasurers throughout the region had been 
informed this was “not true”.153 Though the minutes do not contain the response of any 
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council representatives to this, since discussions of losing restrictions came up frequently in 
tribal council meetings, it seems that this was a major concern among members of the Five 
Tribes.154 
This impression is reinforced by the statement of Cherokee Principal Chief W.W. Keeler 
at a December 1955 meeting discussing Termination policy and the removal of restrictions 
on land. The minutes record Keeler as stating “the Cherokees do not wish to dispose of any 
tribal lands” and that “the lands should be transferred free of debt to the Tribe.”155 Keeler’s 
paraphrased speech in the minutes also presented him as willing to negotiate taxation, if 
the state would then allow Cherokee tribal ownership of the lands in question, stating: “We 
should be willing to assume this obligation, if that is the only question involved in taking 
over these lands”. This proves that council representatives who, like Keeler, were known to 
support federal actions during the Termination period could nonetheless support 
communal land ownership – Keeler’s tentative acceptance of land tax did not preclude his 
wanting to retain lands for his tribe as a community. As Keeler put it, “these lands should be 
retained for the use and benefit of the needy Cherokee people.”156 These discussions in the 
Inter-Tribal Council, along with statements in Klamath, Navajo and Mississippi Choctaw 
tribal councils in the Termination period detailed above, demonstrate the willingness of 
many tribes to retain communal land bases, not generally subscribing to the view of 
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Terminationists avoided discussions surrounding land, providing little indication in their 
speeches of the implications of trust status removal on Native land bases. Nevertheless, 
differing perceptions of land were central to the acceptance of, and opposition to, the 
policy. Although the press did not write about the transformative effects of individual land 
ownership in the Termination period, the strongly negative stereotyping of reservation 
lands in the news media reveals persistent underlying attitudes from previous centuries. As 
reservations continued to be depicted as “primitive” and “unmodern” in the 1960s, even 
alongside instances of Native voices calling for the retention of lands in Indian ownership, it 
is evident that such attitudes were not significantly altered in the Termination period. 
Rather the idea that communal land ownership encouraged dependency maintained a 
deep-rooted, hegemonic position in mainstream beliefs about Native peoples and lifestyles. 
Since the benefits of “modern” individual land ownership were subconsciously accepted by 
the public, Native proponents of alternate models of society were excluded from the 
discussion. The press thus both reflected and helped to maintain predominant views of 
reservations, which facilitated support for the ‘freedom’ that Termination claimed to offer. 
Evidently, some members of federally recognised tribes also subscribed to these views 
of tribal lands, like Klamath Wade Crawford and Oklahoma Choctaw Harry Belvin. While the 
motivations of these two men slightly differed, with Crawford wanting to instigate 
wholesale assimilation while Belvin saw this as having largely already occurred, both shared 
a family history of economic success according to mainstream American ideals of individual 
enterprise. As a result, they viewed economic development as unfeasible – in Crawford’s 
case even morally questionable – whilst tribal lands were held communally. The Klamath 
tribe of course was eventually terminated to disastrous effect, while the Oklahoma 





actions from within the ranks of their own tribal membership, demonstrating that very few 
shared their belief in the need for full assimilation into the mainstream.  
Furthermore, reading into the language used by tribal members within the historical and 
cultural context of each tribe reveals additional layers of interpretation, as the Mississippi 
Choctaw calls for “individual land ownership” show. While some tribal members spoke 
enthusiastically about individual land holdings, this was due to the specific historical 
context of their 1864 Treaty. Discussions of land in the often brief and abbreviated minutes 
furthermore indicate that tribal members supported individual ownership in order to 
maintain lands with the tribe, and particularly in the 1960s the retention and regaining of 
lands in tribal ownership gained prominence. This is an aspect federal supporters of 
Termination had overlooked, with BIA employees in Mississippi instead interpreting this as 
evidence of Choctaw support for assimilation. Similarly, before PL 587 was passed Klamath 
tribal members spoke about land in order to resist BIA paternalism – statements which out 
of context could be interpreted as support for the removal of trust status.  
 Native discussions of their lands in the Termination era, whether limited stretches of 
ancestral homelands or federally selected areas, thus complicate simplistic 
characterisations of tribal land ownership as inherently unorganised, ‘primitive’ spaces that 
are always communal. While representatives of tribes like the Klamath and Navajo 
supported retaining reservation lands in communal ownership due to spiritual and cultural 
connections to it, they did not view this system as restricting economic development 
programmes. The Navajo, indeed, successfully drew on 1960s federal economic funding to 
cultivate industrial development to further the self-determination of the tribe as a 
community. The 1960s move of federal policy rhetoric towards gradual assimilation over 





ownership could be more freely discussed, meaning the determination to maintain tribal 
communities and lifestyles could be more vocally expressed. 
Homogenous, simplistic narratives of reservations as ‘barren’, ‘deprived’ spaces in public 
discussions of Indian affairs thus obscured the real variety of land usage among Native 
individuals and groups, and differing solutions for resource development and ownership 
developed by tribes in accordance with their specific historic and cultural context. As these 
varied cases demonstrate, enthusiasm for economic expansion and improved living 
standards – even through the acceptance of some individual land ownership – did not 
preclude the wish to maintain a tribal community and identity, to which a land base in 





Conclusion: The Significance of Language in American Indian 
Policy 
 
“The goal toward which I propose to lead the Navajo people is the goal of all 
true Americans, is to a time when the free development of each individual is 
the condition for the free development of all men – a government which 
respects the equal dignity of every human being as a child of the same 
Heavenly Father, a government in which all citizens have the same rights 
before the law, but more than that, rights which the law cannot take away, 
and responsibilities, too, in proportion to their gifts and achievements. […] I 
shall never voluntarily surrender the ancient sovereignty of the Navajo people, 
(applause) or barter it away bit by bit, to private interests or other 
governments; but I will restrict the power of the Navajo government toward 
the Navajo people. (applause)”1 
- Raymond Nakai, Navajo Tribal Chairman, 
1963 
The strength of Termination was in the vague and malleable language of “freedom”, 
“citizenship” and “responsibilities”, appealing both to the non-Native mainstream 
population and the members of American Indian tribes. Though tribal members, federal 
officials, journalists and the general public all used the same terms and similar language in 
speaking about American Indian policy, these key concepts were interpreted in vastly 
varying ways. As Navajo Tribal Chairman Raymond Nakai’s inaugural speech demonstrates, 
Native leaders could both aim for sovereignty and self-determination and use terms like 
“freedom” and “responsibilities” that were heavily employed by Terminationists like Myer 
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and Watkins. Nakai embedded these terms with meanings significant to the Navajo, 
speaking of the freedom of tribal members to remain Navajo and his own responsibility to 
his tribal nation. This speech encapsulates the significance of language and interpretation in 
dealing with American Indian policy, a system which inherently involves cross-cultural 
communication and so easily lends itself to obscurities and misunderstanding. 
To date, the significance of the language of Indian policy has been overlooked. Scholars 
have justifiably highlighted the global historical context in which Termination policy was 
adopted – it is clear in tribal council minutes that American Indian war veterans valued their 
military participation and felt connected to the nation-state as a result, identifying 
themselves and their tribes as “American”. Equally, that the Cold War context fostered 
federal endorsement of Termination is evident in press writing referring to the need for an 
“American Indian Point Four” programme. Furthermore, just as Daniel Cobb has found that 
pan-tribal Native activist organisations played on Cold War rhetoric to attract support, 
tribal council members on a local level also aggressively dissociated their tribes from Soviet 
influence and denounced communism.2 WWII and the Cold War thus undoubtedly 
influenced the ways in which American Indian policy was discussed, both by Natives and 
non-Natives.  
These contexts certainly enlighten our understanding of the reasons why Termination 
was adopted in the specific period of the early 1950s – but an undue focus on these has 
also obscured the historical understanding of how the policy developed from the post-war 
era until repudiated by Nixon in 1970. Termination was not accepted simply because of a 
fear of the spread of Communism or a public celebration of Native military effort, even 
though these may have influenced some discussions. In fact, the examination of the press 
presented in this thesis found little evidence of either factor being prominently discussed in 
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relation to Native Americans or federal Indian policy in the 1950s or 1960s. Equally, the 
personal motivations of federal officials like Senator Watkins or Congressman Berry, as 
identified in tribal case studies by R. Warren Metcalf and Edward Charles Valandra, do not 
sufficiently explain why the general public accepted and even applauded the federal policy 
of Termination.3 
Laurie Arnold has written frankly about the challenges she faced in writing the history of 
attempts to terminate her tribe, stating: “I did not conduct any oral histories for this 
research, because termination is relatively recent and still painful.”4 That Arnold was not 
allowed access to the Colville tribal archive despite her enrolment further attests to the 
taboo nature of Termination history, and the trauma the policy caused for tribes that were 
faced with it. These strong reactions against discussing Termination are the result of too 
narrow a historiographical focus, with most scholarship almost exclusively documenting the 
legislative history of withdrawal and the problems it caused. Asking why Native individuals 
or groups may have supported Termination sets an accusatory framework, placing blame 
for the acceptance of withdrawal with tribal members. Instead focus needs to be turned to 
how the language of Termination was interpreted, both by Native peoples and non-Natives.  
Examining Termination from this angle draws attention to federal officials who wilfully 
employed vague language in discussing Termination, whether to mislead tribal members or 
to conceal their own lack of knowledge on the subject. Support for the central concepts of 
Termination – “citizenship”, “freedom” and “equality” – did not mean that tribal members 
supported the withdrawal of their legal status and special services provided to them as a 
result of that status. Examining language also demonstrates the resonance of 
Terminationist rhetoric with the mainstream public, and their willingness to support 
assimilation. In studying the history of federal-Indian relations more attention must be paid 
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to the role interpretation and response plays in federal American Indian policy, to highlight 
the discrepancies in Native experience and mainstream views.  
It is clear from an examination of the 1950s and 1960s press that while Termination was 
perhaps not a popular topic in news reporting, the general public was made aware of the 
broad goals and aims of the policy, though not much attention was paid to legislative 
specifics and tribal Termination Acts. Comparing press discussions of Termination to federal 
officials’ presentations of the policy to tribal councils, it is also clear that withdrawal was 
more openly discussed in the press than in tribal councils, as is evidenced by the 1953 
Washington Post report on federal plans to eliminate BIA functions and services.5  The press 
thus explicitly referred to the removal of federal trust status whereas discussions with 
tribes more commonly focused on vague notions of “freedom” for tribes through the 
adoption of new federal policy. In some cases federal officials even intentionally misled 
tribal councils about the implications of the policy, as in the case of Commissioner Myer 
telling the Navajo council that he did not wish to “liquidate Indian reservations”, whilst also 
informing the Five “Civilized” Tribes Inter-Tribal Council that there would “be no Indian 
service one day”.6  
This discrepancy reflects the local variations in BIA interactions with tribes, showing that 
officials did view tribes differently, as the existence of Zimmerman’s List indicate:  the 
representatives of the Five Tribes most commonly addressed as equals, while the 
Mississippi Choctaw were consistently spoken to in a patronising or demeaning manner, 
despite both councils being administered by the same local BIA Area Office in Muskogee 
Oklahoma. Despite variable levels of respect in these interactions, however, the BIA usually 
offered Native tribal councils only vague indications of federal Indian policy and little 
detailed information on legislative changes. Specifics on Termination legislation was instead 
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usually gained through the initiative of tribal council members, contact with Native activist 
organisations, or through a tribal attorney – not federal sources. 
As a result of the more open press discussions of Termination, opposition to it did 
appear in the print media, but – as shown in Chapter Two – this focused largely on specific 
details, like Myer’s Commissionership, the timing of specific tribal Termination Acts, and PL 
280’s lack of a consent clause, rather than the policy of federal withdrawal as a whole. Even 
the writings and statements of prominent non-Native rights activists like La Farge and 
Collier did not publicly protest the ultimate goal of terminating trust status. This is largely 
because the press, though perhaps including some additional details of how the policy 
would work in practice, generally accepted or uncritically reported the statements of 
federal authorities, who claimed that Termination would lead to “full American citizenship” 
or greater “freedoms” for tribes. The language of Termination, in employing such 
unquestionably positive concepts, was difficult to oppose – critics of the policy could easily 
be labelled as “anti-American” or supporting continued “paternalism”. 
However, Terminationist language being both vague and positive does not sufficiently 
explain why the policy continued into the 1960s. The claim that Termination effectively 
ended in the late 1950s presents the withdrawal of Northern Ponca federal status in 1966 
and the near-miss situation of the Oklahoma Choctaw in 1970 as unfortunate aberrations 
rather than evidence of the continued federal effort to eradicate legal Indian status in the 
United States. As 1960s press representations of American Indian policy shows, fast-paced 
withdrawal was no longer widely publicly advocated, but the ultimate goal of assimilating 
the Native population into the American “melting pot” had not dissipated. As the Post 
wrote in a 1966 editorial, “Termination, a goal laid down by Congress, is a frightening word 





become integrated into their respective states.”7 The language of Termination shifted 
toward emphasising “economic development” rather than “full citizenship” and “freedom”, 
but the end goal of eventually eradicating Native trust status remained, just at a slower 
pace. 
The general public, then, was made aware of Termination and the hegemonic belief that 
assimilation was the solution to the “Indian problem” prevailed throughout the period. In 
contrast, tribes were generally dependent on their own efforts to keep themselves 
informed on policy developments, and to interpret legislation like HCR 108 and PL 280, as 
well as the general statements which federal officials made with regard to Termination. The 
process of linguistic subversion in the English language writings of early twentieth century 
boarding school students, termed “writing Indian” by Katanski, provides a useful model for 
considering discussions within tribal council meetings as a space both allowing intra-tribal 
discussion and mediated by the BIA.8 This thesis has demonstrated that such subversion is 
not restricted to written expression. In mid-twentieth century tribal council meetings, 
members of various tribal councils, including the Navajo, Five Tribes and Mississippi 
Choctaw, were “speaking Indian”, verbally encoding the language of Termination with 
meanings relevant to their experience.  
Reading tribal council minutes with an awareness of the cultural context of each tribe 
highlights the ability of council representatives to “speak Indian”, revealing nuanced layers 
of communication. While tribal members spoke to their councils and federal officials in the 
language of Termination, they did not necessarily advocate full cultural assimilation. This 
process of subverting concepts introduced by federal officials was particularly prominent in 
the early 1950s, in the years leading up to and immediately following the passing of 
Termination legislation, before the trust status of any tribes had been withdrawn. Though 
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Mississippi Choctaw Chairman Joe Chitto in 1953 called for “individual land ownership 
anyway [sic] we can get it”, acknowledging his lifelong opposition of federal paternalism 
demonstrates that his conception of individual land ownership differed from the tribal 
dissolution envisaged by Terminationists like Watkins.9 In the same year, Navajo 
representative Frank Bradley used the idea of Navajos as being “lesser Americans” to 
criticise poor living standards on the reservation.10 Though the BIA considered both tribes 
“predominantly Indian” and poorly educated, the agency of tribal members is evident in 
these processes of negotiating meaning, harnessing federal terminology to advocate 
improved conditions and self-determination for their tribes.  
Neither did the representatives of the Five Tribes espouse Terminationist language 
uncritically, but also integrated their own meanings into the language of HCR 108 – despite 
being presented as more ‘acculturated’ into mainstream America than the Mississippi 
Choctaw or Navajo tribes. Though working within a system modelled on non-indigenous, 
Euro-American parliamentary governments, including both communally-held and allotted 
lands, the representatives of the Inter-Tribal Council generally worked within the structures 
imposed on them to protect their Native cultures and identities. This is demonstrated by 
the Constitution and Bylaws accepted in March 1954, which included protection of “rights 
and benefits” under United States and Oklahoma law, but also emphasised educating the 
mainstream public to help “preserve Indian cultural values”.11  Rather than explicitly 
opposing Termination in this early period, these tribes identified ways in which the policy 
could further economic development and thus work to their advantage in seeking greater 
tribal self-determination.  While the Inter-Tribal Council was perhaps more skilled in 
navigating the BIA tribal government framework without non-Native legal assistance than 
the Mississippi Choctaw and Navajo were, the fact that each of these tribes actively 
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engaged with the language of Termination demonstrates the unsuitability of the BIA’s 
classification of tribes in its withdrawal plan. This supports the contention that 
Zimmerman’s List and BIA estimations of levels of “acculturation” were largely arbitrary. 
The Klamath case, and the ways in which Termination was discussed within their tribal 
council meetings, further illustrates the malleability of the language of withdrawal in the 
early 1950s. As detailed in Chapter One, the BIA played little role in communicating with 
the tribe about HCR 108 and PL 280, and refused clear interpretations of the Klamath 
Termination Act even when directly requested by Klamath tribal members. The minutes of 
the Klamath General Council – until the removal of its status as a BIA recognised tribal 
government – reveal a persistent confusion among the tribe about what Termination would 
entail and how it would be carried out. These also show that once the ways in which the 
policy would be implemented in practice became clear, it was indeed vehemently opposed, 
as is evident from statements by Boyd Jackson, Dorothy McAnulty and unnamed tribal 
members in speaking of their reservation as “home”. 
 Evidence from the Klamath Tribal Council minutes unequivocally shows that though a 
faction of the tribe did support relinquishing trust status, Termination was not voluntary – 
despite Myer’s and Watkins’ claims to the contrary. Federal officials consistently told tribal 
members that they did not ultimately have a say in how the policy would be carried out, 
though they were invited to comment on it. Holding no veto power, all tribal members 
could do was vocally oppose Termination or at least try to negotiate changes to the policy 
that would cause the least destruction to their community. That the Termination of 
Klamath trust status was eventually pushed back to 1961 – but not wholly repealed – 
indicates that Congress recognised that the process was problematic, but refused to 
abandon the policy outright, despite the repeated requests of the tribal council and their 





out not due to a lack of opposition or understanding, but the unwillingness of Congress to 
back out of its set plan of assimilation. The Klamath case, therefore, supports Nicholas 
Peroff’s claims that Congress was determined to see its “experiment” of Termination 
through.12 
Cobb has effectively shown that pan-tribal Indian rights organisations like the NCAI 
systematically opposed Termination, resulting in action like the 1961 Chicago Conference 
and Declaration of Indian Purpose, and how these protest movements developed into more 
direct action like fish-ins later that decade.13 However, this thesis has demonstrated that 
little overt opposition to Termination policy as a whole occurred amongst tribes who were 
not faced with withdrawal in the short-term. As the aforementioned inaugural speech by 
Nakai shows, tribal council leaders and elites continued to speak of their tribes as on a 
trajectory of “development”. This rhetoric allowed tribes to benefit from government 
programmes aimed at preparing tribes for eventual assimilation, without endangering 
working relations with the bureau on which the legitimacy of these councils relied. Tribal 
leaders in the 1960s, like Nakai and Mississippi Choctaw chairman Phillip Martin, tended to 
continue to negotiate their powers within the frameworks set by federal policy. They could 
nevertheless more freely refer to the protection of tribal communities due to an increasing 
public awareness of destructive consequences of Termination for tribes like the Klamath. 
Indeed, in the 1960s both tribal and national Native activism began to vocally call for self-
determination – and even sovereignty. 
Representatives of tribes that were not faced with Termination in the short-term, thus, 
displayed remarkable agency and ability in adopting and harnessing the language of 
Termination to further their own goals and efforts, while the Klamath situation forced tribal 
members vociferously to oppose the policy. In contrast, interpretations of Terminationist 
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language within mainstream public discussions were far more singular, due to the 
hegemonic beliefs about Native Americans that the general public retained. To borrow 
Thomas Farrell’s term, the non-Native mainstream public held a “social knowledge” about 
Natives: that they inhabited a supposedly “lower plane of development”, resided on 
“oppressive” and “barren” reservations, and were destined to “progress” to the level of 
“civilized”, capitalist mainstream America.14 This formed a cultural understanding of the 
terms “freedom”, “citizenship”, and “land ownership” that was not a product of the mid-
twentieth century, but a long-standing Euro-centric tradition with roots as far back as the 
colonial era.   
These findings suggest a U.S. parallel to the continuing exclusion and marginalisation of 
First Nations in the Canadian press, as identified by historians Mark Anderson and Carmen 
Robertson.15 Indeed, the U.S. national news media in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly 
when not writing explicitly about federal Indian policy, presented the Native population as 
destitute, “exotic” or even racially inferior “Others”. Native voices were consistently 
marginalised in press writing about Indian affairs, with only the Christian Science Monitor 
demonstrating any significant attempt at inclusion. Furthermore, the limited incorporation 
of Native opinion did not eradicate the control over all press reporting on Native affairs 
exercised by non-Native writers, as demonstrated by the fact that a 1969 New York Times 
essay by NCAI president Vine Deloria Jr. was given the  controversial headline of ‘The War 
Between the Redskins and the Feds’.16 
The belief in assimilation through the break-up of Native legal status and communal 
landholdings that had been popular during the turn of the century evidently still held 
strong. The Cold War and WWII, therefore, did not create the ideology of assimilation, but 
                                                          
14
 Farrell, ‘Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory’, pp. 140–52. 
15
 Anderson and Robertson, Seeing Red, pp. 265–75. 
16





merely facilitated its re-emergence. Moreover, while Termination policy may have been 
presented more openly and with more detail to the general public than to tribal councils, 
little understanding of the actual legal status of Native Americans could be found in the 
national press. Support for Natives becoming “full American citizens” was predicated on the 
lack of public awareness and understanding of the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act and tribal 
treaty rights. Equally, little understanding of the realities of Native cultures and experiences 
was presented, amongst the portrayals of the indigenous population as a homogenous, 
‘desolate’ mass. 
The withdrawal of federal trust status, thus, continued to be an ultimate, eventual goal 
until explicitly repudiated by Nixon’s 1970 Special Message, which stated:  
“[…] the special relationship between the Indian tribes and the Federal 
government which arises from these agreements continues to carry immense 
moral and legal force. To terminate this relationship would be no more 
appropriate than to terminate the citizenship rights of any other American.”17 
From the late 1940s until the release of Nixon’s Message, no public statements altogether 
opposing Termination appeared in the national press. Tribal council discussions had by this 
point, as Nakai’s speech attests, spoken of self-determination and sovereignty at least since 
the beginning of the decade. Unfortunately the Major Council Meetings of American Indian 
Tribes collection, gathered from BIA records, does not contain minutes of meetings 
throughout the entirety of the 1960s – ending for the Klamath in 1960, a year before their 
final Termination date – so it is difficult to draw a comparison of the development of 
language throughout this period. What is available for the Navajo and Mississippi Choctaw 
tribes, as well as the Inter-Tribal Council, indicate a more vocal discussion of tribal cultures 
and the effort to revitalise and enhance their communities as tribal nations. 
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Nixon’s Special Message, however, did not mark the death of assimilation, or have any 
long-lasting effect on mainstream non-Native views of American Indians. Despite the 
scholarly acceptance of Termination as a disaster, the policy has evaded public memory and 
is not widely acknowledged. Rather, statements made in the hearings of the House 
Subcommittee on Indian Affairs have recently cited the termination of federal trust status 
as a natural progression of Indian policy, implying that later developments toward self-
determination legislation were aberrations in progress toward a congressional goal. On 22 
May 2015, attorney Donald Mitchell gave lengthy testimony opposing the Interior 
Department’s right to grant federal recognition to Native tribes, stating that:  
“[…] in 1953 the 83rd Congress, without a single dissenting vote, passed House 
Concurrent Resolution No. 108 – the so-called ‘termination resolution’ […]. The 
history of Congress’s consistent Indian policy set out above is relevant to this 
Subcommittee’s consideration of the tribal recognition issue in the present day 
because it is evidence that into the 1970s Congress had no interest in creating 
new ‘federally recognised tribes’ by enacting statutes that would confer that 
legal status on new groups composed of individuals of varying degrees of 
Native American descent who did not reside within the boundaries of an 
existing reservation.”18 
As Mitchell’s testimony and the support his ideas received from committee chairman 
Don Young (R-Alaska) demonstrate, tribes’ right to federal recognition continues to be 
contested in Congressional circles. Mitchell, who briefly outlined the history of U.S. Indian 
Affairs since Andrew Jackson’s Indian Removals, painted a picture of consistent assimilation 
policy until the 1970s, claiming that an illegitimate shift of policy-making from Congress to 
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the Interior Department was the reason for change toward self-determination. Similarly, 
the status of the indigenous populations in Scandinavia and Australia has come under 
question, marking what may be a global shift in indigenous affairs toward assimilation over 
state recognition.19 While new Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has vowed to 
protect the rights of First Nations, it remains to be seen how his government intends to 
fulfil these promises, and whether other countries will follow suit.20 
These developments prove that assimilationist policies remain insufficiently recognised 
and studied, considered as isolated cases – or natural progressions – in a long history of 
indigenous-European contact. Rather, scholarly attention needs to be drawn to continuities 
in Indian affairs, and recognition of the continually re-emerging push to alter and remove 
indigenous status. By re-examining the sources available and including Native voices in 
these histories, the extent of paternalism inherent in these policies, and the reasons for 
success in assimilation in the past can be more fully comprehended. Only by including 
Native peoples actively into public discussions of their own affairs, and ending their 
marginalisation in mainstream media, can the dangers of assimilation be fully eradicated.
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